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Abstract 
RISK ANALYSIS OF SMALLHOLDER FARMERS IN CENTRAL AND 
NORTH-EAST THAILAND 
 
by 
Satit Aditto 
 
Agriculture contributes approximately nine per cent to both of Thailand‟s GDP and exports. 
Thai farmers are basically smallholders and large numbers of them live in rural areas and 
below the poverty line. Pervasive and complicating risks cause a farmer‟s income to fluctuate 
every year. The Thai government has tried to strengthen and enhance farmers‟ ability to cope 
with risk and stabilize their farm income. These issues have been widely discussed in the 10
th
 
National Economic and Social Development Plan (2007-2011). The development of 
appropriate solutions to deal with risks has been impeded due to the lack of empirical studies 
on farmers‟ responses to risk and the impacts of risk at the farm level in Thailand. 
This study investigates the farmers‟ perceptions of risk and risk management strategies and 
examines whether the farmers‟ characteristics can be influenced by those perceptions. The 
farmers‟ risk aversion is also elicited using the equally likely certainty equivalent approach 
and four different utility functions are employed to analyse their performances in terms of risk 
preference classification. Stochastic efficiency with respect to a function (SERF) is applied to 
determine the risk efficient farming systems for the farmers in central and north-east regions 
of Thailand. The data for this study were obtained from a face-to-face survey of central and 
north-east region farmers together with the historical data of prices and yields at the 
provincial level (1998-2008) from the Office of Agricultural Economics for each individual 
crop and livestock in the study areas. 
The results indicate that marketing risks associated with the unexpected variability of input 
and product prices are considered as important sources of risk among the farmers in both 
regions. The production strategy related to the purchase of farm machinery to replace labour 
is perceived as an important strategy to manage risk by the central region farmers, whereas 
the north-east region farmers considered storing feed and/or seed reserves as an important 
 iii 
strategy. The results also show that some farm and farmers‟ characteristics (e.g. gender, 
education, off-farm work, farm size and farm location) significantly impact the risk 
perceptions of the farmers in both regions. The negative exponential utility function is 
performed to describe the farmers‟ risk behaviour. This functional form classified all sampled 
farmers in both regions as risk averse. 
The SERF results show that maize followed by sorghum (CRFP4) is the most risk efficient 
farming system for the extremely risk averse rain-fed farmers in the central region. Intensive 
planting of wet rice and dry rice cultivation (CIFP1) is preferred by the extremely risk averse 
central region irrigated farmers. In addition, wet rice and cassava with raising small herd of 
cattle (NRFP5) is the most economically viable farming system for the extremely risk averse 
rain-fed farmers in the north-east region, while two rice crops with raising cattle (NIFP3) is 
preferred by the extremely risk averse north-east irrigated farmers.   
Keywords: risk, stochastic efficiency, farm, uncertainty, Thailand 
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     Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
Risk is one of the most important factors that affect a person‟s welfare and it is commonly 
associated with the probability of unexpected loss or injury (Dallas, 2006; Harwood, Heifner, 
Coble, Perry, & Somwaru, 1999). Conversely, risk is widely viewed as a complicated factor 
that influences decision making under uncertain conditions that may affect outcomes in the 
future (Hardaker, Huirne, Anderson, & Lien, 2004; McCarl & Spreen, 1996).  
There are different definitions of risk and how it is determined. Levy (2006, p. 1) stated that 
“people may have a feel as to what risk means, but if asked how to measure it, there would be 
a little consensus”. Knight (1921) cited by Rose (2001) emphasized the sharp distinction 
between risk and uncertainty. Risk can be defined as the possible outcomes and the 
probability distribution of each outcome are known and measurable. In contrast, uncertainty 
exists when the probability of future outcomes is unknown. However, some economists have 
argued that the terms risk or uncertainty can be used interchangeably (Dillon & Anderson, 
1990; Roumasset, 1976). Risk occurs when the outcome of an operation cannot be forecast 
with certainty but each outcome can be explained by the subjective probabilities. The authors 
also argued that risk can be defined as variability of outcomes.  
In addition, Kaplan and Garrick (1981) and Kaplan (1997) developed the concept of “Triplets 
Idea” to define risk in quantitative terms. The definition of risk can be explained to answer 
three questions; “What can happen?”, “How likely is it?” and “What are the consequences?” 
The term risk is expressed as follows (Kaplan, 1997):  
          ciiiii XPPSR })(),(,{   Ni ,...,2,1      (1.1)   
Where:  
R  is the risk definition, 
iS  is the risk scenario,  
)( iiP   is the probability and 
)( ii XP  is the outcome.  
Similarly, McCarl and Spreen (1996, pp. 14-11) argued that “risk considerations are usually 
incorporated assuming that the parameter probability distribution is known with certainty”. 
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McConnell and Dillon (1997) identified uncertainty as a situation when the decision maker 
has imperfect knowledge. The authors showed how ambiguous outcomes to risk might be 
envisioned with the probability distribution of each outcome. Hardaker (2000) attempted to 
clarify the confusion in risk definitions by suggesting three common meanings of risk, which 
include “the chance of bad outcome”, “the variability of outcomes” and “the uncertainty of 
outcomes”. Hardaker (2000) argued that risk analysts should examine the total distribution of 
consequences, whether bad or good, by providing probabilities to prevent confusion when 
evaluating risk.  
Risk in agriculture is pervasive and complex, especially in agricultural production, which can 
be termed a risky enterprise (Hardaker, Huirne, et al., 2004; Hazell & Norton, 1986). Farmers 
confront a variety of yields, unstable output and input prices and radical changes in 
production technology as inherent in their farming operations. These affect the fluctuation in 
farm profitability from season to season and from one year to another (Dunn, 2002; Hossain, 
Mustapha, & Chen, 2002). The sources of risk and level of its severity can vary according to 
farming systems, geographic location, weather conditions, supporting government policies 
and farm types. Risk is a major concern in developing countries where farmers have 
imperfect information to forecast things such as farm input prices, product prices, and 
weather conditions, that might impact the farms in the future (Hazell & Norton, 1986; Nyikal 
& Kosura, 2005; Pannell, Malcolm, & Kingwell, 2000).  
Sources of risk in agriculture are classified into business risk and financial risk (Hardaker, 
Huirne, et al., 2004; Harwood et al., 1999). Business risks directly affect the profitability of 
the farms (Hardaker, Huirne, et al., 2004). These risks can be categorized as production or 
yield risk and are defined as the uncontrollable factors that influence the amount and quality 
of farm production, including unpredictable weather, drought, diseases and insects (Dillon & 
Anderson, 1990; Hardaker, Huirne, et al., 2004). These factors can vary depending on the 
geographical area where each farm is located (Pellegrino, 1999). Marketing or price risk is 
described as the fluctuation in the price of farm inputs and outputs affected by demand and 
supply in the competitive markets. These include unpredictability of agricultural supply, the 
changes in consumer consumption behaviour and incomes, international trade barriers, 
instability of currency exchange rates and changes in accessibility and price of farm inputs 
(Hardaker, Huirne, et al., 2004; Shadbolt & Martin, 2005). Institution or policy and legal risk 
is associated with changes in government policies, new laws and regulations and supporting 
government programmes that affect farm production as well as farm contractual mechanisms. 
For example, new restrictions regarding the use of pesticides or drugs on farms that will 
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increase cost of production, income taxes, credit policy and forward contracts (Hardaker, 
Huirne, et al., 2004; Shadbolt & Martin, 2005). Farmers may be subject to human or personal 
risk when farm owners face major life crises or poor health that affects the efficiency of farm 
management including the availability and reliability of farm labour (Hardaker, Huirne, et al., 
2004; Pellegrino, 1999). Technological risk is described as the adoption of new techniques in 
agricultural production that lead to higher farm profitability but also higher risk if the new 
techniques are ineffective (Moschini & Hennessy, 2001; Shadbolt & Martin, 2005). On the 
other hand, financial risk occurs when farmers borrow to finance farm activities. In other 
words, financial risk can be described as the variability of net farm income to the farmers‟ 
equity, often affected by leverage. Farmers face variations in interest rates on borrowed 
funds, inadequacy of cash flow for debt payments and changes in credit terms and conditions; 
these factors also create considerable financial risk (Narayan, 1990; Shadbolt & Martin, 
2005). 
Awareness of risk in global agriculture has occurred in many countries. Global-warming, 
caused by the radical changeability in weather patterns, El Nino, and other natural disasters, 
including drought and floods, are recognized as major risk factors. These factors affect world 
production of farm products, particularly in the rain-fed production areas found in developing 
countries, which results in fluctuation of prices of the products (Adesina & Ouattara, 2000; 
Harris, Benson, & Rosson, 1999; International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis 
[IIASA], 2002). Other global agricultural risk factors include changes in consumer 
consciousness that directly influence the demand for farm products and changes in 
government policies that affect the cost of production (Harris et al., 1999). The types and 
severity of risks that farmers face differ from place to place. Incorporating and understanding 
the effects of risk at the farm level will benefit policy makers who develop the appropriate 
strategies that can help farmers survive the numerous risks they confront. 
For several decades, agricultural production in Thailand has faced many problems including 
risk such as variability in yields, product-prices and cost of inputs (Katikarn, 1981; 
Patamakitsakul, 2006; Sayaphan, 2001). Thai farmers normally grow their crops in rain-fed 
conditions due to poor irrigation systems (Kermel-Torrès, 2004). The annual rainfall 
fluctuates widely each year, pests, diseases and poor soil fertility affect the yields of cash 
crops in Thailand (see Table 1.1). In addition, agricultural commodity prices rise and fall 
annually depending on the demand and supply in both local and international markets, which 
are out of the farmer‟s control (see Table 1.2). Similarly, the costs of farm inputs also vary 
each year and may negatively affect farm production costs. 
   4 
Table 1.1 Annual average yields and coefficients of variation (CV) for important crops 
of Thailand, 1998-2006                 
Product 
 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 CV
 a 
Rice 397 388 418 419 432 464 457 474 467 7.30 
Cassava 2,389 2,479 2,697 2,805 2,731 3,087 3,244 2,749 3,375 11.72 
Maize 535 568 588 598 590 617 619 613 633 5.05 
Rubber 224 229 249 268 271 286 290 282 282 9.37 
Sugarcane 9,058 8,776 9,466 9,042 9,496 10,429 9,269 7,434 7,899 9.87 
Soybeans 234 227 232 236 238 246 238 250 250 3.37 
a
 100
SD
CV
X
 
  
 
 where SD  = Standard deviation and X  = Arithmetic mean 
Unit: kilograms per rai 
1 rai = 0.16 ha 
Source: Office of Agricultural Economics (2009)           
Table 1.2 Annual average prices at farm level and CV for important crops of Thailand, 
1998-2006                        
Product 
 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 CV
 a
 
Rice 5.32 4.73 4.35 4.82 5.05 5.57 6.65 6.92 6.83 17.53 
Cassava 1.31 0.91 0.63 0.69 1.05 0.93 0.80 1.33 1.29 27.04 
Maize 3.70 4.31 3.82 3.95 4.14 4.43 4.59 4.78 5.45 12.50 
Rubber 22.73 18.12 21.53 20.52 27.69 37.26 44.13 53.57 66.24 48.81 
Sugarcane 0.48 0.50 0.44 0.51 0.43 0.47 0.37 0.52 0.69 18.02 
Soybeans 9.45 8.84 9.22 9.38 10.40 10.79 10.88 10.15 10.72 7.71 
a
 100
SD
CV
X
 
  
 
 where SD  = Standard deviation and X  = Arithmetic mean 
Unit: baht per kilogram 
1 US$ = 35 baht 
Source: Office of Agricultural Economics (2009)  
Large numbers of farmers in rural Thailand still live below the poverty line. In 2004, Thai 
farm households earned an average income of 115,875 baht/year (US$ 3,310); only 38 per 
cent or 43,883 baht/year (US$ 1,254) is from farm activities (Office of Agricultural 
Economics [OAE], 2009). Thai farmers are basically smallholders and the national farm size 
is approximately 7.72 acres (see Table 1.3) (National Statistical Office of Thailand [NSO], 
2006). Most farmers have limited diversification potential, face resource problems, 
environmental variability, lack of soil fertility and water shortages especially smallholder 
farmers in the north-east region (Lovelace, Subhadhira, & Simaraks, 1988). In addition, 
smallholder farmers in Thailand also face various sources of risk that vary both seasonally 
and annually. These risks affect the variability of farm profitability and farm household 
income. 
 
   5 
Table 1.3 Farming area and average farm size categories by Thai region in 2003  
Region Farming area  Number of holding Average farm size 
(acre) Area (acre) % Person % 
Central 8,604,859 19.2 815,962 15.0 9.56 
North 9,982,355 22.3 1,286,360 23.6 7.32 
North-east 20,281,709 45.3 2,488,253 45.7 7.68 
South 5,910,872 13.2 853,335 7.3 6.68 
Whole Kingdom 44,779,795 100.0 5,792,522 100.0 7.72 
Source: National Statistical Office (2006) 
Agriculture contributes approximately 9 per cent to Thailand‟s GDP and 8.9 per cent to 
exports (Bank of Thailand [BOT], 2008; Ministry of Finance [MOF], 2008). Risk 
management strategies, such as hedging, crop insurance and contracting were discussed in the 
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 National Economic and Social Development Plan (2007-2011) designed to enhance 
farmers‟ ability to cope with risk (Patamakitsakul, 2006). Crop insurance scheme attempts to 
reduce the risk that Thai farmers confront. However, this scheme offers limited coverage for 
some major cash crops such as rice and maize, and the crop insurance is mostly based on the 
weather index. The Thai government has tried to encourage rice farmers to involve in the 
crop insurance scheme for the crop year 2011-2012. The premiums would be roughly 140 
baht per rai and the government will provide damage compensation around 1,400 baht per rai. 
This project aims to cover approximately 57 million rais in rice growing area (Theparat, 
2011). However, rice farmers and insurance companies have been slow to join the crop 
insurance scheme due to the lack of clear definitions in the scheme and rules regarding the 
criteria for evaluation of natural disasters (Asia Insurance Review, 2011).  
Knowledge of the character of risks that influence smallholder farmers is the key to 
developing appropriate solutions to deal with risks. However, empirical studies on farmers‟ 
responses to risks and how risk affects farmers‟ income, especially in rural Thailand are 
limited. Katikarn (1981) conducted a study using a quadratic programming model to test the 
hypothesis that farmers in central Thailand displayed risk-averse behaviour. The results 
showed farmers in the central region were risk averse. However, there are many limitations in 
the research that may have distorted the author‟s results. These include low estimated 
variation in yields, ignoring the capital constraints and focusing on only rice production. 
Phuphak (1993) investigated the optimal area for diversified mango production into lowland 
traditional rice farms in central Thailand to help farmer lower risk. Multi-period linear 
programming with the MOTAD risk form was applied in the author‟s study. The results 
showed suitable mango production areas vary and depended on the farmer‟s socioeconomic 
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situation; they were profitable for large and medium rice farms but not feasible for small rice 
farms. 
Research Problem 
Risk plays an important role in Thailand‟s agriculture and the risk environment has changed 
rapidly recently. Thai farmers experience unpredictable yields and input-output price 
variability. The pervasive pressure and complications of risk in Thailand agriculture has 
caused many small farm household incomes to fluctuate yearly.  
The purpose of this study is to examine the effects of risk on smallholder farmers‟ net farm 
income in the central and north-east regions of Thailand. The optimal risk efficient farming 
system under uncertainty is investigated for smallholder farmers in each region to achieve the 
maximum expected income with low variability, subject to the limitation of farm resources.  
The central and north-east regions differ in terms of resources, economic development and 
income distribution. The central region has a farming area of 8.61 million acres or 19.2 per 
cent of the total farming area. The average monthly income per farmer in this region is 3,711 
baht (see Table 1.4) (NSO, 2006). The central region is known as the „rice bowl of Thailand‟ 
and more than half of the country‟s irrigation systems are located in this region of wet-rice 
agriculture (Sirisup & Kammeier, 2003). In contrast, the north-east region is defined as the 
„poorest region‟ with a long dry season and an annual rainfall that fluctuates widely each year 
(Kermel-Torrès, 2004; Lovelace et al., 1988). Approximately 45 per cent of the total farming 
area in Thailand is located in this region. The average monthly income of the farmers in this 
region is 1,439 baht (NSO, 2006). 
Table 1.4 Average monthly income per person in Thailand in 2000, 2002 and 2004 
Region Agriculture Non-agriculture 
2000 2002 2004 2000 2002 2004 
Bangkok 3,618 4,731 4,626 7,754 8,631 8,262 
Central 2,490 2,829 3,711 4,117 4,496 4,900 
North 1,296 1,662 1,979 3,067 3,579 4,496 
North-east 955 746 1,439 2,768 2,944 2,646 
South 1,960 2,003 3,369 3,397 3,854 4,151 
Whole Kingdom 1,688 2,050 2,956 4,025 4,658 4,586 
Unit: baht/person/month 
1 US$ = 35 baht 
Source: National Statistical Office (2006)     
Several theoretical approaches have been developed to incorporate risk into farm decision 
making analysis (Dillon & Anderson, 1990; Hardaker, Huirne, et al., 2004; Hazell & Norton, 
1986; Moschini & Hennessy, 2001). The level of complexity and detail of each approach 
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depends on the level of interest and the availability of data (Adesina & Ouattara, 2000). 
Torkamani (2005, p. 140) summarized that those theoretical approaches varied from 
“optimization based on linear, non-linear and dynamic programming, to non-optimization 
such as risk efficient, Monte-Carlo programming to risk programming” with both embedded 
and non-embedded risk. 
In analysing risky alternatives on farms requires proper information, both probabilities of the 
outcomes and the farmers‟ preferences (Hardaker, Richardson, Lien, & Schumann, 2004; 
Lien, Stordal, Hardaker, & Asheim, 2007). Accordingly, the subjective expected utility 
hypothesis (SEU) is the most suitable theory for prescriptive assessment of risky alternatives 
(Hardaker, Richardson, et al., 2004).  
Lien et al.(2006, p. 393) defined the SEU theory as “a rational person will seek to make risky 
choices consistently with what they believe, as measured by their subjective probabilities, and 
with what they prefer, as evaluated via their utility functions for consequences”. In other 
words, the shape of the utility function reflects an individual‟s preference toward risk 
(Hardaker, Huirne, et al., 2004; Lien et al., 2006). However, the difficulties in evaluating and 
classifying farmers‟ attitudes toward risk have resulted inaccuracy of some of the agricultural 
risk analysis studies in the past (Hardaker, Huirne, et al., 2004). Stochastic dominance or 
efficiency criteria have been developed to help risk analysts avoid a specific single-value 
utility function (Hardaker, Richardson, et al., 2004). 
Stochastic efficiency with respect to a function (SERF) is the up-to-date method for ranking 
risky alternatives employed in this research. The SERF ranks the set of risky farming systems 
in terms of certainty equivalents (CE) over a range of risk aversion levels (Hardaker, Huirne, 
et al., 2004). Lau (2004, p. 41) argued that “CE is the amount of money a decision maker 
would be willing to pay for a fair bet versus a risk free alternative with the same mean 
return”. The CE can be converted to a monetary value by taking the inverse of the utility 
function (Hardaker, Richardson, et al., 2004). This method illustrates which risky alternative 
is preferred by farmers who are least risk-averse, moderately risk-averse, or extremely risk-
averse (Hardaker, Richardson, et al., 2004; Lien et al., 2006). Moreover, Lien et al.(2007, p. 
1586) argued that “SERF is more transparent, easier to implement, and has stronger 
discriminating power than conventional stochastic dominance with respect to a function 
(SDRF)”.  
SERF is used to compare the simulated empirical probability distributions of annual net farm 
revenue for smallholder farmers in central and north-east Thailand in this study. The SERF 
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has been used in previous studies, especially to rank risky alternatives on farm, see for 
example, Lien et al.(2006); Lien, Hardaker and Flaten (2007); Lien, Stordal et al.(2007); 
Pendell, Williams, Boyles, Rice and Nelson (2007). 
The SERF method is employed to evaluate and compare the set of risky farming systems in 
each study area to identify the best risk efficient farming system. The appropriate risk 
efficient farming system will help smallholder farmers to cope better with risks. The results 
from this research should guide Thailand‟s agricultural policy-makers in producing effective 
policies to sustain smallholder farmers‟ livelihoods. 
1.2 Research objectives 
The issue of risk analysis on farms in evaluating the optimal risk efficient farming system has 
been well reported in the agricultural economics literature. However, there is little published 
empirical evidence about risks at the farm level in Thailand‟s agriculture. This research 
examines the risk sources and the effects of risk on the net farm income of smallholder 
farmers in the central and north-east Thailand. The differences in environmental resources 
and economic development between these two regions are used to compare the results. 
The research objectives are to: 
1. provide an overview of the risk efficiency measurement literature which can 
explain the effect of risk on Thailand farming systems; 
2. identify and analyse the importance sources of  risk on farm and the uses of risk 
management strategies among smallholder farmers in central and north-east 
Thailand;  
3. estimate the risk preferences of the smallholder farmers in central and north-east 
Thailand;  
4. investigate the best alternative risk efficient farming system for smallholder 
farmers in central and north-east Thailand; and 
5.   provide policy implications from the findings. 
1.3 Contributions of the research 
The findings of this study can provide useful information to reinforce the empirical basis for 
risk analysis for Thai farmers. This research explores the currently important risk sources that 
confront smallholder farmers in the central and north-east regions and their risk management 
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strategies. The results will provide more accurate information regarding risk at the farm level 
to policy makers and researchers. 
Further, this research seeks to investigate the risk attitudes of the smallholder farmers in both 
regions. Risk preferences influence farmers‟ decision making on farms and can be used as a 
basis for farm risk analysis research. Therefore, this research finding would enhance the risk 
knowledge pertaining to Thai smallholder farmers‟ risk behaviour.  
Thailand‟s smallholder farmers have experienced pervasive complications of risks that 
caused farm income to fluctuate from year to year. Undeniably, farmers also prefer to 
maximize net farm income with low variability. However, smallholder farmers, especially in 
rural areas, have limited ability to choose appropriate alternative farming systems to stabilize 
their income. In the past, when comparing alternative farming systems most studies focused 
on the expected profitability and did not pay attention to differences in the riskiness of the 
farming systems (Lien, Hardaker, et al., 2007). It seems likely that the farmers‟ decision 
making on choices of alternative farming systems should account for the impact of risk. 
Therefore, another main contribution of this research relates to the evaluation of the most 
appropriate risk efficient farming system alternative using stochastic simulation within 
stochastic efficiency criteria. This risk efficient farming system would facilitate smallholder 
farmers in both regions to better cope with risk and improve their farm income.  
Overall, this research is expected to raise the awareness of risk on farms in policy makers. 
The better the understanding of the effects of risk at the farm level, the more appropriate will 
the policies be that are constructed. These policies would help farmers confront the numerous 
risks they deal with everyday. 
1.4 Structure of the research 
The rest of this thesis is structured as follows. Chapter Two provides a brief historical 
background of Thailand agricultural systems and the sources of risk that typically faced by 
farmers. Chapter Three reviews the literature on the expected utility theory, utility elicitation 
techniques and the risk efficiency approaches. Chapter Four discusses the research 
methodologies and survey procedures. Chapter Five presents the empirical results and 
discusses the findings of the perceptions of sources of risk and risk management strategies. 
The results of the stochastic risk efficiency analysis are discussed in Chapter Six.  Chapter 
Seven concludes the thesis with a summary of the main research findings, policy implications 
followed by the limitations of the research and recommendations for future study. 
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     Chapter 2 
Thailand Agriculture 
This chapter provides a brief historical background of Thailand agriculture, farming systems 
and the on-farm risks that Thai farmers typically face. The chapter is organized as follows. 
Section 2.1 discusses the general background of the agricultural sector in the Thai economy. 
The performance and problems of Thailand agriculture are discussed in Section 2.2. Section 
2.3 discusses the farming systems in Thailand. Section 2.4 discusses the sources of risk and 
risk management strategies that influence small scale farming.       
2.1 General background 
Thailand is similar to several other developing countries in that the country‟s economic 
development is based on agriculture. Over recent decades, agriculture has been the mainstay 
of the Thai economy. In 2007, the agricultural sector represented nearly 9 per cent of 
Thailand‟s gross domestic product (GDP) and around 8.9 per cent of exports (BOT, 2008; 
MOF, 2008). Agricultural exports are an important part of Thailand‟s GDP but the 
contribution has declined. Poapongsakorn, Anuchitworawong, and Mathrsuraruk (2006) 
argued that the agricultural sector is the largest sector in terms of the nation‟s primary 
workforce employment, the principal source of export earnings and GDP share. It also 
represents Thailand‟s rural livelihood.  
The value of Thailand‟s agricultural exports was estimated at 1,129.2 billion baht in 2007 
(OAE, 2008). As one of the world‟s major agricultural exporters, Thailand leads the world in 
the export of rice, cassava and natural rubber. In 2005, Thailand rice exports accounted for 
almost US$ 2.3 billion or 24.3 per cent of the world‟s total rice exports (Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations [FAO], 2008b). Thailand exports of cassava equalled 
almost US$ 0.56 billion or 70.4 per cent of the world‟s total cassava exports. In the global 
natural rubber market, Thailand was the top exporter among major exporters, such as 
Indonesia and Malaysia, with exports valued at nearly US$ 3.7 billion or 40.9 per cent of the 
world‟s total natural rubber export (see Table 2.1). In addition, Thailand is among the top 10 
exporters of sugar, poultry meat, frozen shrimps and pineapple.  
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Table 2.1 World’s Exports of Crops (selected countries), 2005         
Rice Value 
 
Share 
(%) 
Cassava Value Share 
(%) 
Natural 
Rubber 
Value Share 
(%) 
Thailand 2,327.66 24.31 Thailand 559.47 70.38 Thailand 3,704.22 40.88 
India 1,411.15 14.74 Vietnam 61.34 7.72 Indonesia 2,583.96 28.51 
Vietnam 1,407.23 14.70 Indonesia 44.84 5.64 Malaysia 1528.12 16.86 
USA 1,290.70 13.48 Costa Rica 43.92 5.53 Vietnam 244.52 2.70 
Pakistan 930.76 9.72 China 15.12 1.90 Cote d‟Ivore 200.12 2.21 
World 9,574.32 100.00  794.93 100.00  9,061.92 100.00 
Unit: million US$ 
Source: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (2008b) 
Thailand, the geographical heart of the Indo-Chinese peninsula, borders Laos to the north and 
north-east, Myanmar to the north and west, Cambodia to the south-east, and Malaysia to the 
south. The main feature of Thailand‟s physical structure is that it is divided into four natural 
regions (see Figure 2.1). The northern mountainous region comprises a series of north-south 
ridges and narrow valleys interspersed with long flat river basins. The central region is a low-
lying area that contains large alluvial plains surrounding the Choa Phraya River, the core 
river system of the country. This region is conducive to intensive cultivation. The north-east 
occupies nearly 45 per cent of the total area of the country comprising the wide river terraces 
of the Mekong River and its tributaries and the semi-arid Khorat Plateau. This region is 
generally characterized by low fertility soils and erratic rainfall. The south of the country 
consists of rolling and mountainous terrain with narrow coastal plains (Falvey, 2000; Kermel-
Torrès, 2004; Panusittikorn & Prato, 2001). 
The climate in Thailand is classified as tropical rainforest and tropical savanna with 
characteristically high temperatures and humidity. There are three main seasons in Thailand 
with no significant difference in temperature between seasons. The hot season is mid 
February to mid May, the rainy season is from mid May to mid October and the cool season 
is from mid October to mid February. The average temperature range of the country is 26-28 
°C in the cool season and 28-32 °C in the hot season (Falvey, 2000). Rainfall is dominated by 
monsoons and cyclones. The average annual rainfall ranges from 1,400 mm in the north-east 
to 2,700 mm in the south (Thai Meteorological Department [TMD], 2008). However, 
Thailand has experienced wide seasonal climatic fluctuations. Drought is one of the main 
critical crises in agricultural production. Each year, some cultivated areas are damage by 
uneven annual rainfall especially in the north-east region (Department of Agricultural 
Extension [DOAE], 2007). 
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Figure 2.1 Map of Thailand 
 
Source: United Nations (2008) 
With regard to land utilization, Thailand covers 321 million rais (51 million hectares); with 
the total cultivated area estimated at 131 million rais (about 41 per cent), the forests cover 
some of 105 million rais (about 33 per cent) and the rest is considered as non-agriculture area 
(see Table 2.2) (OAE, 2009). According to the 2003 National Agricultural Census, 52.3 per 
cent of the total arable area (about 59 million rais) is used for rice production, 19.1 per cent 
   13 
(about 22 million rais) for field crops, 11.7 per cent (about 13 million rais) for permanent 
crops and 8.6 per cent (about 10 million rais) for para rubber (NSO, 2006). 
Traditional crop production in Thailand is severely impacted by rainfall and flood water. The 
irrigation and drainage system in Thailand has been poorly developed (Falvey, 2000). The 
most important irrigation network development of the country is located in the Chao Phraya 
basin. During 1960s, large-scale multipurpose dams were constructed in the central plain 
under the water resource development schemes financially supported by the World Bank. The 
project was developed to generate hydroelectric power, expand the cultivated areas of 
lowland rice and supply water for the industrial sector. Conversely, the north-east faces water 
deficiency. The topography itself is inappropriate for large scale irrigation projects (Kermel-
Torrès, 2004; Lovelace et al., 1988). According to the Royal Irrigation Department statistics, 
in 2007, approximately 28 million rais or 21 per cent of the total arable land was categorized 
as irrigated. Approximately 41 per cent of the total irrigated area is found in the central area, 
22 per cent in the north-east, 18 per cent in the north and 10 per cent in the south (Royal 
Irrigation Department [RID], 2008).  
Table 2.2 Land utilization of Thailand, 1997-2005 
Year Total area  
(rai) 
Forest area  Arable area 
Area (rai) % Area (rai) % 
1997 320,696,888 81,441,164 25.39 131,107,608 40.88 
1998 320,696,888 81,076,428 25.28 130,393,525 40.66 
1999 320,696,888 80,610,219 25.13 131,341,384 40.95 
2000 320,696,888 100,638,200 31.38 131,195,913 40.91 
2001 320,696,888 106,319,188 33.15 131,059,974 40.87 
2002 320,696,888 106,319,188 33.15 130,892,013 40.81 
2003 320,696,888 106,319,188 33.15 130,682,027 40.75 
2004 320,696,888 104,744,313 32.66 130,480,283 40.69 
2005 320,696,888 104,744,313 32.66 130,275,993 40.62 
1 rai = 0.16 ha 
Source: Office of Agricultural Economics (2009)          
The population of the country in 2006 was estimated at 62.83 million and the population 
growth rate was 0.7 per cent (NSO, 2007). According to the 2000 Thailand Population 
Census, the population density is estimated at 120.6 persons per square kilometre. In 2006, 
almost 40 per cent of the Thai population lived in rural areas and was engaged in agriculture 
(see Table 2.3). There were approximately 5.785 million farm households (OAE, 2009). 
Thus, agriculture in Thailand is characterised by a large number of smallholder farmers. 
Since the 1990s, Thailand agriculture has faced low productivity and a shortage in the 
agricultural labour force because of the severe droughts and the wage gap between rural and 
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urban areas. This led to an increase in permanent and seasonal rural-to-urban migration 
(Fuglie, 2001; Thaiprasert, 2006). Employment in the agriculture sector fell from nearly 70 
per cent of the total labour force in 1980 to 51 per cent in 1998 (Thaiprasert, 2006). In 2006, 
43.3 per cent of the working population resided in agriculture and agro-industries (see Table 
2.3) (OAE, 2009).  
Table 2.3 Population and employment statistics of Thailand, 2002-2006            
Year Population Employment 
Total  Agriculture Non-
agriculture 
Total  Agriculture Non-
agriculture 
2002 62.79 25.72 
(40.9%) 
37.07 
(59.1%) 
34.60 16.57 
(47.9%) 
18.03 
(52.1%) 
2003 63.08 25.64 
(40.6%) 
37.44 
(59.4%) 
35.48 16.31 
(45.9%) 
19.17 
(54.1%) 
2004 61.97 25.53 
(41.2%) 
36.44 
(58.8%) 
36.01 15.29 
(42.5%) 
20.71 
(57.5%) 
2005 62.42 25.36 
(40.6%) 
37.05 
(59.4%) 
36.55 15.77 
(43.1%) 
20.78 
(56.9%) 
2006 62.83 25.16 
(40.1%) 
37.66 
(59.9%) 
36.58 15.83 
(43.3%) 
20.75 
(56.7%) 
Unit: million people 
Source: Office of Agricultural Economics (2009) 
In 2007, Thailand‟s GDP was 4,244.5 million baht with a 4.8 per cent growth rate; 
agriculture accounts for approximately 9 per cent of the GDP (see Table 2.4) (BOT, 2008). 
The proportion of the primary agriculture sector to the GDP has dropped dramatically from 
38 per cent in 1951, 27 per cent in 1970 to roughly 9 per cent in the 2006. In the late 1980s, 
the rapid growth and development of the country‟s economic base came from foreign direct 
investment in the industrial and service sectors. Thailand developed into a semi-industrial 
country during that time. This transformation in the country‟s economic structure affected the 
GDP. For example, the contribution of the industrial and services sectors to the GDP rose 
from 62 per cent in 1951 to nearly 90 per cent in 2007. This may be one of the several causes 
of the decline in importance of agriculture in the Thai economy (Falvey, 2000; 
Limsombunchai, 2006; Thaiprasert, 2006). However, agriculture continues to be a major 
source of raw materials for the industrial sector especially in the agro-industry, industrialized 
food products and beverages, and intermediate products for import substitution and export. 
This includes cassava for the livestock feed industry, sugarcane for sugar refining, and 
natural rubber for latex factories (Fuglie, 2001).  
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Table 2.4 GDP of Thailand 1988-2007 by sector at constant 1988 prices                
Year Gross domestic product 
Agriculture % Non-agriculture % Total 
1988 252.3 16.18 1,307.4 83.82 1,559.8 
1989 276.5 15.80 1,473.3 84.19 1,749.9 
1990 263.6 13.55 1,681.7 86.45 1,945.3 
1991 282.7 13.39 1,829.1 86.61 2,111.8 
1992 296.2 12.98 1,986.3 87.02 2,282.5 
1993 289.0 11.70 2,181.8 88.30 2,470.9 
1994 303.3 11.26 2,389.6 88.74 2,692.9 
1995 276.5 9.40 2,665.1 90.60 2,941.7 
1996 288.8 9.27 2,826.5 90.73 3,115.3 
1997 286.8 9.33 2,785.7 90.66 3,072.6 
1998 282.6 10.28 2,467.0 89.72 2,749.6 
1999 289.1 10.07 2,582.8 89.93 2,871.9 
2000 309.9 10.30 2,698.4 89.70 3,008.4 
2001 320.0 10.41 2,753.5 89.59 3,073.6 
2002 322.1 9.95 2,914.8 90.05 3,237.0 
2003 363.0 10.47 3,105.1 89.53 3,468.1 
2004 354.4 9.61 3,333.7 90.39 3,688.1 
2005 347.8 9.02 3,507.2 90.98 3,855.1 
2006 361.1 8.91 3,690.8 91.09 4,052.0 
2007 375.4 8.84 3,869.1 91.16 4,244.5 
Unit: million baht 
Source: Bank of Thailand (2008) 
Since 1963, agricultural improvement policies have been highlighted in the National 
Economic and Social Development Plans. In the mid 1980s, the Thai government started the 
new concept of “Newly Agro-Industrializing Country” (NAIC). Several key policies were 
implemented to enhance the country‟s comparative advantage in the export of traditional 
crops and new agro-industrial product exports such as chilled and frozen prawns, broilers and 
canned food (Thaiprasert, 2006). Thailand earned a large amount of foreign exchange from 
the export of these products. The value of agricultural exports has risen from 224.17 billion 
baht in 1990 to 1,129.21 billion baht in 2007 (see Table 2.5). However, Thailand‟s 
agricultural exports are still dominated by primary crop production and this varies from year 
to year. In 2007, traditional agriculture comprised nearly 64 per cent of the total value of 
exports, 35 per cent for agro-industrial products and the rest for forestry products (see Table 
2.6). Rice, natural rubber and fishery products were the three most important commodities, 
contributing more than half the total value of agricultural exports in 2007 (see Table 2.7). 
Thailand‟s major agricultural export destinations include the United States (16 per cent), 
Japan (15 per cent), China (12 per cent), European Union (10 per cent) and Malaysia (7 per 
cent) (OAE, 2008). 
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Table 2.5 Value of exports, imports and balance of trade of Thailand, 1990-2007   
Year Export Import Balance of trade 
Total Agricultural 
and product 
Total Agricultural 
and product 
Total Agricultural 
and product 
1990 589,818 224,168 662,679 102,244 -263,144 98,458 
1991 725,449 256,038 852,962 125,710 -230,959 113,169 
1992 824,643 285,264 956,408 142,869 -208,602 126,810 
1993 940,862 279,857 1,033,245 158,454 -229,984 119,968 
1994 1,137,601 336,290 1,170,846 159,889 -231,433 156,433 
1995 1,406,310 407,218 1,369,034 179,857 -428,227 193,680 
1996 1,411,039 412,677 1,834,537 213,538 -421,786 195,844 
1997 1,806,932 485,198 1,832,825 216,833 -117,331 256,367 
1998 2,242,543 519,062 1,774,050 226,827 474,727 364,863 
1999 2,209,458 555,783 1,907,391 228,098 306,858 328,400 
2000 2,764,352 626,286 2,494,133 275,459 273,931 351,452 
2001 2,880,463 685,148 1,752,346 323,320 132,358 363,064 
2002 2,923,941 394,403 2,774,840 325,961 155,333 369,935 
2003 3,325,630 804,349 3,138,776 363,374 192,316 441,922 
2004 3,873,689 883,177 3,801,067 398,356 768,087 485,315 
2005 4,438,691 936,519 4,754,025 437,576 -307,659 499,623 
2006 4,937,372 1,071,543 4,942,923 434,541 1,627 637,390 
2007 5,254,999 1,129,206 4,871,996 456,743 388,616 672,742 
Unit: million baht 
Source: Office of Agricultural Economics (2008) 
Table 2.6 The value of the agricultural exports of Thailand, 2004-2007                    
Items 2004 2005 2006 2007 Growth rate 
Total exports value 3,873.69 4,438.69 4,937.37 5,265.29 12.32 
Agricultural and 
products 
886.15 
 
936.52 
 
1,071.54 
 
1,129.21 
 
9.07 
    - Agriculture 563.22 
(63.56%) 
587.83 
(62.77%) 
694.78 
(64.84%) 
730.52 
(64.70%) 
10.45 
    - Agro-industrial  
      products 
321.58 
(36.29%) 
347.52 
(37.11%) 
375.23 
(35.02%) 
397.66 
(35.21%) 
6.77 
    - Forestry 1.35 
(0.15%) 
1.17 
(0.12%) 
1.53 
(0.14%) 
1.03 
(0.09%) 
0.30 
Unit: billion baht 
Source: Office of Agricultural Economics (2008) 
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Table 2.7 The structure of Thailand’s agricultural exports (selected products), 2004-
2007                 
Items 2004 2005 2006 2007 Growth rate 
Rice 104.49 83.85 87.24 107.34 6.16 
Cassava products 23.24 22.14 31.25 32.36 15.97 
Sugar and products 23.24 30.70 29.70 41.21 -1.03 
Natural rubber 148.84 162.70 228.88 198.72 14.73 
Pineapple products 16.97 18.08 20.24 17.68 2.13 
Livestock products 23.27 28.50 30.33 34.10 -1.27 
Fishery products 84.89 101.37 109.49 109.66 7.40 
Unit: billion baht 
Source: Office of Agricultural Economics (2008) 
Thailand also imported some agricultural commodities and intermediate products for its 
domestic consumption. These commodities were extensively used in local food 
manufacturing and the livestock feed industry because domestic production is inadequate. 
The import commodities included soya beans and products, fresh tuna, dairy products, and 
rubber products (see Table 2.8). The value of agricultural imports was 456.74 billion baht or 
around 9 per cent of the total value of imports in 2007 (see Table 2.5). 
Table 2.8 The structure of Thailand agricultural imports (selected products), 2004-2007                 
Items 2004 2005 2006 2007 Growth rate 
Rubber products 26.09 31.27 34.72 35.07 11.15 
Soya beans and 
products  
34.85 37.95 33.67 41.09 1.54 
Milk products 12.18 13.64 13.19 16.19 9.73 
Fishery products 50.73 59.75 60.63 61.43 7.25 
Unit: billion baht 
Source: Office of Agricultural Economics (2008) 
The above discussion strongly demonstrates the importance of the agricultural sector to the 
Thai economy. To begin with, agriculture is the main source of income and employment for 
the people who live in rural areas and reflects the rural livelihood. Later, the agricultural 
sector afforded food security for the Thai population and for the world. Moreover, it supplied 
raw materials to the industrial sector, especially agro-industry, to enhance the country‟s 
export potential. Finally, agricultural export commodities also provide a great source of the 
country‟s foreign exchange earnings.  
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2.2 Performance and problems of Thailand agriculture  
Thailand‟s agricultural sector has shown outstanding growth during the previous three 
decades. During 1960s and 1970s, the country‟s economy relied heavily on traditional 
agriculture. The agricultural sector at that time experienced rapid growth of nearly 5 per cent 
per annum (see Table 2.9) (Poapongsakorn et al., 2006). With this relatively high growth rate 
in the agricultural sector, the government persuaded Thai farmers to expand their cultivated 
areas to grow cash crops, such as rice, maize, sugarcane, and cassava, to increase the farmers‟ 
income. The government also supported irrigation systems, extension services, production 
credit, and financial investment to help farmers enhance their farm productivity 
(Vanichjakvong, 2002).  
Thailand‟s agricultural production underwent major changes during the 1970s. Thai farmers 
experienced intensive production and market orientation (Gingrich, 1994). However, the 
expansion of the cultivated areas caused severe deforestation. For example, Krasachart 
(2003) argued that the country has lost nearly 28 per cent of the forested areas during 1976 to 
1989. 
The agricultural growth rate declined during the 1980s mainly because of the falling world 
agricultural prices and farm land expansion had reached saturation point (Poapongsakorn et 
al., 2006; Vanichjakvong, 2002). In addition, tariff and non-tariff barriers on agricultural 
products, such as the European Economic Community (EEC) import quotas policy and the 
local rice industry protection policy in the US, along with the Thai government‟s policies that 
focused only on the promotion of industrialization caused Thailand‟s agriculture to lose its 
competitiveness. The growth rate of primary production, such as rice, maize, cassava, and 
some field crops, reduced significantly throughout the 1980s (Falvey, 2000; Thaiprasert, 
2006).  
However, in the mid 1980s, the development of new agro-industrial products, such as frozen 
chicken, sugar, pineapple, and marine products, became a focus of policy makers. The agro-
industrial area has been increasingly recognized as the important driving force in Thailand‟s 
economic growth and development. The livestock and fisheries industries experienced rapid 
growth during that period (see Table 2.9). 
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Table 2.9 Growth rate of Thailand’s agricultural sector and other sectors, 1960-2004     
Year Growth rate 
Industry Services Agriculture Crops Livestock Fisheries Forestry 
1960-80 8.82 7.28 5.08 3.87 4.43 9.68 1.96 
1980-85 6.45 5.18 4.09 5.04 2.16 3.64 -2.44 
1985-90 14.03 9.75 4.05 3.45 6.87 7.87 -10.93 
1990-96 9.78 7.84 3.13 2.22 1.80 8.42 -2.65 
1996-98 -5.15 0.89 -1.22 0.05 -2.52 -1.65 -21.48 
1998 -10.61 -11.98 -1.47 -0.45 -6.89 1.46 -20.11 
1999 11.68 0.09 2.68 3.16 1.21 -0.13 -1.74 
2000 6.04 3.33 6.81 8.11 6.85 4.81 -2.94 
2001 1.35 2.57 3.25 3.57 9.24 -1.73 -1.54 
2002 7.35 4.74 0.68 0.55 6.20 -0.17 1.08 
2003 10.40 3.60 11.44 10.26 8.01 3.33 -5.73 
2004 7.99 6.99 -4.79 -2.98 -17.56 3.63 -9.73 
1998-04 6.67 3.57 3.50 4.01 3.80 1.38 -2.97 
1960-04 8.97 6.67 3.69 3.48 4.01 5.64 -3.31 
Unit: percentage changes 
Source: Poapongsakorn et al. (2006) 
Thailand‟s economy suffered heavily following the Asian financial crisis in 1997. The crisis 
dramatically affected the financial service industry, construction, property market, and some 
high import-intensity industries (Limsombunchai, 2006). The GDP growth rate declined to 
the lowest in a decade to nearly -11 per cent in 1998; the industrial and service sectors‟ 
growth rate dropped to -10.61 and -11.98 per cent respectively (see Table 2.9). These results 
raised the inflation rate from 5.7 per cent in 1997 to 18 per cent in 1998. In addition, the 
unemployment rate also increased. An estimated 600,000 workers lost their jobs in 1997 and 
another 500,000 were unemployed in 1998. Several of the unemployed urban people returned 
to the agricultural sector (Lauridsen, 1998). 
The agricultural growth rate was -1.5 per cent in 1998. It suffered least from the financial 
crisis. For example, the value of agricultural exports increased from 412.68 billion baht in 
1997 to 485.20 billion baht in 1998. Poapongsakorn et al. (2006) identified three factors that 
caused the negative growth rate in the agricultural sector during 1997 to 1998 including the 
El Nino effect, the drop in world agricultural prices and the decline in the livestock and 
marine fisheries subsectors. This illustrated the natural resources and strength of the 
agricultural sector as the growth engine of the economy during the financial crisis (Lauridsen, 
1998; Limsombunchai, 2006).    
During 1998 to 2004, the agricultural sector has maintained sustained growth. The demand 
for world agricultural products has increased, especially the demand for natural rubber and 
cassava by China. The average growth rate in the agricultural sector was around 3.5 per cent. 
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However, in 2002, the EU discovered Nitrofuran in shrimp and chicken exports from 
Thailand. All import orders from the EU were suspended until the problem was resolved. As 
a result, there was a significant decline in the growth rate in both the livestock and fisheries 
subsectors (Nidhiprabha, 2004). In 2004, due to the Avian Influenza (AI) crisis, the growth 
rate of the agricultural sector dropped to nearly -5 per cent. The livestock subsector 
experienced a severe decline to -17.56 per cent. According to Rushtona, Viscarraa, Bleicha, 
and McLeod (2005), nearly 25.9 million birds were culled to control the AI in Thailand. 
However, consumption recovered after the panic had settled. Poapongsakorn et al. (2006) 
estimated a 2.6 to 3.0 per cent decrease in agricultural GDP in 2004 as the result of the AI 
crisis. 
The agricultural growth rate averaged 3.9 per cent throughout 2007 (BOT, 2008). However, 
the agricultural sector growth was estimated at 6.5 per cent in the second quarter of 2008. 
Crops enjoyed remarkable growth of 11 per cent. This was because the world price of rice 
rose significantly during the second quarter of 2008. This result encouraged farmers to 
increase their second crop paddy production. In addition, energy crops, such as oil palm, 
sugarcane and cassava, had increased demand. In contrast, fisheries decreased in 2007. The 
growth rate during the second quarter of 2008 was approximately -3 per cent. The higher 
relative prices for oil caused high input production costs and decelerated the growth in 
fisheries (The Office of the National Economic and Social Development Board [NESDB], 
2008b). 
According to Thaiprasert (2006), Thailand‟s agricultural sector represents two different 
characteristics. First, it serves as food security not only for Thai people but also for the world, 
which had enjoyed remarkable growth during the past three decades and provided a large 
amount of foreign exchange earnings. Second, Thailand‟s agriculture confronted many 
problems, such as low production efficiency, rural-urban income gap and lack of credit 
availability (Krongkaew, 1985; Poapongsakorn, Ruths, & Tangjitwisuth, 1998; Thaiprasert, 
2006). The severity of each problem varied considerably from year to year. Some problems 
were solved by employing short-term agricultural policies but others could not be solved. The 
pervasive and persistent problems of Thai agriculture include: 
I. Rural poverty 
The huge gap in the wage rate, personal income and employment between the agriculture and 
non-agriculture sector has resulted in rural-urban inequality and rural poverty in Thailand 
(Ahmad & Isvilanonda, 2003). The majority of Thai farmers experience poverty and are 
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below the basic standard of living especially smallholder farmers in the rural areas 
(Krongkaew, 1985). Nagayets (2005) argued that the World Bank defines smallholder 
farmers as farmers who have limited resources and operated with a landholding less than 2 
hectares (less than 20 rais). The number of farm households in 2003 having less than 20 rais 
in Thailand was approximately 3.82 million or nearly 65 per cent (NSO, 2006). The 
remaining 35 per cent of farm households comprise medium and large farmers. In 2007, 
nearly 90 per cent of the poor lived in the rural areas and two thirds of them lived in the 
north-east region. Most of the poor are smallholder farmers (Ahmad & Isvilanonda, 2003; 
NESDB, 2008c). 
Wattanutchariya and Jitsanguan (1992) argued that smallholder farmers in rural areas, in 
general, are not able to choose the most efficient type of production to maximize their farm 
income and the optimally use of resources because of limited farm size. This resulted in 
inefficient production and lower farm income. Most poor farmers also have insufficient 
capital and a lack of production technology (Thaiprasert, 2006). In addition, Limsombunchai 
(2006) argued that smallholder farmers obtained large loans to sustain their farm production, 
household consumption, and investment. In 2006, the average net farm household revenue 
was 115,674 baht per household. Only 39 per cent was from farm activities, the rest came 
from off-farm income. On the other hand, the average loan size increased from 43,415 baht 
per household in 2001 to 67,762 baht per household in 2006 (see Table 2.10).        
Table 2.10 Average Thailand farm household income, expenditure, net household 
revenue and loan size, 2001-2006                 
Items 2001 2004 2005 2006 Growth rate 
Income 135,761 115,542 167,544 174,521  
     Farm income 76,520 88,099 99,288 102,907 12.69 
     Off-farm income 59,241 67,443 68,256 71,614 8.00 
Expenditure 104,101 129,733 137,353 148,584  
     Farm expenditure 44,392 50,183 56,843 58,847 12.10 
     Non-farm expenditure 59,709 79,550 80,510 89,737 12.61 
Net household revenue 91,369 105,802 110,702 115,674  
     Net farm revenue 32,128 38,359 42,445 44,060 13.50 
Average loan size 43,415 63,901 65,803 67,762 17.51 
Unit: baht/household 
Source: Office of Agricultural Economics (2009) 
II. Drought 
Drought is considered one of the most significant problems causing yield loss particularly in 
the rain-fed cultivated areas. The drought patterns in Thailand vary across locations and 
   22 
times. The north, north-east and some areas of the central region experience widespread 
annual drought (Fukai, Pantuwan, Jongdee, & Cooper, 1999).  
Jongdee, Pantuwan, Fukai and Fischer (2006) argued that drought affected rice production 
annually. Similarly, Poltanee (1996) and Fukai et al. (1999) identified yield reduction in rice 
as a result of drought, which widely affects rain-fed lowland rice production in the north-east. 
Because of inefficient and inadequate irrigation development, over 70 per cent of the farmers 
in this region are directly involved in rain-fed rice production and only 8 per cent of the 
paddy fields can be cropped twice a year (Mongkolsawat et al., 2001). 
The DOAE (2007) reported that in 2007 approximately 415,174 rais of cultivated area 
throughout Thailand were damaged and nearly 40,152 farm households were impacted by 
serious drought. This resulted in an estimated loss of around 188 million baht.  
III. Agricultural commodities’ price fluctuations  
The price of major agricultural products in Thailand tends to be highly volatile both 
seasonally and annually. The unpredictability of world agricultural prices directly affected 
fluctuations in the domestic market (Poapongsakorn et al., 2006). Devakula (2006) identified 
a general characteristic of agricultural products as “long supply adjustment lags and inelastic 
demand”.  
According to Katikarn (1981) and Wiboonpongse and Chaovanapoonphol (2001), Thai 
farmers are price-takers. A farmer‟s decisions on crop production planning are based upon his 
expectations of the current price and the price received from the previous crop. In addition, a 
traditional farmer cannot control quality and supply. This resulted in poor management of the 
agricultural price policy in the past and farmers suffered from price risk.   
Price fluctuation not only affected Thai farmers but also domestic agricultural processors. 
The Thai government has attempted to provide effective instruments to improve the 
management of instability in agricultural commodities‟ prices. The establishment of the 
Agricultural Futures Exchange of Thailand (AFET) is one of the tools used by local 
agriculture stakeholders to hedge excess price risks and arrange pricing references for the 
public (The Agricultural Futures Exchange of Thailand [AFET], 2007). The AFET 
commenced futures trading with the three largest agricultural exports. These include natural 
rubber ribbed smoke sheet No.3 (RSS3) since May 2004, white rice 5 per cent broken 
(BWR5), and tapioca chips (TC) traded in August 2004 and March 2005, respectively. The 
new product introduced to the futures market in July 2008 was Thai Homali rice 100 per cent 
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grade B (BHMR). However, agricultural futures trading in Thailand is currently at the 
developing stage. According to AEFT 2007 trading statistics, there were 89,966 contracts 
traded from a total market value of 29,932.77 million baht. The RSS3 recorded the highest 
traded volume followed by BWR5 and TC.     
IV. Low productivity 
Despite being one of the world‟s top agricultural exporters, Thailand has low agricultural 
productivity. Thaiprasert (2006) identified insufficient water resources with poor irrigation 
systems, inefficient use of fertilizer, low capital inputs and lack of research and development 
as the main causes for low productivity in major crops in Thailand. The data in Table 2.11 
show the yield per hectare of rice, natural rubber and sugarcane in Thailand, which has low 
range of yields compared with other exports. Productivity improvement is generally 
discussed among agricultural policy makers because it directly enhances a farmer‟s real wage 
and income. 
Table 2.11 Yield of major crops in Thailand compared with selected countries, 2005         
Rice Yield Cassava Yield Natural 
Rubber 
Yield Sugarcane Yield 
USA 74,373 India 255,222 Philippines 38,527 Peru 1,105,481 
Japan 66,483 Thailand 171,803 Mexico 19,540 Columbia 936,012 
Australia 66,167 Indonesia 159,224 Cote d‟Ivore 17,958 Australia 871,573 
Vietnam 48,833 China 154,037 India 17,844 Philippines 851,077 
Pakistan 31,741 Vietnam 153,558 Thailand 17,598 Indonesia 813,888 
Thailand 29,625 Costa Rica 150,224 China 11,050 Thailand 464,620 
Unit: hectogram/hectare 
Source: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (2008a) 
2.3 Farming systems in Thailand 
The farming systems in Thailand are characterized by intensive rice-based cropping system 
because rice is the important staple food crop of Thai people (Ahmad & Isvilanonda, 2003). 
According to Devendra and Thomas (2002), the single lowland rice crop under rain-fed 
conditions is the main crop product for smallholder farmers in South-east Asian countries 
including Thailand. Rice production, which is identified as a “low-input-output farming 
system” begins during the rainy season. Poltanee (1996) argued that rice-based cropping 
systems are generally practised in the rain-fed areas of north-east Thailand.  
On the other hand, commercial crop production systems in Thailand have been greatly 
diversified. This includes rice, field crops, perennial tree crops, vegetables, herbs and cut 
flowers (Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives [MOAC], 2008). Ordinary farming 
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systems that are widely practised in each region of Thailand include (Chainuvati & 
Athipanan, 2001): 
 North: the upland rice-upland annual field crop systems (such as soybean, maize, 
and mungbean) are in the mountainous areas of this region. Fruit tree-based cropping systems 
(such as lychee, longan, and mango) are intercropped with upland field crops; vegetables and 
flowers are widely grown. 
 North-east: the lowland single rice crop systems are typically planted in the rain-
fed areas during the rainy season. Dry land field crops (such as cassava, kenaf, and 
sugarcane) are perhaps grown either before or after the main rice production. Multiple rice 
crop systems are followed by annual field crops (such as soybean, mungbean, and peanuts), 
and crop-livestock-freshwater fish integrated farming systems are also practised on small 
mixed farms in irrigated areas. Perennial tree crop systems based on rubber, eucalyptus, and 
fruit trees are particularly grown in some rain-fed areas.  
 Central: multiple rice crop systems are grown annually. Two or three lowland rice 
crops are followed by field crops and vegetables (such as baby corn, cucumber, and yard long 
bean) in irrigated areas. Livestock and fisheries are also integrated with crops in diversified 
farming systems. For rain-fed areas, the cropping pattern is lowland rice followed by field 
crops. Therefore, the ordinary farming patterns in this region are rice-based and field crop-
based cropping systems.  
 South: rubber-based farming systems intercropped with upland rice, sweet corn, 
pineapple, and upland field crops are extensively planted in the south. In addition, marine 
fisheries and shrimp farming are important for farmers in coastal areas.  
According to the Office of Agricultural Economics statistics, the growth rate of energy crop 
production (oil palm, cassava, and sugarcane) has become increasingly significant compared 
with rice and field crop production (maize and soybean) during 2003-2007. Rapid growth of 
energy crop production was possible because of the high demand for those crops to process 
into biodiesel and gasohol. Perennial tree crops (rubber and longan) are also planted. 
However, Thai farmers are faced instability of yields in major cash crops (see Table 2.12). 
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Table 2.12 Harvested area, production and yield of selected cash crops in Thailand,      
2003-2007 
Crops Items 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Growth rate 
 
Major rice 
Harvested area 56,972 57,652 57,774 57,542 57,442 0.14 
Production 23,142 22,650 23,539 22,840 23,387 0.30 
Yield 406 393 407 397 407 0.15 
 
Second rice 
Harvested area 9,533 9,432 8,914 9,903 10,074 1.60 
Production 6,426 6,332 5,888 6,753 6,802 1.80 
Yield 674 671 661 682 675 0.19 
 
Maize 
Harvested area 6,943 7,040 6,626 6,040 5,970 -4.45 
Production 4,178 4,216 3,943 3,716 3,602 -4.14 
Yield 602 599 595 615 603 0.30 
 
Soybean 
Harvested area 961 945 929 886 873 -2.52 
Production 231 218 226 215 214 -1.64 
Yield 240 230 243 242 245 0.93 
 
Cassava 
Harvested area 6,386 6,608 6,162 6,693 7,339 2.95 
Production 19,718 21,440 16,938 22,584 26,916 6.98 
Yield 3,087 3,244 2,749 3,375 3,668 3.92 
 
Sugarcane 
Harvested area 7,121 7,012 6,670 6,033 6,314 -3.83 
Production 74,259 64,996 49,586 47,658 64,365 -5.79 
Yield 10,429 9,269 7,434 7,899 10,194 -2.03 
 
Oil palm 
Harvested area 1,799 1,932 2,026 2,374 2,663 10.41 
Production 4,903 5,182 5,003 6,715 6,613 8.96 
Yield 2,725 2,682 2,469 2,828 2,483 -1.32 
 
Rubber 
Harvested area 10,008 10,354 10,574 10,870 11,017 2.44 
Production 2,861 3,008 2,977 3,071 3,122 1.97 
Yield 286 290 282 282 283 -0.49 
 
Longan 
Harvested area 619 680 821 870 939 11.38 
Production 396 597 712 472 495 3.58 
Yield 596 878 655 542 528 -6.99 
 
Durian 
Harvested area 733 748 717 701 680 -2.16 
Production 739 831 651 623 723 -3.26 
Yield 1,007 1,110 908 889 1,063 -1.13 
 
Pineapples 
Harvested area 509 556 614 632 597 4.59 
Production 1,899 2,101 2,183 2,705 2,305 6.61 
Yield 3,573 3,513 3,557 4,280 3,858 3.57 
Units: Harvested area in thousand rais, Production in thousand tonnes, and Yield in kilograms per rai 
Source: Office of Agricultural Economics (2009) 
Livestock production in Thailand has its origins in the semi-domesticated stock of 
subsistence production systems. Thai livestock production is a modernised industry providing 
hygienic animal products to the world market (Falvey, 2000). Thai livestock production faced 
a huge revolution starting in the 1970s after the Charoen Pokphand Company (CP) was 
established as a commercial exporter of broiler chicken to Japan. The successful and rapid 
growth of the broiler export-oriented industry led several large companies to enter into 
livestock business and the livestock contract farming has become a common practice among 
Thai farmers (Delgado, Narrod, & Tiongco, 2008).  
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Delgado et al. (2008) identified three major types of livestock contract farming in Thailand. 
They include: (i) guaranteed price in baht per kilogram; (ii) wage contract with the hiring rate 
in baht per kilogram; and (iii) wage contract with the hiring rate in baht per head. Guaranteed 
price contract was the popular contract in the Thai livestock industry. Livestock contract 
farming can be seen not only in poultry farms but also in swine farms throughout Thailand. 
The contract terms and regulations may differ for each farm depending on farm location and 
the agreement between the commercial livestock company and the farmer. 
The expansion of livestock contract farms is concentrated in a small number of provinces 
around Bangkok. The reason is the proximity of major feed industrial areas, the largest meat 
market and the main export ports and shipping services. The most important production zones 
of broiler and swine contract farming include Nakorn Pathom and Ayudhaya in the central 
area, Chonburi and Chacherngsao in the east, and Nakorn Rachasima in the north-east 
(Delgado et al., 2008).  
Conversely, the development of the dairy industry in Thailand is under the government 
management conducted by the Dairy Farming Promotion Organization of Thailand. The 
major components of the dairy industry, such as breeding stock imports, production 
subsidies, tariff barriers and quota protection, have directly involved the Thai government to 
help small-scale dairy farmers and dairy producer cooperatives to increase their 
competitiveness (Delgado et al., 2008). Falsey (2000) suggested that future enhancement of 
the Thai dairy industry depends on the stock survival and reproductive rates, feed quality 
including concentrate and roughage feed, genetics, and farmers‟ management skills. 
Chudam and Toros (2008) argued that most dairy farms in Thailand are small holder 
dairying. The average number of milking cows per farm has risen from 8.41 milking cows 
per farm in 1993 to 18.66 milking cows per farm in 2006. Delgado et al. (2008) identified the 
three most important provinces for dairy farms as Ratchaburi in the west, Saraburi in the 
central region and Nakorn Ratchasima in the north-east.  
Table 2.13 shows the major livestock population numbers and the number of livestock farms 
in Thailand as of 1 January 2007. Most commercial livestock farming, such as poultry, swine, 
and dairy cows, is significantly concentrated in the central region. Cattle and buffaloes are the 
most important livestock for smallholder farmers in the north-east (Department of Livestock 
Development [DLD], 2008).  
 
   27 
Table 2.13 Number of livestock inventory on 1 January 2007 and number of livestock 
farms in Thailand by region, 2007                                             
Livestock Items North North-east Central South 
Buffalo Number of heads 225,970 1,175,826 129,866 46,136 
Number of farms 31,009 326,563 12,836 7,408 
Cattle Number of heads 1,953,406 4,501,769 1,516,298 876,919 
Number of farms 168,482 908,673 101,895 197,072 
Pig Number of heads 1,780,029 1,693,707 53,038,136 788,201 
Number of farms 112,367 95,465 25,401 35,122 
Dairy cows Number of heads 42,918 101,942 339,795 4,938 
Number of farms 1,912 4,112 14,965 241 
Broiler Number of birds 16,466,308 32,478,230 113,745,460 7,610,979 
Number of farms 11,172 21,486 6,558 9,309 
Layer Number of birds 5,837,855 9,418,102 28,372,204 5,808,854 
Number of farms 2,319 8,582 3,900 2,597 
Source: Department of Livestock Development (2008) 
Farm production in Thailand is either crop specialized or integrated crop-livestock. 
According to Roonnaphai (2005), the promotion of crop diversification and integrated 
farming systems has been widely debated among Thailand agricultural policy makers since 
the 8
th
 National Economic and Social Development plan (1997-2001). The purposes of this 
policy are to create stability between agricultural production and the use of natural resources, 
improve the standard of living of farmers and also to reduce risk and uncertainty on farms. 
However, Wattanachariya and Jitsanguan (1992) argued that smallholder farmers in rural 
rain-fed areas of Thailand are not able to expand their farm activities because of limited farm 
size, lower farm management skills, lack of capital and credit and the inadequate use of farm 
inputs.  
Poapongsakorn et al. (2006) identified nearly 65 per cent of total farms in the central region 
as specialized crop production farms, around 20 per cent as integrated crop and livestock 
farms and the rest as pure livestock farms, such as poultry and swine farms. In contrast, 48 
per cent are integrated crop and livestock farms in the north-east region. The major livestock 
activities include cattle, buffaloes, or milking cows. The proportion of specialized crop farms 
in this region is estimated at about 45 per cent and 5 per cent are mixed crop-livestock-
freshwater fish production farms. 
Following the 1997 Asian financial crisis, the King of Thailand, His Majesty King Bhumibol 
Adulyadej, suggested the concept of “Sufficient Economy” to the public. The Thai 
government has incorporated this concept into the economic development policy that aims to 
overcome poverty, improve the rural livelihood, and lead Thailand to sustainable economic 
development (The Government Public Relations Department [PRD], 2004).  
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At the same time, his Majesty‟s “New Theory” concept is to guide particularly smallholder 
farmers to achieve self-sufficiency. There are three stages in the New Theory of agricultural 
management process (PRD, 2008):  
 First, farmers will produce adequate food for their household consumption by 
maximizing efficient land utilization management. Any production surplus may be sold on 
the market.  
 Secondly, farmers will organise themselves to establish farmer cooperatives to 
conduct various activities focussing on production, such as input bargaining, sharing of farm 
machinery, and selling negotiation. In this stage, the group of farmers can help each other to 
increase bargaining power, resulting in cost reduction and increased in product prices and 
management of group production planning.  
 Thirdly, the farmer cooperatives will enlarge their commercial activities, such as 
owning rice-mills. This stage will strengthen the group of farmers and the farmers can learn 
production, processing and marketing. 
In terms of land use management, the strategy recommended that smallholder farmers 
separate their farm land into four parts. The proportions of 30:30:30:10 restructured land 
forms were suggested to maximize farm income. This type of farming system has been well 
researched and developed to suit Thailand‟s agriculture. First, around 30 per cent of farm 
land would be constructed into a reservoir to provide adequate water for the farm during the 
dry season and freshwater fish production for additional income. The next 30 per cent is rice 
plantation to service farm household consumption, any surplus can be sold. Thirdly, 
commercial field crops were encouraged to be grown in another 30 per cent of the farm land. 
Finally, the last 10 per cent was for farm residence, animal sheds and storage (PRD, 2008). 
The New Theory concept has been successfully implemented. Many Thai smallholder 
farmers who applied this strategy found that it was useful and adaptable. The New Theory 
brought back the integrated crop-livestock farming system to supply small farm household 
consumption and produce higher farm incomes. This strategy also helped to improve the 
living standard and strengthen the farmers‟ group participation (Falvey, 2000; Thaiprasert, 
2006). The New Theory is one of the most important agricultural production development 
policies in the 10
th
 National Economic and Social Development plan (2007-2011) (MOAC, 
2008). 
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2.4 Sources of risk and risk management strategies on farm 
There is much literature on risk sources that impact farming operations and their risk 
management strategies. Flaten, Lien, Koesling, Valle and Ebbesvik (2005) argued that the 
assessment of farmers‟ perceptions and how they respond to risk are very important because 
this can describe the decision making behaviour of farmers when faced with risky situations. 
Similarly, Hardaker, Huirne et al. (2004, p. 12) stated that “the welfare of the farm family and 
the survival of farm business may depend on how well farming risks are managed”. 
The lack of relevant information on farmers‟ risk perceptions and their risk behaviour present 
a challenging task for policy makers and researchers who want to create a proper risk 
management system to help farmers (Flaten et al., 2005; Nicol, Ortmann, & Ferrer, 2007). 
According to empirical studies, there is no agreement about the most appropriate methods to 
describe sources of risk and risk responses on farms. However, the Likert-scale rating method 
has been regularly applied in previous research. In most of those studies, the respondents 
were asked to rate the sources of risk that affected their farm and the risk management 
strategies they used on a five-point scale (where 1 is not particularly important and 5 is highly 
important).  
The types of on-farm risk can be divided into two main categories: business risk (which 
directly affects farm profitability) and financial risk (which is associated with the variability 
of net cash flows to farmers‟ equity) (see Section 1.1). Pellegrino (1999) argued that both 
business and financial risk can affect each other and need to be considered carefully when 
developing a whole farm plan. Nicol et al. (2007) argued that the sources of farm risk, 
especially business risk, may vary depending on farm type, farm size, the economic situation, 
political environment, time of the study and farm geographical location. The sources of farm 
risk are summarised in Table 2.14. 
Boggess, Anaman, and Hanson (1985) examined farmers‟ awareness of risk in crop and 
livestock production in northern Florida and southern Alabama. A total of 48 farmers were 
randomly selected. The respondents were requested to identify the definition of risk and then 
to rank the sources of risk and risk management strategies based on how important each risk 
was to their farm. The results showed that most respondents defined risk as the probability of 
a negative outcome. The respondents ranked rainfall variability, pests and diseases, and crop 
price variability as the primary sources of risk for crop production. Livestock price and 
weather variability and livestock diseases were perceived as important sources of risk for 
livestock production.  
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Patrick, Wilson, Barry, Boggess and Young (1985) studied farmer attitudes towards risk and 
risk management among mixed crop and livestock farmers in the US. A total of 149 farmers 
in 12 states were interviewed. The respondents were grouped into five farm types; mixed 
farming; cotton; corn, soybean and hogs; small grain and ranch. The results showed that 
changes in weather, output price and input costs were rated as the three most important 
sources of risk in both crop and livestock production.  
In Martin‟s (1996) study, a nationwide mail survey was used to examine the sources of risk 
and the risk management strategies of New Zealand farmers. The survey covered eight farm 
types including sheep and beef, dairy, deer, pip fruit, kiwifruit, cropping, vegetables and 
flowers. The results showed that marketing risk (such as change in product prices and change 
in input costs) was ranked as a very important source of risk by all farmers. Conversely, 
production risks (such as rainfall variability, weather, and pests and diseases) were regarded 
differently depending on geographical location, farm type and product.  
Pellegrino (1999) studied rice farmers‟ perceptions of the sources of risk and risk 
management responses in Argentina. Using size of the respondents‟ farms as large, medium, 
and small farms, the author argued that a farmer‟s awareness of the sources of risk varied 
depending on farm size. The small size farm group tended to have a higher awareness of 
production risks than the other two groups. 
Meuwissen, Huirne and Hardaker (2001) identified price and production risks as the most 
important sources of risk for livestock farmers in the Netherlands. An insurance scheme was 
rated as the appropriate strategy to manage risk. Flaten et al. (2005) compared risk perception 
and the risk responses of conventional and organic dairy farmers in Norway. The results 
demonstrated that the institutional (such as government support policies) and marketing risks 
were classified as the principal sources of risk for the organic dairy farmers. The authors 
ranked production cost variability and animal welfare policy as the greatest worries for 
conventional dairy farmers.  
Hall, Knight, Coble, Baquet and Patrick (2003) found severe drought and meat price 
variability as the primary sources of risk perceived amongst cattle farmers in Texas and 
Nebraska. In a recent study, large-scale South African sugarcane farmers perceived land 
reform regulations, labour legislation and crop price variability as the three most important 
risk factors (Nicol et al., 2007).  
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Table 2.14 Ranking perception of potential risk factors on farms in worldwide studies 
Risk source variables Boggess et 
al. (1985) 
Patrick et 
al. (1985) 
Martin (1996) Pelligrino 
(1999) 
Meuwissen et 
al. (2001) 
Flaten et 
al. (2005) 
Hall et 
al. (2003) 
Nicol et al. 
(2007) 
Studies location US US New Zealand Argentina Netherlands Norway US South Africa 
Type of farm Crop Livestock Sheep & Beef Rice Livestock Dairy Cattle Sugarcane 
Crop yield variability - - - - - - - 5 
Crop price variability 3 - - 6 - - - 3 
Livestock production variability - - - - 6 - - - 
Livestock price variability - 1 1 - 1 2 2 - 
Rainfall variability (severe drought) 1 - 5 2 - - 1 - 
Other weather factors - 3 10 3 - - 5 - 
Pests and diseases 2 4 9 8 1 5 6 - 
Production cost variability 6 2 2 12 5 3 3 4 
Government law and policies 5 9 7 9 7 1 4 1 
World economic situation 8 7 2 - - - - - 
Nation economic situation - - 2 1 - - - - 
Hired labour force 11 12 11 10 - 8 7 2 
Variability in interest rates 9 8 8 7 4 6 - 7 
Credit availability 13 10 - - - 9 - 8 
Changes in Inflation/deflation rate 4 6 - - - - - - 
Farmer operator safety and health 7 5 5 13 2 4 - 6 
Theft of farm equipment 10 - 12 14 - - - - 
Changes in technology 12 11 13 11 8 7 - - 
Note: The numbers in this table represent the ranking of sources of risk in each study, 1 as the most important sources of risk and the last number as the least important sources of 
risk. 
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In terms of risk management strategies, Boggess et al. (1985) and Patrick et al. (1985) 
reported that „placing of investments‟, „obtaining market information‟ and „enterprise 
diversification‟ were the most important strategies that the sampled crop and livestock 
farmers use to handle risk in the US. Meuwissen et al.(2001) found that „cost of production‟ 
and „insurance schemes‟ were regarded as important risk strategies among livestock farmers 
in the Netherlands. Similarly, Flaten et al. (2005) noted that organic and conventional dairy 
farmers in Norway perceived „increasing farm liquidity‟, „disease prevention‟, „buying farm 
insurance‟ and „cost of production‟ as the most important strategies used to deal with risk on 
their farms. 
Martin (1996) stated that New Zealand farmers used a mix of risk management strategies to 
reduce risk. The strategies varied among the groups of farmers depending on the nature of the 
product, market structure and conditions, farmer characteristics, dynamic risk adjustment 
considerations and the regulatory situation. The risk management strategies are summarized 
in Table 2.15. 
Despite the fact that the evaluation of farmers‟ risk perceptions and risk management 
responses are essential to better understand their risk behaviour and managerial decisions, 
few studies have explicitly investigated awareness of risk among Thai farmers. 
Kukeawkasem (2008) studied sources of risk and risk management strategies among 408 
swine farmers in northern Thailand. Multiple and logit regressions were employed to 
examine the relationship between farmers‟ risk attitudes and sources of risk and socio-
economic characteristics of the farmers. The author‟s results showed that „animal diseases‟ 
and „capability to manage a pig farm‟ were the most important sources of risk that 
significantly impacted swine farmers‟ risk attitudes. In addition, „reducing input uses‟, „cost 
flexibility‟, „holding reserve‟, „insurance‟ and „diversification‟ were considered as the most 
important risk management strategies among swine farmers in the study area.     
Akasinha, Ngamsomsuk, Thongngam, Sinchaikul and Ngamsomsuk (2006) examined risk 
perceptions among rice farmers in Payao and Lampang provinces in the northern region. In 
this study, the Participatory Risk Mapping (PRM) technique was used to elicit sources of risk. 
The authors‟ results showed that rice farmers in Payao faced five major sources of risk 
including „outbreak of rice disease‟, „insects causing damage to rice‟, „high input costs‟, 
„flooding‟, and „shortage of water supply‟. Farmers in Lampang typically faced „drought‟, 
„insects causing damage to rice‟, „low output prices‟, „pests‟, and „high input costs‟.  
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Table 2.15 Ranking perception of potential farm risk management strategies in worldwide studies 
Risk management strategies Boggess et al. 
(1985) 
Patrick et al. 
(1985) 
Martin 
(1996) 
Pelligrino 
(1999) 
Meuwissen 
et al. (2001) 
Flaten et al. 
(2005) 
Hall et al. 
(2003) 
Studies location US US New Zealand Argentina Netherlands Norway US 
Type of farm Crop & Livestock Crop & Livestock Sheep & Beef Rice Livestock Dairy Cattle 
Enterprise diversification 1 3 6 12 7 8 6 
Market information 3 2 3 6 - - - 
Cooperative marketing - - - - - 6 - 
Spreading sales 7 4 3 1 - 9 - 
Forward contracting 10 9 17 6 5 10 7 
Use of futures market 17 17 - - 8 - 8 
Pacing of investment 2 1 16 11 6 13 5 
Debt management 13 11 11 4 4 5 - 
Maintaining financial reserves 4 5 9 2 - 1 3 
Holding credit reserves 16 8 14 13 - - 4 
Managed capital spending 14 14 6 - - 7 - 
Keeping debt low - - 3 8 - - - 
Use of insurance 8 12 9 4 2 3 - 
Farm operator working off-farm 15 15 19 14 - 11 - 
Family members working off-farm 11 16 18 - - 11 - 
Maintaining feed reserves 6 6 1 - - - - 
Production practice diversification 5 7 12 - - - - 
Routine spraying and drenching 
Monitor pests and diseases 
Not produce to full capacity 
Producing at lowest possible costs  
- 
- 
12 
- 
- 
- 
13 
- 
1 
15 
12 
- 
- 
3 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
1 
- 
2 
1 
4 
- 
1 
- 
2 
Incentives and rewards for labour - - - 8 - - - 
Apply strict hygienic rules - - - - 3 - - 
Maintaining flexibility in farm 9 10 6 10 - - - 
Note: The numbers in this table represent the ranking of risk management strategies in each study, 1 as the most important risk management strategies and the last number as the 
least important risk management strategies.  
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The PRM is a systematic and convenient technique to apply to categorize and order sources 
of risk. Smith, Barrett and Box (2000) employed the PRM technique to study risk perceptions 
among pastoralists in the arid and semi-arid land of southern Ethiopia and northern Kenya. 
Their results showed there were many differences among ethnic groups and other general 
characteristics among pastoralists. One hundred and twenty respondents were interviewed 
and 15 major sources of risk were identified. The most frequent risk factors identified for 
pastoralists include food shortages, water availability and livestock diseases. These results 
were from drought and long dry seasons in East Africa. A similar study by Quinn, Huby, 
Kiwasila and Lovett (2003) focused on the local perceptions of risk in Tanzania. The authors‟ 
results showed the respondents grouped risks into 21 categories. Access to the water supply 
was the risk most frequently cited by respondents. The sources of risk cited by male and 
female respondents differed slightly depending on their experience. The authors also 
suggested that the PRM is a useful technique for realizing sources of risk that affect a group 
of people in rural areas. 
Barrett (2003) pointed out that the PRM technique is a qualitative-quantitative method of 
integration. This method used an open-ended questionnaire for collecting sources of risk 
where the respondents identified and ranked the risks concern to them. Following this, a 
simple index can be constructed using the ordinal data. The author also argued that the data 
can be analyzed using limited dependent methods. In addition, The World Bank (2007) 
suggested that the PRM method can illustrate the sources and levels of risk faced by a group 
of people. This is an especially useful method to pre-identify the types of risk in areas that 
have limited studies on risk. However, the PRM technique has some constraints (K. Smith et 
al., 2000). For example, the meaning of risk differs and may be unclear among the 
respondents and may cause misleading answers. The categorization of responses is difficult 
due to ambiguous answers and because some answers are possibly influenced by the 
interviewers. 
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     Chapter 3 
Literature Review 
This chapter presents some theoretical concepts for evaluating and ranking on-farm risky 
alternatives. The conceptualization of the expected utility theory is described in the first 
section. The next section presents the concepts of risk aversion. The technique to elicit the 
decision makers‟ utility function and the utility functional forms are discussed in Sections 3.3 
and 3.4 respectively. Section 3.5 concludes with the fundamental concepts of risk efficiency 
approaches and previous studies on agricultural decision making under risk using the 
stochastic efficiency.  
3.1 Expected utility theory 
The expected utility theory plays a principal role in measuring a person‟s preferences under 
complex decision situations. The mathematical form of the expected utility was initiated by 
Gabriel Creamer and Daniel Bernoulli in the eighteenth century (Anderson, Dillon, & 
Hardaker, 1977; Schoemaker, 1980). That was later recognized as the St Petersburg paradox. 
The fair coins game was demonstrated in this paradox following the conditions that the coin 
is tossed till the n
th
 toss when the first head arises, then an individual wins the prize of 
12n  
dollars. What certain amount would an individual be willing to pay to play this game? The 
expected prize of the game can be infinite as follows:     
 1
1
1
2
2
n
n
n



            (3.1) 
Where:  
1
2n
 is the probability of the occurrence; and  
n  can be any number from 1 to infinity.  
According to Levy (2006), the amount which the player is willing to pay is the “certainty 
equivalent” (CE) of the game. This kind of game is similar to a risky investment. For 
instance, say one is willing to pay 50 dollars to play this game. Then, in the game, tails shows 
up four times with a head once. The prize of this game is 5 1 42 2 16    dollars, which means 
one loses 34 dollars; and the probability of the occurrence is 
5
1 1
322
 . Initially, the expected 
prize of the game is infinite but, in the real world, this paradox is difficult to explain how 
people feel about lotteries using mathematical expression.  
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In general, people try to maximize their expected payoff but are willing to pay a 
comparatively small amount of money (finite) to play a game (Levy, 2006; McKenna, 1986). 
Bernoulli assumed that people, in making their decisions, prefer those alternatives that 
maximize their expected utilities (utility depends on wealth) rather than expected monetary 
values (Bassett, 1987; Levy, 2006; Schumann, 2005). In addition, each person has a different 
perception of the value of the lottery because the utility of an extra dollar is different between 
a rich man and a poor man. This illustrates that a person‟s utility related to wealth increases at 
a decreasing rate.  
Bernoulli used a logarithmic function as a plausible expected utility function to describe his 
proposal (Bassett, 1987; Schoemaker, 1980). Bernoulli‟s utility function is expressed as 
follows: 
( ) log
x
U x b


 
  
 
        (3.2) 
Where: 
 b  is a constant;  
              is the initial wealth; and   
     x  is the increase in wealth (Schoemaker, 1980). 
Bernoulli‟s concept of expected utility has been repeatedly reviewed as a riskless theory in 
consumer economics in many studies during the second half of the nineteenth century 
(Fishburn, 1988). However, in 1947, John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern developed a 
new theory of utility known as the economic theory of games. The theory represents rational 
decision-making under stochastic outcomes in the form of axioms of preference 
(Schoemaker, 1980). 
According to the Von Neumann and Morgenstern theory, a person ought to constantly prefer 
an alternative with the highest expected utility (Schoemaker, 1980; Schumann, 2005). The 
axioms about the attributes of an individual‟s preference over a simple lottery (a lottery with 
just two alternatives) are expressed as follows (Schoemaker, 1980):  
 1. The complete ordering axiom: For any lottery, there is an ordering, which is 
complete and transitive. For every 1L  and 2L , the individual prefers either 1L  to 2L  (we 
can write 1 2L L ) or 2L  to 1L  ( 2 1L L ) or else is indifferent ( 1 2L L ). Moreover, for 
every 1L , 2L  and 3L  with 1 2L L  and 2 3L L  then 1 3L L  (called transitivity). 
 
 2. The continuity axiom: If an individual prefers outcomes x  to y  and y  to z  then 
there exists a subjective probability p  (between 0 and 1). This means that the 
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individual is indifferent between a sure amount of y  and a lottery offering x  with 
probability p  or a lottery offering z  with probability )1( p .  
 
 3. The independence axiom: Let 
1L  and 2L  be two lotteries with 1 2L L ; 3L  is any 
other risky prospect and (0,1)  then 1 3 2 3(1 ) (1 )L L L L       . 
 
 4. The unequal probability axiom: If outcome x  is preferred to y , then lottery 1L  
should be preferred to 
2L  when both lotteries have the only outcomes x  and y  and 
when the probability of winning x  is higher in 
1L  than 2L . 
 
 5. The axiom of complexity: Let 
1L  and 2L  be two lotteries, offer outcomes x  and y  
for 
1L  and create two new lotteries 3L  and 4L  as the outcomes for 2L . Lottery 3L  and 
4L  have only outcomes x  and y . The individual should be indifferent between 1L  and 
2L  only if the expected values of 1L  and 2L  are equal. 
 
The Von Neumann and Morgenstern expected utility concept can explain the relationship of 
an individual‟s preferences over the probability of the real outcomes throughout the 
functional forms. However, the measurability controversy has been widely discussed among 
economists during the 1950s in terms of “ordinal” and “cardinal” utility (Mongin, 1997; 
Pennings & Garcia, 2004). A number of Neoclassic economists agree that for a given 
individual‟s preferences, the ordinal properties of )(aU  can be provided by using a non-
stochastic theory of preferences among the outcomes (Mongin, 1997). However, in 1987 
Maurice Allais noted that the appropriate technique to analyse choice under risky prospects 
required both a function of wealth under certainty by using a cardinal specification and a 
separate attitude toward uncertainty (Quiggin, 2002). Pennings and Garcia (2004, p. 6) 
summarised that “ordinary utility provides only a ranking of risky prospects while cardinal 
utility refers to a decision maker’s strength-of-preference function for consequences under 
certainty”. 
Therefore, the expected utility theorem says that a person‟s utility function (U ) exhibits 
his/her preferences for consequences are congruent with the above axiomatic properties. The 
function correlates a single utility value ( ( )jU a ) with any risky prospect ( ja ) and has the 
following properties (Anderson et al., 1977; Hardaker, Huirne, et al., 2004): 
 1. If 1a  is preferred to 2a , then 1( )U a  > 2( )U a  and vice versa. That is the “utility 
value can be used to rank risky prospects and to identify the one with the highest utility as the 
most preferred” (Hardaker, Huirne, et al., 2004, p. 35). 
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 2. The preference relation in terms of the expectation of some utility function based 
on the decision maker‟s subjective distribution of outcomes. In other words, “the utility of a 
risky prospect is its expected utility value” (Hardaker, Huirne, et al., 2004, p. 35). This can be 
defined by the following equation: 
 ( ) ( )j jU a E U a            (3.3) 
In the case of discrete outcomes, equation (3.3) becomes: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )j j i i
i
U a U a P         (3.4)  
Where: 
 i  is an uncertain event; and 
      ( )iP   is the probability of the incidence of an uncertain event i . 
and, in the case of continuous distributions of outcomes, is given as: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )j jU a U a f d           (3.5) 
Hardaker, Huirne et al. (2004, p. 36) state that “the implication in both equations (3.4) and 
(3.5) is that higher order moments of utility such as variance do not enter into decisions 
among risky prospects”.  
   3. This U  function is “unique up to a positive linear transformation” (Hardaker, 
Huirne, et al., 2004, p. 36). 
3.2 Risk aversion 
Risk aversion is the central behavioural concept in the expected utility theory (Quiggin, 1993, 
2002). Risk aversion measures a decision maker‟s unwillingness to accept a bargain with an 
uncertainty payoff rather than another bargain with more certainty but with the probability of 
a lower expected payoff. This implies that the shape of a decision maker‟s utility function 
reflects his or her risk preferences (Hardaker, Huirne, et al., 2004). The decision maker‟s 
utility function has a positive slope over the whole range of payoffs, which implies that 
greater payoff is always preferred to less. This can be illustrated in mathematical terms as 
0)(  wU , where )(' wU  is the first derivative of the utility function with respect to wealth 
(Hardaker, Huirne, et al., 2004). 
Risk aversion can be measured by the second derivative of the utility function for wealth 
( )(wU  ). In other words, risk aversion is the change in the marginal utility as the level of 
wealth increases. This became a way to classify a decision maker‟s attitude toward risk as 
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risk loving, neutral or averse in terms of the second derivative  (Hardaker, Huirne, et al., 
2004; Schumann, 2005):   
 1. 0)(  wU  means risk averse; 
  2. 0)(  wU  means risk neutral; and  
 3. 0)(  wU  means risk loving.  
The three possible attitudes to risk classification are shown in Figure 3.1.  
Figure 3.1 The shape of utility functions exhibiting risk attitude behaviour with respect 
to wealth ( w ) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                  w     w     w  
        (a) Risk Preference           (b) Risk Neutral     (c) Risk Averse 
Source: Hardaker, Huirne et al. (2004) 
Because the utility function is defined only up to a positive linear transformation and can be 
measured on an ordinal scale, the value of  U   is of little relevance and difficult to use to 
compare risk aversion (Binici, Koc, Zulauf, & Bayaner, 2003; Quiggin, 1993). The 
coefficient of absolute risk aversion, developed by Pratt (1964) and Arrow (1965), is the best 
way to elicit risk attitudes by using a measure that is invariant and constant for any positive 
linear transformation of a utility function (Hardaker, Huirne, et al., 2004). The Arrow-Pratt 
measure of absolute risk aversion can be expressed as: 
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         (3.6) 
Where:  
)(wra  is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion; and 
  )(wU   and )(' wU  are the second and first derivatives of the utility function, 
respectively.  
u
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w
) 
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Hardaker, Huirne et al. (2004) stated that the coefficient of absolute risk aversion function 
can be classified in relation to how it changes with respect to increasing wealth ( w ). 
Schumann (2005) argued that the absolute amount of change can be calculated by using the 
derivative with respect to wealth of the absolute risk aversion coefficient ( )(wra

). The three 
categories are:  
1) Decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA) arises if 0)( 

wra . This implies that 
the more the decision maker‟s wealth increases, the constant amount of money that he/she is 
willing to pay in the risky prospects increases (Levy, 2006; Schumann, 2005).  
2) Constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) arises if 0)( 

wra . Hardaker, Huirne et 
al. (2004) argues whether a constant amount of money is added to or deducted from all 
payoffs in the risky prospect, the decision maker‟s preferences are still the same. 
3) Increasing absolute risk aversion (IARA) arises if ( ) 0ar w
  . IARA implies that 
the decision maker‟s willingness to pay for the risky outcomes decreases as his/her wealth 
increases (Schumann, 2005).   
The measurement of )(wra  relies on the monetary units of w , which means different 
currency units are not comparable for risk aversion. To overcome this restriction, Pratt and 
Arrow introduced the coefficient of relative risk aversion ( ( )rr w ), which is autonomous of w  
levels (Hardaker, Huirne, et al., 2004; Quiggin, 1993). The relative risk aversion coefficients 
can be calculated as follows: 
 ( ) ( )r ar w wr w          (3.7) 
Similarly, the relative risk aversion function can be categorized as decreasing relative risk 
aversion (DRRA), constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) or increasing relative risk aversion 
(IRRA). Using the derivative with respect to w  of ( )rr w  ( ( )rr w
 ) shows the changes in the 
proportional amounts of money that the decision maker is willing to pay with risky prospects. 
DRRA arises if ( ) 0rr w
   and, as a decision maker‟s wealth increases, the proportional 
amount of money that he/she is willing to pay with risky prospects increases. Similarly, 
CRRA and IRRA arises if ( ) 0rr w
   and ( ) 0rr w
   respectively (Hardaker, Huirne, et al., 
2004; Schumann, 2005). 
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3.3 Utility elicitation  
Several methods have been developed to extract a decision maker‟s preferences for wealth 
and convert their preferences into an appropriate utility function (McConnell & Dillon, 
1997). Three common widely used methods are reported in the literature to represent farmers‟ 
attitudes and their utilities toward risk. They include (Gómez-Limón, Arriaza, & Riesgo, 
2003): 
1) Direct elicitation of the utility functions (DEU): In this method, the farmer‟s risk 
preferences are assessed by interview. The farmer is asked to state their indifference point 
with a series of the hypothetical risky prospects and the sure outcomes. An individual utility 
function can be calculated using regression. According to Young (1979) and Gómez-Limón 
et al. (2003), some empirical research that used DEU to elicit the risk preferences of farmers 
can be found in Francisco and Anderson (1972), Hamal and Anderson (1982), Ramaratnam, 
Rister, Bessler and Novak (1986) and Feinerman and Finkelshtain (1996).   
 2) Experimental methods (EM): Real money payoffs are employed to measure 
farmers‟ preferences rather than using hypothetical alternatives. However, this approach is 
not widely used and is quite complicated to implement in practice (Gómez-Limón et al., 
2003). Binswanger (1980) employed the EM technique to measure the attitude toward risk of 
rural farm households in India. The results of his study showed that all respondents were 
moderately risk-averse. Also, the author argued that the EM is a reliable technique compared 
with DEU because the interviewer‟s bias can influence the DEU results.  
 3) Observed economic behaviour (OEB): In this method, the risk response behaviour 
of farmers can be estimated from econometric models that incorporate risk attitude 
parameters along with other observed parameters. OEB is less costly compared with the DEU 
and EM techniques and researchers can generate risk effects econometrically from a large 
amount of response data. However, the OEB approach has some restrictions because of the 
availability of aggregate data and other relevant economic variables that might influence risk 
attitudes (Gómez-Limón et al., 2003; Rovere, 1997; Young, 1979). Studies that used the OEB 
method to estimate farmers‟ attitudes toward risk include Chavas and Holt (1990), Chavas 
and Holt (1996), Pope and Just (1991) and Lence (2000).  
Anderson et al. (1977) argued that the most reliable method to elicit a decision maker‟s 
preferences is to require him or her to choose between two-state risky choices with equal 
probability of 0.5 for each state and the sure prospect until indifference is achieved. Some 
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decision makers experience an uncomplicated assessment to choose but others find it 
difficult.  
Therefore, Anderson et al. (1977) introduced two elicitation techniques to obtain the certainty 
equivalent (CE) with unbiased probability. A CE is the sure amount of payoff that a decision 
maker would have to accept and to be indifferent between receiving the amount of payoff and 
taking the given risky choices (Anderson et al., 1977; McConnell & Dillon, 1997). 
Furthermore, Anderson et al. (1977) and Hardaker, Huirne et al. (2004) emphasized that a 
decision maker‟s risk behaviour can be evaluated using the information from CE. The 
expected money value (EMV) can be employed to compare with the CE to identify a decision 
maker‟s risk behaviour. The decision maker can be classified as risk averse if CE is smaller 
than EMV. Conversely, if EMV is larger than CE the decision maker is classified as risk 
loving. Moreover, the difference between the mean or EMV of a risky prospect and its CE 
( CEEMV  ) is called the “risk premium” (McConnell & Dillon, 1997).  
The two utility elicitation techniques developed by Anderson et al. (1977) are: (a) the equally 
likely certainty equivalent (ELCE) method and (b) the equally likely risky outcome (ELRO) 
method. The details of these two techniques are discussed below. 
The equally likely certainty equivalent (ELCE) method 
The ELCE is the most common and efficient method used to elicit individual utility functions 
(Binici et al., 2003; Torkamani & Haji-Rahimi, 2001). The ELCE method begins with a 
simple hypothetical lottery of 0.5/0.5 probabilities, which include the best and worst possible 
outcomes of the decision problem presented to the decision maker (Anderson et al., 1977). 
The decision maker is asked for a sure prospect (CE) that he or she would accept to make 
him/her indifferent between the sure sum and a risky prospect. The CEs are produced for 
each lottery question and are used to plot the individual utility function. The upper and lower 
boundaries of the utility function are set at good and bad possible attribute levels (Ananda & 
Herath, 2005). 
According to Hardaker, Huirne et al. (2004), shorthand notations are established in order to 
explain details of the elicited procedure. We denote ( 1 2, ,...a a ) as a decision maker‟s 
judgments with a set of possible payoffs with corresponding probabilities. We can write the 
risky decisions ( 1 2, ,...a a ) with a discrete payoffs and the sure one ( sa ) as follows: 
1 2 1 2( , ,...; , ,...)~( ;1.0)sX X p p X        (3.8) 
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Where:  
1 2, ,...X X  is a set of possible payoffs; 
1 2, ,...p p  is the probability, summing to 1.0; and 
the ~ symbol implies “is indifferent between”.     
The process of elicitation of CEs for the ELCE method can be explained as follows (the 
notations , , , , ,a b c d e f  specify different values of the payoff to assess w ) (Hardaker, Huirne, 
et al., 2004; Ladányi, 2008):  
Step 1 → set a scale by assuming that a  is the lowest payoff of interest and b  is the highest. 
We declare that ( ) 0U a   and ( ) 1U b  . 
Step 2 → estimate c  such that ( , ;0.5,0.5)~(c;1.0)a b . Next, we can calculate ( )U c  by 
( ) 0.5 ( ) 0.5 ( ) 0.5U c U a U b   . 
Steps 3-4 → estimate d  and e  using ( , ;0.5,0.5)~(d;1.0)a c  and ( , ;0.5,0.5)~(e;1.0)c b . We 
obtain ( ) 0.5 ( ) 0.5 ( ) 0.25U d U a U c    and ( ) 0.5 ( ) 0.5 ( ) 0.75U e U d U b   . 
Step 5 (for the optional check) → estimate f  such that ( , ;0.5,0.5)~(f;1.0)d e . Then we 
obtain ( ) 0.5 ( ) 0.5 ( ) 0.5U f U d U e   . 
Those CE values ( , , , , ,a b c d e f ) that correlate with the utility values of 0 to 1 are used to 
construct a utility function graph (see Figure 3.2).  
Figure 3.2 Utility function derived from the ELCE elicitation method 
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The equally likely risky outcome (ELRO) method 
The ELCE and ELRO methods are quite similar. Quiggin (1981) pointed out that the ELRO 
method compared the risky decision using pairs of values elicited from the same probabilities 
but with different outcomes. Anderson et al. (1977) argued that the ELRO presents the utility 
function for outcomes over the range a  to z , a z , can be formally expressed in the general 
form as follows (Hardaker, Huirne, et al., 2004): 
( , ;0.5,0.5)~(b,c;0.5,0.5)a d        (3.9) 
This method starts by picking a reference interval outcome with a b  and c a  then is 
asked for d  that makes the decision maker indifferent among the risky prospects. To set the 
scale for the utility function, it is assumed that ( ) ( ) 1U b U c   and ( ) 0U a   is defined as the 
origin. Hence, ( ) 1U d  . In the following step, replace the outcome c  with d  to discover a 
new indifference (defined as e ), which refers to as a new point of utility value. The 
procedure continues until a whole range of utility points is captured. The utility function is 
plotted as in the ELCE method (Hardaker, Huirne, et al., 2004). 
The ELCE method has been widely used and recommended for utility function evaluations, 
especially from farmers, because it more reliable and less complicated compared with the 
ELRO. The ELCE is an unbiased method since it is based on the equal probability of 50:50 
risky prospects. Hardaker, Huirne et al. (2004, p. 98) stated that “most people find 50:50 
risky prospects much easier to conceptualize than prospects with other probability ratios”. In 
previous studies, survey questionnaires and interview techniques have been incorporated in 
the ELCE method to elicit the CE for a series of risky outcomes to use as a utility value.  
For example, Tauer (1986) conducted a study using the ELCE method to assess risk 
preferences among dairy farmers in New York. The author attempts to explain the effect of 
risk preferences on farming decisions. Seventy two respondents were interviewed; the results 
showed that 34 per cent were risk averse, 39 per cent were risk neutral, and the rest were risk 
loving. However, there is limited evidence to reveal the relationship between farmers‟ risk 
preferences and their actions and on-farm decisions. Oglethorpe (1995) employed the ELCE 
to derive utility values for a sample of 20 farmers in northern England. The author examined 
how the farm plan developed under the profit maximization approach. The author used a 
negative exponential utility function to fit the values with non-linear least squares. The 
Arrow-Pratt coefficients of absolute risk aversion were estimated and the MOTAD 
programming model employed to generate the E-V frontiers. The results illustrated that, 
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under the profit maximisation approach, risk-averse farmers are extremely sensitive in their 
decision making when the expected farm income declined slightly.  
Torkamani (2005) evaluated the risk aversion attitudes of farmers in Fars province, Iran. A 
total of 60 respondents were interviewed using an applied ELCE questionnaire to elicit the 
farmers‟ utility values and the absolute risk aversion coefficients were assessed. The results 
showed that all sampled farmers were risk averse. The empirical range of the absolute risk 
aversion values ranged from 0.0001 to 0.000001.   
Ananda and Herath (2005) conducted a study of community risk preferences of forest land-
use in Australia using multi-attribute utility theory. The ELCE method was used to extract the 
individual utility functions. There was significant risk-averse behaviour among stakeholders 
of the old-growth forest, conservation and forest-based recreation groups. However, there 
was less risk-averse behaviour in the native timber extraction group.  
According to the literature, the ELCE method has been employed as the basic instruments for 
generalization of the individual utility function. However, Hardaker, Huirne et al. (2004) 
identified some constraints of the ELCE method. First, the ELCE method requires the 
decision maker to compare between a risky prospect and a sure outcome. If the person avoids 
gambling or is a gambling lover then biased decisions may occur. Particularly if the decision 
maker is a person who believes that gambling is prohibited by religion, the ELCE may not 
apply at all. When this occurs, the ELRO is the alternative method to elicit the individual 
utility function. Secondly, both the ELCE and ELRO may be used to compare only in the 
continuous outcomes, such as wealth or income, but cannot apply to discrete outcomes.  
3.4 Utility functional forms 
The utility function determines an individual‟s relative preferences with respect to different 
levels of wealth (Norstad, 1999). The function can be transformed in terms of algebraic form 
for computing and making comparison among its properties. The different algebraic 
specifications of the utility function may affect the classification of risk preferences of the 
decision maker in different ways (Anderson et al., 1977; Hardaker, Huirne, et al., 2004).  
A number of functional forms have been used in previous research to illustrate farmers‟ 
attitudes toward risk. Lin and Chang (1978) investigated the most appropriate functional 
forms to assess farmers‟ utility function. The results showed that the logarithmic and semi-
logarithmic were the appropriate functional forms that can best describe decreasing absolute 
risk aversion. The authors suggested that the choice of utility functional forms can affect the 
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classification of risk preference results. Buccola and French (1978) reported risk parameter 
estimation problems using the exponential utility form. Their results showed that logarithmic 
transformation of the exponential utility function was inconsistent with the Von Neumann 
and Morgenstern principles. The use of the Box-Cox transformation and power functional 
forms were inappropriate to estimate the utility function because of intercept problems 
(Buccola, 1982).  
Musser et al. (1984) emphasized the problems when using different functional forms to 
classify the risk attitude of a decision maker. The authors applied the quadratic, semi-log and 
modified power functional forms to categorize risk preferences of 13 graduate students in an 
agricultural finance class during winter 1981. Their results showed that the quadratic and 
modified power function categorized most respondents as risk neutral whereas all the 
respondents were risk-averse using the semi-log function form. The authors argued that 
alternative utility functions may affect classification of risk preferences. 
Ramaratnam, Rister, Bessler and Novak (1986) examined the appropriateness among the four 
different utility functional forms (quadratic, log-linear, semi-log and exponential) to describe 
the risk behaviour of grain sorghum farmers in Texas. The exponential function was 
determined as the most appropriate functional form to explain farmers‟ risk preferences. 
Zuhair, Taylor and Kramer (1992) indicated that the exponential form was appropriate when 
employed to explain risk aversion and the prediction of farmers‟ harvesting strategy in Sri 
Lanka. Both studies argued that the choice of utility functional forms is very important 
because different utility functional forms can describe farmers‟ risk preferences in different 
ways.  
Saha (1993) introduced a new utility functional form namely the expo-power utility function. 
The author emphasized that the expo-power utility function is flexible to demonstrate almost 
any type of risk aversion coefficient structure (DARA, CARA, IARA, DRRA or IRRA) that 
is devoid of restriction relying on parameter values. Saha, Shumway and Talpaz (1994) 
employed the expo-power utility function and production function using the joint estimation 
method to describe the risk preference structure and production technology among Kansas 
wheat farmers. The risk characteristics of farmers in their study exhibited DARA and IRRA. 
The authors argued that the joint estimation method was suitable when applied to estimate 
production parameters with utility function parameters.   
Torkamani and Haji-Rahimi (2001) used four different utility functional forms to test 
goodness of fit and compared their properties. The authors‟ results showed that all the 
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sampled farmers were risk averse when the exponential and expo-power utility functions 
were used. On the other hand, 65 per cent and 75 per cent of the farmers were categorized as 
having risk averse behaviour using the cubic and quadratic utility function, respectively. 
Similarly, a study of 50 farmers from Turkey found that 49 and 48 farmers were classified as 
risk-averse for the expo-power and the power utility function, respectively. Fifteen of the 50 
farmers were risk loving when the cubic utility function was tested. All of the interviewed 
farmers were risk-averse when the negative exponential utility function was used (Binici et 
al., 2003). Ananda and Herath (2005) argued that the negative exponential functional form 
was popularly employed to produce the utility function in previous studies on multi-attribute 
conditions.  
The most appropriate functional forms and type of risk measurement that are recommended 
to specify utility function are listed below (Binici et al., 2003; Hardaker, Huirne, et al., 2004; 
Torkamani & Haji-Rahimi, 2001):   
1. The cubic utility function  
The cubic utility functional form can be expressed as:  
 32)( dwcwbwawU         (3.10) 
Where:  
)(wU  is the utility with respect to wealth ( w ); cba ,,  and d  are parameters.  
The cubic utility function can examine the Arrow-Pratt absolute risk aversion 
coefficient ( ( )ar w ) as follows: 
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Binici et al. (2003) and Torkamani and Haji-Rahimi (2001) pointed out that ( )ar w  of the 
cubic utility function can be either negative or positive depending on the parameter values 
and level of wealth. The cubic utility function is compatible with risk aversion, risk neutrality 
and risk loving behaviour because it exhibits both IARA and DARA.   
2. The negative exponential utility function 
The negative exponential utility function can be formally expressed as: 
( ) 1 exp( ), 0U w cw c           (3.12) 
Where:  
exp denotes exponential; c  is parameter.  
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The absolute risk aversion coefficient of the negative exponential utility function 
estimated as follows:  
c
wU
wU
wra 



)(
)(
)(         (3.13) 
The vital properties of this utility function are that ( )ar w  is constant ( c ) and positive over all 
levels of wealth (Binici et al., 2003; Ladányi & Erdélyi, 2007). Hence, the negative 
exponential utility function assumes CARA and is extensively used in empirical decision 
analysis because the function itself can be assessed using a single CE with a normal 
distribution of wealth. However, Hardaker, Huirne et al. (2004) argued that it may have some 
numerical problems when assessing the negative exponential utility function for large values 
of wealth together with a relatively large values of c . 
3. The power utility function 
The power utility functional form can be written as: 
( ) ,0 1U w w             (3.14) 
Where:  
,   and   are parameters.  
The absolute risk aversion coefficient of the power utility functional form can be 
calculated as follows: 
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wra        (3.15) 
The power utility function has interesting properties because it exhibits DARA, which 
decreases while wealth increases and the ( )ar w  is positive (Binici et al., 2003). 
4. The expo-power utility function 
The expo-power utility functional form can be expressed as: 
 ( ) exp( ), 1, 0, 0, 0U w w                (3.16) 
Where:  
,   and   are parameters.  
The absolute risk aversion coefficient of the expo-power utility functional form can be 
calculated as follows: 
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According to Saha (1993), the attractive property of the expo-power utility function is its 
flexibility and that it can exhibit IARA if 1  , CARA if 1   and DARA if 1  . 
Moreover, this functional form is quasi concave for all values of 0w  .  
However, there are other common functional forms that could be used to describe the risk 
behaviour of the farmers such as log, exponent and a hyperbolic absolute risk aversion 
(HARA) type utility function (Schumann, Richardson, Lien, & Hardaker, 2004).   
3.5 Risk efficiency approaches  
As discussed above, to evaluate risky alternatives requires consideration of the whole range 
of outcomes with their probability distributions, along with the relative preferences (utilities) 
of the decision maker(s) for those consequences.  
The efficiency criteria approach should be applied when decision analysis is based on 
uncertain situations and the preferences of the decision makers are unknown (Lien, Stordal, et 
al., 2007). Efficiency criteria allow some ranking of risky choices when the specific utility is 
not provided (Hardaker, Huirne, et al., 2004). Three common methods are used for ranking 
risky alternatives including mean variance (E-V), stochastic dominance and certainty 
equivalent (CE) when simulation is employed (Lau, 2004). The mean-variance efficiency 
method is widely used in whole-farm planning but this technique does not incorporate a 
decision maker‟s risk preferences (Hardaker, Huirne, et al., 2004; Hardaker, Richardson, et 
al., 2004; Lau, 2004).  
Stochastic dominance (SD) is one of the most widely used risk efficiency approaches to rank 
risky alternatives. The SD technique relies on a pair-wise comparison of alternative risky 
prospects (Hardaker, Huirne, et al., 2004). Each alternative is enclosed with the probability 
distribution of outcome x  that is described by a cumulative distribution function (CDF). The 
CDF, denoted by )(xF , is given as: 
 


xX
xPxXPxF )()()(    for a discrete distribution; and (3.18)  
 


x
dttfxF )()(    for a continuous random variable.  (3.19) 
Where: 
 X  is a random variable; and  
 x  is a particular value, )(xF  ranges from ( ) 0F    to ( ) 1F    (Levy, 2006).  
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Some stochastic dominance decision analysis forms are briefly introduced below. The 
development of each technique involves the wellness of fit in risk preferences assumptions 
and a reduction in the size of the efficient set (Hardaker, Huirne, et al., 2004).  
First-degree stochastic dominance (FSD) 
The FSD is the most uncomplicated form of stochastic dominance. This technique is used to 
rank the alternatives for the individual who prefers more wealth to less, implying that 0U    
(Hardaker, Huirne, et al., 2004; Levy, 2006). Let us assume that the decision maker is faced 
with two alternative plans X and Y, and desires to rank the two risky plans that have the CDF 
of ( )F   and ( )G  , respectively. The FSD rule can tell us whether one alternative 
stochastically dominates the other or we can say the alternative X is first degree stochastically 
dominant over Y if and only if:  
 ( ) ( )F x G x  , for all x        (3.20) 
with at least one strong inequality (Schumann, 2005). This implies that the CDF of X lies 
below and to the right of the CDF of Y. If the CDFs of X and Y crosses each other, then 
neither dominates. Therefore, this is a crucial point to the limited discriminatory power of the 
FSD (Hardaker, Huirne, et al., 2004). See Figure 3.3 for a graphical representation of the 
FSD analysis.   
Figure 3.3 First-degree stochastic dominance analysis applied to two of alternative 
plans, X and Y 
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Note: It can be clearly seen that X is first degree stochastically dominant over Y.  
Source: Schumann (2005) 
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Second-degree stochastic dominance (SSD) 
This is designed to rank two risky alternatives X and Y with related distribution functions 
( )F   and ( )G   under the SSD criterion. The restrictive axiom required is that most decision 
makers are risk averse, preferring more wealth to less from which it may be inferred that the 
utility function is concave or 0U    and 0U   . The risk aversion coefficient bounds are 
0 ( )ar w    (Hardaker, Huirne, et al., 2004). Alternatively, X is said to be second degree 
stochastically dominant over Y if, and only if: 
 


x
dttFtG 0)()(  , for all values of x      (3.21)  
with at least one strong inequality (Schumann, 2005). In the SSD, the distribution of 
outcomes is indicated by the area under the CDF curve of each alternative. Graphically, this 
says that “the curve of the cumulative area under the CDF for the dominant alternative lies 
everywhere below and to the right of the corresponding curve for the dominated alternative” 
(Hardaker, Huirne, et al., 2004, p. 149). See Figure 3.4 for an illustration of the SSD analysis.  
Hardaker, Huirne et al. (2004) and Lien, Stordal et al. (2007) argued that the SSD is more 
discriminatory than the FSD. However, the SSD test cannot yield useful results from previous 
studies because the efficient sets are still too large.  
Figure 3.4 Second-degree stochastic dominance analysis applied to two alternative 
plans, X and Y 
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Note: Alternative X is second degree stochastically dominant over alternative Y because area A is greater than 
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Stochastic dominance with respect to a function (SDRF) 
The SDRF, which is also called generalized stochastic dominance, is an alternative to SSD 
and FSD because it has more discriminatory power than both methods. The SDRF requires 
the appropriate assessment of the decision makers‟ utility functional forms to be fitted in its 
computation process. Evidently, the different applications of a utility function can affect the 
results of this technique. SDRF allocates a ranking to risky alternatives for decision makers 
whose absolute risk aversion coefficient lies within set boundaries, upper ( ( )Ur w ) and lower 
( ( )Lr w ) bound,  ( ) ( ) ( )L a Ur w r w r w   (Hardaker, Richardson, et al., 2004).  
For example, assume there are two risky alternatives X and Y with associated cumulative 
distributions ( )F   and ( )G  , respectively. Alternative X is said to be second degree 
stochastically dominant over Y with respect to function ( )k x  if, and only if: 
 
0
( ) ( ) ( ) 0
y
G x F x dk x  ,  0,1y         (3.22) 
See Figure 3.5 for a graphical representation of the second degree stochastic dominance with 
respect to a function analysis. 
Figure 3.5 The utility-weighted distribution function of two alternative plans, X and Y 
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Note: In this case, alternative X is second degree stochastically dominant over alternative Y with respect to the 
negative exponential utility function 
xexk  )(  and 010.0 ar  or as it can be seen from the 
graph, alternative X dominates Y because area A is greater than area B.  
Source: Schumann (2005) 
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Stochastic efficiency with respect to a function (SERF) 
Hardaker, Huirne et al. (2004) introduced SERF, a new method for ranking risky alternatives. 
The authors argued that there are more advantages in SERF over SDRF. SERF varies risk 
aversion over a defined range and ranks risky alternatives in terms of CE of each alternative 
over the relevant parameter of the utility function (Schumann, 2005). SERF can be applied 
with any utility function and can identify a smaller efficient set for a specified degree of risk 
aversion which can be parameterised within a given upper and lower bound than SDRF 
(Hardaker & Lien, 2010). SERF can compare any level of decision makers‟ preferences 
including risk-averse, risk neutral and risk loving. In addition, SDRF requires a pair-wise 
comparison between  two risky alternatives to investigate which alternative is stochastically 
dominant over the other but SERF can compare all risky alternatives over the defined range 
of absolute risk aversion (Meyer, Richardson, & Schumann, 2009). 
Hardaker, Huirne et al. (2004, p. 154) state that “for each risky alternative and for a chosen 
form of the utility function, the subjective expected utility hypothesis means that utility can be 
calculated depending on the degree of risk aversion ( r ) and the distribution of wealth ( w )” 
as follows: 
 dwwfrwUrwU )(),(),(        (3.23)  
Where: 
  U  is the utility function and the expression is calculated for selected values of r  over 
the range Lr  (lower) to Ur  (upper).  
The CE for each of these values of U  is defined as follows: 
1( , ) ( , )CE w r U w r          (3.24)  
The rule of SERF is “the efficient set contains only those alternatives that have the highest 
(or equal highest) CE for some value of ar  in the relevant range” (Hardaker, Huirne, et al., 
2004, p. 154). An illustration of the SERF methods of evaluating two risky alternatives is 
given in Figure 3.6.  
With SERF analysis, the range of risk aversion to be used is very important (Lien, Stordal, et 
al., 2007). Anderson and Dillon (1992) recommended a rough classification of the degree of 
risk aversion coefficient ranging from 0.5 for a decision maker who is least risk averse to 4.0 
for a decision maker who is extremely risk averse. 
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The SERF technique is a novel improved methodology for assessing and ranking risky 
alternatives but empirical studies using SERF are limited. In this study, the technique is 
applied to assess a set of alternative risky farming systems. The SERF method ranks 
alternative risky farming systems in terms of the CE of annual net farm revenue over a range 
of risk aversion levels.  
Figure 3.6 Stochastic efficiency with respect to a function analysis, showing the certainty 
equivalent (CE) for two alternative plans, X and Y 
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Note: In this case, alternative X presents stochastic efficiency over Y with respect to the negative exponential 
utility function 
wewk  )( over a range of values of )018.0,(  and alternative Y presents 
stochastic efficiency over X over a range of values of ),018.0(  . 
Source: Schumann (2005) 
According to the literature, the economic risk efficiency using stochastic approaches to 
investigate risk efficient alternatives in agriculture is well researched. Stochastic approaches 
are applied to compare risky alternatives in farm production, marketing and financial matters 
(see Table 3.1). The important findings of those studies are summarized and discussed below. 
Risky farm production alternatives 
In terms of on-farm production, stochastic approaches have been used to quantify and 
compare risk efficiency among the different farm production alternatives. Lien et al. (2006) 
applied SERF to assess and compare the distribution of net farm returns between three risky 
cropping systems including organic, integrated and conventional farming systems in eastern 
Norway. Their results showed that an organic cropping system was the most efficient 
( )($)CE   
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alternative and appropriate for risk-averse farmers in the area. Lien, Hardaker and Flaten 
(2007) applied a whole-farm stochastic model to support eastern Norway farmers‟ decision 
making whether to change from conventional farming systems to organic. Their model 
assessed the financial performance of both farming systems. Six years planning the net 
present value (NPV) distribution for each farm system were generated under two scenarios: 
the current scenario and the reducing organic price premiums scenario. SERF was used to 
investigate the alternative risky farming systems for each scenario. The scenario results 
showed that when the farmers tried to eliminate organic areas payments and organic price 
premiums from the stochastic model, the conventional system was higher economically and 
more risk efficient compared with the organic farming system.   
Tzouramani, Karanikolas, Alexopoulos, Sintori and Liontakis (2008) examined the net return 
of sheep production in the Macedonia region of Greece. SERF was employed to determine 
risk efficiency between conventional and organic sheep farming. The data obtained from 
eight conventional and 16 organic sheep farms were combined with the historical data of 
yield and price from 1999 to 2003. The results showed that both conventional and organic 
sheep farming exhibited a low possibility to generate a negative net return and the organic 
method was stochastically efficient over the conventional sheep farming. However, the 
authors found that, when the organic subsidies were removed, conventional sheep farming 
was more risk efficient than organic farming. Like Tzouramani, Karanikolas and 
Alexopoulos‟s (2008) study, the authors found that the organic subsidies and crop loss 
assistance payments were important factors to help the organic cultivation of lemons and 
citrus be more economically viable than conventional cultivation. 
Upadhyay, Smith, Clayton and Harker (2004) investigated net returns associated with risk for 
canola production in Alberta. Canola farmers were confronted by some risky alternatives 
including cultivar selection, time of seeding and time of weed control. Eighteen different 
management decisions in canola production were examined to evaluate their net returns and 
risks. The results showed that seeding in early spring with late weed control was the risk 
efficient production alternative for risk-averse Alberta canola farmers. Devkota, Holcomb, 
Taylor and Epplin (2006) applied SERF to rank the most risk efficient cropping pattern for 
farmers in Oklahoma. The stochastic simulation model was employed to examine the net 
return distribution for the eight different cropping alternatives. The results showed that 
seedless watermelon production was stochastically more efficient than other cropping 
alternatives and appropriate for the risk loving farmers, but irrigated peanut production was 
economically viable for risk averse farmers.  
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In Weisensel and Schoney‟s (1989) study, the authors examined the risk efficiency of 
incorporating lentils with wheat in Saskatchewan farms. Two crop rotations were selected as 
sample alternatives for the farmers. The authors applied SDRF to establish the suitable risk 
aversion levels of farmers who needed to incorporate lentils with their wheat system. The 
authors‟ results indicated that lentil rotation would be preferred by risk loving farmers, but a 
wheat rotation was suitable for risk averse farmers. The authors also argued that the farmers‟ 
risk attitude was the main criterion why many farmers in Saskatchewan would not 
incorporate lentils in the wheat rotation. Similarly, McLellan and Carlberg (2010) 
investigated the most risk efficient crop rotations for southern Manitoba for grain and oilseed 
farmers to integrate legumes and legume cover crops into their farm production. The results 
showed that including a black lentil cover crop into a cereal based production system was 
stochastically efficient over the other crop rotation alternatives and appropriate for the risk 
neutral and all levels of risk averse farmers. This crop rotation not only increased the farmers‟ 
net returns by approximately 49 per cent but could also reduce the application of chemical 
fertilizer.  
Lien, Stordal et al. (2007) conducted a study to investigate an optimal tree replanting plan on 
an area recently harvested in Norway. The NPV distribution of each rotation plan length from 
t = 60 to 110 years was calculated. SERF illustrated that the forest owner‟s degree of risk 
aversion affected both the optimal rotation plan selection and the reinvestment decision. The 
results showed that the shorter rotation length would be preferred by risk-neutral forest 
owners. The authors argued that policy makers should incorporate the forest owners‟ degree 
of risk aversion to implement a suitable policy on forest investment. 
Pendell, Williams, Boyles, Rice and Nelson (2007) conducted a study to examine the net 
returns in Kansas corn production using the no-tillage system versus conventional tillage with 
either commercial nitrogen or cattle manure. Eight production systems were constructed to 
simulate the net farm returns using either conventional tillage or no-tillage with either 
ammonium nitrate or cattle manure on corn farms. The SERF results showed that no-tillage 
with cattle manure was stochastically efficient over other production systems and suitable for 
risk neutral and less risk averse farmers. The results also indicated that this production system 
could raise the level of carbon in the soil but gave lower net returns. The authors argued that 
carbon credits or government programme incentives were not required to attract risk-averse 
corn farmers to use no-tillage. Yiridoe, Weersink, Hooker, Vyn and Swanton (2000) applied 
SDRF to assess and compare the net returns associated with risk for one conventional tillage 
and seven conservation tillage practices (including five reduced tillage and two no tillage) in 
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corn and soybean cropping systems for two clay soils in Ontario. The tillage system selection 
was crucial in soil conservation. Total net returns were calculated for each of the eight tillage 
systems. The results showed that the conventional tillage systems dominated the reduced 
tillage and no-tillage systems in both clay soil types regardless of levels of risk aversion.  
Archer and Reicosky (2009) investigated the most risk efficient tillage system alternatives on 
corn and soybean production in west-central Minnesota. Eight different tillage systems were 
constructed to compare their risk efficiency using SERF analysis. Historical yield data for 
each tillage system (1997-2003) were obtained from the experimental farm. Crop and input 
prices for 2003 to 2007 were collected from the Census of Agriculture and all prices were 
adjusted to 2007 dollars. The results showed that fall residue management was the most 
economically viable alternative and appropriate for risk neutral and risk averse corn and 
soybean producers. 
Shively (1999) conducted a study to analyse risk and profitability associated with soil 
preservation of hedgerows practice among hillside corn farms in the Philippines. This 
practice was widely recommended to hillside farmers because it can increase soil fertility and 
decrease the use of chemical fertilizers. The author used SDRF combined with a 
heteroskedastic regression model to investigate the hypothesis that the hedgerow practice 
could lower yield risk. The average data on yields and NPV were compared using data 
collected from a sample of 115 hillside corn farms in the province of Davao del Sur. The 
regression results showed weak support for the hypothesis that hedgerow practice could 
reduce yield variability. However, the SDRF results showed that such a practice was 
appropriate for the farmer who had a coefficient of relative risk aversion in the range of 3.0-
5.5. 
Risky marketing alternatives 
Elrod, Robinson and Richardson (2008) applied SERF to investigate the most risk efficient 
marketing strategy that would be preferred by the risk averse cotton farmers in west Texas. 
Three marketing alternatives were constructed to evaluate their performance in terms of 
reducing price risk. They were forward pricing, cash selling at harvest and putting the crop 
into a Commodity Credit Corporation loan programme to delay selling. The authors 
employed scenario analysis to investigate each marketing strategy for both irrigated and dry 
land cotton farms. The findings showed that in every scenario the put option was the most 
risk efficient marketing strategy and appropriate for the risk averse irrigated and dry land 
cotton farmers. 
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Donnelly and Noel (2006) evaluated the optimal forward contracting strategy for lettuce 
farmers in California. The authors employed five different market combinations: 40 per cent 
contract-60 per cent cash market, 50 per cent contract-50 per cent cash market, 65 per cent 
contract-35 per cent cash market, 80 per cent contract-20 per cent cash market and 100 per 
cent contract, to quantify which option generated the highest economic returns and was risk 
efficient for the lettuce farmers. The results indicated that 100 per cent contract was the 
stochastically efficient option and would be preferred by all levels of risk averse lettuce 
farmers. However, the authors suggested that a 100 per cent contract strategy might be 
impossible in the real world. This was because there are not enough buyers available in the 
market and some farmers are willing to sell their products in the cash market. Therefore, 
combinations of 65 per cent, or more, contract should be possible options to generate higher 
returns for the farmers.  
Risky financial alternatives 
Lau (2004) conducted a study to investigate the effect of economic factors on the location 
decision and the financial feasibility project of MixAlco, a corn-based ethanol factory, in 
three alternative regions in Texas. The author employed SERF to simulate the 16-year 
planning NPV distribution to predict the optimal location preference for decision makers with 
different levels of risk aversion. The results showed that, compared with other alternative 
locations, the central region was preferred by risk-averse decision makers. The author also 
argued that SERF was a useful technique for analysing feasibility and location problems. 
Richardson, Herbst, Duncan, den Besten and van Hoven (2007) investigated and compared 
the economic returns associated with risk between Dutch dairy farms and dairy farms in 
different regions of the US. The authors tried to elucidate whether Dutch dairy farmers 
should continue their farm operations in the Netherlands or relocate their investments to the 
US. The 10-year NPV of net returns (2002-2011) was simulated for each dairy farm and 
SERF was employed to rank the NPV distributions with different levels of farmers‟ risk 
preferences. The results showed that risk averse Dutch dairy farmers who had sufficient 
equity preferred to liquidate their farm operations in the Netherlands and emigrate to the US 
to invest in dairying in Idaho or north Texas. This is because the dairy farms in these areas 
were stochastically efficient over dairy farms in other regions of the US. 
Nartea and Webster (2008) attempted to clarify whether New Zealand sheep and beef farmers 
could earn some benefits by incorporating other financial investments, such as ordinary 
industrial shares, government bonds and bank bills, to diversify their farm asset portfolios. 
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Mean-variance (EV) analysis was employed to generate the possible risk efficient portfolio 
options using historical annual rates of return on farmland, shares, bonds and bank bills from 
1990 to 2005. Each portfolio option was simulated using different combinations of 
investment strategies, which can represent different risk-return characteristics, ranging from 
the minimum variance portfolio to the maximum expected return portfolio. The authors 
employed SERF to rank the portfolio options‟ CE over a range of farmers‟ risk preferences. 
The results indicated that investing in financial assets was preferred by New Zealand farmers 
who had a high degree of risk aversion, but incorporating bonds rather than shares for 
portfolios was appropriate for somewhat risk averse farmers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 6
0
 
Table 3.1 Summary of the economic risk efficiency in agriculture studies using stochastic approaches  
Author(s) Country/Area of 
the studies 
Major purpose(s) Stochastic 
approaches 
Results of the study 
Farm production alternatives – compare organic versus conventional farming systems 
Lien et al. (2006)  Norway Evaluate risk efficiency 
of organic, integrated and 
conventional crop 
farming systems.  
SERF  Organic farming is risk efficient over 
the other farming systems and most 
suitable for all risk averse farmers.  
Lien, Hardaker et al. 
(2007) 
Norway Investigate economic 
sustainability and risk 
efficiency between 
organic and conventional 
crop farming systems.  
SERF  The economic sustainability of 
conventional farming tends to be higher 
than organic farming, especially when 
the organic areas payments and organic 
price premiums were removed. 
Tzouramani et al. (2008) Greece Evaluate risk efficiency 
of organic versus 
conventional sheep 
farming.  
SERF  Organic sheep farming generates 
higher expected net farm income than 
conventional sheep farming. This is 
because of the effect of the organic 
subsidies. 
Tzouramani, Karanikolas 
and Alexopoulos (2008) 
Greece Determine risk efficiency 
between organic and 
conventional lemons and 
citrus cultivation.  
SERF  Organic lemons and citrus farming are 
stochastically efficient over the 
conventional farming and appropriate 
for all risk averse farmers. 
Farm production alternatives – determine the most risk efficient farming alternatives 
Upadhyay et al. (2004) Alberta, Canada Investigate the most risk 
efficient cropping 
alternatives for canola 
production. 
SDRF  Seeding in early spring with late weed 
control was the most economically 
viable canola production option and 
appropriate for risk averse farmers.  
 
 
 
 6
1
 
Table 3.1 Summary of the economic risk efficiency in agriculture studies using stochastic approaches (cont.) 
Author(s) Country/Area of 
the studies 
Major purpose(s) Stochastic 
approaches 
Results of the study 
Devkota et al. (2006) Oklahoma, USA Determine and compare 
economic risk cropping 
patterns for farmers. 
SERF  Seedless watermelon production was 
the most suitable cropping option for 
risk loving farmers, while the irrigated 
peanuts production was suitable for risk 
averse farmers.    
Weisensel and Schoney  
(1989) 
Saskatchewan, 
Canada 
Assess the net returns 
associated with risk 
between wheat and lentil 
crop rotations. 
SDRF  Wheat rotation would be preferred by 
the risk averse farmers and lentil 
rotation was appropriate for risk loving 
farmers.  
McLellan and Carlberg  
(2010) 
Manitoba, Canada Investigate the economic 
risk crop rotations which 
incorporate legumes and 
legume cover crops into 
cereal production. 
SERF  Including black lentil cover crop in 
cereal production was the most 
economically viable for the risk neutral 
and all levels of risk averse farmers. 
Lien, Stordal et al. (2007) Norway Investigate the most risk 
efficient tree replanting 
strategies. 
SERF  Shorter rotation length preferred by the 
risk neutral forest owner. 
Farm production alternatives – determine the most risk efficient tillage systems  
Pendell et al. (2007) Kansas, USA Investigate the risk 
efficient system 
alternatives between no-
tillage and conventional 
tillage systems of corn 
production. 
SERF  No-tillage and cattle manure was the 
most risk efficient production system 
and appropriate for risk neutral and less 
risk averse corn producers. 
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Table 3.1 Summary of the economic risk efficiency in agriculture studies using stochastic approaches (cont.) 
Author(s) Country/Area of 
the studies 
Major purpose(s) Stochastic 
approaches 
Results of the study 
Yiridoe et al. (2000) Ontario, Canada Compare net returns for 
conventional tillage and 
conservation tillage 
systems of corn and 
soybean production on two 
types of clay soil. 
SDRF  Conventional tillage systems were 
generally considered more efficient in 
reducing risk than other systems for 
both types of clay soil. 
Archer and Reicosky 
(2009) 
Minnesota, USA Assess the economic risks 
and net returns for 
different tillage system 
options for corn-soybean 
production.  
SERF  Fall residue management was 
stochastically efficient over the other 
tillage system options and appropriate 
for the risk neutral and risk averse 
farmers. 
Shively (1999) Philippines Investigate economic risk 
between contour 
hedgerows and 
conventional tillage 
systems on hillside corn 
farms. 
SDRF  Hedgerows preferred by risk averse 
farmers who have relative risk aversion 
in the range 3.0 to 5.5. 
Marketing alternatives 
Elrod et al. (2008) Texas, USA Evaluate the most risk 
efficient marketing options 
which were suitable for 
risk averse cotton farmers. 
SERF  Put option strategy was stochastically 
efficient over the other marketing 
options and preferred by the risk averse 
cotton farmers in both irrigated and 
dryland areas.  
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Table 3.1 Summary of the economic risk efficiency in agriculture studies using stochastic approaches (cont.) 
Author(s) Country/Area of 
the studies 
Major purpose(s) Stochastic 
approaches 
Results of the study 
Donnelly and Noel (2006) California, USA Assess the optimal 
forward contracting 
strategy to maximize 
returns and minimize risk 
for the lettuce farmers 
SERF  A 100 per cent contract was the most 
risk efficient strategy and suitable for 
risk averse lettuce farmers. 
Financial alternatives 
Lau (2004) Texas, USA Investigate the most risk 
efficient financial project 
feasibility of ethanol 
factory investment in three 
different regions.  
SERF  The central region of Texas was the 
most suitable area for the ethanol plant 
to be built and would be preferred by 
the risk averse investors.  
Richardson et al. (2007) Netherlands and 
USA 
Investigate and compare 
economic returns 
associated with risk of the 
dairy farms in both 
countries. 
SERF  Risk averse Dutch dairy farmers 
preferred to liquidate their farm 
operations in the Netherlands and 
invest in dairying in the US. 
Nartea and Webster 
(2008) 
New Zealand Analyse the appropriate 
farmers‟ portfolio options 
to include other financial 
investments.  
SERF  Highly risk averse farmers would 
prefer to diversify their farm asset 
portfolios, while incorporate bonds 
rather than shares in portfolios would 
be suitable for somewhat risk averse 
farmers. 
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     Chapter 4 
Research Methodology 
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.1 discusses the research design of the study. 
The locale of the study is presented in Section 4.2. The methodological approach used in 
collecting the data as well as the sample selection and the instrument administration are 
outlined in Section 4.3. In the following section, the data limitations are described. Section 
4.5 discusses data processing and analysis.     
4.1 Research design 
The approach used to analyse the data in this study can be addressed as follows: 
a) What is the most risk efficient farming system suitable for Thai smallholder 
farmers? 
b) What are the risk preferences of Thai smallholder farmers? 
c) What are the major sources of risk that Thai smallholder farmers confront and 
how do they manage and cope with those risks? 
Different farming systems are thought to produce significant income variation and risk. In 
order to investigate a risk efficient farming system, the risk efficiency approach was 
employed to compare economic variability between different farming systems. The 
comparison of the risky options using risk efficiency criteria required information on a 
whole-farm stochastic simulation to analyse and assess income risk differences (Lien et al., 
2006). Many previous studies employed farm-level panel data on yield and price of the 
optional farming systems from the scientific experimental station database to specify their 
stochastic farm models (Lien et al., 2006; Pendell et al., 2007).  
However, due to insufficient relevant information about smallholder farm-level panel data in 
Thailand, field surveys were employed to estimate the average net farm income of each 
farming system, supplemented by historical data on yields and prices from the Office of 
Agricultural Economics (OAE) database. These data were used to generate the whole-farm 
stochastic models in the study areas.  
In addition, it was interesting to elicit the risk preferences of smallholder farmers in Thailand 
because risk attitudes represent farmers‟ decision behaviour in managing their farm. The 
farmers‟ risk attitude will be measured using the equal likely certainty equivalent (ELCE) 
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method (Hardaker, Huirne, et al., 2004). This method obtains the individual certainty 
equivalent (CE) for a series of risky outcomes and then matches the CEs with the utility 
values. The risk aversion coefficient will be evaluated and compared using several utility 
function forms. The choice of utility function will directly affect the classification of attitudes 
toward risk.    
Risky environments vary and depend on farm type, geography and other factors, and 
influence farm business in different ways. A weighted Likert scale was used to measure Thai 
farmers‟ perceptions on sources of risk and risk management strategies. Each scale indicates 
the respondent‟s level of agreement with a statement measured on a five point scale, with „1‟ 
not important, „5‟ extremely important and „3‟ quite important. The number of sources of risk 
and risk responses were grouped and reduced using factor analysis. The relationship of socio-
economic characteristics and risk perceptions was also examined. 
4.2 Locale of the study  
The investigation was conducted in the central and north-east regions of Thailand. The two 
regions are dissimilar in terms of natural resources, economic development and income 
distribution. The north-east has nearly 35 per cent of the total land area of the country. 
Roughly 58 million rai (9.3 million ha) or 55 per cent, is categorized as the arable (OAE, 
2009). The population of the north-east was estimated at around 23 million in 2007; around 
one third of the Thai population lives in this region (NESDB, 2008a). Although, the north-
east has the biggest share of agriculture land, most farmers in the region are poor. 
In 2007, the NESDB reported the gross regional product (GRP) at current market prices of 
the north-east at approximately 904,119 million baht. The income from the agricultural sector 
accounted for 20 per cent of the north-east GRP or nearly 183,977 million baht. Though the 
GRP of the north-east is greater than that of the central region, the GRP per capita of the 
north-east is considerably smaller than that of the central region (NESDB, 2008a). Nearly 
half the population in the north-east lives in the rural area and engages in agriculture. In 2007, 
the number of farm units in the north-east was estimated at 2.7 million farms (OAE, 2009). 
The average annual net farm income of a farmer in the north-east is lower than in the central 
area and the lowest in the country (around 21,399 baht/household/year) (OAE, 2009).  
In the north-east agricultural production is relatively small compared with the central region 
with significantly lower yields of some major cash crops; this may explain the low net farm 
income in the north-east (see Table 4.1). The poor productivity of soil, inadequate rainfall 
and lack of water resource infrastructure have been identified as vital constraints that affect 
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the low crop yields in the north-east (Floch, Molle, & Loiskandl, 2007; Suetrong & Pairintra, 
1989). 
Most soils in the north-east are categorised as Solodize-Solonetz. The common features of 
this type of soil are sandy, low fertility, highly acid and poor water-holding capacity. On the 
other hand, soils in the central area are alluvial soils that are poorly drained and moderately 
high fertility. The alluvial soils appear suitable for rice cultivation (Attanandana, Kyuma, & 
Kunaporn, 1996; Land Development Department, 2009). In terms of irrigation development, 
in 2007, public irrigation systems in Thailand covered an area of approximately 28 million rai 
(4.5 million ha). Roughly 11.3 million rai (1.8 million ha) is located in the central area with 
41 large scale irrigation schemes. However, the development of water resource infrastructure 
in the north-east is slow covering an agricultural area of roughly 5.9 million rai (0.9 million 
ha) (RID, 2008). 
The different farming resources and economic situations were used to select the two regions 
as the study areas. These conditions may have a significant effect on farming patterns, 
particularly for smallholder farmers. Therefore, the best and worst characteristics of 
smallholder farmers between both two regions provide a basis for comparison of the results 
using risk efficiency criteria. In addition, the central and north-east regions are the major 
agricultural regions of Thailand. Both regions cover approximately 65 percent of farming 
area of the country. Over 60 percent of Thai farmers live in these two regions (see Table 1.3). 
These are the rationales why the central and north-east regions were selected as the study 
location. 
Table 4.1 Main agricultural features of the central and north-east regions in Thailand 
Main features Central North-east 
Gross regional product (GRP) at current market prices 
in 2007 
a 
(millions baht) 
       - Agriculture  
       - Non-agriculture  
 
611,413 
38,892 
572,521 
 
904,119 
183,977 
720,142 
GRP per capita in 2007 
a
 (baht) 203,245 40,144 
Population in 2007
 a
 (1,000 persons)  3,008 22,522 
Total land area in 2007 
b
  (1,000 rais) 64,938 105,534 
Total arable area in 2007
 b
  (1,000 rais) 25,831 57,736 
Number of farms in 2007 
b
 881,830 2,695,472 
Average annual net farm income in 2007 
b
 
(baht/household/year) 
83,814 21,399 
Production and yields of selected cash crops in 2007 
b
   
       Wet rice 
             - production (1,000 tonnes) 
             - yield (kilograms/rai) 
 
5,515 
592 
 
10,378 
338 
       Dry rice 
             - production (1,000 tonnes) 
             - yield (kilograms/rai)        
 
3,910 
714 
 
478 
535 
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Table 4.1 Main agricultural features of the central and north-east regions in Thailand 
(cont.) 
Main features Central North-east 
       Cassava 
             - production (1,000 tonnes) 
             - yield (kilograms/rai) 
 
8,433 
3,803 
 
13,715 
3,607 
       Maize 
             - production (1,000 tonnes) 
             - yield (kilograms/rai) 
 
686 
629 
 
666 
550 
       Sugarcane 
             - production (1,000 tonnes) 
             - yield (kilograms/rai) 
 
22,850 
10,100 
 
22,469 
9,829 
Soil type 
c
 Alluvial soils Solodized-Solonetz 
Irrigation area in 2007
 d
 (1,000 rai)  11,282 5,873 
1 rai = 0.16 ha 
Source: 
a 
The Office of the National Economic and Social Development Board (2008a) 
  b Office of Agricultural Economics (2009) 
  c Land Development Department (2009) 
  d Royal Irrigation Department (2008) 
4.3 Data collection 
The data for this study were collected from two main sources: (a) primary data gathered from 
a field survey sample of smallholder farmers in the central and north-east regions of 
Thailand; and (b) secondary data obtained from government annual statistical reports.  
4.3.1 Selection of samples 
The sampling frame for this study focused on smallholder farmers in the central and north-
east regions of Thailand. A smallholder farmer is defined as a farmer who has a farming area 
less than 30 rai (4.8 ha). Purposive random sampling was employed to classify a particular 
group of respondents from a certain portion of the population.  
The sample selection process is as follows. First, the provinces in each region were separated 
into two main groups: (a) the provinces with large and medium irrigation systems and (b) the 
provinces in the rain-fed area. Secondly, purposive sampling was employed to select 
smallholder farmers in each group. This procedure ensured that the sample covered 
smallholder farmers of both the irrigated and rain-fed areas in the central and north-east 
regions. 
The sample size in this study was calculated from the following formula given by Yamane 
(1973): 
21
N
n
Ne


        (4.1) 
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Where:   
n  = sample size; 
N  = population size; and 
e  = acceptable error (per cent). 
The population, N , of smallholder farmers is based on the 2003 Thailand agricultural census. 
The entire number of smallholder farmers is roughly 747,641 in the central region and 
2,394,274 in the north-east (see Table 4.2). Using a 5 per cent acceptable error, the sample 
size, n , is approximately 400 in each region. However, the sample size can be different from 
that calculation, which is based on the given cost and other limited conditions (Padilla-
Fernandez, 2000; Scheaffer, Mendenhall, & Ott, 2006). 
Table 4.2 Populations of farmers in the central and north-east Thailand by size holding, 
2003 
Size of total areas of 
holding (rai) 
Whole Kingdom Central North-east 
≤ 6 1,372,215 256,848 415,012 
6-9 816,588 88,341 393,074 
10-39 2,970,571 402,452 1,586,188 
40-139 625,917 142,825 252,561 
≥139 29,388 12,293 6,556 
Total 5,814,679 902,759 2,653,391 
a
 1 rai = 0.16 ha 
Source: National Statistical Office (2006) 
Currently, the central and north-east regions consist of 25 and 19 administrative provinces, 
respectively. This study was conducted in 4 provinces of the north-east including Khon Kaen, 
Kalasin, Chaiyaphum and Nakorn Ratchasima. The criterion used to select those provinces 
was the large scale irrigation system, and the Nongwai and Lumpoa project, located in the 
east of Khon Kaen and Kalasin provinces. In contrast, some areas in west Khon Kaen, 
Chaiyaphum and Nakorn Ratchasima represent the rain-fed agriculture of the north-east.  
The most provinces in the central region are located in irrigated areas. Ayutthaya, Patum 
Thani, Sing Buri and Lop Buri provinces were selected to represent irrigated agriculture in 
the central region. However, in some parts of Lop Buri province, rain-fed agriculture data 
were collected. The selected areas are shown in Figure 4.1.  
The villages and smallholder farmers were purposefully selected with the assistance of the 
agricultural office staff and the heads of the village in the study areas. This study consulted 
and sought assistance from OAE staff during the field survey in the central region. This was 
because the staff members are familiar with farmers and the local farming situation. 
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Therefore, the availability of these staff, the limited time and transportation costs were also 
considered. The distribution of the respondents in this study is shown in Table 4.3. 
Table 4.3 Distribution of respondents in central and north-east Thailand categorized by 
province and farm location 
Region Province Respondent’s farm located in Total number of 
respondents Irrigated area Rain-fed area 
Central  294 106 400 
 Lop Buri 114 106 220 
 Ayutthaya 121 - 121 
 Pathum Thani 40 - 40 
 Sing Buri 19 - 19 
North-east  168 232 400 
 Khon Kaen 89 157 246 
 Kalasin 79 18 97 
 Nakon Ratchasima - 34 34 
 Chaiyaphum - 23 23 
Total    800 
Source: Field survey, 2009 
4.3.2 Questionnaire design 
The structured interview questionnaire method was employed to elicit information from the 
smallholder farmers. The questionnaire is divided into six major sections: (1) general farm 
information; (2) farming system; (3) sources of risk on farm; (4) risk management strategies; 
(5) farmer‟s utility elicitation; and (6) socio-economic profile of the farmers. The 
questionnaire comprised of closed-ended questions, multiple choice questions and open-
ended questions (see Appendix A).     
The first section of the questionnaire contained questions relating to general information 
about the farm including farm size, owner status, farm finance and the details of on-farm 
assets. The second section was designed to obtain information about the agricultural activities 
on the farm. The respondents were asked to specify the main farm activities on the farm and 
the crop rotation. The areas allocated to each crop, total production, price of crop sold and 
production cost for each crop were obtained in order to generate a small farm cropping 
pattern and revenue.  
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Figure 4.1 Map of Thailand and the selected study areas 
 
 
Source: Modified from Office of Agricultural Economics (2009) 
 
 
Pathum Thani 
Ayutthaya 
Sing Buri 
Lop Buri 
Khon Kaen Kalasin 
Chaiyaphum 
Nakon Ratchasima 
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Section three focused on the sources of on-farm risk. This section measure how important the 
sources of risk are to small farm operations. The scale ranged between „1‟ not important, to 
„5‟ extremely important through „3‟ quite important. Similarly, in section four, the attitudes 
toward the importance of risk management options in managing small farms were assessed 
on a scale, with „1‟ not important, „5‟ extremely important and „3‟ quite important. The 
sources of risk and risk management variables were adapted from Martin (1993); Martin and 
McLeay (1998) and Pellegrino (1999). Section five contained a series of hypothetical risky 
lottery tickets with equal probability that were used to derive the respondent‟s utility function 
following the ELCE elicitation method. The last section included questions on the 
respondent‟s demographic characteristics and the household‟s income. 
The draft questionnaire was sent for consultation to three academic experts in agricultural 
economics and farm management at Kasetsart and Khon Kaen Universities, Thailand. 
Constructive suggestions about some content and the sequence of questions improved the 
questionnaire. The questionnaire was translated into Thai and pre-tested.  
The pre-test was conducted with 30 sample farmers in Chaiyaphum province, Thailand, with 
the assistance of DLD staff. The purpose of this pre-test was to determine the effectiveness of 
the questionnaire in terms of wording and the sequence of questions. The length of time for 
interviewing each respondent was also considered. Most interviews were completed in an 
average of 30 minutes. 
According to the pre-test results, the range of lower and upper decision boundary of the risky 
lottery ticket that follows the ELCE method produced major concern. It was found that, 
during the pre-test, when the range employed was 0 to 25,000 baht, the sampled farmers were 
less interested in participating. After careful consideration, the range of the lower and upper 
decision boundary was changed to 0 to 100,000 baht in the final survey to obtain better 
participation for the respondent‟s utility function elicitation.  
4.3.3 Interviewing procedure 
The field survey was conducted from January to April 2009. Face-to-face interviews were 
employed to gather relevant information from the respondents. Five research assistants were 
recruited for the field survey from the Department of Agricultural Economics, Faculty of 
Agriculture, Khon Kaen University. The research assistants were trained in a workshop for 
three days before administering the surveys. The training was to brief them about the general 
information on the purpose of the study, details of each question and the interview technique. 
The pilot survey was performed on the last day of the workshop to ensure that the research 
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assistants clearly understood all questions in the questionnaire, particularly the ELCE 
elicitation method. Problems relating to the questionnaire were reported and discussed during 
the pilot surveys to generate the final version of the questionnaire. The research assistants 
were required to strictly follow the ethical regulations of Lincoln University Human Ethics 
Committee, including the anonymity and confidentiality requirements, completely voluntary 
participation of the respondents and the right of participants to withdraw from the interview 
at any time. 
The participants in this research were smallholder farmers who are resource-poor farmers and 
have limited on-farm activity diversification. The researcher sought help from the agricultural 
staff and heads of the villages to determine qualified participants, in particular for two stages. 
First, the researcher contacted the provincial office of agriculture staff in the study areas and 
requested them to provide information from their statistics database on the names of villages 
that had a high number of smallholder farmers in both the irrigated and rain-fed areas. 
Secondly, the researcher purposefully selected villages from the list and then the researcher 
contacted the head of each village and briefed them about the research. The researcher asked 
the head of the village to announce the research study on the public address system in the 
village a few days before the field survey was to start and to invite smallholder farmers to 
participate in the interview. The smallholder farmers who were willing to participate in this 
study were gathered together in a central location, such as head of the village‟s house, on the 
appointed date and time. However, some interviews took place at the farmer‟s house or on a 
farm visit. 
The interviews performed by the researcher and research assistants relied on the individual 
participant‟s permission. Before the interview, each participant was provided with brief 
information by the interviewers including the purpose of the study, activities and time 
required to complete the interview, the anonymity and confidentiality and the right to stop 
and withdraw from the interview at any time. The participants were asked to sign the consent 
form. The participant‟s name was not included on the questionnaire. Codes were employed to 
identify each participant and farm location.  
During the field surveys, some participants withdrew from the interview because they 
thought the interview was too difficult or they did not have enough time to complete it. These 
participants were replaced to maintain the sample size. The information on crops and 
livestock production and prices of products sold collected from the respondents was based on 
crop year 2008. All completed questionnaires were manually edited and then coded and 
entered in Microsoft Excel.  
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4.3.4  Secondary data 
The time series data on yields and prices of each individual crop at provincial level in the 
study area were collected from the Centre of Agricultural Information, OAE database. The 
historical data covered the 1998-2008 crop years. The resulting data sets were used for the 
cumulative probability distribution of price and yield for each individual crop and then fitted 
into the stochastic simulation model to generate the risk efficiency for each alternative 
farming system.    
4.4 Data limitations 
Some minor problems occurred during the field surveys, especially with the ELCE interview, 
because the procedure in this method required the respondents to play a “gambling game”. 
Some respondents refused to participate in this game because of their religious beliefs. This is 
drawback of the ELCE method cited by Hardaker, Huirne et al. (2004). In addition, some 
respondents are severely risk averse. Most selected only the alternative that obtained cash and 
thus terminated the game in the process. Therefore, the remaining 228 respondents in the 
north-east and 207 respondents in the central region were used in the analysis of risk aversion 
coefficients. Those respondents had completed all the required data points. 
4.5 Data analysis 
4.5.1 Descriptive statistics 
Descriptive statistics are employed to describe the general attributes and to summarize the 
pertinent information about the respondents. Household and farm characteristics of the 
respondents were examined using frequency distribution and arithmetic means. Tests of 
statistically significant differences, such as independent t -test and chi-square test, were used 
to determine the differences between the groups of smallholder farmers in the central and 
north-east regions. 
4.5.2 Annual net farm income calculation 
The annual net farm income of each alternative farming system that produced by the sampled 
smallholder farmers in the central and north-east regions in crop year 2008 was calculated 
using the following formula (Lien et al., 2006; Mustafa, 2006):  
iiii LYPFR )(          (4.2) 
Where: 
  iFR  is the farm revenue from the specific farm activity in baht; 
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  iP  is the price of product sold in baht per kg for rice and arable crops and per head 
for animals; 
  iY  is the yield per rai of the specific crop activity in kg and per head for animals; 
 iL  is area in rai of the specific crop in farm; and 
   i  is the index for the different farm activities. 
The total variable cost for each farm activity was calculated as follows: 
 iii HVCPLCLPCTVcr i        (4.3) 
 iii OTCFDCTVan         (4.4) 
Where: 
 iTVcr  is the total variable cost for the specific crop activity on farm in baht;  
 iTVan  is the total variable cost for the specific animal activity on farm in baht; 
 iLPC  is the total land preparation cost for the specific crop activity in baht; 
 iPLC is the total planting cost for the specific crop activity in baht; 
 iHVC is the total harvesting cost for the specific crop activity in baht; 
 iFDC is the total feed cost for the specific animal activity in baht; 
 iOTC  is the other costs for the specific animal activity in baht; and  
     i  is the index for different farm activities. 
Therefore, the gross margin is calculated as follows:  
 iii TVFRGM          (4.5) 
Where: 
 iGM  is the gross margin in baht of the specific farm activity; and 
     i  is the index for the different farm activities. 
The total fixed costs of a smallholder farm are given as follows: 
 FADRTLTTF         (4.6) 
Where:  
 TF is the total fixed costs in baht; 
 LT is the annual land taxes in baht; 
 RT is the annual land rental in baht; and 
 FAD is the annual farm assets depreciation which are estimated using the straight line 
depreciation method.  
The annual whole farm income was estimated using the following formula: 
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       TFGMA
k
i
i 
1
        (4.7) 
Where: 
 A is the whole farm income estimated from the different farm activities in baht; 
 iGM is the gross margin from each farm activity in baht; and  
 TF is the total fixed costs in baht. 
4.5.3 Sources of risk and risk management strategies analysis  
The information on the sources of risk and risk management strategies perceptions obtained 
from the respondents using a five-point Likert scale were analyzed in two steps:  
First, exploratory factor analysis (EFA) was used to capture the information on the 
interrelationships among the set of variables. This technique enabled the researcher to 
manage and reduce the number of original variables into a smaller group of a new correlation 
dimensions (factors), which are linear combinations of the original variables (Hair, 2006; 
Pallant, 2007). The EFA summarized and reduced the 19 and 16 variables involved with the 
risk sources and risk management responses, respectively in this study. 
The Kaiser-Meyer-Oklin (KMO) method measured the appropriateness for factor analysis of 
both data sets. The KMO index varies from 0 to 1, with results of 0.6 or greater being suitable 
for factor analysis. Also, the latent root criterion (eigenvalue > 1) was estimated to identify 
how many factors in each data set to extract. After the number of factors had been identified, 
the orthogonal (varimax) rotational approach was performed in order to minimize the number 
of variables that have high loadings on each factor. A factor loading of  0.4 was employed 
as a cut off criterion to determine the inter correlation among the original variables. In 
addition, Cronbach Alpha was employed to evaluate the internal consistency of each factor 
(Hair, 2006). Following factor analysis, the summated scale of each factor for each group of 
respondents was prepared for subsequent analysis. 
Secondly, the relationships of interest between the socioeconomic variables and the 
perception of risk sources and risk management strategies of the smallholder farmers were 
considered. Multiple regression was employed to evaluate the influence of farm and farmer 
characteristic variables on the smallholder farmers‟ risk perception and risk management 
responses. Preliminary analyses were carried out to verify there was no violation of the 
multiple regression assumptions. Normality, linearity, multicollinearity and homoscedasticity 
were examined and are discussed in the results chapter.  
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The model specification for the farmer‟s perception of risk source with socioeconomic 
variables is postulated as follows: 
     
eHSIZbAHINbFINCb
LOCbINCMbFSIZbOFFWbEXPbEDUbGENbAGEbbSi


11109
876543210
 (4.8) 
The model for risk management responses with socioeconomic variables is given as follows:  
     
eHSIZbAHINbFINCb
LOCbINCMbFSIZbOFFWbEXPbEDUbGENbAGEbbRi


11109
876543210
 (4.9) 
Where: 
 iS is sources of risk i  (from factor analysis); 
 iR is risk management strategies i  (from factor analysis); 
 ib is regression coefficient; 
      AGE is 1, if the respondent‟s age is over 40 years old, 0 otherwise; 
       GEN is 1, if respondent is male, 0 if female; 
       EDU is 1, if the highest education of the respondent is high school and higher, 0 if 
primary school education or less; 
       EXP is 1, if the farming experience is over 30 years, 0 otherwise; 
   OFFW is 1, if the respondent has off-farm work, 0 if no off-farm work; 
      FSIZ is farm size; 
    INCM is net farm income; 
      LOC is 1, if the respondent‟s farm is located in central region, 0 if a farm located in 
north-east region; 
     FINC is 1, if farm has a loan, 0 if farm without a loan; 
     AHIN is 1, if the annual household income greater than 90,001 baht, 0 otherwise; 
      HSIZ is household size; and 
e  is error term. 
4.5.4  Farmers’ utility elicitation 
The ELCE method, which is generally the procedure used for eliciting an individual utility 
function, was incorporated in this study to determine the risk attitudes of smallholder farmers 
(see Section five in Appendix A). The details of this procedure are discussed below.  
According to Hardaker, Huirne et al. (2004), the ELCE method obtains certainty equivalent 
(CE) from a series of risky outcomes with the equal probabilities of 0.5. The CEs are 
correlated with the utility values of 1 (the best outcome) to 0 (the bad outcome). Therefore, 
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this study assumes the lowest outcome that a farmer gets from the lottery ticket is 0 baht, and 
the highest is 100,000 baht. We set 0)0( U  and 1)000,100( U .  
The elicitation procedure involved asking the respondent to choose between alternative I, a 
lottery ticket, and alternative II, a sure sum of money ( A ) (see Figure 4.2). The lottery tickets 
offered of a chance to win either 100,000 baht ( maxA ) or 0 baht ( minA ) with a 50:50 
probability. A  is arbitrarily selected along with maxA and minA which are considered the upper 
and lower decision boundary between alternative I and II. Following this, the respondent was 
asked to choose which alternative he or she preferred. If the respondent chose cash, then A  is 
decreased by some amount and process is repeated. In contrast, if the respondent chose a 
lottery ticket, then A  is increased by some amount and the process is repeated. The value of 
A  changes until the respondent feels indifferent between the alternatives. This value is called 
the CE for the risky incident. After the first CE was obtained, the same procedure as 
described above is repeated. We continued to present the respondent with another lottery 
ticket in accordance with several different maxA  and minA  scenarios until the seven CE values 
were completely elicited and the process is completed.  
Figure 4.2 Certainty equivalent elicitation procedure 
 
Source: Modified from Akcaoz & Ozkan (2005) 
The exact computation steps in order to correlate the utilities with the CE values for each 
respondent are illustrated in Table 4.4. The notation in Table 4.4 gcba ,...,,,  denotes the 
sequence of seven CE values for the risky outcomes obtained from the ELCE procedure.   
The ELCE interviews were carefully conducted by the researcher and trained research 
assistants because of the awareness of interviewer bias on the elicitation of the utility function 
Alternative I: A lottery ticket 
Alternative II: Cash 
maxA  
minA  
A  
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(Binswanger, 1980). In addition, counterfeit notes (similar to Thai banknotes) and the two 
different colour post-it papers were employed during the ELCE interview process (see Figure 
4.3). The counterfeit notes were used to ensure that the respondents paid attention to the 
amount of money that was offered by the interviewer. The two different colour papers helped 
prevent confusion among the respondents regarding the 50:50 probabilities of the lottery 
ticket. This was helpful for the respondents with limited literacy.  
Table 4.4 Elicitation of CEs in approximating a respondent’s utility function 
Step Elicited CE Utility calculation 
1 
 
Setting a scale 0)0( U ; 1)000,100( U  
2
 
 )0.1;(a ~ )5.0,5.0;000,100,0(  5.0)000,100(5.0)0(5.0)(  UUaU  
3
 
 )0.1;(b ~ )5.0,5.0;,0( a   25.0)(5.0)0(5.0)(  aUUbU  
4
 
 )0.1;(c ~ )5.0,5.0;,0( b  125.0)(5.0)0(5.0)(  bUUcU  
5 )0.1;(d ~ )5.0,5.0;,0( c  062.0)(5.0)0(5.0)(  cUUdU  
6 )0.1;(e ~ )5.0,5.0;,000,100( a  75.0)(5.0)000,100(5.0)(  dUUeU  
7 )0.1;( f ~ )5.0,5.0;,000,100( e  875.0)(5.0)000,100(5.0)(  eUUfU  
8 )0.1;(g ~ )5.0,5.0;,000,100( f  937.0)(5.0)000,100(5.0)(  fUUgU  
Source: Modified from Hardaker, Huirne et al. (2004) 
Figure 4.3 Counterfeit notes and two different colour papers used in the ELCE 
interview 
 
 
Alternative II 
Cash 
 
Alternative I 
A lottery ticket 
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4.5.5 Measurement of risk aversion coefficients  
Risk aversion measures a person‟s willingness to accept a bargain with an uncertainty payoff 
rather than another bargain with more certainty with the probability of a lower expected 
payoff. This indicates that the shape of a person‟s utility function affects risk aversion 
(Hardaker, Huirne, et al., 2004).  
Previous studies have criticized the effect of the choice of utility functional form on the 
classification of risk preference results (Binici et al., 2003; Torkamani & Haji-Rahimi, 2001; 
Zuhair et al., 1992). In order to avoid ambiguous results in choosing a particular functional 
form that exhibits the respondents‟ attitude towards risk, different utility functions should be 
employed to analyse their performances in terms of risk preference classification. The utility 
function forms, such as the cubic function, negative exponential function, power function and 
expo-power function, were used to estimate and compare risk preference classification results 
in this study. We chose the specific functional forms because it is easier to estimate the 
parameters of the function and imposes the least restrictive assumptions. The general form of 
each utility function and its examination of the Arrow-Pratt absolute risk aversion coefficient 
( )(wra ) are summarized in Table 4.5.  
Table 4.5 General form and parameter restrictions of the four different utility functions 
used in this study and the absolute risk aversion coefficients estimation    
Utility function  General form Absolute risk aversion 
calculation 
Cubic function
 32)( dwcwbwawU   









232
)62(
)(
dwcwb
dwc
wra  
Negative exponential 
function 
occwwU  ),exp(1)(  cwra )(  
Expo function 10,)(   wwU  1)1()(  wwra   
Expo-power function 
0,0,0,1
),exp()(



 wwU
 
w
w
wra
)1(
)(
 
  
Note )(wU  is the utility with respect to wealth ( w ); )(wra  is the Arrow-Pratt risk aversion coefficient; and 
 ,,,,,, dcba are parameters. 
The sequences of data points elicited from the ELCE for each respondent were regressed 
using the non-linear least square (NLS) method to fit four different utility functions. The 
statistical goodness of fit assessment, 2R , was tested to verify the curve fit. Any violation of 
parameters‟ restrictions in each functional form was also tested. Subsequently, )(wra  was 
computed using the estimated parameters of the four utility functions. The )(wra for the cubic 
function, expo function and expo-power function were calculated at the midpoints of the 
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ranges used to elicit the respondents‟ utility function except the )(wra for the negative 
exponential is independent of any level of wealth. All the tests were carried out using Eviews 
version 6.0. The performance comparison of the four utility functions in predicting the risk 
preferences of smallholder farmers are discussed in the results chapter.     
It is also interesting to investigate the risk aversion characteristics of the smallholder farmers 
in Thailand. Previous studies (e.g. Binswanger, 1980; Shahabuddin, Mestelman, & Feeny, 
1986) employed multivariate regression analysis to estimate the relationship of risk aversion 
coefficients and demographic variables of farmers and farm households. The categorization 
of wealth and non-wealth variables influencing the risk aversion of farmers‟ examined in 
previous studies is summarized in Table 4.6.  
Table 4.6 Socioeconomic variables affecting a farmer’s risk aversion from previous 
studies 
Variables Moscardi 
and Janvry 
(1977) 
Dillon and 
Scandizzo 
(1978) 
Binswanger 
(1980) 
Shahabuddi 
et al. (1986) 
Bicini, Koc 
and 
Bayaner 
(2001) 
Gómez-
Limón, 
Arriaza and 
Riesgo 
(2003) 
Studies location Mexico Brazil India Bangladesh Turkey Spain 
Non-Wealth 
Age       
Household size       
Education       
Gender       
Farm size       
Land ownership       
Wealth 
Farm income       
Off-farm income       
Total assets       
 
With reference to the literature, multiple regression analysis was used to investigate the 
relationship between the socioeconomic characteristics and the variation of risk aversion 
coefficients of smallholder farmers. The equation can be written as follows: 
eINCMbFSIZbHSIZbEDUbGENbAGEbbZ i  6543210   (4.10) 
Where: 
   iZ is the absolute risk aversion coefficient for farmer i ; 
  ib is the regression coefficient; 
      AGE is 1, if the respondent‟s age is over 40 years old, 0 otherwise; 
      GEN is 1, if respondent is male, 0 if female; 
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       EDU is 1, if the highest education of the respondent is high school and higher, 0 if 
primary school education or less; 
     HSIZ is household size; 
     FSIZ is farm size; 
   INCM is net farm income; and 
           e  is error term. 
4.5.6 Stochastic efficiency with respect to a function (SERF) analysis    
Risk efficiency comparisons among the farming system alternatives of smallholder farmers in 
this study were assessed using the SERF method. According to Hardaker, Huirne et al. 
(2004), SERF ranks the farming systems options using the certainty equivalent (CE) over a 
range of values of risk aversion.  
The CE for each risky alternative relies on the particular utility functional form specified. The 
chosen utility function can be calculated, depending on the degree of absolute risk aversion 
( ar ) and stochastic outcome ( x ), as follows (Hardaker, Huirne, et al., 2004):  
dxxfrxUrxU aa )(),(),(         (4.11) 
 Where:  
 )(U  is a utility function, and the expression is estimated for selected values of ar  in 
the range of Lr  to Ur . 
Transforming the utilities to CEs can be achieved by performing the reverse of the utility 
function, described as (Hardaker, Huirne, et al., 2004): 
 ),(),( 1 aa rxUrxCE
         (4.12) 
The negative exponential utility function was chosen to estimate the coefficient of absolute 
risk aversion of Thai farmers and the relevant range used in the SERF analysis. This 
functional form exhibits constant absolute risk aversion (CARA). In addition, this utility 
function conforms to the assumption that the farmers desire less risk to more, given the same 
expected outcome (Pendell et al., 2007). Hence, the following equations are used to 
approximate the expected utility, the negative exponential utility function, and the CE for a 
given absolute risk aversion and can be expressed as follows (Hardaker, Huirne, et al., 2004): 
 
           UaLiiaiaiai
i
ia rrrxxrxrxrFFrxU   ,)(/)exp()exp(1)(),( 111  (4.13) 
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                    aa rrxUCE /),(1ln         (4.14) 
The CEs derived from the calculation corresponding to the values of ar  for each farming 
system are plotted on a graph. In order to determine which is the most risk efficient set, the 
farming system option that has the highest CE in the relevant range of ar  will be generated as 
the most risk efficient alternative (Hardaker, Huirne, et al., 2004).  
The stochastic simulation model employed to evaluate the empirical probability distribution 
for annual net farm income ( )
~
A  that incorporates equations 4.13 and 4.14 for each farming 
system can be described as follows (Lien et al., 2006; Tzouramani, Karanikolas, & 
Alexopoulos, 2008): 
   TFTVHCLYPA
k
i
iiiii 
1
~
)
~~
(
~
       (4.15) 
Where: 
 iP
~
 is the per kilogram stochastic price of crop i  in the farming system (in baht); 
 iY
~
 is the per rai stochastic yield of crop i  (in kilograms); 
 iL  is the deterministic effective areas used to grow crop i  in crop year 2008 (in rai); 
 iC
~
 is the per head stochastic price of animal i  in the farming system; 
 iH  is the deterministic heads of livestock i  sold in crop year 2008; 
 TV  is the deterministic total variable costs for the farming system in crop year 2008 
(in baht); and  
 TF  is the deterministic total fixed costs for the farming system in crop year 2008 (in 
baht). 
The SERF analysis in this study was programmed and simulated using the SIMETAR 
(Simulation & Econometrics to Analyze Risk) developed by James W. Richardson, Keith D. 
Schumann and Paul A. Feldman since 1997 (Simetar Inc, 2007). SIMETAR was employed to 
simulate stochastic net farm income, rank risky farming system alternatives over different 
magnitude of farmers‟ risk preferences and summarizes those results graphically. SIMETAR 
was also used in previous empirical studies (e.g. Lien et al., 2006; Pendell et al., 2007) to 
simulate stochastic models and rank a set of risky alternatives. 
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     Chapter 5 
Perceptions of Sources of Risk and Risk Management 
Strategies - Results and Discussion 
This chapter presents the empirical results and discuss the findings on risk perceptions and 
risk management strategies. The chapter is structured into five sections. The results of the 
socioeconomic characteristics of the farmers are discussed in Section 5.1. In the following 
section, farmers‟ perceptions of sources of risk and risk management strategies are discussed. 
The results of the exploratory factor analysis are described in Section 5.3. Section 5.4 
discusses the association between the farmer‟s characteristics and the source of risk and risk 
management strategy components. The last section summarizes the findings. 
The results and findings in each section are compared with the results from each of the 
regions studied. In addition, comparisons of the results between the irrigated and rain-fed 
areas of those regions are also investigated.   
5.1 Socioeconomic characteristics of the farmers 
The aggregated statistics of the central and north-east region farmers are presented in Table 
5.1. A sample t -test and a chi-square test were employed to test the differences between the 
characteristics of the farmers in the two regions.  
The data in Table 5.1 show the central and north-east region farmers have dissimilar 
characteristics. Comparisons of the farmers‟ characteristics between the two regions (both the 
t -test and chi-square) are significantly different, except for gender, household size and 
finance used for the farm business. The findings indicate that the central and north-east 
region farmers generally differ in terms of personal, farm characteristics and income 
distribution.  
The age group distribution indicates that the majority of the farmers in both regions were 
over 40 years old. Around 40 per cent of the north-east region farmers were over 60 years 
old, whereas 42 per cent of the central region farmers were between 41-50 years old. The age 
distribution between the farmers in both regions was significantly different. The north-east 
region farmers were more likely to be older than the central region farmers. Nearly half of the 
farmers in the north-east had been involved in agricultural work for over 40 years. This 
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implies that younger farmers are rare especially in the north-east. This may be a result of the 
rural-to-urban migration problems in Thailand (see Section 2.1).  
Around 75 per cent of the farmers in both regions graduated with a primary education and 
about three per cent were illiterate. The result indicates that the central region farmers had 
higher levels of education than the north-east farmers ( 01.0P ). Mustafa (2006) argued that 
the educational level of farmers affected their decision making capacity. A higher educated 
farmer was expected to perform better than an uneducated farmer in terms of management 
skills and farm resource allocation to maximize farm profitability.  
The average farm size of the farmers in the central region was 21.40 rai (3.42 ha) of which 30 
per cent was self-lease operated. In contrast, farmers in the north-east had an average farm 
size of 14.80 rai (2.37 ha) of which 90 per cent was self owned. This result indicates that the 
central region farmers hold average farm sizes larger than north-east farmers ( 01.0P ). This 
is consistent with OAE ( 2009) and NSO (2006) who reported that farmers in the central 
region usually had an average farm size larger than the north-east farmers. 
The results for the average net farm income between the farmers in the central and north-east 
regions were statistically significant at the one per cent level. This result indicated that the 
average net farm income of the central farmers was larger than for the north-east farmers. In 
2008, the central farmers had an average net farm income of 166,445.05 baht/household, 
whereas the average net farm income of the north-east farmers was only 42,632.80 
baht/household. As discussed in Section 4.2, the poor productivity soils, low crop yields and 
lack of irrigation may have caused the low net farm income of the north-east farmers.  
In addition, approximately 63 per cent of the central region farmers worked off-farm, which 
was significant more than for the north-east farmers ( 01.0P ). The results also showed that 
central farmers had significantly higher annual household incomes than north-east farmers.  
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Table 5.1 Household and farm characteristics of the farmers in central and north-east 
Thailand 
Item Unit  Region Overall 
(n=800) 
 
Test of 
difference 
a 
Central 
(n=400) 
North-east 
 (n=400) 
Gender %    0.66 
     Male  73.3 75.8 74.5  
     Female  26.8 24.3 25.5  
Age group %    67.14
***
 
     Less than 30 years old  1.5 0.5 1.0  
     31-40 years old  10.3 7.3 8.8  
     41-50 years old  42.0 22.3 32.1  
     51-60 years old  30.0 30.5 30.3  
     Over 60 years old  16.3 39.5 27.9  
Marital status %    12.52
***
 
     Single/Never married  4.0 2.0 3.0  
     Married  87.5 86.3 86.9  
     De factor relationship  0.8 4.3 2.5  
     Divorced/separated  7.8 7.5 7.6  
Highest education %    17.79
***
 
     Illiterate   3.3 2.0 2.6  
     Primary school  69.5 81.8 75.6  
     Secondary school  23.5 14.0 18.8  
     Vocational training  2.3 0.8 1.5  
     Bachelor degree  1.5 1.5 1.5  
Farming experience %    105.69
***
 
     Less than 10 years  12.8 6.5 9.6  
     11-20 years  29.3 10.0 19.6  
     21-30 years  22.5 16.0 19.3  
     31-40 years  19.5 22.8 21.1  
     Over 40 years  16.0 44.8 30.4  
Household size persons 4.36 4.28 4.32 -0.66 
Total farm size rai 
b 
21.40 14.80 18.09 -10.10
*** 
Land ownership status %    168.93
***
 
     Owner-self operated  64.8 89.5 77.1  
     Lease-self operated  29.3 2.0 15.6  
     Tenant  0 8.5 4.3  
     Other  6.0 0 3.0  
Finance farm business %    0.15 
     Yes  69.3 68.0 68.6  
Average net farm income
 c
 baht 166,450.05 42,632.80 104,541.42 -19.26
***
 
Working off-farm %    43.29
***
 
     Yes  63.3 40.0 51.6  
Annual household income %    113.16
***
 
     Less than 10,000 baht  0 1.3 0.6  
     10,001-30,000 baht  0.8 14.3 7.5  
     30,001-50,000 baht  5.0 16.3 10.6  
     50,001-70,000 baht  11.0 15.8 13.4  
     70,001-90,000 baht  11.5 11.0 11.3  
     More than 90,001 baht  71.8 41.5 56.6  
a
 Test of differences of the central and north-east household and farm characteristics based on chi-square and 
independent t test; 
*
 significant at 10%, 
**
 significant at 5% and 
***
 significant at 1%  
b 
1 rai = 0.16 ha. 
c 
 Net farm income is based on the 2008 crop year, see details in Table 6.8 and 6.9. 
Source: Field survey, 2009 
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In terms of farmer access to credit, nearly 70 per cent of the farmers in the central and north-
east regions had loans and nearly half of them borrowed from the Bank of Agriculture and 
Agricultural Cooperatives (BAAC). In addition, eight per cent of the farmers used their own 
savings to operate their farm business. Only about four per cent had loans from commercial 
banks. The majority of the farmers in this study obtained short-term loans (see Table 5.2). 
This finding supports Limsombunchai (2006), who argued that smallholder farmers in rural 
Thailand lacked investment funds due to a credit accessibility barrier. 
Nearly 50 per cent of the farmers had small debts. Further, 30 per cent of the farmers in the 
north-east had outstanding debts of less than 30,000 baht during the 2008 crop year. 
Similarly, 27 per cent of the farmers in the central region had debts between 31,000-50,000 
baht. An average of 72.6 per cent of the loans were reported to be used in operating the farm 
business, such as purchasing farm equipment, seeds and fertilizers, but the balance was spent 
on the farmer‟s personal and household consumption, for example, food and clothing.  
Table 5.2 Financial background of the farmers in central and north-east Thailand 
Item Region Overall 
(n=800) 
 
Central 
(n=400) 
North-east 
(n=400) 
Sources of finance 
a
     
     Bank of Agriculture and 
     Agricultural Cooperative 
57.5 34.3 44.6 
     Cooperatives 23.7 15.9 19.4 
     Village funds 11.8 25.4 19.4 
     Personal funds 3.2 12.4 8.3 
     Commercial bank 6.8 0.3 3.9 
Duration of credit     
     Less than 1 year 65.0 72.8 68.9 
     Greater than 3 years 6.9 20.6 13.7 
Outstanding loan debt    
     Under 30,000 baht  14.4 29.4 21.9 
     31,000-50,000 baht 27.4 23.2 25.3 
     Over 91,000 baht 13.7 21.0 17.3 
Average percentage of loan used    
     On-farm activities 79.8 65.1 72.6 
     Household expenses 20.1 34.7 27.4 
a
 Multiple responses 
Source: Field survey, 2009 
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When comparing farmers in irrigated and rain-fed areas of the central and north-east regions, 
the survey results showed that the farmers from both areas in the two regions did not differ 
significantly in most characteristics (see Tables 5.3 and 5.4). The exceptions were farm size, 
land ownership status, net farm income and annual household income. 
Average farm size was significantly different ( 01.0P ) between the irrigated and rain-fed 
farmers 
a
 in both regions. The average farm size of the central region rain-fed farmers was 
23.99 rai (3.84 ha). This is considerably larger than the average farm size of the central 
region irrigated farmers. Similarly, the average farm size of the north-east rain-fed and 
irrigated farmers was 16.29 rai (2.61 ha) and 12.75 rai (2.04 ha), respectively. This finding 
indicates that the farmers in rain-fed areas had larger farms than the irrigated farmers. This is 
probably due to agricultural land prices in irrigated areas generally being more expensive 
than rain-fed areas.  
There also appear to be significant differences in land ownership status between the central 
region rain-fed and irrigated farmers. Approximately 30 per cent of the farmers in the central 
region irrigated areas were self-lease operated and seven per cent of them owned and leased 
land at the same time. Farm land rental rate was relatively high among the farmers in the 
irrigated areas of the central region.  
The survey results showed that the average net farm income and annual household income of 
the irrigated farmers were significantly higher than for the rain-fed farmers in both regions. In 
2008, the central region irrigated farmers had an average net farm income of 194,325.21 
baht/household and over 80 per cent of them had an annual household income greater than 
90,000 baht. In contrast, north-east rain-fed farmers had an average net farm income of 
30,903.20 baht/household and nearly 70 per cent of them had an annual household income of 
less than 90,000 baht. This finding reflects a widening gap in income distribution among the 
smallholder farmers in the central and north-east regions of Thailand.   
 
 
 
 
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
a
 „Irrigated farmers‟ is a short form for „farmers owing irrigated farms‟ and „rain-fed farmers‟ is a short form for 
„farmers owing rain-fed farms‟ this shortened version is used to save words and space even though it is a logical 
nonsense.    
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Table 5.3 Household and farm characteristics of the Thai farmers in the central region 
irrigated and rain-fed areas 
Item Unit  Irrigated 
(n=294) 
Rain-fed 
 (n=106) 
Test of 
difference 
a 
Gender %   1.24 
     Male  71.8 77.4  
     Female  28.2 22.6  
Age group %   4.84 
     Less than 30 years old  2.0 0  
     31-40 years old  11.6 6.6  
     41-50 years old  41.8 42.5  
     51-60 years old  28.6 34.0  
     Over 60 years old  16.0 17.0  
Marital status %   5.82 
     Single/Never married  5.1 0.9  
     Married  87.8 86.8  
     De factor relationship  0.7 0.9  
     Divorced/separated  6.5 11.3  
Highest education %   21.58
***
 
     Illiterate  1.0 9.4  
     Primary school  69.0 70.8  
     Secondary school  25.2 18.9  
     Vocational training  2.7 0.9  
     Bachelor degree  2.0 0  
Farming experience %   3.50 
     Less than 10 years  14.3 8.5  
     11-20 years  28.9 30.2  
     21-30 years  21.1 26.4  
     31-40 years  19.0 20.8  
     Over 40 years  16.7 14.2  
Household size persons 4.45 4.11 2.05
*
 
Total farm size rai 
b 
20.46 23.99 -3.795
*** 
Land ownership status %   11.61
***
 
     Owner-self operated  59.9 78.3  
     Lease-self operated  33.3 17.9  
     Other  6.8 3.8  
Finance farm business %   1.89 
     Yes  67.3 74.5  
Average net farm income
 c
 baht 194,325.21 89,135.92 10.92
***
 
Working off-farm %   0.90 
     Yes  64.6 59.4  
Annual household income %   58.54
***
 
     Less than 10,000 baht  0 0  
     10,001-30,000 baht  0 2.8  
     30,001-50,000 baht  4.1 7.5  
     50,001-70,000 baht  5.8 25.5  
     70,001-90,000 baht  8.8 18.9  
     More than 90,001 baht  81.3 45.3  
a
 Test of differences of the central region irrigated and rain-fed household and farm characteristics based on chi-
square and independent t test; 
*
 significant at 10%, 
**
 significant at 5% and 
***
 significant at 1%.  
b 
1 rai = 0.16 ha 
c 
 Net farm income is based on the 2008 crop year, see details in Table 6.8. 
Source: Field survey, 2009 
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Table 5.4 Household and farm characteristics of the Thai farmers in the north-east 
irrigated and rain-fed areas 
Item Unit  Irrigated 
(n=168) 
Rain-fed 
 (n=232) 
Test of 
difference 
a 
Gender %   1.84 
     Male  79.2 73.3  
     Female  20.8 26.7  
Age group %   5.46 
     Less than 30 years old  0.0 0.9  
     31-40 years old  6.0 8.2  
     41-50 years old  18.5 25.0  
     51-60 years old  33.9 28.0  
     Over 60 years old  41.7 37.9  
Marital status %   4.12 
     Single/Never married  1.2 2.6  
     Married  89.9 83.6  
     De factor relationship  2.4 5.6  
     Divorced/separated  6.5 8.2  
Highest education %   5.46 
     Illiterate  1.8 2.2  
     Primary school  85.1 79.3  
     Secondary school  10.7 16.4  
     Vocational training  1.2 0.4  
     Bachelor degree  1.2 1.7  
Farming experience %   17.17
***
 
     Less than 10 years  2.4 9.5  
     11-20 years  7.1 12.1  
     21-30 years  14.3 17.2  
     31-40 years  21.4 23.7  
     Over 40 years  54.8 37.5  
Household size persons 4.34 4.25 0.588 
Total farm size rai 
b 
12.75 16.29 -3.74
*** 
Land ownership status %   1.87 
     Owner-self operated  87.5 90.9  
     Lease-self operated  3.0 1.3  
     Tenant  9.5 7.8  
Finance farm business %   6.52
**
 
     Yes  75.0 62.9  
Average net farm income
 c
 baht 58,830.81 30,903.20 6.46
***
 
Working off-farm %   4.45
**
 
     Yes  33.9 44.4  
Annual household income %   20.87
***
 
     Less than 10,000 baht  0.6 1.7  
     10,001-30,000 baht  8.9 18.1  
     30,001-50,000 baht  11.9 19.4  
     50,001-70,000 baht  15.5 15.9  
     70,001-90,000 baht  9.5 12.1  
     More than 90,001 baht  53.6 32.8  
a
 Test of differences of the north-east region irrigated and rain-fed household and farm characteristics based on 
chi-square and independent t test; 
*
 significant at 10%, 
**
 significant at 5% and 
***
 significant at 1%.  
b 
1 rai = 0.16 ha 
c 
 Net farm income is based on the 2008 crop year, see details in Table 6.9. 
 Source: Field survey, 2009 
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5.2 Farmers’ perceptions of sources of risk and risk management 
strategies 
As discussed in Section 4.5.3, the perceived sources of risk and risk management strategies 
were measured on a five point Likert scale. The scale ranges from „1‟ (not important) to „5‟ 
(extremely important). A list of 19 sources of risk and 16 risk management strategies were 
provided for the farmers‟ consideration in terms of how important the impact each risk source 
and risk management strategy was on their farming operation.    
5.2.1 Sources of risk 
The mean scores of each source of risk were ranked. Standard deviation (SD) was used to 
indicate the variation in the ratings. In addition, the independent sample t  test was employed 
to compare mean score differences between the farmers in the central and north-east regions, 
including both the irrigated and rain-fed areas. 
5.2.1.1 All farmer group results 
Table 5.5 summarizes the results of the most important perceived sources of risk for the 
farmers in the central and north-east regions. The table shows that marketing risks associated 
with „unexpected variability of input prices‟ and „unexpected variability of product prices‟ 
were the highest and the second highest mean scores for sources of risk by the farmers in 
both regions. The SDs of both sources of risk in each group were less than one and this 
indicates that those sources of risk gained a high level of consensus among the farmers in 
both regions (Meuwissen et al., 2001).  
The survey results showed that the uncertainty of input prices and product prices have 
become increasingly worrying among smallholder farmers in the central and north-east 
regions. As discussed in Chapter 1, this is probably due to the fact that both sources of risk 
are out of the farmers‟ control but directly affect their farm incomes. The prices of the major 
cash crops in Thailand, such as rice, cassava and sugarcane, are unstable; they depend on 
supply and demand in both local and international markets. Similarly, the average prices of 
the major farm inputs such as fertilizer NPK 16-20-0, which is widely used by rice farmers, 
fluctuated from 9,485 baht/tonne in 2006 to a peak of 19,386 baht/tonne in 2008 and then 
dropped to 16,199 baht/tonne in 2009 (OAE, 2009).  
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Table 5.5 Ranking of perceptions of sources of risk by sampled farmers in central and north-east Thailand 
Source of risk Overall 
(n=800) 
Central 
(n=400) 
North-east  
(n=400) 
Test of 
difference 
b 
Mean 
a 
SD Rank Mean 
a 
SD Rank Mean
 a 
SD Rank 
Unexpected variability of input prices 4.22 0.910 (1) 4.09 0.901 (1) 4.34 0.904 (1) 3.92
***
 
Unexpected variability of product prices 3.82 0.926 (2) 3.83 0.861 (2) 3.82 0.988 (2) -0.11 
Diseases and pests that affect plants and animals 3.52 1.153 (3) 3.70 1.014 (3) 3.34 1.252 (6) -4.47
***
 
Changes in Thailand‟s economic and political 
situation 
3.48 
 
1.080 
 
(4) 
 
3.44 0.992 (7) 3.53 1.161 (3) 1.28 
Unexpected variability of yields 3.47 0.946 (5) 3.58 0.965 (5) 3.36 0.915 (5) -3.35
***
 
Changes in national government laws and policies 3.38 1.090 (6) 3.38 1.024 (8) 3.39 1.154 (4) 0.16 
Natural disasters such as heat, fire, flood, storm 3.38 1.345 (7) 3.47 1.092 (6) 3.29 1.554 (8) -1.92
*
 
Changes in the world economic and political situation 3.30 1.097 (8) 3.27 1.029 (9) 3.32 1.161 (7) 0.71 
Excess rainfall 3.27 1.293 (9) 3.59 1.017 (4) 2.95 1.453  -7.16
***
 
Deficiency in rainfall causing drought 3.11 1.441 (10) 3.09 1.372 (10) 3.13 1.508 (9) 0.44 
Problems with hired labour 3.02 1.259  2.95 1.161  3.10 1.347 (10) 1.72
*
 
High level of debt 2.84 1.075  2.90 1.052  2.77 1.095  -1.75
*
 
Accidents or problems with health 2.74 1.145  2.56 1.007  2.91 1.245  4.34
***
 
Changes in interest rates 2.73 1.106  2.86 1.054  2.60 1.144  -3.28
***
 
Changes in technology and breeding 2.52 1.089  2.49 0.952  2.55 1.211  0.75 
Changes in land prices 2.47 1.222  2.56 1.241  2.38 1.198  -2.03
**
 
Risk from theft 2.19 1.179  2.57 1.144  1.82 1.094  -9.44
***
 
Changes in family situation such as marital status, 
inheritances, etc. 
1.98 
 
1.032 
 
 2.11 0.966  1.85 1.081  -3.52
***
 
Being unable to meet contracting obligations 1.82 1.046  2.13 1.038  1.52 0.965  -8.50
***
 
a 
Likert scale is used from 1 (not important) to 5 (extremely important). 
b
 The mean scores of central and north-east farmers are significantly difference at 
*
P<0.1, 
**
P<0.05 and 
***
P<0.01 based on independent samples t test. 
Source: Field survey, 2009
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This finding is consistent with those of Patrick et al. (1985), Martin (1993) and Flaten et al. 
(2005) who argued that marketing risks associated with the variability of product and input 
prices were the most important sources of risk considered by the farmers in their respective 
study areas.    
The production risks related to „diseases and pests affecting plants and animals‟, „excess 
rainfall‟ and „natural disasters such as floods‟ were ranked third, fourth and sixth, among the 
farmers in the central region with mean scores of 3.70, 3.59 and 3.47, respectively. The 
results reflect the heavy floods that hit the central provinces during September 2008. 
Following this incident, 100,000 rai (16,000 ha.) of farmland in the central region were 
damaged (IRINNews, 2008).  
Institutional risks related to „changes in Thailand‟s economic and political situation‟ and 
„changes in national government laws and policies‟ were ranked third and fourth, among the 
north-east region farmers. This finding revealed that smallholder farmers were very 
concerned about the effect of the political conflicts in Thailand on their farm operation.  
„Unexpected variability of yields‟ was ranked the fifth most important source of risk in both 
regions. In addition, the financial risks associated with „changes in interest rates‟ and „high 
levels of debt‟ were considered as „quite important‟ by all farmers.   
Sources of risk that obtained low mean scores included „changes in technology and breeding‟, 
„changes in land prices‟, „risk from theft‟, „changes in the situation of farm families‟ and 
„unable to meet contracting obligations‟. 
Comparisons of risk perception between the farmers in the central and north-east regions 
showed significant differences in most sources of risk. This interesting finding might be 
attributable to the fact that sources of risk vary depending on the farm‟s geographical 
condition, farm type, the environmental impact and the country‟s political and economic 
situation. Evidently, the small farm business may be affected in different ways by changes in 
those sources of risk. 
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5.2.1.2 Central region farmer group results 
Table 5.6 shows „deficiency in rainfall causing drought‟ was the most important source of 
risk for the farmers in the central region rain-fed areas with an average score of 4.42 and a 
SD of 0.755. Furthermore, the perception of drought between the farmers in central region 
rain-fed and irrigated areas was significantly different ( 01.0P ). This indicates that the 
drought was the main specific risk that dominated the smallholder farmers‟ concerns in 
central rain-fed areas. 
The impact of marketing risks associated with „unexpected variability of input prices‟ and 
„unexpected variability of product prices‟ enormously worried the farmers in both groups. 
„Diseases and pests that affect plants and animals‟ was ranked as the third and the fourth most 
important sources of risk among the farmers in the central region irrigated and rain-fed areas, 
respectively. „Excess rainfall‟ and „natural disasters such as flood‟ were ranked fourth and 
sixth in the central region irrigated areas. A possible explanation for this is because of the 
geographical constraint of the central region, which is a low-lying region. 
„Problems with hired labour‟ is considered „important‟ by farmers in the central region rain-
fed areas. However, this source of risk is considered „quite important‟ for the irrigated 
farmers. Farmers in central region rain-fed areas ranked „problems with hired labour‟ higher 
than the irrigated farmers because the central region rain-fed farmers cultivated arable crops 
such as sugarcane, maize and sorghum, and most of these crops are labour-intensive.   
„Changes in national government laws and regulations‟ and „changes in Thailand‟s economic 
and political situation‟ were of moderate concern among the farmers in both groups. In 
addition, concerns among the central region irrigated farmers regarding the financial risk 
associated with „high level of debt‟ and „changes in interest rates‟ were significantly higher 
than for the central region rain-fed farmers.   
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Table 5.6 Ranking of perceptions of sources of risk by Thai farmers in central region 
irrigated and rain-fed areas 
Source of risk Irrigated 
(n=294) 
Rain-fed  
(n=106) 
Test of 
difference 
b 
Mean 
a 
SD Rank Mean
 a 
SD Rank 
Unexpected variability 
of input prices 
4.04 0.965 (1) 4.25 0.673 (2) -2.41
**
 
Unexpected variability 
of product prices 
3.89 0.877 (2) 3.65 0.793 (3) 2.56
**
 
Diseases and pests that 
affect plants and animals 
3.74 1.074 (3) 3.57 0.817 (4) 1.56 
Excess rainfall 3.72 0.940 (4) 3.22 1.113 (7) 4.11
***
 
Unexpected variability 
of yields 
3.71 0.946 (5) 3.23 0.929 (6) 4.58
***
 
Natural disasters such as 
heat, fire, flood, storm 
3.60 1.033 (6) 3.10 1.171 (9) 3.87
***
 
Changes in Thailand‟s 
economic and political 
situation 
3.57 0.931 (7) 3.07 1.063 (10) 4.30
***
 
Changes in national 
government laws and 
policies 
3.48 1.001 (8) 3.10 1.041 (8) 3.19
***
 
Changes in the world 
economic and political 
situation 
3.38 0.983 (9) 2.97 1.099  3.35
***
 
High level of debt 3.01 1.068 (10) 2.59 0.944  3.78*** 
Changes in interest rates 2.99 1.042  2.48 0.997  4.48
***
 
Problems with hired 
labour 
2.78 1.158  3.42 1.032 (5) -5.37
***
 
Changes in land prices 2.69 1.227  2.18 1.209  3.72
***
 
Risk from theft 2.60 1.166  2.46 1.079  1.08 
Deficiency in rainfall 
causing drought 
2.60 1.215  4.42 0.755 (1) -17.87
***
 
Accidents or problems 
with health 
2.59 1.034  2.50 0.928  0.75 
Changes in technology 
and breeding 
2.52 1.017  2.40 0.739  -0.19 
Changes in family 
situation such as marital 
status, inheritances, etc. 
2.13 0.979  2.05 0.930  0.75 
Being unable to meet 
contracting obligations 
2.12 1.107  2.14 0.822  1.18 
a 
Likert scale is employed from 1 (not important) to 5 (extremely important). 
b
 The mean scores of central region irrigated and rain-fed farmers are significantly difference at 
*
P<0.1, 
**
P<0.05 and 
***
P<0.01 based on independent samples t test. 
Source: Field survey, 2009 
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5.2.1.3 North-east region farmer group results 
Like the central region farmer group, marketing risks associated with „unexpected variability 
of input prices‟ and „unexpected variability of product prices‟ were the most important risk 
sources among farmers in the north-east irrigated and rain-fed groups (see Table 5.7). 
„Deficiency in rainfall causing drought‟ was a major concern for the north-east region rain-
fed farmers, whereas „excess rainfall‟ and „natural disasters such as flood‟ were considered 
„important‟ by the irrigated farmers. 
„Changes in Thailand‟s economic and political situation‟ and „changes in national 
government laws and policies‟ enormously worried among the north-east rain-fed farmers. 
This is because the north-east rain-fed area is one of the poorest parts of Thailand and most 
farmers in this area are poor. Therefore, the farmers worry about the uncertainties of 
government agricultural and rural development policies; changes in such policies directly 
impact their livelihoods and farm operation.     
Production risks associated with „unexpected variability in yields‟ was considered „important‟ 
by the north-east region irrigated and rain-fed farmers (SD=0.914 and 0.917, respectively). 
„Diseases and pests that affect plants and animals‟ was significantly higher for the north-east 
irrigated farmers than for rain-fed farmers. 
The test of differences in perception of human risks associated with „accidents or problems 
with the health of the farm owners‟ and „changes in family situation‟ between the farmers in 
the two groups were statistically significantly ( 01.0P  and 1.0P , respectively). North-
east rain-fed farmers rated the importance of human risks higher than the north-east irrigated 
farmers.  
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Table 5.7 Ranking of perceptions of sources of risk by Thai farmers in north-east 
irrigated and rain-fed areas 
Source of risk Irrigated 
(n=168) 
Rain-fed  
(n=232) 
Test of 
difference 
b 
Mean 
a 
SD Rank Mean
 a 
SD Rank 
Unexpected variability 
of input prices 
4.35 0.909 (1) 4.34 0.902 (1) 0.05 
Unexpected variability 
of product prices 
3.86 0.924 (2) 3.79 1.033 (3) 0.68 
Natural disasters such as 
heat, fire, flood, storm 
3.84 1.424 (3) 2.89 1.525  6.33
*
 
Diseases and pests that 
affect plants and animals 
3.71 1.220 (4) 3.07 1.208 (9) 5.20
*
 
Changes in Thailand‟s 
economic and political 
situation 
3.47 1.168 (5) 3.58 1.156 (4) -0.91 
Excess rainfall 3.43 1.421 (6) 2.61 1.379  5.80
*
 
Changes in the world 
economic and political 
situation 
3.37 1.145 (7) 3.29 1.173 (7) 0.64 
Changes in national 
government laws and 
policies 
3.37 1.146 (8) 3.40 1.162 (5) -0.22 
Unexpected variability 
of yields 
3.34 0.914 (9) 3.38 0.917 (6) -0.385 
Problems with hired 
labour 
2.97 1.412 (10) 3.19 1.293 (8) -1.62 
Accidents or problems 
with health 
2.74 1.262  3.03 1.222 (10) -2.28
***
 
High level of debt 2.65 1.022  2.86 1.140  -1.89
***
 
Changes in technology 
and breeding 
2.45 1.242  2.62 1.186  -1.34 
Changes in interest rates 2.41 1.080  2.74 1.170  -2.88
*
 
Deficiency in rainfall 
causing drought 
2.22 1.429  3.79 1.189 (2) -11.61
*
 
Changes in land prices 2.15 1.172  2.55 1.191  -3.33
*
 
Risk from theft 1.73 1.029  1.88 1.137  -1.329 
Changes in family 
situation such as marital 
status, inheritances, etc. 
1.68 1.050  1.97 1.089  -2.66
*
 
Being unable to meet 
contracting obligations 
1.44 0.971  1.58 0.959  -1.45 
a 
Likert scale is employed from 1 (not important) to 5 (extremely important). 
b
 The mean scores of north-east region irrigated and rain-fed farmers are significantly difference at 
*
P<0.1, 
**
P<0.05 and 
***
P<0.01 based on independent samples t test. 
Source: Field survey, 2009 
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5.2.2  Risk management strategies 
The results of the perceptions of the various risk management responses by the farmers in the 
central and north-east regions are discussed in this section. The mean score of each risk 
management response with the associated SD was calculated. The independent sample t  test 
was used to compare the mean score differences among the groups of farmers. The farmers 
were asked to specify whether each risk management strategy was implemented on their 
small farm operations. 
According to Martin (1993), Patrick et al. (1985) and Pellegrino (1999) the risk management 
strategies in this study can be classified into: (1) production strategies, including purchasing 
of farm machinery to replace labour, storing feed and/or seed reserves, applying pests and 
diseases programmes, having a farm reservoir for water supplies in the dry season and having 
diversified crop/animal or other enterprises on farm; (2) marketing strategies, including 
spreading sales over several time periods, obtaining market information on price forecasts 
and trends, selection of crop and/or animal varieties with low price variability and using 
forward contracts; (3) financial strategies, including holding cash and easily converted cash 
assets, working off-farm to supplement household income, reducing debt levels, leasing farm 
machinery rather than owning them and investing in non-farm businesses; and (4) 
miscellaneous strategies, including the ability to adjust quickly to the weather, prices and 
other adverse factors. 
5.2.2.1 All farmer group results 
Table 5.8 summarizes the results of the perceptions of risk management strategies elicited 
from the farmers in the central and north-east regions. Production and financial strategies 
were considered more important managerial responses to risk than marketing strategies by the 
farmers in both regions.  
Among the production strategies perceived by the central region farmers, „purchase farm 
machinery to replace labour‟ was the most important with an average rating of 3.45. Nearly 
60 per cent of central region farmers reported using this strategy to cope with hired 
agricultural labour problems on their farms. From the survey, farm machinery, such as hand 
tractors and four-wheel tractors, was widely used among the central region farmers. This 
reflects the imbalance problem between agricultural and industrial labour forces in Thailand. 
This finding supports Ahmad and Isvilanonda (2003) who argued that the rural labour force 
preferred to work in the industrial sector more than in the agricultural sector due to the gap in 
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wage rates. This may be the cause of the lack of agricultural labour especially in the central 
region, which has many factories located there. 
„Storing feed and/or seed reserves‟ and „have a farm reservoir for water supplies in dry 
season‟ showed significant differences in importance between the farmers in the central and 
north-east regions ( 01.0P ). North-east farmers perceived the importance of these two 
production strategies higher than central region farmers. They rated „storing feed and/or seed 
reserves‟ as the most important production strategies and „having a farm reservoir for water 
supplies in dry season‟ was ranked third with mean ratings of 3.61 and 3.47, respectively. 
Over 80 per cent of the north-east farmers learned „storing feed and/or seed reserves‟ in 
managing their small farm operations and approximately 65 per cent of them had experienced 
using the „having a farm reservoir for water supplies in dry season‟ strategy on their farm. 
This indicates that the north-east farmers were confronted with the variability of input prices 
and severe droughts. 
„Having diversified crop, animal or other enterprises‟ and „planting several varieties of crops‟ 
were the least important production strategies for both groups. The north-east farmers 
considered these two production strategies as „important‟ but the central region farmers rated 
them as „quite important‟, which is statistically significant different ( 01.0P ). The results 
indicated that the lack of farm resources may affect the diversification performance of the 
farmers in both groups.  
Financial strategies associated with „holding cash and easily converted cash assets‟ and 
„working off farm to supplement household income‟ were considered „important‟ by the 
farmers in the central and north-east regions. Approximately 60 per cent of the farmers in 
both regions reported that they used these two financial strategies. However, the north-east 
farmers perceived the importance of „holding cash and easily converted cash assets‟ 
significantly higher than the central region farmers. In addition, „reduce debt level‟ was given 
greater importance by the north-east farmers, whereas „investing in non-farm businesses‟ was 
more important among the central region farmers. In terms of marketing strategies, north-east 
farmers assigned significantly greater rating scores than central region farmers to „obtaining 
market information‟, „spread sale over several time period‟ and „selection of crop and/or 
animal varieties with low price variability‟.  
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Table 5.8 Ranking of perceptions of risk management strategies by sampled farmers in central and north-east Thailand 
Risk management strategy Overall 
(n=800) 
Central 
(n=400) 
North-east  
(n=400) 
Test of 
difference 
c 
Mean 
a 
SD %
 b
   Rank Mean 
a 
SD %
 b
 Rank Mean
 a 
SD %
 b
 Rank 
Production strategies:              
Purchase farm machinery to replace 
labour 
3.44 1.086 61.6 (1) 3.45 1.082 58.8 (1) 3.43 1.092 64.5 (5) -0.26 
Storing feed and/or seed reserves 3.40 1.088 60.9 (3) 3.20 1.158 40.8 (6) 3.61 0.972 81.0 (1) 5.49
***
 
Apply pests and diseases program 3.23 1.108 53.9 (7) 3.26 1.103 53.8 (4) 3.19 1.113 54.0 (9) -0.89 
Have a farm reservoir 3.06 1.295 47.9 (10) 2.65 1.200 35.5  3.47 1.258 60.3 (3) 9.40
***
 
Having diversified crop, animal or 
other enterprises 
2.94 
 
1.126 
 
33.4 
 
 2.84 1.118 26.0 
 
 3.05 1.126 40.8 
 
 2.65
***
 
Planting several varieties of crops 2.86 1.174 30.0  2.71 1.119 19.5  3.01 1.209 40.5  3.64
***
 
Marketing strategies:              
Obtaining market information 3.27 1.085 65.3 (5) 3.09 1.159 51.8 (7) 3.46 0.972 78.8 (4) 4.89
***
 
Spreading sale over several time 
periods 
3.19 1.213 41.6 (8) 3.01 1.232 31.5 (9) 3.39 1.164 51.8 (6) 4.48
***
 
Selection of crop and/or animal 
varieties with low price variability 
2.70 
 
1.036 
 
24.8 
 
 2.61 1.012 21.0 
 
 2.79 1.052 28.5 
 
 2.46
**
 
Use forward contracts 2.13 1.161 12.4  2.32 1.081 12.3  1.95 1.209 12.5  -4.59
***
 
Financial strategies:              
Holding cash 3.41 1.012 64.8 (2) 3.31 1.056 60.0 (3) 3.52 0.955 69.5 (2) 2.98*** 
Working off farm 3.28 1.255 63.3 (4) 3.33 1.241 68.8 (2) 3.24 1.268 57.8 (8) -1.07 
Reduce debt level 3.27 1.042 60.0 (6) 3.20 1.133 48.5 (5) 3.33 0.940 71.5 (7) 1.73
*
 
Leasing farm machinery 3.13 1.085 48.9 (9) 3.08 1.081 38.5 (8) 3.17 1.089 59.3 (10) 1.17 
Investing in non-farm businesses 2.64 1.282 31.3  2.92 1.258 42.3  2.36 1.246 20.3  -6.30
***
 
Miscellaneous strategies:               
Able to adjust quickly to weather, 
price and other adverse factors 
3.02 
 
0.956 
 
42.6 
 
 2.98 0.911 42.0 
 
(10) 3.06 0.998 43.3 
 
 1.18 
a 
Likert scale is used from 1 (not important) to 5 (extremely important). 
b
 The percentage of farmers using each risk management strategy. 
c The mean scores of central and north-east farmers are significantly difference at *P<0.1, **P<0.05 and ***P<0.01 based on independent samples t test  
Source: Field survey, 2009 
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„Use forward contracts‟ was the least important marketing strategy considered by most 
central and north-east regions farmers. Only 10 per cent of the farmers in both regions had 
used this strategy to manage risk. This suggests that the agricultural production under forward 
contracts in Thailand is still in its developmental stages and is not popular among the 
smallholder farmers in rural areas. However, the central region farmers perceived the 
importance of this marketing strategy significantly more than the north-east farmers 
( 01.0P ) with the mean scores of 2.32 and 1.95, respectively. 
The perceptions of risk responses between the farmers in the central and north-east regions 
were statistically different in many strategies similar to their perceived sources of risk (see 
Table 5.8). The findings from the survey revealed that the smallholder farmers in both 
regions used a mix of risk strategies to manage and reduce the sources of risk they 
confronted. The findings support Martin (1996), who argued that the farmers‟ selection 
criteria for risk management strategies varied depending on farm type, climatic conditions, 
marketing factors and agricultural rules and regulations. 
5.2.2.2 Central region farmer group results 
The perceptions of risk management strategies for the central region irrigated and rain-fed 
farmers are presented in Table 5.9. „Purchase farm machinery to replace labour‟ was the most 
important production strategy considered for central region irrigated farmers. The second 
most important production strategy was „apply pests and diseases programme‟ with a mean 
score of 3.33. This is because farmers in the central region irrigated areas have recently been 
confronted with diseases and pests that affected plants and animals.  
Perceptions of the importance of „having diversified crop, animal or other enterprises‟ and 
„planting several varieties of crop‟ were significantly different across farmers in the central 
region irrigated and rain-fed areas ( 01.0P ). Central region rain-fed farmers seemed to 
prefer these two strategies more than the irrigated farmers (SD=0.886 and 1.038, 
respectively). In addition, 50 per cent of the farmers in the central region rain-fed areas used 
these two strategies to manage risk on their small farms. This indicates that the central region 
rain-fed farmers practice higher levels of diversification than central region irrigated farmers. 
Ahmad & Isvilanonda (2003) identified high agricultural land prices along with increases in 
labour costs as the main obstacles for diversification of farming in the irrigated areas of the 
central region.
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Table 5.9 Ranking of perceptions of risk management strategies by Thai farmers in the central region irrigated and rain-fed areas 
Risk management strategy Irrigated 
(n=294) 
Rain-fed  
(n=106) 
Test of difference 
c 
Mean 
a 
SD %
 b
 Rank Mean
 a 
SD %
 b
 Rank 
Production strategies:           
Purchase farm machinery to replace labour 3.45 1.109 59.2 (1) 3.45 1.006 57.5 (4) -0.06 
Apply pests and diseases program 3.33 1.075 55.1 (2) 3.08 1.164 50.0 (10) 1.87
*
 
Storing feed and/or seed reserves 3.21 1.190 40.1 (4) 3.15 1.067 42.5 (8) 0.46 
Have a farm reservoir 2.62 1.156 37.4  2.75 1.317 30.2  -0.95 
Having diversified crop, animal or other enterprises 2.61 1.105 19.0  3.47 0.886 45.3 (2) -8.03
***
 
Planting several varieties of crops 2.47 1.047 10.5  3.39 1.038 44.3 (6) -7.78
***
 
Marketing strategies:          
Spreading sale over several time periods 3.01 1.268 32.3 (8) 2.99 1.134 29.2  0.14 
Obtaining market information 2.96 1.220 49.7 (10) 3.45 0.874 57.5 (3) -4.49
***
 
Selection of crop and/or animal varieties with low 
price variability 
2.53 0.993 15.3  2.83 1.037 36.8  -2.55
**
 
Use forward contracts 2.33 1.128 13.6  2.28 0.944 8.5  0.38 
Financial strategies:          
Working off farm 3.33 1.278 67.3 (3) 3.34 1.137 72.6 (7) -0.09 
Holding cash 3.17 1.117 54.1 (5) 3.69 0.748 76.4 (1) -5.31
***
 
Reduce debt level 3.13 1.191 44.2 (6) 3.40 0.933 60.4 (5) -2.31
**
 
Leasing farm machinery 3.07 1.163 39.8 (7) 3.10 0.816 34.9 (9) -0.24 
Investing in non-farm businesses 2.94 1.283 42.5  2.84 1.188 41.5  0.72 
Miscellaneous strategies:          
Able to adjust quickly to weather, price and other 
adverse factors 
2.99 0.988 39.1 (9) 2.95 0.653 50.0  0.32 
a 
Likert scale is employed from 1 (not important) to 5 (extremely important). 
b
 The percentage of farmers using each risk management strategy. 
c The mean scores of central and north-east farmers are significantly difference at *P<0.1, **P<0.05 and ***P<0.01 based on independent samples t test  
Source: Field survey, 2009 
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Central region rain-fed farmers perceived the importance of „holding cash‟ and „reduce debt 
level‟ significantly more than the central region irrigated farmers ( 01.0P  and  05.0P , 
respectively). Moreover, „working off-farm‟ was considered „important‟ by the farmers in 
both areas. 
Marketing strategies associated with „obtaining market information‟ were evaluated higher 
among the central region rain-fed farmers with a mean score of 3.45, which was significantly 
greater than the central region irrigated farmers. „Use of forward contracts‟ was regarded as 
the least important marketing strategy among farmers in both areas. In addition, only 13.6 
and 8.5 per cent of the central region irrigated and rain-fed farmers, respectively, had used 
this strategy to reduce marketing risks on their farm.    
5.2.2.3 North-east region farmer group results 
Table 5.10 presents the perceptions of risk management strategies elicited from the north-east 
irrigated and rain-fed farmers. The north-east rain-fed farmers‟ responses indicated „having a 
farm reservoir for water supplies in dry season‟ was the most important risk strategy with a 
mean score of 3.91; 70 per cent of them reported using this strategy for water supplies in the 
dry season. In particular, the result confirmed that severe droughts are the most important 
sources of risk that affect smallholder farmers in the area.    
„Storing feed and/or seed reserve‟ was ranked the most important risk strategy among the 
north-east irrigated farmers and ranked second among the rain-fed farmers (mean score=3.60 
and 3.62, respectively). Over 80 per cent of the farmers in both areas used this strategy to 
reduce risk. This is because most north-east farmers are poor. Thus, this production strategy 
is undertaken to reduce their production costs, especially for rice farmers. In addition, seed 
storage cottages, which were found during the field surveys, have been widely used by north-
east farmers compared with the central region farmers. 
Like the central region farmer results, the north-east irrigated farmers were less concerned 
with production strategies associated with „having diversified crop, animal or other 
enterprises‟ and „planting several varieties of crop‟ ( 1.0P ).   
„Holding cash‟ was evaluated as an „important‟ financial strategy by the farmers in the north-
east irrigated and rain-fed areas (SD=0.966 and 0.947, respectively). Other financial 
strategies that differed significantly between the groups of farmers included „reduce debt 
level‟, „working off farm‟ and „investment in non-farm businesses‟.  
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Table 5.10 Ranking of perceptions of risk management strategies by Thai farmers in the north-east region irrigated and rain-fed areas 
Risk management strategy Irrigated 
(n=168) 
Rain-fed  
(n=232) 
Test of difference 
c 
Mean 
a 
SD %
 b
 Rank Mean
 a 
SD %
 b
 Rank 
Production strategies:          
Storing feed and/or seed reserves 3.60 0.856 83.3 (1) 3.62 1.050 79.3 (2) -0.27 
Purchase farm machinery to replace labour 3.27 1.140 67.9 (4) 3.54 1.044 62.1 (4) -2.50
**
 
Apply pests and diseases program 3.18 1.085 56.5 (8) 3.20 1.135 52.2  -0.21 
Have a farm reservoir 2.86 1.315 49.4  3.91 1.009 68.1 (1) -8.96
*
 
Having diversified crop, animal or other enterprises 2.77 1.076 35.1  3.25 1.122 44.8 (9) -4.22* 
Planting several varieties of crops 2.74 1.170 30.4  3.21 1.200 47.8 (10) -3.93* 
Marketing strategies:          
Obtaining market information 3.44 0.914 82.7 (3) 3.47 1.015 75.9 (6) -0.30 
Spreading sale over several time periods 3.19 1.110 50.0 (7) 3.53 1.184 53.0 (5) -2.87* 
Selection of crop and/or animal varieties with low 
price variability 
2.68 0.987 31.0  2.88 1.092 26.7  -1.85
***
 
Use forward contracts 1.80 1.159 11.9  2.05 1.235 12.9  -1.99** 
Financial strategies:          
Holding cash 3.47 0.966 76.8 (2) 3.56 0.947 64.2 (3) -0.89 
Leasing farm machinery rather than owing them 3.24 1.094 69.6 (5) 3.11 1.083 51.7  1.30 
Reduce debt level 3.24 0.904 73.8 (6) 3.40 0.961 69.4 (7) -1.67*** 
Working off farm 3.02 1.292 53.0 (9) 3.39 1.230 61.2 (8) -2.94
*
 
Investing in non-farm businesses 2.13 1.221 20.2  2.52 1.241 20.3  -3.13* 
Miscellaneous strategies:          
Able to adjust quickly to weather, price and other 
adverse factors 
3.01 0.945 44.6 (10) 3.09 1.036 42.2  -0.89 
a 
Likert scale is employed from 1 (not important) to 5 (extremely important). 
b
 The percentage of farmers using each risk management strategy. 
c The mean scores of central and north-east farmers are significantly difference at *P<0.1, **P<0.05 and ***P<0.01 based on independent samples t test  
Source: Field survey, 2009 
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Marketing strategies related to „obtaining market information‟ and „spreading sale over 
several time periods‟ were considered „important‟ by both groups of farmers with the mean 
scores from 3.19 to 3.53. In addition, the north-east rain-fed farmers perceived „selection of 
crop and/or animal varieties with low price variability‟ significantly greater than the north-
east region irrigated farmers ( 01.0P ). „Use forward contracts‟ was the least important 
marketing strategy evaluated by the farmers of both types. 
5.3 Factor analysis 
In this section, the results of the factor analysis of sources of risk and risk management 
strategies are discussed. Exploratory factor analysis with varimax orthogonal rotation was 
applied to the data using SPSS version 15. Exploratory factor analysis is used to reduce the 
number of sources of risk and risk management strategies for each group of farmers.  
The Kaiser-Meyer-Oklin (KMO) value was assessed to ensure the appropriateness for factor 
analysis of each data set (greater than 0.6 is recommended) (Hair, 2006). A cut-off of  0.4 
was employed for the factor loadings to determine the inter correlation among the original 
variables and for interpretation purposes in this study. In addition, the test of internal 
consistency reliability of each factor was assessed. A Cronbach‟s Alpha value greater than 
0.6 was suggested by Hair (2006) to yield a satisfactory result in reliability of the factor.  
Subsequently, the summated scale for each factor for each group of farmers was summed and 
averaged depending on each factor‟s structure (Hair, 2006). The summated scales were used 
in further analysis.  
5.3.1 Sources of risk 
5.3.1.1 All farmer group results 
The rotated factor loadings of risk sources for all farmers in the central and north-east 
regions, obtained from the principal analysis and a varimax orthogonal rotation, are discussed 
in this section. Before conducting factor analysis, the data set adequacy measurement was 
assessed. The KMO value was 0.779 and the Bartlett‟s Test of Sphericity achieved statistical 
significance ( 58.49272  , 01.0P ), confirming that the data set was appropriate for factor 
analysis. However, the preliminary results indicated three sources of risk including „accidents 
or problems with health‟, „deficiency rainfall‟ and „changes in technology or breeding‟ 
should be eliminated from the factor analysis because of their low communalities ( 40.0 ) 
(Hair, 2006). Following this, iteration of varimax orthogonal rotation was performed. 
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The results are presented in Table 5.11. Latent root criteria (eigenvalues > 1) were specified 
for six factors (AS1-6) from the 16 sources of risk variables for the all farmer group. These 
six factors can explain almost 71.2 per cent of the total variance. The Cronbach‟s Alpha 
values for factors AS1-5 in the all farmer group ranged from 0.671 to 0.899, which exceeded 
the minimum requirement of 0.6. This demonstrates an adequate reliability among those 
factors. However, the alpha value was somewhat lower (0.426) for factor AS6. Factors AS1-6 
for the all farmer group can be labelled in accordance with the significant loading variables 
that were obtained for each factor and explained as follows: 
Factor AS1: this factor is named „economic and political‟ because of the relatively high 
loadings on the sources of risk variables with the changes in Thailand and the world 
economic and political situations and changes in the government laws and policies that 
affected the small farm operations.  
Factor AS2: this factor incorporates a number of sources of risk related to the farm business 
environment, including risk from being unable to meet contracting obligations, problems with 
hired labour, theft and changes in land prices. Moreover, risk from changes in family 
situation (also as personal risk) loaded highly on this factor. Therefore, this factor is named 
„personal and farm business environment‟.  
Factor AS3: this factor consists of the significant loading of „excess rainfall‟ and „natural 
disaster‟. Factor AS3 is labelled „natural disaster‟. 
Factor AS4: this factor can be interpreted as the „financial situation‟ because of the high 
factor loadings on the changes in interest rates and high level of debt.   
Factor AS5: this factor is related to the risk from unexpected variability in yields and the 
unpredictable product prices. Thus, this factor is classified as „yields and product prices‟. 
Factor AS6: this factor is labelled „input prices‟ because of the highest factor loading of the 
unexpected variability in input prices in this factor. 
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Table 5.11 Varimax rotated factor loadings of sources of risk for all sampled in 
Thailand farmers (n=800) 
Source of risk Factors 
a 
Communality
 
AS1 AS2 AS3 AS4 AS5 AS6 
Changes in Thailand‟s 
economic and political 
situation 
0.923 0.091 0.005 0.092 0.134 0.053 0.890 
Changes in the world 
economic and political 
situation 
0.875 0.064 0.066 0.164 0.030 0.050 0.804 
Changes in national 
government laws and 
policies 
0.833 0.220 0.003 0.048 0.179 0.094 0.786 
Changes in family 
situation 
0.087 0.748 0.097 0.079 0.126 -0.176 0.629 
Being unable to meet 
contracting obligations 
0.009 0.747 0.121 0.285 0.042 -0.082 0.663 
Risk from theft 0.107 0.700 0.078 0.203 0.151 0.108 0.583 
Problems with hired labour 
and contractors 
0.132 0.616 -0.170 -0.147 -0.127 0.427 0.646 
Changes in land prices 0.315 0.559 -0.014 0.242 0.107 0.087 0.489 
Excess rainfall 0.018 0.050 0.895 0.086 0.085 -0.039 0.821 
Natural disasters 0.033 0.077 0.862 -0.056 -0.007 0.190 0.789 
Changes in interest rates 0.119 0.261 -0.024 0.827 0.065 0.162 0.797 
High level of debt 0.169 0.220 0.070 0.825 0.064 0.010 0.768 
Unexpected variability of 
yields 
0.141 0.103 0.053 0.071 0.846 0.017 0.755 
Unexpected variability of 
product prices 
0.131 0.122 0.033 0.046 0.823 0.135 0.730 
Unexpected variability of 
input prices 
0.077 -0.094 -0.014 0.064 0.115 0.852 0.758 
Diseases and pests that 
affect plants and animals 
0.073 0.104 0.329 0.135 0.071 0.579 0.483 
        
Eigenvalues 4.35 1.83 1.71 1.22 1.21 1.07  
Per cent of total variance 
explained  
27.17 11.46 10.70 7.61 7.55 6.69  
Cumulative per cent of the 
variance explained 
27.17 38.63 49.33 56.95 64.49 71.19  
Cronbach‟s Alpha 0.889 0.743 0.776 0.763 0.671 0.426  
Number of variables 3 5 2 2 2 2  
a 
Factors AS1-6 are labelled as AS1=economic and political, AS2=personal and farm business environment, 
AS3=natural disaster, AS4=financial situation, AS5=yields and product prices and AS6=input prices.  
„Accidents or problems with health‟, „deficiency in rainfall causing drought‟ and „changes in technology and 
breeding‟ are deleted from the analysis due to these sources of risk have low communalities.  
Factor loadings for an absolute values greater than 0.4 are in bold. 
Source: Field survey, 2009  
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5.3.1.2 Central region farmer group results 
Table 5.12 presents the final results of the varimax rotated factor loadings of sources of risk 
for the central region farmer group. The KMO value was 0.773 with a statistically significant 
Bartlett‟s Test of Sphericity ( 83.35132  , 01.0P ). In addition, based on the preliminary 
results, „problems with hired labour and contractors‟ was removed from the factor analysis 
because the communality was lower than 0.4. Factor analysis was then repeated with 18 
sources of risk specified.  
The results in this group were similar to the all farmer group, where the factor analysis 
grouped the 18 sources of risk into six factors. The factors CS1-6 were named as „personal 
and farm business environment‟, „economic and political‟, „yields and product prices‟, 
„financial situation‟, „input prices‟ and „natural disaster‟, respectively. 
In addition, these six factors identified for the central region farmer group can be explained 
by 72.17 per cent of the total variance. With regard to the reliability test, the Cronbach‟s 
Alpha for factors CS1-6 ranged from 0.639 to 0.884. Therefore, these factors were 
determined to be reliable for further analysis.  
5.3.1.3 North-east region farmer group results 
Table 5.13 shows the final rotated factor analysis of 15 sources of risk variables for the north-
east farmer group. The KMO value was 0.747 with a statistically significant Bartlett‟s Test of 
Sphericity ( 24.21262  , 01.0P ). Four sources of risk with low communalities and 
relatively high cross-loading problems were deleted from the factor analysis. They included 
„diseases and pests that affect plants and animals‟, „changes in technology and breeding‟, 
„deficiency in rainfall causing drought‟ and „being unable to meet contracting obligations‟. 
The factor loadings obtained from the varimax rotations grouped the 15 sources of risk into 
six factors for the north-east farmer group. Factor one (NS1) had three significant loading 
variables, factor two (NS2) had five variables, factors 3-5 (NS3-5) had two variables each 
and factor six (NS6) had a single component variable. The six factors explained almost 70 per 
cent of the total variance. The Cronbach‟s Alpha values for factors NS1-4 ranged from 0.675 
to 0.893, which were reliable among those factors. However, the alpha value for factor NS5 
had a somewhat lower reliability of 0.514. Factors NS1-6 were labelled as „economic and 
political‟, „personal and farm business environment‟, „natural disaster‟, „yields and product 
prices‟, „financial situation‟ and „input prices‟, respectively. 
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Table 5.12 Varimax rotated factor loadings of sources of risk for farmers in the central 
region of Thailand (n=400) 
Source of risk Factors 
a 
Communality
 
CS1 CS2 CS3 CS4 CS5 CS6 
Being unable to meet 
contracting obligations 
0.835 0.129 0.004 0.164 0.076 0.026 0.747 
Changes in family 
situation 
0.761 0.048 0.211 0.258 -0.139 0.034 0.713 
Accidents or problems 
with health 
0.690 -0.108 0.020 0.244 -0.022 0.007 0.549 
Changes in technology 
and breeding 
0.662 0.279 -0.003 -0.173 0.062 0.289 0.634 
Risk from theft 0.553 0.243 0.264 0.226 0.327 -0.121 0.606 
Deficiency in rainfall 
causing drought 
0.448 -0.043 -0.422 -0.386 0.350 0.193 0.690 
Changes in Thailand‟s 
economic and political 
situation 
0.047 0.888 0.218 0.186 0.092 -0.032 0.882 
Changes in the world 
economic and political 
situation 
0.065 0.846 0.006 0.257 -0.014 0.067 0.791 
Changes in national 
government laws and 
policies 
0.157 0.797 0.299 0.085 0.165 -0.044 0.786 
Unexpected variability of 
yields 
0.045 0.217 0.854 0.031 0.031 0.135 0.798 
Unexpected variability of 
product prices 
0.182 0.153 0.793 -0.033 0.162 0.202 0.753 
Changes in interest rates 0.237 0.261 -0.050 0.749 0.260 0.078 0.761 
High level of debt 0.343 0.348 -0.036 0.707 0.055 0.146 0.764 
Changes in land prices 0.356 0.212 0.323 0.497 0.175 -0.086 0.561 
Unexpected variability of 
input prices 
-0.056 0.043 0.123 0.181 0.809 0.096 0.717 
Diseases and pests that 
affect plants and animals 
0.078 0.113 0.031 0.049 0.798 0.145 0.681 
Excess rainfall 0.047 0.014 0.156 0.007 0.069 0.880 0.806 
Natural disasters  0.073 -0.023 0.087 0.088 0.170 0.839 0.754 
        
Eigenvalues 5.28 2.18 1.94 1.45 1.11 1.03  
Per cent of total variance 
explained  
29.35 12.13 10.75 8.05 6.17 5.71  
Cumulative per cent of 
the variance explained 
29.35 41.49 52.24 60.29 66.46 72.17  
Cronbach‟s Alpha 0.748 0.884 0.812 0.766 0.639 0.766  
Number of variables 6 3 2 3 2 2  
a 
Factors CS1-6 are labelled as CS1=personal and farm business environment, CS2=economic and political, 
CS3=yields and product prices, CS4=financial situation, CS5=input prices and CS6=natural disaster.  
„Problems with hired labour and contractors‟ is deleted from the analysis due to this source of risk has low 
communalities.  
Factor loadings for an absolute values greater than 0.4 are in bold. 
Source: Field survey, 2009 
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Table 5.13 Varimax rotated factor loadings of sources of risk for farmers in the north-
east region of Thailand (n=400) 
Source of risk Factors 
a 
Communality
 
NS1 NS2 NS3 NS4 NS5 NS6 
Changes in Thailand‟s 
economic and political 
situation 
0.923 0.100 0.020 0.031 0.112 0.024 0.876 
Changes in the world 
economic and political 
situation 
0.891 0.050 0.082 0.075 0.076 0.049 0.817 
Changes in national 
government laws and 
policies 
0.841 0.200 0.001 0.072 0.121 0.039 0.770 
Changes in family 
situation 
0.048 0.724 0.090 0.082 0.166 -0.242 0.627 
Accidents or problems 
with health 
-0.011 0.702 0.097 0.076 0.055 0.159 0.537 
Risk from theft 0.109 0.658 0.037 0.137 0.100 -0.073 0.480 
Changes in land prices 0.358 0.559 -0.028 0.217 -0.011 -0.099 0.499 
Problems with hired 
labour and contractors 
0.179 0.550 -0.231 -0.014 -0.188 0.342 0.540 
Excess rainfall  0.054 0.016 0.899 0.102 -0.006 -0.088 0.830 
Natural disasters 0.036 0.081 0.891 -0.058 -0.022 0.126 0.822 
High level of debt 0.081 0.092 0.082 0.856 0.086 -0.021 0.763 
Changes in interest rates 0.075 0.248 -0.042 0.823 0.090 0.057 0.757 
Unexpected variability of 
yields 
0.100 0.054 -0.026 0.060 0.842 -0.029 0.727 
Unexpected variability of 
product prices 
0.144 0.112 0.001 0.104 0.723 0.157 0.592 
Unexpected variability of 
input prices 
0.054 -0.071 0.058 0.032 0.145 0.910 0.861 
        
Eigenvalues 3.64 1.75 1.68 1.33 1.08 1.01  
Per cent of total variance 
explained  
24.29 11.69 11.19 8.89 7.23 6.71  
Cumulative per cent of 
the variance explained 
24.29 35.98 47.17 56.05 63.28 69.99  
Cronbach‟s Alpha 0.893 0.675 0.784 0.678 0.514 -  
Number variables 3 5 2 2 2 1  
a 
Factors NS1-6 are labelled as NS1=economic and political, NS2=personal and farm business environment, 
NS3=natural disaster, NS4=yields and product prices, NS5=financial situation and NS6=input prices.  
„Diseases and pests that affect plants and animals‟, „changes in technology and breeding‟, „deficiency in rainfall 
causing drought‟ and „being unable to meet contracting obligations‟ are deleted from the analysis due to these 
sources of risk have low communalities.  
Factor loadings for an absolute values greater than 0.4 are in bold. 
Source: Field survey, 2009 
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5.3.2 Risk management strategies 
5.3.2.1 All farmer group results 
Factor analysis was employed to reduce the risk strategy variables as perceived by the 
farmers in both the central and north-east regions. The KMO measure of data sufficiency was 
0.887. In addition, Bartlett‟s Test of Sphericity was statistically significant at the one per cent 
level ( 16.33012  ). This indicates that the data were suitable for factor analysis.  
The first iteration of factor analysis results identified the removal of „able to adjust quickly to 
weather, price and other adverse factors‟ and „purchase farm machinery to replace of labour‟, 
because these variables exhibited low communalities. Following this, the second rotation was 
performed with 14 risk strategies for the all farmer group.  
The final results of the varimax rotated factor loadings for each risk strategy for this group of 
farmers are documented in Table 5.14. Factor analysis grouped the 14 risk management 
strategies into four factors. These four factors explained almost 58.33 per cent of the 
variance.  
With regard to reliability, the Cronbach‟s Alpha values for factors AR1-3 were 0.742, 0.711 
and 0.642, respectively. The alpha value for factor AR4 was 0.596, which is very close to the 
minimum cut-off level of 0.6. The factors AR1-4 can be named according to each factor 
structure as follows: 
Factor one (AR1): this factor has a relatively high loading of the risk strategy variables 
related to „apply pests and diseases programme‟, „storing feed and/or seed reserves‟, „have a 
farm reservoir for water supplies in dry season‟, „spreading sale over several time period‟ and 
„obtaining market information on prices forecast and trends‟. This factor is named „farm 
production and marketing management‟. 
Factor two (AR2): this factor is described as „diversification‟ because there were significant 
loadings of risk strategy variables related to „having diversified crop, animal or other 
enterprises‟, „planting several varieties of crops‟ and „selection of crop and/or animal 
varieties with low price variability‟. 
Factor three (AR3): this factor is loaded highly on „investing in non-farm 
investment/business‟ and „working off farm to supplement net farm income‟, which really 
represent the influence of off-farm income. Thus, factor three is named „off-farm income‟. 
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Factor four (AR4): this factor is interpreted as „financial management‟, which is concerned 
with „reduce debt level‟, „leasing farm machinery rather than owning them‟ and „holding cash 
and easily converted cash assets‟. 
However, in factor AR3, factor analysis grouped the „use forward contracts‟ variable, which 
is unrelated to the definition of this factor. Therefore, the „use forward contracts‟ variable was 
deleted from factor AR3 and the Cronbach Alpha coefficient slightly improved from 0.642 to 
0.697. This result illustrated that factor AR3 had a stronger internal consistency after „use 
forward contracts‟ variable was deleted. 
Table 5.14 Varimax rotated factor loadings of risk management strategies for all 
farmers sampled inThailand (n=800) 
Risk management strategy Factors 
a 
Communality
 
AR1 AR2 AR3 AR4 
Apply pests and diseases program 0.655 -0.035 0.318 0.047 0.533 
Storing feed and/or seed reserves 0.651 0.162 -0.025 0.339 0.565 
Have a farm reservoir for water 
supplies in dry season 
0.641 0.288 0.022 0.031 0.495 
Spreading sale over several time period 0.618 0.301 0.183 0.159 0.531 
Obtaining market information on 
prices forecast and trends 
0.505 0.363 0.259 0.280 0.532 
Having diversified crop, animal or 
other enterprises 
0.211 0.796 -0.030 0.147 0.700 
Planting several varieties of crops 0.252 0.742 0.093 0.095 0.632 
Selection of crop and/or animal 
varieties with low price variability 
0.387 0.505 0.345 -0.039 0.525 
Investing in non-farm 
investment/business 
0.172 -0.001 0.807 0.124 0.696 
Working off farm to supplement net 
farm income 
0.341 0.058 0.711 0.143 0.646 
Use forward contracts -0.121 0.441 0.590 0.076 0.563 
Reduce debt level 0.094 0.117 0.061 0.787 0.645 
Leasing farm machinery rather than 
owning them 
0.164 -0.023 0.111 0.715 0.551 
Holding cash and easily converted cash 
assets 
0.117 0.440 0.177 0.559 0.552 
      
Eigenvalues 4.69 1.28 1.19 1.01  
Per cent of total variance explained  33.48 9.14 8.48 7.24  
Cumulative per cent of the variance 
explained 
33.48 42.62 51.09 58.33  
Cronbach‟s Alpha 0.742 0.711 0.642 0.596  
Number of variables 5 3 3 3  
a 
Factors AR1-4 labelled as AR1=farm production and marketing management, AR2=diversification, AR3=off-
farm income and AR4=financial management.  
„Able to adjust quickly to weather, price and other adverse factors‟ and „purchase farm machinery to replace of 
labour‟ are deleted from the analysis due to these risk management strategies have low communalities.  
Factor loadings for an absolute values greater than 0.4 are in bold. 
Source: Field survey, 2009 
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5.3.2.2 Central region farmer group results 
Table 5.15 summarizes the final results of the varimax rotation of risk strategy variables for 
the central region farmer group. The KMO was 0.891 with a statistically significant Bartlett‟s 
Test of Sphericity ( 15.29172  , 01.0P ). From the first iteration of the factor analysis 
results, three risk strategy variables were removed due to their low communalities. They were 
„holding cash and easily converted cash assets‟, „obtaining market information on prices 
forecast and trends‟ and „use forward contracts‟. 
The second iteration was conducted with 13 risk strategy variables and factor analysis 
grouped them into four factors. In addition, these four factors explained nearly 67 per cent of 
the total variance for this group of farmers. With regard to reliability assessment, the 
Cronbach‟s Alpha values for factors CR1-4 ranged from 0.670 to 0.790. Factor CR1 has five 
significant loading risk strategy variables, factor CR2 has three variables, factor CR3 has 
three variables and factor CR4 has two variables. The factors CR1-4 are labelled as „farm 
production and marketing management‟, „diversification‟, „off-farm income‟ and „financial 
management‟, respectively.  
Factor CR3 included the variable „apply pests and diseases programme‟ that was not related 
to the definition of this factor. Therefore, the „apply pests and diseases programme‟ variable 
was removed. The Cronbach Alpha coefficient increased from 0.753 to 0.848 after „apply 
pests and diseases programme‟ variable was deleted.  
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Table 5.15 Varimax rotated factor loadings of risk management strategies for farmers 
in the central region of Thailand (n=400) 
Risk management strategy Factors 
a 
Communality
 
CR1 CR2 CR3 CR4 
Purchase farm machinery to replace of 
labour 
0.811 -0.046 0.069 0.108 0.677 
Have a farm reservoir for water supplies 
in dry season 
0.601 0.398 0.308 -0.048 0.616 
Spreading sale over several time period 0.570 0.329 0.343 0.329 0.659 
Storing feed and/or seed reserves 0.553 0.262 0.299 0.380 0.608 
Able to adjust quickly to weather, price 
and other adverse factors 
0.532 0.266 0.058 0.254 0.422 
Having diversified crop, animal or other 
enterprises 
0.123 0.896 0.042 0.231 0.825 
Planting several varieties of crops 0.082 0.842 0.165 0.132 0.760 
Selection of crop and/or animal varieties 
with low price variability 
0.423 0.547 0.306 0.038 0.573 
Working off farm to supplement net farm 
income 
0.115 0.203 0.852 0.186 0.815 
Investing in non-farm 
investment/business 
0.162 0.175 0.843 0.125 0.784 
Apply pests and diseases program 0.454 -0.043 0.530 0.138 0.508 
Reduce debt level 0.221 0.131 0.054 0.824 0.749 
Leasing farm machinery rather than 
owning them 
0.105 0.156 0.276 0.774 0.711 
      
Eigenvalues 5.35 1.28 1.07 1.00  
Per cent of total variance explained  41.15 9.86 8.25 7.70  
Cumulative per cent of the variance 
explained 
41.16 51.01 59.26 66.97  
Cronbach‟s Alpha 0.792 0.776 0.753 0.670  
Number of variables 5 3 3 2  
a 
Factors CR1-4 labelled as CR1=farm production and marketing management, CR2=diversification, CR3=off-
farm income and CR4=financial management.  
„Holding cash and easily converted cash assets‟, „obtaining market information on prices forecast and trends‟ 
and „use forward contracts‟ are deleted from the analysis due to these risk management strategies have  low 
communalities.  
Factor loadings for an absolute values greater than 0.4 are in bold. 
Source: Field survey, 2009 
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5.3.2.3 North-east region farmer group results 
Table 5.16 presents the varimax rotated factor loadings of risk management strategies for the 
north-east farmer group. The KMO was 0.826 with a statistically significant Bartlett‟s Test of 
Sphericity ( 38.9952  , 01.0P ). The first rotated of results deleted „have a farm reservoir 
for water supplies in dry season‟ and „spreading sale over several time period‟ because of 
their low communalities. Following this, the second rotation was performed.  
Factor analysis grouped the 14 risk strategy variables for the north-east farmer group into 
four factors, which explained almost 51 per cent of the variance. Factor one (NR1) is 
labelled, because of its structure as „preventative strategies‟. This factor has high loadings of 
the risk strategy variables „obtaining market information on prices forecast and trends‟, 
„apply pests and diseases programme‟, „able to adjust quickly to weather, price and other 
adverse factors‟ and „holding cash and easily converted cash assets‟. These strategies are used 
to protect production and reduce marketing and financial risks.  
Factor two (NR2) consists of the significant loading risk strategy variables associated with 
„investing in non-farm investment/business‟, „working off farm to supplement net farm 
income‟, „use forward contracts‟ and „selection of crop and/or animal varieties with low price 
variability‟. This factor is labelled as „off-farm income and marketing management‟ to best 
describe the dimensionality of the data. Factors three (NR3) and four (NR4) are interpreted as 
„diversification‟ and „financial management‟, respectively.  
Regarding the reliability measurement, factors NR1-3 have Cronbach‟s Alpha values that 
achieved the minimum acceptable level of reliability. However, the alpha coefficient for 
factor NR4 was 0.226. This finding may have resulted from the proportion of variables in this 
factor exhibiting multidimensionality (Yu, 2001). Therefore, the „financial management‟ 
factor was excluded from further analysis because it was inconsistent and had a high level of 
error variance.  
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Table 5.16 Varimax rotated factor loadings of risk management strategies for farmers 
in the north-east region of Thailand (n=400) 
Risk management strategy Factors 
a 
Communality
 
NR1 NR2 NR3 NR4 
Obtaining market information on prices 
forecast and trends 
0.715 0.025 0.211 0.105 0.567 
Apply pests and diseases program 0.662 0.155 0.170 0.028 0.492 
Able to adjust quickly to weather, price 
and other adverse factors 
0.605 0.288 -0.125 -0.276 0.541 
Holding cash and easily converted cash 
assets 
0.574 0.100 0.192 0.393 0.530 
Investing in non-farm 
investment/business 
0.071 0.684 -0.002 0.189 0.509 
Use forward contracts 0.090 0.679 -0.095 -0.023 0.479 
Working off farm to supplement net farm 
income 
0.198 0.636 0.198 0.104 0.494 
Selection of crop and/or animal varieties 
with low price variability 
0.377 0.479 0.328 -0.161 0.505 
Having diversified crop, animal or other 
enterprises 
0.212 -0.068 0.750 -0.058 0.615 
Planting several varieties of crops 0.268 0.243 0.612 -0.028 0.506 
Storing feed and/or seed reserves 0.013 -0.133 0.584 0.275 0.435 
Purchase farm machinery to replace of 
labour 
0.017 0.434 0.568 -0.004 0.511 
Reduce debt level 0.133 0.078 -0.013 0.679 0.486 
Leasing farm machinery rather than 
owning them
 
 
-0.070 0.065 0.048 0.674 0.466 
      
Eigenvalues 3.41 1.46 1.25 1.03  
Per cent of total variance explained  24.32 10.40 8.89 7.35  
Cumulative per cent of the variance 
explained 
24.32 34.72 43.62 50.97  
Cronbach‟s Alpha 0.611 0.613 0.588 0.226  
Number of variables 4 4 4 2  
a 
Factors NR1-4 labelled as NR1=preventive strategies, NR2=off-farm income and marketing management, 
NR3=diversification, and NR4=financial management. 
„Have a farm reservoir for water supplies in dry season‟ and „spreading sale over several time period‟ are 
deleted from the analysis due to these risk management strategies have low communalities.  
Factor loadings for an absolute values greater than 0.4 are in bold. 
Source: Field survey, 2009 
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5.4 The association between the farmers’ characteristics and 
source of risk and management perception of risks 
Multiple regression analysis was employed to investigate the relationship between the 
farmers‟ socioeconomic characteristics and the perceptions of sources of risk and risk 
management strategy components obtained from the factor analysis. The summated scales of 
sources of risk and risk strategy factors of each group of farmers were summed up and 
averaged based on the relevant variables in each factor structure and their internal 
consistency. 
Before performing multiple regression analysis, all models were assessed for normality, 
linearity, multicollinearity and homoscedasticity to ensure the appropriateness of the 
equations (Pallant, 2007). Pearson correlation coefficients of the farmers‟ perceptions of 
sources of risk and risk management strategies with socioeconomic variables are shown in 
Appendix B. 
The results in this section are divided into two parts. In the first part, the association between 
the farmers‟ perceptions of sources of risk and the socioeconomic characteristics of each 
group of farmers are discussed. In the next part, the influences of the farmers‟ characteristics 
on risk management responses are investigated. 
5.4.1 Sources of risk 
5.4.1.1 All farmer group results 
Table 5.17 shows the relationship between all farmers‟ socioeconomic status and the different 
perceptions of sources of risk components. Models 1-4 are statistically significant at the one 
per cent level. However, the coefficients of determination ( 2R ) of most of the models are 
low. This result is consistent with the findings of Flaten et al. (2005) and Meuwissen et al. 
(2001) who found low explanatory power of regression models between the perceptions of 
sources of risk and risk strategies with the farmers‟ characteristics. Both sets of authors 
argued that the lower 2R  of the regression models implies that the farmers‟ perceptions of 
sources of risk and risk strategies differed from farmer to farmer.  
Gender is negatively related to the „personal and farm business environment‟ and „natural 
disaster‟ risks on farm. This implies that female heads of farm households are likely to 
perceive these sources of risk as significantly more important than male household heads. 
Similarly, the age of farmers and farm size are negatively related to the „natural disaster‟ risk, 
which means young farmers and farmers who have smaller farm sizes tended to perceive 
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„natural disaster‟ as a higher on-farm source of risk. This finding may be attributable to the 
severe floods across Thailand in 2008. 
The highest educational level is positively related to the „personal and farm business 
environment‟ risk, which indicates that more educated farmers perceived this source of risk 
as significantly more important in farming. The reason may be due to the more educated 
farmers having found that the family farm situation and the changes in farm business 
environment, such as high labour wages and relatively high prices of agricultural land, may 
indirectly affect their farm operations. 
The number of years in farming experience is negatively related to the „economic and 
political‟ risk perceptions. However, the annual household income and the size of farm 
household exhibited a positive relationship with this source of risk. This result suggests that 
less experienced farmers, farmers who have higher annual household income and farmers 
with larger household size tended to perceive risk related to „economic and political‟ as 
highly important. This finding may have resulted from the instability of Thailand political 
situation since September 2006.  
Farm business finance is positively related to the „financial situations‟ risk factor and is 
statistically significant at the one per cent level. This suggests that farmers who have loans 
are more likely to pay more attention to the changes to their farm financial situation, such as 
interest rates and level of debts. In addition, farm business finance is positively related to the 
„natural disaster‟ risk factor. This implies that farmers who have loans perceived this source 
of risk as highly important. This may be due to the „natural disaster‟ risk damaging their farm 
crops, which results in insecurity of their farm income and debt repayment capacity. 
Risks related to the „economic and political‟ and „personal and farm business environment‟ 
were perceived as highly important by farmers who had off-farm work. This suggests that 
farmers who have off-farm work are very concerned about those risks that can disrupt their 
off-farm income.  
With regard to the farm location variable, the regression result showed a strong relationship 
with more than half of the risk factors. Farmers in the central region tended to perceive the 
„personal and farm business environment‟, „natural disaster‟ and „financial situation‟ as more 
important risk factors than north-east farmers; north-east farmers are more concerned about 
„economic and political‟ risk. This finding indicates that the sources of risk on small-holding 
farms differ significantly between these two regions. 
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Table 5.17 Multivariate regression of the source of risk components and household and 
farm characteristics of all sampled Thai farmers (n=800) 
a
  
Independent variables Risk source components 
b
 
AS1 AS2 AS3 AS4 AS5 AS6 
Constant
 
3.170
***
 1.943
***
 3.287
***
 2.466
***
 3.619
***
 3.887
***
 
Age 
c 
-0.039 -0.079 -0.306
**
 -0.056 -0.118 -0.110 
Gender
 d
 -0.024 -0.199
***
 -0.182
*
 -0.063 -0.056 0.040 
Highest education 
e
 0.068 0.233
***
 0.123 0.122 0.123 -0.015 
Farming experiences
 f
 -0.139
*
 0.024 0.134 -0.098 0.013 0.102 
Off-farm work 
g
 0.135
*
 0.281
***
 0.037 0.067 0.092 0.057 
Farm size  -0.003 0.005 -0.011
**
 -0.004 0.001 -0.007
*
 
Net farm income -2.37E-07 -9.81E-07
***
 1.35E-06
**
 -6.90E-07 -2.77E07 -2.78E-07 
Farm location 
h
 -0.166
*
 0.301
***
 0.313
***
 0.196
**
 0.079 0.138
*
 
Finance farm business 
i
 0.028 -0.038 0.294
***
 0.408
***
 0.027 0.083 
Annual household income 
j
  0.231
***
 0.068 0.009 0.130 0.100 0.044 
Household size 0.063
***
 0.051
***
 0.008 0.023 0.001 -0.006 
       
2R  0.034
***
 0.124
***
 0.064
***
 0.061
***
 0.021 0.015 
a
 Variables and models significant at 
*
P<0.1, 
**
P<0.05 and 
***
P<0.01; 
b
 Factors AS1-6 are labelled as AS1=economic and political, AS2=personal and farm business environment, 
AS3=natural disaster, AS4=financial situation, AS5=yields and product prices and AS6=input prices; 
c
 1, if the farmer‟s age over 40 years old, 0 otherwise;  
d
 1, if the farmer is male, 0 if female; 
e
 1, if the highest education of the farmer is high school and higher, 0 if primary school education or less;    
f
 1, if the farming experience over 30 years, 0 otherwise; 
g
 1, if the farmer has off-farm work, 0 if no off-farm work; 
h
 1, if farmer‟s farm is located in central region, 0 if a farm located in north-east region; 
i
 1, if farm has a loan, 0 if farm without a loan; and 
j
 1, if household income greater than 90,001 baht and 0 represent otherwise. 
Source: Field survey, 2009 
5.4.1.2 Central region farmer group results 
Table 5.18 presents the relationships of the sources of risk and the central region farmers‟ 
characteristics. Models 1-6 exhibited a low 2R , but all models are statistically significant. 
The farming experience variable did not show any significant association with any source of 
risk component.  
Female household heads in the central region perceived „personal and farm business 
environment‟ and „natural disaster‟ as important sources of risk. The „personal and farm 
business environment‟ risk was perceived as more important by the more educated central 
region farmers. 
Except for the „economic and political‟ risk, the off-farm work coefficient shows a positive 
significant association with the sources of risk. This suggests that central region farmers who 
have off-farm work exhibited more anxiety about the risks that can affect their overall 
household income. Similarly, net farm income was negatively related to the sources of risk 
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CS1-4. This implies that central region farmers who have lower net farm incomes tend to 
perceive these sources of risk as highly important. 
Central region farmers with larger farms were highly concerned about the „yields and product 
prices‟ risk. The reason may be due to the farming conditions in the central region, which is 
concentrated with rice and cash crops. Thus, changes in yields and product prices lead to the 
instability of farm income, especially for farmers with large farms. 
Table 5.18 Multivariate regression of the source of risk components and household and 
farm characteristics of the Thai central region farmers (n=400) 
a
  
Independent variables Risk source components 
b
 
CS1 CS2 CS3 CS4 CS5 CS6 
Constant
 
2.368
***
 2.987
***
 3.602
***
 2.338
***
 4.212
***
 3.731
***
 
Age 
c 
-0.075 -0.002 -0.164 -0.021 -0.205 -0.091 
Gender
 d
 -0.214
***
 -0.135 -0.104 0.031 -0.089 -0.291
***
 
Highest education 
e
 0.201
**
 0.139 0.111 0.114 0.007 0.099 
Farming experiences
 f
 -0.026 0.106 0.073 0.150 -0.018 -0.042 
Off-farm work 
g
 0.250
***
 0.151 0.186
**
 0.222
**
 0.203
**
 0.304
***
 
Farm size  -0.003 0.005 0.020
***
 0.003 -0.011 -0.002 
Net farm income -7.14E-07
*
 -1.39E06
**
 -1.59E-06
***
 -2.44E06
***
 -2.73E-07 3.29E-07 
Farm location 
h
 0.246
**
 -0.421
***
 -0.486
***
 -0.581
***
 0.048 -0.519
***
 
Finance farm business 
i
 0.041 -0.070 -0.160
*
 0.156 0.139 0.182
*
 
Annual household income 
j
  0.033 0.287
**
 0.144 0.352
***
 0.010 -0.282
**
 
Household size 0.048
**
 0.089
***
 0.029 0.080
***
 -0.010 0.020 
       
2R  0.142
***
 0.117
***
 0.105
***
 0.163
**
 0.057
**
 0.134
***
 
a
 Variables and models significant at 
*
P<0.1, 
**
P<0.05 and 
***
P<0.01; 
b
 Factors CS1-6 are labelled as CS1=personal and farm business environment, CS2=economic and political, 
CS3=yields and product prices, CS4=financial situation, CS5=input prices and CS6=natural disaster; 
c
 1, if the farmer‟s age over 40 years old, 0 otherwise;  
d
 1, if the farmer is male, 0 if female; 
e
 1, if the highest education of the farmer is high school and higher, 0 if primary school education or less;    
f
 1, if the farming experience over 30 years, 0 otherwise; 
g
 1, if the farmer has off-farm work, 0 if no off-farm work; 
h
 1, if the farmer‟s farm is located in central region rain-fed areas, 0 if a farm located in irrigated areas; 
i
 1, if farm has a loan, 0 if farm without a loan; and 
j
 1, if household income greater than 90,001 baht and 0 represent otherwise. 
Source: Field survey, 2009 
The farm location coefficient negatively related to „economic and political‟, „yields and 
production prices‟, „financial status‟ and „natural disaster‟ risks. This implies that central 
region irrigated farmers tended to perceive these sources of risk as more important than the 
central region rain-fed farmers. However, the farmers in the central region rain-fed areas are 
more concerned with the „personal and farm business environment‟ risk.  
The central region farmers with larger households tended to perceive sources of risk related 
to the „personal and farm business environment‟, „economic and political‟ and „financial 
situation‟ as highly important. Larger annual household income farmers in the central region 
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perceived the „economic and political‟ and „financial situation‟ risk as highly important. 
However, they perceived the „natural disaster‟ risk as less important. 
5.4.1.3 North-east region farmer group results 
Multiple regression results for the sources of risk components and socioeconomic variables of 
the north-east farmers are shown in Table 5.19. The 2R  of models 1-4 are statistically 
significant and explained about 10 per cent of the total variance. There are five 
socioeconomic variables, age, farming experience, off-farm work, farm location and finance 
farm business, which have statistically significant associations with at least one source of risk 
for north-east farmers.  
Age is negatively related to „natural disaster‟ risk. The young north-east farmers perceived 
this risk factor as more important than older farmers. The north-east farmers who have off-
farm work and the farmers who have larger net farm income perceived „personal and farm 
business‟ as a highly important source of risk. 
Risks associated with „economic and political‟ and „yields and product prices‟ were perceived 
as much less relevant by the more experienced north-east farmers. This may be because these 
sources of risk caused fluctuations in farm income. Therefore, less-experienced farmers 
worried more about these sources of risk. 
The farm location coefficient was negatively related to the „natural disaster‟ risk factor. This 
suggests that north-east irrigated farmers‟ perceived „natural disaster‟ as more important than 
north-east rain-fed farmers. The reason may be because some areas in the north-east irrigated 
lowland were severely damaged by the severe floods in 2008. In contrast, north-east rain-fed 
farmers scored highly on the „personal and farm business environment‟ and „yields and 
production prices‟ risk factors. 
The farm business finance coefficient was positively related to „natural disaster‟ and „yields 
and product prices‟. This means that farmers who had loans were more concerned about those 
risk factors that affect their debt repayment capacity.  
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Table 5.19 Multivariate regression of the source of risk components and household and 
farm characteristics of the north-east Thai farmers (n=400) 
a
  
Independent variables Risk source components 
b
 
NS1 NS2 NS3 NS4 NS5 NS6 
Constant
 
3.146
 ***
 2.189
***
 3.939
***
 2.457
***
 3.545
***
 3.799
***
 
Age 
c 
0.130 -0.008 -0.567
**
 -0.013 0.132 0.252 
Gender
 d
 0.175 -0.100 -0.117 -0.103 0.094 0.046 
Highest education 
e
 -0.111 0.131 0.076 0.123 0.016 0.037 
Farming experiences
 f
 -0.430
***
 0.015 0.225 -0.254
**
 -0.110 0.191
*
 
Off-farm work 
g
 0.128 0.164
*
 -0.124 0.020 0.041 -0.065 
Farm size  0.002 0.002 0.011 0.001 0.005 -0.002 
Net farm income 7.14E-07 2.05E-06
*
 6.55E-07 8.94E-07 -1.65E-06 4.41E-07 
Farm location 
h
 0.007 0.275
***
 -0.895
***
 0.285
**
 -0.082 0.096 
Finance farm business 
i
 0.161 0.092 0.291
**
 0.632
***
 0.204
**
 0.024 
Annual household income 
j
  0.049 -0.119 -0.178 -0.122 -0.055 0.170 
Household size 0.019 -0.019 -0.029 -0.032 -0.038 0.007 
       
2R  0.052
**
 0.055
**
 0.134
***
 0.137
***
 0.036 0.036 
a
 Variables and models significant at 
*
P<0.1, 
**
P<0.05 and 
***
P<0.01; 
b
 Factors NS1-6 are labelled as NS1=economic and political, NS2=personal and farm business environment, 
NS3=natural disaster, NS4=yields and product prices, NS5=financial situation and NS6=input prices; 
c
 1, if the farmer‟s age over 40 years old, 0 otherwise;  
d
 1, if farmer is male, 0 if female; 
e
 1, if the highest education of the farmer is high school and higher, 0 if primary school education or less;    
f
 1, if the farming experience over 30 years, 0 otherwise; 
g
 1, if the farmer has off-farm work, 0 if no off-farm work; 
h
 1, if the farmer‟s farm is located in north-east region rain-fed areas, 0 if a farm located in irrigated areas; 
i
 1, if farm has a loan, 0 if farm without a loan; and 
j
 1, if household income greater than 90,001 baht and 0 represent otherwise. 
Source: Field survey, 2009 
5.4.2 Risk management strategies 
5.4.2.1 All farmer group results  
Table 5.20 summarizes the multiple regression models of the risk management strategy 
components and the socioeconomic variables for all farmers. The goodness-of-fit coefficients 
of all models were rather low, except for model three where the coefficient explained around 
27 per cent of the variation of the dependent variable. Models 1-4 are statistically significant 
( 01.0P ). The age variable is insignificant in relation to the risk strategy components of all 
farmers. 
Gender was negatively related to „off-farm income‟, which means that female household 
heads perceived this risk strategy as more important than male household heads. The reason 
is because the female farmers or wives can easily find off-farm work, such as weaving and/or 
handicrafts that are widely found throughout the north-east, to supplement their household 
income. 
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The highest educational level was positively related to the „farm production and marketing 
management‟, „diversification‟ and „off-farm income‟ risk strategies. This implies the more 
educated farmers perceived these risk management strategies as highly important. This 
finding is similar to that of Mustafa (2006) who argued that the more educated farmers 
performed better in managing their farm business compared with less educated farmers.  
The length of farming experience was negatively related to the „farm production and 
marketing management‟, „diversification‟ and „financial management‟ risk strategies. This 
suggests that less experienced farmers were more likely to be interested in employing these 
strategies to manage risk on their farms than the more experienced farmers. 
Off-farm work was positively related to all four risk strategy components. These relationships 
may be due to the farmers who have off-farm work to enhancing their farm income; they are 
willing to adopt such strategies to improve and maintain their farm income. Similarly, the net 
farm income coefficient shows a negative relationship with all four risk strategy components. 
This suggests that the farmers who have a lower net farm income believe that these risk 
strategies can help to increase their farm income. 
Farm size was positively related to the „diversification‟ strategy. Farmers with larger farms 
perceived a diversification strategy as highly important. It should be noted that farm size is 
one of the constraints to diversification, that is, farmers with a small holding have limited 
ability to diversify their farm activities (Ahmad & Isvilanonda, 2003). 
Farmers who had higher annual household incomes perceived the „financial management‟ 
strategy as highly important. In contrast, they perceived the „diversification‟ strategy as less 
important than farmers who had lower annual income. In addition, risk management 
strategies related to „farm production and marketing management‟ and „off-farm income‟ 
were perceived as less important by the farmers who had loans. Farmers with larger 
households perceived „farm production and marketing management‟ as slightly more 
important than smaller household farmers. 
The farm location coefficient was negatively related to „farm production and marketing 
management‟, „diversification‟ and „financial management‟ risk strategies. This may imply 
that farmers in the north-east perceived these risk strategies as more important than the 
central region farmers. This is because most north-east farmers are poorer. 
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Table 5.20 Multivariate regression of the risk strategy components and household and 
farm characteristics of all sampled Thai farmers (n=800) 
a
  
Independent variables Risk strategy components 
b
 
AR1 AR2 AR3 AR4 
Constant
 
3.310
***
 2.956
***
 2.523
***
 3.428
***
 
Age 
c 
0.054 0.124 0.003 -0.002 
Gender
 d
 -0.019 -0.107 -0.136
*
 -0.047 
Highest education 
e
 0.258
***
 0.167
**
 0.378
***
 0.110 
Farming experiences
 f
 -0.132
**
 -0.238
***
 -0.100 -0.121
*
 
Off-farm work 
g
 0.249
***
 0.227
***
 0.944
***
 0.150
**
 
Farm size  0.001 0.015
***
 0.003 -0.004 
Net farm income -1.11E-06
***
 -1.98E-06
***
 -7.67E-07
*
 -7.32E-07
**
 
Farm location 
h
 -0.383
***
 -0.143
*
 0.092 -0.160
**
 
Finance farm business 
i
 -0.126
**
 -0.039 -0.202
***
 -0.026 
Annual household income 
j
  0.023 -0.275
***
 0.054 0.158
**
 
Household size 0.033
*
 0.002 0.026 -0.001 
     
2R  0.146
***
 0.138
***
 0.267
***
 0.053
***
 
a
 Variables and models significant at 
*
P<0.1, 
**
P<0.05 and 
***
P<0.01; 
b
 Factors AR1-4 are labelled as AR1=farm production and marketing management, AR2=diversification, 
AR3=off-farm income and AR4=financial management; 
c
 1, if the farmer‟s age over 40 years old, 0 otherwise;  
d
 1, if farmer is male, 0 if female; 
e
 1, if the highest education of the farmer is high school and higher, 0 if primary school education or less;    
f
 1, if the farming experience over 30 years, 0 otherwise; 
g
 1, if the farmer has off-farm work, 0 if no off-farm work; 
h
 1, if the farmer‟s farm is located in central region, 0 if a farm located in north-east region; 
i
 1, if farm has a loan, 0 if farm without a loan; and 
j
 1, if household income greater than 90,001 baht and 0 represent otherwise. 
Source: Field survey, 2009 
5.4.2.2 Central region farmer group results 
Table 5.21 shows the regression coefficients between the risk strategy components and the 
central region farmers‟ socioeconomic variables. All models are statistically significant at the 
one per cent level but model four is weak with 2R  of about 0.084. All socioeconomic 
variables, excluding age, farming experience and farm business finance, exhibited a 
statistically significant association with at least one risk strategy component of the central 
region farmers. 
The female household heads in the central region perceived the „diversification‟ and „off-
farm income‟ risk strategies as highly important. In addition, the more educated central 
region farmers tended to perceive risk strategies related to „farm production and marketing 
management‟, „diversification‟ and „off-farm income‟ as highly important. Central region 
farmers with off-farm work perceived all four risk strategies as more important than farmers 
with no off-farm work. 
  124 
The farm location coefficient was positively related to the „diversification‟ and „financial 
management‟ risk strategies. This implies that the central region rain-fed farmers tended to 
perceive these strategies as highly important. This finding supports Ahmad and Isvilanonda 
(2003) who argued that the central region rain-fed farmers tended to show high levels of 
diversification. 
Central region farmers who had higher net farm income tended to recognise the „farm 
production and marketing management‟ risk strategy as less important. Moreover, the 
„diversification‟ strategy was perceived as less important by central region farmers who had 
higher annual household incomes. Risk strategies related to „farm production and marketing 
management‟ and „off-farm income‟ were perceived as highly important by the larger 
household farmers.  
Table 5.21 Multivariate regression of the risk strategy components and household and 
farm characteristics of the Thai central region farmers (n=400) 
a
  
Independent variables Risk strategy components 
b
 
CR1 CR2 CR3 CR4 
Constant
 
2.945
***
 3.064
***
 2.539
***
 3.424
***
 
Age 
c 
-0.138 -0.066 -0.026 -0.241 
Gender
 d
 -0.087 -0.179
**
 -0.254
**
 -0.130 
Highest education 
e
 0.210
**
 0.197
**
 0.481
***
 0.117 
Farming experiences
 f
 0.018 -0.110 0.128 -0.085 
Off-farm work 
g
 0.330
***
 0.260
***
 1.155
***
 0.197
*
 
Farm size  0.003 -0.010 -0.002 -0.017 
Net farm income -1.28E-06
***
 -4.09E-07 -5.01E-07 5.82E-08 
Farm location 
h
 -0.099 0.624
***
 0.012 0.362
***
 
Finance farm business 
i
 -0.076 -0.085 -0.175 -0.115 
Annual household income 
j
  -0.118 -0.330
***
 -0.152 0.248 
Household size 0.076
***
 0.018 0.055
*
 0.015 
     
2R  0.139
***
 0.257
***
 0.350
***
 0.084
***
 
a
 Variables and models significant at 
*
P<0.1, 
**
P<0.05 and 
***
P<0.01; 
b
 Factors CR1-4 are labelled as CR1=farm production and marketing management, CR2=diversification, 
CR3=off-farm income and CR4=financial management; 
c
 1, if the farmer‟s age over 40 years old, 0 otherwise;  
d
 1, if farmer is male, 0 if female; 
e
 1, if the highest education of the farmer is high school and higher, 0 if primary school education or less;    
f
 1, if the farming experience over 30 years, 0 otherwise; 
g
 1, if the farmer has off-farm work, 0 if no off-farm work; 
h
 1, if the farmer‟s farm is located in central region rain-fed areas, 0 if a farm located in irrigated areas; 
i
 1, if farm has a loan, 0 if farm without a loan; and 
j
 1, if household income greater than 90,001 baht and 0 represent otherwise. 
Source: Field survey, 2009 
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5.4.2.3 North-east region farmer group results 
Table 5.22 shows the regression coefficients between the risk strategy components and the 
north-east farmers‟ socioeconomic variables. Model two can explain nearly 20 per cent of the 
variation in the dependent variable. However, the 2R  of models one and three are low (see 
Table 5.22). All three models are statistically significant at the one per cent level.  
Age of household head was positively related to „diversification‟. This implies that the older 
north-east farmers perceived this risk strategy as more important than younger farmers. The 
more educated north-east farmers attached high scores to the „off-farm income and marketing 
management‟ strategy. Farming experience had a significant negative relationship with all 
risk strategy components of the north-east farmers. This suggests that less experienced 
farmers were more concerned with risk management on their farms. In addition, farmers with 
off-farm work perceived „off-farm income and marketing management‟ as highly important.  
The north-east rain-fed farmers perceived the importance of „off-farm income and marketing 
management‟ and „diversification‟ as greater than the north-east irrigated farmers. This is due 
to the difference in the nature of farming under the two conditions. In the north-east irrigated 
area, the farmers, in general, were involved with intensive rice production. Therefore, they 
were less concerned about diversification strategies. 
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Table 5.22 Multivariate regression of the risk strategy components and household and 
farm characteristics of the north-east Thai farmers (n=400) 
a
  
Independent variables Risk strategy components 
b
 
NR1 NR2 NR3 
Constant
 
3.149
***
 2.391
***
 2.815
 ***
 
Age 
c 
0.220 0.118 0.338
**
 
Gender
 d
 0.103 -0.021 0.015 
Highest education 
e
 0.146 0.190
*
 -0.064 
Farming experiences
 f
 -0.308
***
 -0.355
***
 -0.352
***
 
Off-farm work 
g
 0.079 0.447
***
 0.128 
Farm size  -0.003 -2.71E-05 -0.002 
Net farm income 1.77E-06
*
 8.41E-07 2.02E-06
*
 
Farm location 
h
 0.085 0.227
**
 0.330
***
 
Finance farm business 
i
 -0.042 -0.159
*
 0.044 
Annual HH income 
j
  0.121 0.138 0.012 
Household size -0.018 0.003 0.010 
    
2R  0.087
***
 0.194
***
 0.107
***
 
a
 Variables and models significant at 
*
P<0.1, 
**
P<0.05 and 
***
P<0.01; 
b
 Factors NR1-3 are labelled as NR1=preventive strategies, NR2=off-farm income and marketing management, 
NR3=diversification; 
c
 1, if the farmer‟s age over 40 years old, 0 otherwise;  
d
 1, if the farmer is male, 0 if female; 
e
 1, if the highest education of the farmer is high school and higher, 0 if primary school education or less;    
f
 1, if the farming experience over 30 years, 0 otherwise; 
g
 1, if the farmer has off-farm work, 0 if no off-farm work; 
h
 1, if the farmer‟s farm is located in north-east region rain-fed areas, 0 if a farm located in irrigated areas; 
i
 1, if farm has a loan, 0 if farm without a loan; and 
j
 1, if household income greater than 90,001 baht and 0 represent otherwise. 
Source: Field survey, 2009 
5.5 Summary of findings 
In summary, the perceptions of sources of risk and risk management strategies were different 
between farmers in the central and north-east regions and also between farmers in rain-fed 
and irrigated areas. The farmers‟ perceptions of sources of risk showed that the marketing 
risk associated with „unexpected variability of input prices‟ and „unexpected variability of 
product prices‟ were perceived as the most important sources of risk for all smallholder 
farmers in the central and north-east regions. The analysis of the perceptions of sources of 
risk indicated that „deficiency in rainfall causing drought‟ was a major concern among the 
rain-fed farmers of both regions, whereas irrigated farmers were more concerned about 
„diseases and pests that affect plants and animals‟ and „natural disaster such as flood‟.  
Production and financial risk management strategies were of major concern to smallholder 
farmers in both regions. „Purchase farm machinery to replace labour‟ and „working off farm‟ 
were determined as the most important risk management strategies for the central region 
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farmers, whereas north-east farmers put more emphasis on „storing feed and/or seed reserves‟ 
and „holding cash‟.  
The study used factor analysis to group and reduces the number of sources of risk and risk 
management strategy variables into a smaller set of components. The factor analysis of 
sources of risk variables of the central region farmers produced the following components: 
CS1=personal and farm business environment, CS2=economic and political, CS3=yields and 
product prices, CS4=financial situation, CS5=input prices and CS6=natural disaster. The 
sources of risk components for the north-east farmers were NS1=economic and political, 
NS2=personal and farm business environment, NS3=natural disaster, NS4=yields and 
product prices, NS5=financial situation and NS6=input prices.  
In terms of risk management strategy, factor analysis grouped risk strategy variables for 
farmers in the central region into the following components: CR1=farm production and 
marketing management, CR2=diversification, CR3=off-farm income and CR4=financial 
management. The risk strategy components for the north-east farmers comprised 
NR1=preventive strategies, NR2=off-farm income and marketing management, 
NR3=diversification, and NR4=financial management. 
The relationships between the socio-economic characteristics and the perceptions of sources 
of risk and risk strategy components of farmers in the central and north-east regions were 
investigated using multiple regression analysis. The results indicated that some socio-
economic variables had a statistically significant impact on the perceptions of the source of 
risk and risk strategy components of the farmers in both regions. However, the explanatory 
power ( 2R ) of most of the investigated models was low. The results also indicated that the 
perceptions of sources of risk and risk management strategies were individual and revealed 
the perceived differences between the central and north-east region farmers. This is because 
each farmer has had different experiences regarding sources of risk and responded in 
different ways to cope with the risks, depending on farm type, geographical location of farm, 
economic and political situation. 
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     Chapter 6 
Stochastic Risk Efficiency Analysis - Results and 
Discussion 
This chapter analyses the stochastic risk efficiency of the alternative farming systems in the 
central and north-east regions. This chapter is divided in five sections. The results of the 
farmers‟ absolute risk aversion coefficients derived from alternative utility functions are 
described in Section 6.1. Section 6.2 analyses the whole-farm net income among the different 
farming systems, as elicited from the farmers in both regions. The stochastic efficiency 
analysis of each farming system is then assessed and ranked in Section 6.3. Section 6.4 
discusses the sensitivity analysis results. The last section summarizes the findings. 
6.1 Farmers’ absolute risk aversion coefficients 
The results in this section are divided into two parts. The results relating to the measurement 
of the absolute risk aversion coefficients ( )(wra ) of the farmers in the central and north-east 
regions are described in the first part. In the second part, the relationships between the )(wra  
and farmers‟ socioeconomic characteristics are investigated and discussed.  
6.1.1 Measurement of the absolute risk aversion coefficients 
As discussed in Section 4.5.4, individual certainty equivalent (CE) values elicited from the 
farmers using the ELCE method were employed to derive the each farmer‟s utility function. 
The alternatives between a lottery ticket with a 50:50 chance of winning either 100,000 baht 
or zero and a sure sum of money were offered to the farmers in several different scenarios 
until a series of nine CE values, in accordance with nine utility values, were obtained for each 
farmer.  
In addition, a comparison between different utility functional forms was examined to find the 
best fit for the sequence of data points elicited from each farmer, using the nonlinear least 
square (NLS) method. The general form of the alternative utility functions, which comprise 
the cubic function, negative exponential function, power function and expo-power function, 
and the )(wra  estimation for each functional form are presented in Table 4.5. 
Two hundred and seven central region farmers and 228 north-east farmers were then 
incorporated into the )(wra  estimation. This is due to the sufficiency of the sequence of data 
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points elicited from the ELCE method. Therefore, a total of 828 and 912 equations, 
respectively, were estimated using four different utility functions (four equations for each 
farmer). The summary of the individual estimated parameters and 2R  for the equations 
categorized by four utility functional forms are documented in Appendix C. Full details of the 
)(wra  estimated by four different functional forms for each farmer are also documented. 
The 2R  of all equations estimated by the four utility functional forms are significant at the 10 
per cent level, based on the F-statistic. When comparing the average 2R  estimated across the 
four utility functions, the cubic function provided the highest average 2R  of 0.985 and 0.986 
for the central and north-east farmers, respectively, whereas the negative exponential function 
provided the lowest average 2R  values of 0.926 and 0.930, respectively (see Tables C.1 and 
C.2 in Appendix C).  
However, in terms of the significance of the individual parameters, a number of the utility 
functions parameters were statistically insignificant based on the t-statistic ( a ,b , c  and d  
parameters for the cubic function;   and   parameters for the power function and   
parameter for the expo-power function). This problem is similar to previous studies relating 
the choice of utility function to the classification of risk preferences (see Binici et al., 2003; 
Torkamani & Haji-Rahimi, 2001). Binici et al. (2003) revealed that this problem may result 
from the use of small numbers of observations to estimate each equation. The authors also 
argued that when the curve-fitting test is carried out, the statistical significance of the 
equation, 2R , is more likely to be important than the significance of the individual parameter.  
Furthermore, care should be taken when interpreting the results from the power and expo-
power functions regarding the fit of the parameters‟ restrictions. For the power function, there 
are 25 equations among the central region farmer group and 40 equations among the north-
east farmer group that a parameter restriction ( 10   ) is violated. Similarly, with 85 and 
54 equations of the central and north-east farmer groups using the expo-power function, a 
parameter restriction ( 1 ) is violated. 
The estimated parameters, subsequently, are used to evaluate the farmers‟ risk attitudes. A 
summary of the maximum and minimum ranges of the )(wra  derived by each utility function 
for the central and north-east farmers is shown in Tables 6.1 and 6.2. 
The results of this study strongly support the findings of Ramaratnam et al. (1986), Zuhair et 
al. (1992) and Binici et al. (2003), who pointed out that the choice of utility functional form 
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directly influenced the classification of the farmers‟ risk preferences (see Table C.3 and C.4 
for full details). For example, farmer 577 is classified as risk averse when assessed by the 
negative exponential and expo-power utility functions, whereas for the cubic and power 
utility functions this farmer has risk preferring behaviour. This implies that one farmer, 
perhaps, can be classified as risk averse by one utility functional form and risk loving when 
another utility functional form is employed. Consequently, the choice of utility function is 
important because it can reveal opposite risk preferences.  
Based on the central region farmer group results, the negative exponential and expo-power 
functions categorized all farmers as risk averse. The )(wra  given by the negative exponential 
function ranged from 0.0000144 to 0.0001330, which is exactly the same as the range of 
)(wra  estimated by the expo-power function. The cubic function generates a range of 
)(wra from -0.0004612 to 0.0010622. At the income midpoint, the cubic function classified 
106 central region farmers as risk averse, whereas 101 farmers had a risk preferring attitudes. 
Moreover, the )(wra  given by the power function ranged from -0.0000098 to 0.0000135. 
One hundred and eighty-five central region farmers were classified as risk averse and 22 
farmers as risk loving at the income midpoint. 
Table 6.1 Summary of the absolute risk aversion coefficients evaluated by four different 
utility functional forms using information acquired from the Thai central 
region farmers 
Summary Absolute risk aversion coefficients 
Cubic 
function 
Negative 
exponential 
function 
Power 
function 
Expo-power 
function 
Range:     
     Minimum -0.0004612 0.0000144 -0.0000098 0.0000046 
     Maximum 0.0010622 0.0001330 0.0000135 0.0001571 
Mean -0.0000016 0.0000300 0.0000062 0.0000373 
Standard deviation 0.0001062 0.0000137 0.0000049 0.0000259 
Number of farmer‟s utility 
functions estimated 
207 207 207 207 
Number of farmers were classified 
as risk averse 
106 207 185 207 
Number of farmers were classified 
as risk preferring  
101 0 22 0 
Note: The )(wra  for cubic, power and expo-power utility functions are estimated at the midpoints of the ranges 
of income used for eliciting each farmer‟s utility function. The )(wra  for the negative exponential utility 
function is independent at any level of income. 
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Table 6.2 Summary of the absolute risk aversion coefficients evaluated for four 
different utility functional forms using information acquired from the north-
east Thai farmers 
Summary Absolute risk aversion coefficients 
Cubic 
function 
Negative 
exponential 
function 
Power 
function 
Expo-power 
function 
Range:     
     Minimum -0.0033131 0.0000109 -0.0000110 -0.0000005 
     Maximum 0.0012670 0.0012450 0.0000174 0.0030196 
Mean -0.0000042 0.0000345 0.0000051 0.0000399 
Standard deviation 0.0002477 0.0000831 0.0000056 0.0001998 
Number of farmer‟s utility 
functions estimated 
228 228 228 228 
Number of farmers were classified 
as risk averse 
126 228 189 227 
Number of farmers were classified 
as risk preferring 
102 0 39 1 
Note: The )(wra  for cubic, power and expo-power utility functions are estimated at the midpoints of the ranges 
of income used for eliciting each farmer‟s utility function. The )(wra  for the negative exponential utility 
function is independent at any level of income. 
 
The negative exponential function classified most of the 228 farmers in the north-east as risk 
averse. The )(wra  varied from 0.0000109, the least risk averse, to 0.0012450, the most risk 
averse. The cubic function exhibited a wide range of )(wra , from -0.0033131 to 0.0012670. 
This functional form classified 126 farmers as risk averse and 102 as risk preferring. The 
power function classified 189 north-east farmers as risk averse and 39 farmers as risk loving, 
the )(wra  ranged from -0.0000110 to 0.0000174. Most north-east farmers were classified as 
risk averse when estimated by the expo-power function, with only one farmer classified as 
risk loving. The )(wra  given by the expo-power function ranged from -0.0000005 to 
0.0030196. 
The independent sample t -test was conducted to investigate the differences in the )(wra  
values obtained from the four different utility functions for the central and north-east farmer 
groups (see Table C.5). The comparative results suggested that the )(wra  derived from the 
cubic, negative exponential and expo-power functions were not significantly different 
between both groups of farmers, but the )(wra  given by the power function is statistically 
significant at the 10 per cent level. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that the risk 
preferences among the smallholder farmers in both regions are similar. 
As noted by Musser et al. (1984), the interpretation of risk preferences derived by different 
functional forms must be considered carefully. Therefore, the negative exponential appeared 
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to be the best utility function to describe the observed farmers‟ risk preferences in this study 
compared with the other three utility functions. This is because the results obtained from the 
negative exponential function did not violate either the parameter restriction or the statistical 
criteria. This finding is consistent with Ramaratnam et al. (1986) and Zuhair et al. (1992) who 
emphasized that the negative exponential function performed better than other functional 
forms in explaining the producers‟ risk behaviour in their study. Therefore, the relevant 
ranges of the )(wra  derived from the negative exponential utility function for the central and 
north-east farmers will be incorporated into the stochastic efficiency analysis in Section 6.3.  
Unfortunately, the consistency in the levels of )(wra  obtained from this study cannot be 
compared with other studies because there is a lack of up-to-date evidence pertaining to risk 
preferences assessment among Thailand‟s farmers. However, Grisley and Kellog (1987) 
provided an empirical evaluation of the partial relative risk aversion of farmers in northern 
Thailand using an experimental method, which was similar to Binswanger‟s (1980) study. 
The authors‟ results indicated that all farmers were risk averse.  
In addition, the )(wra  estimation could vary depending on the process employed to elicit the 
utility function, geographical zone and the selection of functional form to predict )(wra  
(Binici et al., 2003). The results of )(wra  obtained from the negative exponential utility 
function in this study are quite close to Zuhair et al.‟s (1992) results among Sri Lanka 
farmers; their )(wra  ranged from 0.0000161 to 0.0035684. In a recent study, Nartea and 
Webster (2008) employed a similar magnitude of the )(wra , derived from the negative 
exponential function, as a suggested guideline to classify New Zealand farmers‟ attitudes 
towards risk.    
6.1.2 Influence of farmers’ characteristics on the absolute risk aversion 
coefficients  
This section discusses the impact of the socioeconomic characteristics on the variation in risk 
preferences. A multiple regression analysis was conducted to investigate the possible 
relationships between risk coefficients and the personal characteristics within each group of 
farmers. As discussed in Section 4.5.5, the six socioeconomic variables of farmer‟s age, 
gender, education level, size of household, farm size and net farm income were employed to 
correlate with the )(wra  obtained from the negative exponential function for the central and 
north-east region farmers. 
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The principal measure for violations of the basic assumptions of the regression analysis was 
examined (Pallant, 2007). The results showed no major problems with either model. The 
Pearson correlation coefficients of )(wra  and the socioeconomic variables of both regression 
models are documented in Appendix D.    
Table 6.3 presents the estimated regression results for )(wra  and the socioeconomic variables 
of the central and north-east region farmer groups. The 2R  of both regression models is 
statistically significant ( 05.0P ), and explained roughly six per cent of the total variance. 
The results for the central region farmer group indicated that highest education level had a 
negative significant relationship with )(wra . This implies that the less educated central 
region farmers tended to exhibit more risk-averse behaviour. This result is similar to 
Moscardi and Janvry‟s (1977) and Binswanger‟s (1980) findings.  
The household size of central region farmers had a significantly negative relationship with 
)(wra . This suggests that central region farmers with smaller households are likely to be 
more risk averse than the larger household farmers. The finding is consistent with Moscardi 
and Janvry (1977) who argued that farmers become less risk averse as family size increases. 
The authors also indicated that this maybe because the larger household size is associated 
with increasing availability of agricultural and off-farm labour. Therefore, it could enhance 
the potential to generate more household income and increased risk seeking behaviour. 
Table 6.3 Multivariate regression of the absolute risk aversion coefficients and 
socioeconomic variables of Thai central and north-east farmers 
Independent variables Regression coefficients a 
Central farmer group  North-east farmer group  
Constant
 
3.73E-05
***
 7.42E-05
***
 
Age 
b
 8.59E-07 -5.10E-05
***
 
Gender
 c
 -3.19E-07 -8.02E-07 
Highest education 
d
 -5.47E-06
**
 2.17E-05 
Household size -1.51E-06
**
 -6.35E-07 
Farm size 2.33E-08 -1.27E-07 
Net farm income -2.50E-12 1.60E-10 
   
2R  0.066
**
 0.055
**
 
a
 Variables and models significant at 
*
P<0.1, 
**
P<0.05 and 
***
P<0.01; 
b
1, if the farmer age over 40 years old, 0 otherwise;  
c
 1, if the farmer is male, 0 if female; and 
d
 1, if the highest education of the farmer is high school and higher, 0 if primary school education or less.   
Source: Field survey, 2009 
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For north-east farmers, only the farmer‟s age variable showed a negative significant 
relationship with )(wra . That is, younger north-east farmers tended to have a higher risk 
aversion. This finding contrasts with Moscardi and Janvry (1977), Lins, Gabriel and Sonka 
(1981) and Gómez-Limón et al. (2003) who argued that younger generation farmers would be 
less risk averse than the older generation. However, Shahabuddin et al. (1986) showed a 
negative relationship between a farmer‟s age and the risk aversion of the farmers in their 
study. This is because most north-east farmers are poor. Therefore, even though the farmers 
are young and potential express a high acceptance of risk, but most of the farmers preferred 
stability rather than deal with risk and income variability.  
Unfortunately, the impact of the gender variable on )(wra  was insignificant in both 
regression models. Therefore, the results of this study could not indicate whether women or 
men farmers were more willing to assume risk. However, Binswanger (1980) showed a 
negative relationship between gender and risk aversion among the Indian farmers, which 
indicated that women farmers were less willing to assume risk than men. This study showed a 
weak relationship between the net farm income variable, which is associated with wealth of 
the farmers, and )(wra  in both groups of farmers. This finding is similar to Binswanger‟s 
(1980) result, which showed wealth did not impact on risk aversion significantly.  
Despite both regression models not yielding satisfactory results in terms of predictive power, 
it can be concluded that the characteristics of risk aversion among smallholder farmers in 
central and north-east Thailand can be explained by their non-wealth socioeconomic 
variables. 
6.2 Analysis of annual net farm income for alternative farming 
systems 
This section discusses the results from the sampled farmers in central and north-east regions 
of the annual net farm income of the different farming systems. The returns and production 
costs for each farming system are based on the information from the 2008 crop year. The 
results in this section are reported in two parts. The physical characteristics of the different 
farming systems and their rotations in the central and north-east regions are provided in the 
first part. In the second part, the calculation and analysis of the annual net farm income for 
the different farming systems using the whole-farm income model (as discussed in Section 
4.5.2) are estimated. 
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6.2.1 Cropping patterns 
6.2.1.1 Central region 
Table 6.4 shows details of the different farming systems practised by the sampled smallholder 
farmers in the central region rain-fed and irrigated areas. The results showed that field crop-
based production is the most important farming system for farmers in the central region rain-
fed area. Rice-intensive production is a significant farm activity among the different farming 
systems for central region irrigated farmers. The average total farm size for the different 
farming systems in the central region and their rotations are documented in Table 6.5.  
The results showed that cassava, sugarcane, maize and sorghum were important field crops 
produced by the farmers in the central region rain-fed area. More than 70 per cent of the 
central region rain-fed farmers have experience growing large scale monoculture crops. The 
study revealed the four different farming systems commonly practised among the farmers in 
the central region rain-fed area are: 
CRFP1 Cassava: the farmers planted cassava during May and harvested it about 10-11 
months later, in February-March. Approximately 17 per cent of the central region rain-fed 
farmers apply this farming system, with an average cultivated area around 21.44 rais. 
CRFP2 Sugarcane: approximately 41 per cent of the central region rain-fed farmers cultivate 
sugarcane, with an average area around 25 rais. Sugarcane is a long-duration field crops that 
is generally planted at the end of rainy season (December-January) and harvested during 
November-December. 
CRFP3 Maize: this is a single crop of maize produce by around 17 per cent of the central 
region rain-fed farmers with an average cultivated area of approximately 26.22 rais. The 
farmers usually grow maize before the rainy season begins, during May-June, and harvest it 
in September. 
CRFP4 Maize → sorghum: the mixed crops of maize and sorghum fit this farming system 
well. About 22 per cent of the central region rain-fed farmers grow sorghum in the dry season 
after the maize harvest (September-December). The average area used for growing maize and 
sorghum are 21.24 and 21.67 rais, respectively.  
Conversely, a multiple lowland rice cropping pattern was widely practised among the central 
region irrigated farmers. Around 80 per cent of the central region irrigated farmers cultivated 
wet rice followed by one crop of dry rice (CIFP1). Around 17 per cent of them practised three 
lowland rice crops annually (CIFP2). This is because the central region irrigated area is the 
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largest commercial rice cultivated area of Thailand. In CIFP1, wet rice is generally planted 
during June-July and harvested in December, after which dry rice is cultivated. However, in 
the CIFP2 system intensive rice production is practised. The central region rain-fed farmers 
have reduced the period of wet rice cultivation to nearly four months (July-October). The first 
crop of dry rice is planted in October and harvested in March and this is followed by the 
second crop during March to July. 
Table 6.4 Different farming systems produced by the Thai central region farmers 
(n=400) 
Farming system Irrigated area Rain-fed area 
Number of 
farmers 
% Number of 
farmers 
% 
CRFP1: Cassava - - 18 17.0 
CRFP2: Sugarcane - - 43 40.6 
CRFP3: Maize - - 18 17.0 
CRFP4: 
 Maize → sorghum - - 23 21.7 
CIFP1: WSR → DSR I 233 79.2 - - 
CIFP2: WSR → DSR I → DSR II 50 17.0 - - 
Others 11 3.8 4 3.8 
Total 294 100 106 100 
Note: WSR=wet rice; DSR I=first crop of dry rice; and DSRII=second crop of dry rice. 
Source: Field survey, 2009 
6.2.1.2  North-east region 
The different farming systems and their rotations for the sampled farmers in the north-east 
region are summarized in Tables 6.6 and 6.7. The study showed that multiple cropping 
between rice and different upland field crops is the main cropping pattern for the farmers in 
rain-fed agriculture of the north-east. Wet rice, cassava and sugarcane are the most important 
cash crops. A single crop of wet rice can be found in the severe drought zone of this region. 
However, about 35 per cent of the farmers in the north-east rain-fed area have a multiple crop 
pattern. North-east rain-fed farmers divide their available land and other production resources 
to cultivate wet rice together with cassava or sugarcane to enhance their farm income. In 
addition, integrated crop-livestock farming systems are becoming popular among the farmers 
here. Around 30 per cent of the north-east rain-fed farmers produce crops and possess small 
numbers of livestock, especially cattle. The six different farming systems in north-east region 
rain-fed areas are: 
NRFP1 Wet rice: following seasonal drought problems, around 30 per cent of the north-east 
rain-fed farmers grow only a single crop of rice a year, in the rainy season from June to 
November. The average area for this type of farming is relatively small (around 9 rais).
  
1
3
7
 
Table 6.5 Average farm size and rotations for the different farming systems in the central region of Thailand for the year 2008 
Farming system Average 
total area 
(rai) 
Average effective area 
for each individual 
crop activity (rai) 
Cropping rotations 
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 
Rain-fed area 
CRFP1: 
Cassava 
21.44 21.44   
Cassava 
CRFP2: 
Sugarcane 
25.23 24.93 
Sugarcane 
 
CRFP3: 
Maize 
26.22 26.22     
Maize 
   
CRFP4:
  
 
Maize → sorghum 
21.67 21.24/21.67     
Maize Sorghum 
Irrigated area 
CIFP1: 
WSR → DSR I 
20.50 20.45/20.48 
DSR I 
   
WSR 
 
CIFP2: 
WSR → DSR I → DSR II 
21.90 21.82/21.82/21.58  
DSR II WSR DSR I 
Note: 1 rai = 0.16 ha. 
WSR=wet rice; DSR I=first crop of dry rice; and DSRII=second crop of dry rice
 
Source: Field survey, 2009 
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Generally, this farming system is used by farmers in severe drought areas without irrigation 
where other crops could not grow during the dry season. 
NRFP2 Wet rice + cassava: in this farming system, around 23 per cent of the north-east rain-
fed farmers separated their land to grow wet rice and cassava. Wet rice is cultivated in June 
and harvested in late November, whereas cassava is planted before the rainy season begins 
(during April-May) and harvested from March to April. The average farm size is around 
18.33 rais and the land allocated for wet rice and cassava is around 8.97 and 9.31 rais, on 
average, respectively. 
NRFP3 Wet rice + sugarcane: wet rice and sugarcane is the main combination of crops for 
this farming system. Similar to NRFP2, rice is grown in the rainy season, during June to 
November. Sugarcane is planted during November and harvested between 11-12 months 
later. The average farm size is approximately 21.14 rais. The average effective area used for 
growing rice and sugarcane is 8.52 and 11.21 rais, respectively. 
NRFP4 Wet rice with cattle: around 23 per cent of the north-east rain-fed farmers applied this 
crop-livestock farming system. The farmers grow one crop of rice during the rainy season 
and have small herds of domesticated cattle. Raising free-range cattle is generally practised 
among farmers in this region and rice straw is use as cattle feed. The average area under 
cultivation is 16 rais and the average number of cattle sold during 2008 was 1.91 head. 
NRFP5 Wet rice + cassava with cattle: approximately five per cent of north-east rain-fed 
farmers cultivated multiple crops of rice and cassava and also owned cattle. The average farm 
size is around 21 rais. About 10.2 rais is used to produce rice and another 10.8 rais to grow 
cassava. In addition, in 2008, an average of 1.2 head of live cattle was sold to the local 
market by the farmers.  
NRFP6 Wet rice + sugarcane with cattle: in this farming system, the farmers allocated an 
average of 9 rais to grow rice and 9.57 rais for growing sugarcane. In 2008, an average of 
1.42 head of cattle was sold. However, this farming system was used by only three per cent of 
the surveyed north-east rain-fed farmers.  
For the north-east irrigated area, the results showed that wet rice followed by dry rice 
(NIFP1) was the primary cropping pattern. Around 60 per cent of the north-east irrigated 
farmers cultivated wet rice during June to November, and dry rice is planted in January and 
harvested in late April. The average farm size is approximately 13 rais. The two crops of rice, 
together with tomatoes (NIFP2), were planted by five per cent of the north-east irrigated 
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farmers. Tomatoes are usually planted in a small area of approximately 0.58 rai after the 
rainy season and harvested in April. In addition, approximately 21 per cent of the north-east 
irrigated farmers have a crop-livestock farming system, growing two rice crops and raising 
cattle (NIFP3). On average, 1.01 head of cattle was sold from this farming system. 
Table 6.6 Different farming systems produced by the north-east Thai farmers (n=400) 
Farming system Irrigated area Rain-fed area 
Number of 
farmers 
% Number of 
farmers 
% 
NRFP1: WSR - - 70 30.2 
NRFP2: WSR + cassava - - 54 23.3 
NRFP3: WSR + sugarcane - - 29 12.5 
NRFP4
 a
: WSR with cattle - - 54 23.3 
NRFP5
 a
: WSR + cassava with cattle - - 10 4.3 
NRFP6
 a
: WSR + sugarcane with cattle - - 7 3.0 
NIFP1: WSR → DSR I 96 57.1 - - 
NIFP2: WSR → DSR I + tomato 9 5.4 - - 
NIFP3
 a
: WSR → DSR I  with cattle 35 20.8 - - 
Others 28 16.7 8 3.5 
Total 168 100 232 100 
Note: WSR=wet rice; and DSR I=first crop of dry rice 
a
 Crop-livestock farming system 
Source: Field survey, 2009 
6.2.2 Annual net farm income 
The structure of returns and costs of production estimated using the whole-farm income 
model for alternative farming systems practised by the smallholder farmers in the central and 
north-east regions in the 2008 crop year are discussed in this section. The average yields and 
prices of the individual crops and livestock used to generate the total farm income and the 
variable and fixed costs of each farming system are documented in Appendix E. 
The expenses of the different farming systems in this study were measured for three major 
production process costs. The details of each process are: (1) land preparation cost including 
the labour costs, cost of hired machinery, cost of maintenance and fuel costs; (2) planting cost 
consists of labour costs for planting, seeds, fertilisers, pesticides, herbicides, weeding, 
spraying and irrigation service fee; and (3) harvesting cost such as wages for harvesting, 
loading and transportation. In addition, feed cost is considered in the crop-livestock farming 
systems.  
  
1
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Table 6.7 Average farm size and rotations for the different farming systems in the north-east region of Thailand for the year 2008  
Farming system Average 
total area 
(rai) 
Average effective 
area for each 
individual crop 
activity (rai) 
Average 
cattle sold 
(head) 
Cropping rotations 
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 
Rain-fed area 
NRFP1: 
WSR 
10.11 9.09 -      
WSR 
 
NRFP2: 
WSR + cassava 
18.33 8.97/9.31 -      WSR  
  Cassava 
NRFP3: 
WSR + sugarcane 
21.14 8.52/11.21 -      WSR  
  Sugarcane 
NRFP4
 a
: 
WSR with cattle 
17.98 15.97 1.91      
WSR 
 
NRFP5
 a
: 
WSR + cassava with cattle 
21.00 10.20/10.80 1.20      WSR  
  Cassava 
NRFP6
 a
: 
WSR + sugarcane with cattle 
20.28 9.00/9.57 1.42      WSR  
  Sugarcane 
Irrigated area 
NIFP1: 
WSR → DSR I 
13.33 12.55/12.77 - 
DSR I 
 
WSR 
 
NIFP2: 
WSR → DSR I + tomato 
12.83 10.33/10.11/ 0.58 - DSR I  WSR  
Tomato          
NIFP3
 a
:  
WSR → DSR I with cattle 
9.82 8.88/8.84 1.01 
DSR I 
 
WSR 
 
Note: 1 rai = 0.16 ha. 
WSR=Wet rice; and DSR I=First crop of dry rice
 
a
 Crop-livestock farming system 
Source: Field survey, 2009 
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The fixed cost calculations include agricultural land tax, rent and depreciation of farm assets. 
This study revealed Thailand government charges agricultural land use taxes to farmers at a 
low rate (approximately 4 to 10 baht per rai). Moreover, in some areas of the north-east the 
government provides a land tax exemption scheme for smallholder farmers who owned land 
areas less than 5 rais (0.8 ha.). 
With regard to the annual depreciation estimation, the straight-line method without salvage 
value was employed. McConnell and Dillon (1997) pointed out that this depreciation method 
is efficient and best suited to small farms in Asian countries because most of the farm asset 
values experienced little impact from external obsolescence. Therefore, the fixed cost for farm 
buildings, machinery and vehicles used for farm activities were included as part of the annual 
depreciation analysis in this study. 
6.2.2.1 Central region 
Table 6.8 summarises the returns and costs for the different farming systems in the central 
region. In the central region rain-fed area, the results showed that sugarcane production 
(CRFP2) generated the highest annual gross farm income, which amounted to approximately 
300,000 baht. This is nearly three times greater than the total farm income earned from 
cassava (CRFP1). The CRFP4 (maize followed by sorghum) system generated gross farm 
income of 129,465 baht, which is a little higher than maize production (CRFP3). 
Regarding farm expenditure, sugarcane production (CRFP2) had the highest production costs 
of the different farming systems. This is because sugarcane is a labour-intensive crop. Labour 
is hired for either hand-planting or hand harvesting activities. Therefore, wage costs would 
probably have influenced the increased expenses of sugarcane production (see Table E.1 in 
Appendix E). The total variable cost of sugarcane production is 155,916 baht, whereas, for the 
other farming systems, expenses varied from 40,000 to 50,000 baht. Regarding the fixed 
expenditure, the results show fixed costs represented a small proportion of the total 
production costs, contributing approximately 10 per cent for all farming systems in this area.  
The results for the central region irrigated area showed the three rice crop production (CIFP2) 
system generated the highest gross farm income. CIFP2 produced an annual gross farm 
income of around 500,000 baht, but the total expenses of this farming system were over 
200,000 baht. Most of the expenses were associated with the large chemical fertilizer costs 
and the cost of hired farm machinery, use for either land preparation or harvesting. Moreover, 
it was reported that nearly half of fixed expenditure from farming systems in the central 
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region irrigated area were spent on rent (see Table E.2). This may due to the increased 
demand for agricultural land in the area (Ahmad & Isvilanonda, 2003). 
Therefore, we can conclude that the increase in intensity of rice crops is associated with an 
increase in annual gross farm income for the farmers in the central region irrigated area. The 
results also showed that crop yields, product prices and the area under cultivation are major 
factors that directly influence the differences in annual gross farm income among the different 
farming systems in central region rain-fed area.  
Moreover, it can be assumed that farm production in the central region is transforming into 
intensive agriculture. There are two reasons for this transformation. First, farm machinery 
(such as four-wheel tractors, hand tractors and combine harvesters) has been widely used 
among the sampled central region farmers in an attempt to replace increasingly expensive 
hired labour. Second, the excessive application of chemical fertilizer to maintain high crop 
yields, especially for the irrigated rice farmers, not only resulted in increased costs of 
production but also caused soil pollution and environmental changes. 
Table 6.8 Average net farm income of each farming system in central Thailand, 2008 
year price levels (n=400) 
Farming system Average (baht) 
Total farm 
income
 a
 
Total variable 
cost
 a
 
Gross 
margin 
Total   
fixed cost
 a
 
Net farm 
income 
Rain-fed area  
CRFP1: 
Cassava 
93,288.67 40,194.44 53,094.22 4,604.64 48,489.58 
CRFP2: 
Sugarcane 
303,690.93 155,916.28 147,774.65 17,677.19 130,097.46 
CRFP3: 
Maize 
111,126.11 45,179.44 65,946.67 8,121.91 57,824.76 
CRFP4:
  
 
Maize → sorghum 
129,465.43 49,839.78 79,625.65 8,223.83 71,401.82 
All rain-fed area farms 192,796.24 91,966.93 100,829.30 11,693.38 89,135.92 
Irrigated area 
CIFP1: 
WSR → DSR I 
323,650.99 126,535.07 197,115.92 14,527.37 182,588.55 
CIFP2: 
WSR → DSR I → DSR II 
505,186.00 206,474.00 298,712.00 15,983.14 282,728.86 
All irrigated area farms 345,607.76 136,832.89 208,774.86 14,449.65 194,325.21 
All central region farms 305,112.70 124,943.42 180,169.29 13,719.24 166,450.05 
Note: WSR=wet rice; DSR I=first crop of dry rice; and DSRII=second crop of dry rice 
a
 See more details in Tables E.1 and E.2 in Appendix E  
 
Source: Field survey, 2009 
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6.2.2.2 North-east region 
For the north-east rain-fed area, the results showed that the single crop of wet rice (NRFP1) 
produced the lowest annual gross farm income, 27,496 baht. The annual gross farm income 
generated by the multiple cropping systems, NRFP2 and NRFP3, were 62,147 and 110,038 
baht, respectively. Integrated crop and livestock farming systems (NRFP4-6) also provided 
the farmers with relatively high gross farm incomes (see Table 6.9). It is noticeable from the 
results that the increase in gross farm income of the north-east rain-fed farmers was due to 
increased farm diversification. In addition, variations in gross farm income among the 
different farming systems under rain-fed production may have resulted from the wide 
fluctuations in agricultural productivity, caused by either the irregularity of annual rainfall or 
poor soil fertility (Grandstaff, Grandstaff, Limpinuntana, & Suphanchaimat, 2008; Ng, 1970).  
In terms of expenses, almost all farming systems in the area have a low level of variable costs, 
ranging from 20,000 to 30,000 baht, except for the NRFP3 and NRFP6. This is because these 
two farming systems are associated with sugarcane, a labour-intensive crop. The expenses of 
all the farming systems included fertilizer and wages during the planting and harvesting stages 
(see Table E.3). The cost of feed for cattle in the integrated crop and livestock farming 
systems were fairly low. This is either because the farmers have only small herds of cattle or 
the farmers feed their herds by letting the cattle graze on the public land. In addition, the 
results show that all the alternative farming systems in the area have a low proportion of fixed 
costs in the total production costs (approximately 15 per cent). 
The results from the north-east irrigated area showed that NIFP1 had an average gross farm 
income of 118,073 baht, followed by 111,200 and 82,843 baht for NIFP2 and NIFP3 system, 
respectively. Rice-intensive production was the main farm activity and provided quite similar 
gross farm income across all farms. NIFP2 represented the highest average total variable costs 
among the farming systems in this area. Most of the expenses were for the planting and 
harvesting stages; to buy chemical fertilizers, pay for hired labour and renting farm machinery 
(see Table E.4).  
Based on the survey results, it is likely that the farming systems in the north-east are classified 
as traditional agricultural production. This is because of the low usage of large farm 
machinery among the north-east farmers compared with the central region farmers. North-east 
farmers generally owned hand tractors and use them efficiently for multi purposes on their 
farms. In addition, the costs to operate large farm machinery, such as four-wheel tractors, are 
very high, whereas the income of the north-east farmers were quite low.  
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Table 6.9 Average net farm income of each farming system in north-east Thailand, 2008 
year price levels (n=400) 
Farming system Average (baht) 
Total farm 
income
 a
 
Total variable 
cost
 a
 
Gross 
margin 
Total fixed 
cost
 a
 
Net farm 
income 
Rain-fed area  
NRFP1: 
WSR 
27,496.26 11,955.21 15,541.04 2,388.77 13,152.27 
NRFP2: 
WSR + cassava 
62,147.84 28,583.11 33,564.73 5,332.71 28,232.02 
NRFP3: 
WSR + sugarcane 
110,038.45 58,990.34 51,048.10 6,069.19 44,978.91 
NRFP4
 b
: 
WSR with cattle 
71,948.80 22,695.80 49,253.00 4,587.49 44,665.51 
NRFP5
 b
: 
WSR + cassava with cattle 
67,561.00 28,813.00 38,748.00 5,068.08 33,679.92 
NRFP6
 b
: 
WSR + sugarcane with cattle 
97,238.57 43,030.00 54,208.57 4,119.47 50,089.09 
All rain-fed area farms 62,356.69 27,102.31 35,254.38 4,351.17 30,903.20 
Irrigated area 
NIFP1: 
WSR → DSR I 
118,073.18 48,085.22 69,987.96 6,530.75 63,457.20 
NIFP2: 
WSR → DSR I + tomato 
111,220.00 49,533.33 61,686.67 4,178.37 57,508.29 
NIFP3
 b
: 
WSR → DSR I  with cattle 
82,843.73 38,010.43 44,833.30 4,554.84 40,278.46 
All irrigated area farms 108,698.25 44,097.00 64,601.25 5,770.43 58,830.81 
All north-east farms 81,820.14 34,240.08 47,580.06 4,947.26 42,632.80 
Note: WSR=wet rice; and DSR I=first crop of dry rice
 
a
 See more details in Tables E.3 and E.4 in Appendix E  
b
 Crop-livestock farming system 
Source: Field survey, 2009 
6.3 Results of the stochastic efficiency analysis 
In this section, the risk efficiency of the different farming systems in the central and north-
east regions are assessed and compared. Using stochastic efficiency with respect to a function 
(SERF), risk efficiency for alternative farming systems was ranked using certainty equivalents 
(CEs) over a range of )(wra  values (see Section 4.5.6).  
As discussed in Section 6.1.1, a negative exponential utility function performed best to 
describe the )(wra  of smallholder farmers in central and north-east Thailand. Therefore, the 
relevant range of the lower and upper bounds of )(wra  were employed for the SERF analysis. 
The )(wra  ranged from 0.0000144 (slightly risk averse) to 0.0001330 (extremely risk averse) 
for the central region farmers, and )(wra  ranged from 0.0000109 (slightly risk averse) to 
0.0012450 (extremely risk averse) for the north-east farmers.  
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In order to calculate the CE with respect to a negative exponential utility function following 
equation 4.14, the stochastic simulation model was estimated to generate the probability 
distribution of net farm income for each farming system (see equation 4.15).The deterministic 
variables including the effective areas used to grow individual crops, heads of livestock sold, 
total variable costs and total fixed costs for each farming system were based on the results 
from the observed farms for the 2008 crop year price levels. In addition, the historical data on 
prices and yields of each individual crop and prices for livestock were collected from the 
statistical datasets of the Office of Agricultural Economics. The stochastic simulation was 
generated using 1998 to 2008 historical data (see Appendix F for details).  
The SERF analysis for the risky different farming systems in the central and north-east 
regions were simulated using the SIMETAR program; the results are discussed below.  
6.3.1 Central region rain-fed area 
Figure 6.1 shows the cumulative distribution functions (CDFs) for the net farm income of 
each farming system in the central region rain-fed area. The results indicated that CRFP1 can 
exhibit higher net farm income than the other farming systems. However, the CDF for CRFP1 
is less steep compared with the CDFs for CRFP3 and CRFP4. This implies that CRFP1 has a 
more uncertain net farm income than CRFP3 and CRFP4 (Lien et al., 2006). The result shows 
CRFP1 has about a 12.8 per cent chance of creating negative net farm income. The highest 
uncertainty in the price of cassava in the central region (coefficient of variation (CV) = 33.48 
per cent) may affect net farm income volatility for this farming system (see Table F.1 in 
Appendix F).  
A comparison of the CDFs for CRFP3 and CRFP4 demonstrates that both farming systems 
have a low possibility of generating a negative net farm income. The result clearly shows 
CRF3 has almost 92.6 per cent chance of achieving a positive net farm income, whereas 
CRFP4 has no chance of experiencing returns lower than the total production expenses. 
Although there are relatively high uncertainties in prices of maize and sorghum in the central 
region, both commodities have experienced low variation in yields. This may have resulted in 
CRFP3 and CRFP4 being less risky farming systems compared with CRFP1. In contrast, 
CRFP2 is associated with a 95 per cent chance of generating a negative net farm income. The 
high variation in the price of sugarcane in the central region and high production expenses of 
this farming system are the main causes driving CRFP2 to exhibit high net farm income 
volatility.  
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The expected value of net farm income for the simulated CRFP1 is 29,095 baht, for CRFP4 
28,268 baht, for CRFP3 23,086 baht and for CRFP2 -57,177 baht. 
Figure 6.1 Simulated cumulative distribution functions (CDFs) of annual net farm 
income ( A
~
) for the different farming systems (CRFP1-4) in Thailand’s 
central region rain-fed area 
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The SERF analysis results for the different farming systems in the central region rain-fed area 
over the  )(wra  range of zero (risk-neutral) to 0.0001330 with respect to the negative 
exponential utility function are given in Figure 6.2. Figure 6.2 shows CRFP4 would be 
preferred by the slightly risk averse to the extremely risk averse central region rain-fed 
farmers over the CRFP3, CRFP1 and CRFP2. This is because CRFP4 has a higher CE than 
the other farming systems. However, CRFP1 would be slightly more preferred than the other 
farming systems by risk-neutral central region rain-fed farmers. 
In other words, in the central region rain-fed area, CRFP4 is the most risk efficient farming 
system for all levels of risk averse farmers, whereas CRFP1 was preferred by the risk neutral 
farmers. 
It can be seen that, although CRFP2 generated the highest average net farm income for the 
central region rain-fed farmers using the 2008 year price levels (see Table 6.8), the CRFP2 
system had the lowest expected value of net farm income and had the highest chance of 
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generating negative net farm income when using stochastic simulation. This may have 
resulted from growing sugar cane, which is associated with a high cost of production and 
would not be appropriate for small scale central region rain-fed farmers. Therefore, CRFP4 
and CRFP1 are considered suitable in terms of risk efficient farming system options for risk 
averse and risk neutral central region rain-fed farmers, respectively. The results imply that the 
extremely risk averse central region rain-fed farmers may significantly increase their net farm 
income sustainability by growing CRFP4. 
Figure 6.2 Certainty equivalents (CEs) of the different farming systems (CRFP1-4) in 
Thailand’s central region rain-fed area with the different magnitudes of 
absolute risk aversion coefficient with respect to a negative exponential utility 
function 
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6.3.2 Central region irrigated area 
The CDFs for net farm income of the alternative farming systems in the central region 
irrigated area are summarized in Figure 6.3. The results show that CIFP2 can generate a 
higher net farm income than CIFP1. However, the less steep slope of the CDF for CIFP2 
compared with CIFP1 implies that CIFP2 was a more risky farming system than CIFP1. 
The simulated CIFP2 has a 24.6 per cent chance of a negative net farm income, whereas 
CIFP1 has a 23.8 per cent chance to generate a negative net farm income. There are two 
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reasons driving either CIFP1 or CIFP2 to produce a high uncertain net farm income. First, 
although rice is an important crop for central region irrigated farmers, the price of rice in this 
region fluctuates widely from year to year, especially for dry rice (CV = 37.36 per cent) (see 
Table F.1). Second, the aggressive use of chemical fertilizers, high wage costs and the high 
cost of land rent in the central region irrigated area increased production costs in both farming 
systems.  
The expected net farm income for the simulated CIFP2 and CIFP1 are 50,312 and 26,651 
baht, respectively. 
Figure 6.3 Simulated cumulative distribution functions (CDFs) of annual net farm 
income ( A
~
) for the alternative farming systems (CIFP1 and CIFP2) in 
Thailand’s central region irrigated area 
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Figure 6.4 illustrates the SERF analysis results for CIFP1 and CIFP2 over the )(wra  ranges 
from zero to 0.0001330 with respect to the negative exponential utility function. The results 
show CIFP2 is more efficient than the CIFP1 when the )(wra  ranges from zero to 0.0000125. 
This implies that CIFP2 is the preferred farming system for risk neutral and some of the 
slightly risk averse central region irrigated farmers. 
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Above the )(wra  of 0.0000125, central region irrigated farmers preferred CIFP1 over CIFP2. 
We can conclude that CIFP1 is the most risk efficient farming system for the extremely risk 
averse central region irrigated farmers. In addition, at the point where CIFP1 and CIFP2 cross, 
the farmer is indifferent between the two alternative farming systems. 
Overall, using the 2008 price levels (see Table 6.8), CIFP2 appeared to generate higher 
average net farm income for central region irrigated farmers and has higher expected net farm 
income than CIFP1 when using stochastic simulation. However, due to the unstable price of 
rice in the area combined with high production costs, both farming systems have somewhat 
high probabilities of giving a negative net farm income. Therefore, CIFP1 would be suggested 
as the risk efficient farming system appropriate for the extremely risk averse central irrigated 
farmers, whereas the risk neutral and some of the slightly risk averse farmers (those who have 
)(wra  less than 0.0000125) would preferred CIFP2.  The results imply that the extremely risk 
averse central region irrigated farmers may significantly increase their net farm income 
sustainability by growing CIFP1. 
Figure 6.4 Certainty equivalents (CEs) of the alternative farming systems(CIFP1 and 
CIFP2) in Thailand’s central region irrigated area with the different 
magnitudes of absolute risk aversion coefficient with respect to a negative 
exponential utility function 
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6.3.3 North-east region rain-fed area 
Figure 6.5 presents the CDFs of net farm income for the farming systems in the north-east 
rain-fed area. It appears that NRFP5 can generate a higher net farm income than the other 
farming systems in the area. 
NRFP3 has a 20.3 per cent probability of obtaining a negative net farm income, whereas 
NRFP1 and NRFP2 have probabilities of 10.6 and 6.6 per cent, respectively. There are two 
factors that affected the net farm income volatility among these single-crop and multiple-crop 
farming systems. First, the low productivity and high uncertainty of price of wet rice (CV = 
26.22 per cent), which is the main cash crop for rice-based farmers in the rain-fed area of 
north-east Thailand (see Tables F.2 and F.4). Second, there is the high uncertainty of price of 
cassava (CV = 31.84 per cent) combined with the high production costs of sugarcane.   
Figure 6.5 Simulated cumulative distribution functions (CDFs) of annual net farm 
income ( A
~
) for the different farming systems (NRFP1-6) in Thailand’s 
north-east region rain-fed area 
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The results also show that the volatility in net farm income is reduced within the crop-
livestock alternative farming systems. The simulated NRFP4-6 shows no probability of 
generating a negative net farm income. We can conclude that raising cattle could help 
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increase farm income diversification and serve as a buffer to protect farm income volatility 
for north-east rain-fed farmers.  
The expected net farm income for the simulated NRFP5 is 43,189 baht, followed by 41,428 
baht for NRFP6 and 36,860 baht for NRFP4. NRFP1 had the lowest expected net farm 
income of 8,542 baht. The expected net farm income for NRFP3 was 12,697 baht and 20,004 
baht for the NRFP2. 
The ranked CEs of the farming systems in the north-east region rain-fed area over the )(wra  
ranges from zero to 0.0012450 with respect to the negative exponential utility function are 
shown in Figure 6.6. The results show that NRFP5 is the most risk efficient farming system 
for all risk averse north-east rain-fed farmers because NRFP5 lies highest on the graph within 
this range of )(wra . NRFP6 and NRFP4 are the second and third most preferred farming 
systems at all risk aversion levels.  
It can be seen that the crop-livestock farming system options (NRFP4-6) generated higher 
average net farm income using the 2008 price levels compared with other farming systems 
(see Table 6.9). Similarly, when using stochastic simulation, NRFP4-6 appeared to generate 
high expected values of net farm income and had no probability of a negative net farm 
income. This finding implies that crop-livestock farming systems are more risk efficient than 
single-crop and multiple-crop farming systems and appropriate to reduce net farm income 
volatility for north-east rain-fed farmers. NRFP5 is considered as the most risk efficient 
farming system and is appropriate for all levels of risk averse farmers. The results imply that 
the extremely risk averse north-east rain-fed farmers may significantly increase their net farm 
income sustainability by growing NRFP5. 
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Figure 6.6 Certainty equivalents (CEs) of the different farming systems (NRFP1-6) in 
Thailand’s north-east region rain-fed area with the different magnitudes of 
absolute risk aversion coefficient with respect to a negative exponential utility 
function 
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6.3.4 North-east region irrigated area 
Figure 6.7 presents the CDFs for the net farm income of the farming systems in the north-east 
irrigated area. The results show that simulated NIFP2 can generate a higher net farm income 
than NIFP3 and NIFP1. However, NIFP2 has a probability of 5.3 per cent of a negative net 
farm income. NIFP3 has the lowest probability, less than five per cent, of generating a 
negative net farm income. NIFP1 has a probability of 16.1 per cent of generating a negative 
net farm income.  
It is likely that relatively low yields, combined with the high uncertainty of the price of either 
wet rice or dry rice (CV = 25.10 and 29.22 per cent, respectively), may have influenced the 
volatility of net farm income for the high-intensity rice alternative farming systems in the 
north-east irrigated area (see Tables F.2 and F.4). 
The expected values of net farm income for these three farming systems are quite similar. The 
simulated NIFP2 generated the highest expected net farm income of 22,405 baht, followed by 
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NIFP3 with an expected net farm income of 18,477 baht and NIFP1 with an expected net farm 
income of 14,661 baht.    
Figure 6.7 Simulated cumulative distribution function (CDFs) of annual net farm 
income ( A
~
) for the different farming systems (NIFP1-3) in Thailand’s north-
east region irrigated area 
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The SERF analysis results for the different farming systems in the north-east irrigated area are 
summarized in Figure 6.8. The CE of each farming system is ranked over the )(wra  ranges 
from zero to 0.0012450 under the negative exponential utility function. The results show that 
NIFP2 is the preferred farming system when the )(wra  ranges between zero and 0.0001625. 
This means that NIFP2 is risk efficient over the other farming systems and appropriate for 
risk neutral north-east irrigated farmers and some of the slightly risk averse farmers (those 
who have )(wra  less than 0.0001625).   
In addition, above the )(wra  of 0.0001625, NIFP3 is higher on the graph than NIFP2. This 
illustrates that NIFP3 is the most risk efficient farming system and suitable for the extremely 
risk averse north-east irrigated farmers. 
In summary, using the 2008 price levels (see Table 6.9), NIFP1 appeared to generate the 
highest average net farm income for the north-east irrigated farmers. However, due to the low 
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productivity and unstable prices of rice in the area, NIFP1 generated the lowest expected 
value of net farm income and had the highest probability to generate negative net farm income 
when using stochastic simulation. Therefore, NIFP3 would be considered as a risk efficient 
farming system appropriate for extremely risk averse north-east irrigated farmers, whereas the 
risk neutral and some of the slightly risk averse farmers (those who have )(wra  less than 
0.0001625) would prefer NIFP2. The results imply that the extremely risk averse north-east 
irrigated farmers may significantly increase their net farm income sustainability by growing 
NIFP3.  
Figure 6.8 Certainty equivalents (CEs) of the different farming systems (NIFP1-3) in 
Thailand’s north-east region irrigated area with the different magnitudes of 
absolute risk aversion coefficient with respect to a negative exponential utility 
function 
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6.4 Sensitivity analysis 
As discussed in Section 6.3, high uncertainty in commodity prices is one of the most 
important factors that impacted net farm income volatility for the farming systems in the 
central and north-east regions. Therefore, a sensitivity analysis was conducted in order to 
investigate the effects of commodity price inflation on net farm income volatility for the 
farming systems in this study.  
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The consumer price index (CPI) of Thailand 1998-2008 (see Table G.1 in Appendix G) was 
used to estimate the inflation-adjusted (real) prices for each individual crop in 2008 Thai baht. 
This procedure aimed to eliminate misleading interpretations regarding the effects of inflation 
from the commodity prices. The details of inflation adjusted prices for each individual crop in 
the central and north-east regions are documented in Tables G.2 and G.3.  
The result showed that all CVs of the inflation adjusted prices for each individual crop in 
2008 baht values were somewhat smaller than the CVs of non-inflation adjusted (nominal) 
prices. This implies that there is less variability in the inflation adjusted commodity prices.  
Specifically, the SERF analysis was performed using the inflation adjusted crop prices to 
examine the changes in net farm income volatility for each farming system. The sensitivity 
analysis simulation results are presented in Appendix H. The differences between the 
simulated results using real and nominal commodity prices are discussed below. 
The CDFs of net farm income for the different farming systems in the central region rain-fed 
area, using inflation-adjusted crop prices, are illustrated in Figure H.1 in Appendix H. 
Comparing Figure H.1 with Figure 6.1, there are slight increase in the expected net farm 
incomes for CRFP1, CRFP3 and CRFP4. The possibility of generating a negative net farm 
income for CRFP1 decreases to 5.5 per cent, but CRFP3 has no chance of obtaining a 
negative net farm income. Despite this, CRFP2 still has a negative expected net farm income; 
the probability of receiving a negative net farm income dropped from 92.6 to 85 per cent 
when simulated with the real price of sugarcane. Moreover, the SERF sensitivity analysis 
results illustrated in Figure H.2 indicate that CIFP4 is the most risk efficient farming system 
for all levels of risk aversion considered, when inflation is not accounted for in the 
commodity prices. 
For the central region irrigated area, CIFP1 and CIFP2 have a 10 per cent probability of 
generating a negative net farm income (see Figure H.3). The expected net farm incomes 
increased to 92,647 baht for CIFP2 and 52,864 baht for CIFP1, when simulated using the real 
commodity prices. On the one hand, the SERF sensitivity analysis results show that CIFP2 is 
the preferred faming system by the risk neutral and some of the slightly risk averse central 
region irrigated farmers (those who have )(wra  of zero to 0.0000221). On the other hand, the 
central region irrigated farmers who have )(wra  greater than 0.0000221 would prefer CIFP1 
over CIFP2 (see Figure H.4).  
Figure H.5 shows the simulated CDFs of the alternative farming systems in the north-east 
rain-fed area using real commodity prices in 2008 baht values. The results indicate that 
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NRFP1, NRFP2 and NRFP3 have less than a five per cent probability of experiencing a 
negative net farm income. Moreover, the expected net farm incomes for all farming systems 
in the north-east rain-fed area have increased. NRFP6, NRFP5 and NRFP4 generated the 
highest expected net farm incomes of 55,779, 55,578 and 47,218 baht, respectively. The 
simulated NRFP2 had an expected net farm income of 28,605 baht, followed by NRFP3 with 
an expected net farm income of 25,232 baht and NRFP1 with an expected net farm income of 
12,179 baht. The SERF sensitivity analysis results shown in Figure H.6 indicate that NRFP6 
is the most risk efficient farming system across various risk aversion levels of the north-east 
rain-fed farmers. This result is completely different from the previous simulation using 
nominal commodity prices. 
The CDFs of net farm income for the alternative farming systems in the north-east irrigated 
area shows that the probability of generating a negative net farm income for NIFP1 dropped 
from 16.1 to 2.7 per cent when using inflation adjusted commodity prices. NIFP2 and NIFP3 
exhibited no chance of obtaining a negative net farm income (see Figure H.7). The expected 
net farm incomes for all farming systems in the north-east irrigated area increased slightly. 
NIFP2 had the highest expected net farm income of 34,425 baht. As documented in Figure 
H.8, NIFP2 was preferred by the risk neutral and slightly risk averse north-east irrigated 
farmers when inflation is not accounted for in the commodity prices. However, the extremely 
risk averse north-east irrigated farmers (those who have )(wra  greater than 0.0007781) 
preferred NIFP3, since the CE is slightly higher than for the NIFP2. 
Overall the SERF-sensitivity analysis results show, the net farm income volatility for all 
alternative farming systems in central and north-east Thailand are reduced when inflation 
adjusted commodity prices were used instead of the non-inflation adjusted prices. SERF 
assessed the most risk efficient farming system in each of the study area, which were quite 
similar to the previous simulations, except for the north-east rain-fed area.    
6.5 Summary of findings 
In conclusion, the results showed that the negative exponential utility function performed best 
among the other selected functional forms in explaining the risk behaviour of the farmers in 
central and north-east regions. The )(wra  given by the negative exponential function 
described risk behaviour of the observed farmers in both regions as risk averse. The )(wra  
ranged from 0.0000144 to 0.0001330 for the farmers in the central region, and )(wra  ranged 
from 0.0000109 to 0.0012450 for the north-east farmers. In addition, the independent sample 
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t-test results showed that the )(wra  between the central and north-east region farmers were 
not significantly different.  
The results of the multivariate regression of risk aversion against the socio-economic 
characteristics of the farmers indicated that Highest Education and Household Size were 
significant and negatively impacted the risk aversion of the farmers in the central region, but 
Age was negative and significantly influenced the risk aversion of the north-east region 
farmers. However, the effects of the wealth variable (Net Farm Income) on risk aversion of 
the farmers are ambiguous in both regions. 
In terms of stochastic efficiency analysis, the results revealed that maize followed by sorghum 
(CRFP4) was the most risk efficient farming system for slightly to extremely risk averse 
farmers‟ in the central region rain-fed area. The extremely risk averse central region irrigated 
farmers preferred growing low land wet rice followed by one crop of dry rice (CIFP1), but 
three low land rice crops (CIFP2) system was suitable for slightly risk averse central region 
irrigated farmers. 
Multiple crops of rice and cassava, combined with raising small herds of cattle (NRFP5) was 
a stochastically risk efficient farming system for all risk averse north-east rain-fed farmers. 
For the north-east irrigated area, two rice crops and raising cattle (NIFP3) was the most risk 
efficient for the extremely risk averse farmers, but two rice crops and tomatoes (NIFP2) was 
preferred by the slightly risk averse north-east irrigated farmers 
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     Chapter 7 
Summary and Conclusions 
This chapter presents a summary of the research. Section 7.1 provides the conclusions and the 
findings of the research. The policy implications derived from the findings are discussed in 
Section 7.2. In the following section, the limitations of the research are presented. The 
recommendations for future research are discussed in Section 7.4. 
7.1 Summary and empirical findings 
Agricultural production faces a number of unpredictable risks. The variability of yields and 
unstable input and output prices are important sources of risk that produce farm income 
volatility. The severity of the risk can vary considerably depending on the farming system, 
geographic location, weather conditions, government support policies, farm prices and farm 
types. For several decades, Thai farmers have experienced pervasive and complicating risks 
that caused their farm incomes to fluctuate every year, especially for small scale farmers. 
Therefore, the findings from this research will enhance our understanding of the important 
sources of risk confronting Thailand‟s farmers, and the impacts of those risks at the farm 
level, so that positive ways to minimize the effects of risk on farms can be developed that will 
help farmers survive and deal with the risks.  
The objective of this research was to identify the important sources of risk and risk 
management strategies of smallholder farmers in the central and north-east Thailand. This 
research also assessed the farmers‟ utility functions and the risk attitudes in both regions. In 
addition, this research estimated the risk efficient farming system options for smallholder 
farmers in each study region. The different farming resources and the economic development 
in the two regions provided the basis for a comparison of the results using risk efficiency 
criteria. 
This research used both primary and secondary data sources. The primary data were gathered 
from a field survey of smallholder farmers in central and north-east Thailand. The sample 
selection process involved two stages. First, the provinces in each region were grouped into 
those provinces with large and medium irrigation systems and those in the rain-fed areas. 
Secondly, a purposive random sampling technique was employed to draw out samples from 
each group. Eight hundred respondents from eight provinces in the central and north-east 
regions were interviewed. Face-to-face interviews were performed to elicit relevant 
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information. The data collection process was carried out from January to April 2009. In 
addition, time series data of prices and yields at the provincial level from the 1998 to 2008 
crop years were obtained from the OAE database for each individual crop and livestock 
species in the study area. Both primary and secondary data were employed in a stochastic 
simulation model to determine the risk efficiency of each farming system. 
The approaches employed to analyse the data include several steps. First, the sources of risk 
the smallholder farmers in both regions perceived as most important, and the risk 
management strategies they used to cope with the risks, were measured using a five-point 
Likert scale. Exploratory factor analysis (EFA) was applied to reduce the large number of 
sources of risk and risk strategy variables. In addition, the associations between smallholder 
farmers‟ characteristics and the perceptions of sources of risk and risk strategy components 
were assessed using multiple regression. Second, the smallholder farmers‟ attitudes towards 
risk were elicited using the equal likely certainty equivalent (ELCE) technique. Four 
alternative utility function forms were selected to calculate the absolute risk aversion 
coefficients and compare their performances in terms of the risk preference classification. 
Multiple regressions were used to investigate wealth and non-wealth factors influencing the 
smallholder farmers‟ risk aversion. Lastly, the different risky farming systems of smallholder 
farmers in both regions were evaluated using the stochastic efficiency with respect to a 
function (SERF) approach. Each alternative farm plan was simulated and ranked based on its 
certainty equivalent (CE) over a defined range of risk aversion values using SIMETAR 
software.   
The findings of the perceptions of sources of risk and risk management strategies indicated 
some notable differences between farmers in the central and north-east regions and also 
between the farmers in the irrigated and rain-fed areas of both regions. Tables 7.1 and 7.2 
summarize the five most important sources of risk and risk management strategies perceived 
by farmers in each group.  
The results showed that marketing risks associated with „unexpected variability of input 
prices‟ and „unexpected variability of product prices‟ were major concerns of the farmers in 
both regions. Production risks related to „diseases and pests affecting plants and animals‟ and 
„excess rainfall‟ were considered as important by the central region farmers, but the north-east 
farmers ranked these risks lower. Additionally, concern among the north-east farmers 
regarding institutional risks associated with „changes in Thailand‟s economic and political 
situation‟ and „changes in national government laws and policies‟ were significantly higher 
than for the central region farmers. 
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Marketing risks associated with „unexpected variability of input prices‟ and „unexpected 
variability of product prices‟ were also major concerns among farmers in the irrigated and 
rain-fed areas of both regions. However, „deficiency in rainfall causing drought‟ was ranked 
most and second most important by farmers in rain-fed areas of the central and north-east 
regions, respectively. Farmers in the irrigated area of both regions were more concerned about 
„diseases and pests that affect plants and animals‟, „excess rainfall‟ and „natural disaster‟, but 
these risks were only of moderate importance to farmers in rain-fed areas. Moreover, „changes 
in Thailand‟s economic and political situation‟ and „changes in national government laws and 
policies‟ were considered as important sources of risk for north-east rain-fed farmers who 
showed a higher degree of concern than the farmers in other groups.  
Table 7.1 Five most important sources of risk perceived by Thailand’s smallholder 
farmers in central and north-east regions 
Rank All farmer group Central region farmer group North-east region farmer 
group 
Central North-east Irrigated Rain-fed Irrigated Rain-fed 
1 Unexpected 
variability of 
input prices 
Unexpected 
variability of 
input prices 
Unexpected 
variability of 
input prices 
Deficiency in 
rainfall 
causing 
drought 
Unexpected 
variability of 
input prices 
Unexpected 
variability of 
input prices 
2 Unexpected 
variability of 
product prices 
Unexpected 
variability of 
product prices 
Unexpected 
variability of 
product prices 
Unexpected 
variability of 
input prices 
Unexpected 
variability of 
product prices 
Deficiency in 
rainfall causing 
drought 
3 Diseases and 
pests that 
affect plants 
and animals 
Changes in 
Thailand‟s 
economic and 
political 
situation 
Diseases and 
pests that 
affect plants 
and animals 
Unexpected 
variability of 
product prices 
Natural 
disaster such 
as heat, fire, 
flood, storm 
Unexpected 
variability of 
product prices 
4 Excess rainfall Changes in 
national 
government 
law and 
policies 
Excess rainfall Diseases and 
pests that 
affect plants 
and animals 
Diseases and 
pests that 
affect plants 
and animals 
Changes in 
Thailand‟s 
economic and 
political 
situation 
5 Unexpected 
variability of 
yields 
Unexpected 
variability of 
yields 
Unexpected 
variability of 
yields 
Problem with 
hired labour 
Changes in 
Thailand‟s 
economic and 
political 
situation 
Changes in 
national 
government law 
and policies 
 
 
The results from the perceptions of risk management strategies suggested that production and 
financial strategies were considered more important than marketing strategies by the central 
and north-east region farmers. A production strategy related to „purchase farm machinery to 
replace labour‟ was the most important risk response for the central region farmers, but north-
east farmers rated „storing feed and/or seed reserves‟ as the most important production 
strategies. In addition, „holding cash and easily converted cash assets‟ and „working off farm 
to supplement household income‟ were considered as important financial strategies by 
farmers in both regions. The north-east farmers perceived the importance of „having a farm 
  161 
reservoir for water supplies in dry season‟ higher than the central region farmers. In contrast, 
„apply pests and diseases programme‟ was considered as important by the central region 
farmers but was less important for the north-east farmers. The differences between the risk 
responses of farmers in the central and north-east regions suggested that the farmers in both 
regions used a mix of risk strategies to cope with the sources of risk they confronted.  
The central region irrigated farmers perceived „purchase farm machinery to replace labour‟ 
and „apply pests and diseases programme‟ as the important risk strategies, whereas the central 
region rain-fed farmers preferred „holding cash‟ and „having diversified crop, animal or other 
enterprises‟ as risk strategies. „Storing feed and/or seed reserves‟ and „holding cash‟ were 
ranked highly among the north-east irrigated and rain-fed farmers. Additionally, the north-east 
rain-fed farmers rated „have a farm reservoir‟ as the most important risk strategy. The results 
also indicated that the farmers in the rain-fed areas of both regions perceived production 
strategies related to „having diversified crop, animal or other enterprises‟ and „planting several 
varieties of crop‟ significantly greater than the irrigated farmers.  
Table 7.2 Five most important risk management strategies perceived by Thailand’s 
smallholder farmers in central and north-east regions    
Rank All farmer group Central region farmer group North-east region farmer 
group 
Central North-east Irrigated Rain-fed Irrigated Rain-fed 
1 Purchase farm 
machinery to 
replace labour 
Storing feed 
and/or seed 
reserves 
Purchase farm 
machinery to 
replace labour 
Holding cash Storing feed 
and/or seed 
reserves 
Have a farm 
reservoir 
2 Working off 
farm 
Holding cash Apply pests 
and diseases 
programme 
Having 
diversified 
crop, animal 
or other 
enterprises  
Holding cash Storing feed 
and/or seed 
reserves 
3 Holding cash Have a farm 
reservoir 
Working off 
farm 
Obtaining 
market 
information 
Obtaining 
market 
information 
Holding cash 
4 Apply pests 
and diseases 
programme 
Obtaining 
market 
information 
Storing feed 
and/or seed 
reserves 
Purchase farm 
machinery to 
replace labour 
Purchase farm 
machinery to 
replace labour 
Purchase farm 
machinery to 
replace labour 
5 Reduce debt 
level 
Purchase farm 
machinery to 
replace labour 
 
Holding cash Reduce debt 
level 
Leasing farm 
machinery 
rather than 
owing them 
Spreading sale 
over several 
time period 
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EFA was applied to reduce the numbers of sources of risk and risk management strategies of 
the farmers in each group. Regression analysis was employed to examine the influence of the 
farm and the farmer‟s socio-economic characteristics on the farmer‟s perceptions of sources 
of risk and risk management strategies as obtained from the factor analysis. The robustness of 
all models was tested and did not exhibit any problem. However, the coefficients of 
determination ( 2R ) of most regression models did not yield satisfactory results. This may 
imply that the perceptions of sources of risk and risk management strategies were individual 
and differed from farmer to farmer. However, there were a number of farms and farmers‟ 
characteristics that had statistically significant influences on the perceptions of sources of risk 
and risk management strategies. The findings of the relationships between the farms and the 
farmers‟ characteristics with the perceptions of source of risk components for each group of 
farmer are summarized as follows (see Table 7.3): 
For all farmer group 
 Female heads of farm households perceived „personal and farm business environment‟ 
and „natural disaster‟ as the important sources of risk more than male household 
heads. 
 Young farmers and the farmers who had smaller farms size were more likely to 
perceive „natural disaster‟ as significantly more important source of risk on farm. 
  More educated farmers were very concerned with „personal and farm business 
environment‟ risk than did less educated farmers.   
 Less experienced farmers, farmers who had higher annual household incomes and 
farmers with larger sized household rated „economic and political‟ as the important 
sources of risk. 
 Farmers who had loans rated „financial situation‟ and „natural disaster‟ as more 
important sources of risk than did farmers without loans. 
 Farmers who had off-farm work were more likely to rate paying attention to 
„economic and political‟ and „personal and farm business environment‟ risks higher 
than farmers with no off-farm work. 
 Central region farmers perceived „personal and farm business environment‟, „natural 
disaster‟ and „financial situation‟ as more important sources of risk on farm higher 
than did the north-east farmers. However, the north-east farmers were more concerned 
about „economic and political‟ risks. 
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Table 7.3 Variables affecting perceptions of source of risk components  
Variables All farmer group Central region farmer 
group 
North-east region farmer 
group 
Age (-) Natural disaster  (-) Natural disaster 
Gender  (-) Personal and farm 
business environment 
(-) Natural disaster 
(-) Personal and farm 
business environment 
(-) Natural disaster 
 
Education (+) Personal and farm 
business environment 
(+) Personal and farm 
business environment 
 
Farming 
experiences 
(-) Economic and political  (-) Economic and political 
(-) Yields and product 
prices 
Off-farm work (+) Economic and political  
(+) Personal and farm 
business environment 
(+) Personal and farm 
business environment 
(+) Yields and product 
prices 
(+) Financial situation 
(+) Input prices 
(+) Natural disaster 
(+) Personal and farm 
business environment 
Farm size (-) Natural disaster (+) Yields and product 
prices 
 
Net farm income (-) Personal and farm 
business environment 
(+) Natural disaster 
(-) Personal and farm 
business environment 
(-) Economic and political 
(-) Yields and product 
prices 
(-) Financial situation 
(+) Personal and farm 
business environment 
Farm location (-) Economic and political 
(+) Personal and farm 
business environment 
(+) Natural disaster 
(+) Financial situation 
(+) Personal and farm 
business environment 
(-) Economic and political 
(-) Yields and product 
prices 
(-) Financial situation 
(-) Natural disaster 
(+) Personal and farm 
business environment 
(-) Natural disaster 
(+) Yields and product 
prices 
Finance farm 
business 
(+) Natural disaster 
(+) Financial situation 
(-) Yields and product 
prices 
(+) Natural disaster 
(+) Natural disaster 
(+) Yields and product 
prices 
Annual 
household 
income 
(+) Economic and political 
 
(+) Economic and political 
(+) Financial situation 
(-) Natural disaster 
 
Household size (+) Economic and political 
(+) Personal and farm 
business environment 
(+) Personal and farm 
business environment   
(+) Economic and political 
(+) Financial situation 
 
Note: (+) and (-) represent positive and negative significant impact, respectively 
 
For central region farmer group 
 Female heads of farm households in the central region were more likely to perceive 
„personal and farm business environment‟ and „natural disaster‟ as more important 
sources of risk than did male household heads.  
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 Central region farmers with larger farm sizes were more concerned about „yield and 
product prices‟ risks on farm. 
 Central region farmers who had off-farm work and farmers who had lower net farm 
income perceived most risk components as important sources of risk on farm. 
 Central region irrigated farmers perceived „economic and political‟, „yields and 
product prices‟, „financial situation‟ and „input prices‟ risks as highly important risks 
greater than did the farmers in rain-fed areas. The central region rain-fed farmers, in 
contrast, were more likely to be concerned about „personal and farm business 
environment‟ risks. 
For north-east region farmer group 
 Young north-east farmers rated „natural disaster‟ as more important source of risk than 
did the older farmers.  
 Less experienced north-east farmers were likely to perceive „economic and political‟ 
and „yields and product prices‟ risks greater than did the more experienced farmers. 
 North-east irrigated farmers were more concerned about „natural disaster‟, whereas 
north-east rain-fed farmers perceived „personal and farm business environment‟ and 
„yields and product prices‟ as important sources of risk on farm.  
 
Table 7.4 presents a summary of the results of the farmers‟ perceptions of risk management 
strategies and the socio-economic characteristics of the farmers in each group. The major 
findings are summarized as follows: 
For all farmer group 
 Female heads of farm households perceived „off-farm income‟ as more important risk 
management strategy than did male household heads. 
  More educated farmers, less experienced farmers, farmers who had off-farm work and 
farmers with smaller net farm income were more likely to perceive most risk strategy 
components as important strategies for managing their farm business risks.  
 Farmers who had larger farm sizes were more highly concerned about a 
„diversification‟ strategy than did farmers with smaller farm sizes. 
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 North-east farmers perceived „farm production and marketing management‟, 
„diversification‟ and „financial management‟ as of greater importance than did the 
farmers in the central region. 
For central region farmer group 
 Female heads of farm households in the central region were more likely to be 
interested in „off-farm work‟ and „diversification‟ strategies than male household 
heads. 
 More educated central region farmers and the central region farmers who have off-
farm work perceived most risk management strategy components as important risk 
strategies. 
 Central region farmers with larger households rated „farm production and marketing 
management‟ and „off-farm income‟ as more highly important risk strategies than did 
the smaller household farmers. 
 Central region rain-fed farmers perceived the importance of „diversification‟ and 
„financial management‟ greater than did the irrigated farmers.  
For north-east region farmer group 
 Older north-east farmers considered „diversification‟ more important than younger 
north-east farmers.  
  Less experienced north-east farmers were more likely to perceive „diversification‟, 
„preventive strategies‟ and „off-farm income and marketing management‟ as the 
important risk strategies than the more experienced farmers. 
 North-east rain-fed farmers were more concerned about „off-farm income and 
marketing management‟ and „diversification‟ than the north-east irrigated farmers. 
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Table 7.4 Variables affecting perceptions of risk management strategy components 
Variables All farmer group Central region farmer 
group 
North-east region farmer 
group 
Age   (+) Diversification 
Gender  (-) Off-farm income (-) Diversification  
(-) Off-farm income 
 
Education (+) Farm production and 
marketing management  
(+) Diversification 
(+) Off-farm income 
(+) Farm production and 
marketing management  
(+) Diversification 
(+) Off-farm income 
(+) Off-farm income and 
marketing management 
Farming 
experiences 
(-) Farm production and 
marketing management  
(-) Diversification, 
(-) Financial management 
 (-) Preventive strategies 
(-) Off-farm income and 
marketing management 
(-) Diversification 
Off-farm work (+) Farm production and 
marketing management  
(+) Diversification 
(+) Off-farm income 
(+) Financial management 
(+) Farm production and 
marketing management  
(+) Diversification 
(+) Off-farm income 
(+) Financial management 
(+) Off-farm income and 
marketing management 
Farm size (+) Diversification   
Net farm income (-) Farm production and 
marketing management  
(-) Diversification 
(-) Off-farm income 
(-) Financial management 
(-) Farm production and 
marketing management  
 
(+) Preventive strategies 
(+) Diversification 
Farm location (-) Farm production and 
marketing management  
(-) Diversification, 
(-) Financial management 
(+) Diversification,  
(+) Financial management 
(+) Off-farm income and 
marketing management 
(+) Diversification 
Finance farm 
business 
(-) Farm production and 
marketing management  
(-) Off-farm income 
 (-) Off-farm income and 
marketing management 
 
Annual 
household 
income 
(-) Diversification 
(+) Financial management 
(-) Diversification  
Household size (+) Farm production and 
marketing management 
(+) Farm production and 
marketing management   
(+) Off-farm income 
 
Note: (+) and (-) represent positive and negative significant impact, respectively 
 
In terms of farmers‟ attitude towards risk assessment, this research applied four alternative 
utility functional forms to evaluate their power in terms of risk aversion determination. A 
series of nine CE values was incorporated with nine utility values obtained from the ELCE 
method for each farmer in the central and north-east regions and they were examined across 
four functions using the nonlinear least square method. The findings verified that the 
classification of individual risk preferences were directly affected by the choice of utility 
function (see Appendix C). The results suggested that the negative exponential function 
performed best, compared with other utility function forms, in explaining farmers‟ risk 
behaviour. The negative exponential function classified all observed farmers in both regions 
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as risk averse. The absolute risk aversion coefficients ( )(wra ) given by the negative 
exponential function ranged from 0.0000144, for the least risk averse, to 0.0001330, for the 
most risk averse, for the central region farmers and from 0.0000109 to 0.0012450 for the 
farmers in the north-east. An independent sample t-test was employed to examine the 
differences between the )(wra  of the farmers in both regions. The results indicated that the 
farmers in both regions had similar risk preferences. 
The results regarding the influence of socioeconomic characteristics on the variation in risk 
preferences of the farmers in both regions showed that the less educated farmers and the 
farmers who had smaller households in the central region tended to exhibit more risk-averse 
behaviour (see Table 6.3). In contrast, the younger north-east farmers were likely to be more 
risk averse than the older farmers. The findings also indicated that there was a weak 
relationship between the net farm income, associated with wealth, and the risk aversion of the 
farmers in both regions. 
A whole farm income model was employed to estimate the annual net farm income for each 
farming system planted by the farmers in the central and north-east regions. The results 
suggested that field crop-based and intensive rice production were the main farming systems 
for the central region rain-fed and irrigated farmers, respectively (see Tables 6.4 and 6.5). 
Multiple cropping and integrated crop-livestock production were the major cropping patterns 
for north-east rain-fed farmers, but a rice-intensive pattern was practiced by farmers in the 
north-east irrigated area (see Tables 6.6 and 6.7). The results of this research showed that the 
average net farm income in the 2008 crop year for the central region farmers was significantly 
greater than for farmers in the north-east. The average net farm income of the farmers in the 
irrigated area of both regions was significantly higher than for the rain-fed farmers (see 
Tables 6.8 and 6.9). Additionally, the use of large farm machinery and chemical fertilizer in 
agricultural production of the central region farmers was higher than the north-east region 
farmers. 
The findings in this research provided a framework for SERF analysis to determine the most 
risk efficient farming systems for farmers in the central and north-east Thailand. A stochastic 
simulation model was used to estimate the probability distribution of net farm income for 
each alternative farming system. In terms of risk efficiency criteria, the risky farming systems 
were ranked using their certainty equivalent (CE) over the plausible ranges of )(wra  obtained 
from the negative exponential utility function. Table 7.5 summarizes the preferred farming 
systems based on the farmers‟ risk behaviour in the study areas. The SERF results indicated 
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that maize followed by sorghum (CRFP4) was the most risk efficient farming system 
appropriate for the moderate and extremely risk averse rain-fed farmers in the central region. 
However, cassava (CRFP1) was preferred by the risk neutral central region rain-fed farmers. 
Furthermore, the results showed that wet rice followed by one crop of dry rice (CIFP1) was 
appropriate for the extremely risk averse central region irrigated farmers, but three lowland 
rice crops annually (CIFP2)  was the most risk efficient farming system for the risk neutral 
and some of the moderately risk averse central region irrigated farmers. 
The results suggested that wet rice and cassava with raising cattle (NRFP5) was the most risk 
efficient farming system appropriate for all risk aversion levels of north-east rain-fed farmers. 
The extremely risk averse north-east irrigated farmers preferred to grow two rice crops with 
raising cattle (NIFP3), but two rice crops and tomatoes (NIFP2) was appropriate for the risk 
neutral and some of the moderately risk averse north-east irrigated farmers. 
Table 7.5 Preferred farming system based on the different farmers’ risk behaviours in 
central and north-east Thailand 
Study areas 
Farmers’ risk behaviours 
Risk neutral Extremely risk averse 
Central region rain-fed area Cassava (CRFP1) Maize followed by sorghum 
(CRFP4) 
Central region irrigated area  Three lowland rice crops 
annually (CIFP2) 
Wet rice followed by one crop 
of dry rice (CIFP1) 
North-east region rain-fed area Wet rice and cassava with 
raising cattle (NRFP5) 
Wet rice and cassava with 
raising cattle (NRFP5) 
North-east region irrigated 
area 
Two rice crops and tomatoes 
(NIFP2) 
Two rice crops with raising 
cattle (NIFP3) 
 
7.2 Implications of the research findings 
The findings of this research have several important implications for academics, farmers and 
policy makers. For academics, this research provided empirical knowledge pertaining to 
farmers‟ risk behaviours and optimal farming systems that helped reduce risk for farmers in 
the central and north-east Thailand. The ELCE method yielded satisfactory results in terms of 
eliciting the CE for a series of risky outcomes to use as utility values. However, the response 
rates of the observed farmers in this elicitation technique were somewhat low (around 50 per 
cent in both regions). This was because some of the farmers declined to participate in a 
gambling style game due to religious beliefs. It has been documented by Hardaker, Huirne et 
al. (2004) that the ELCE technique will not work efficiently with persons who avoid 
gambling. Hence, this suggested that care should be taken when considering the selection of a 
technique to extract an individual‟s risk preferences. 
  169 
The results showed that the farmers in both regions were averse to risk. This view supported 
Katikarn (1981) and Grisley and Kellog (1987) who argued that Thai farmers exhibit risk 
averse behaviour. The results further indicated that the choice of the utility function chosen by 
the researcher was crucial in predicting the farmers‟ risk behaviour. In this research, the 
negative exponential utility function could describe the observed farmers‟ risk preferences 
better than the cubic, power and expo-power functions. However, the results did not suggest 
that the negative exponential utility function might necessarily be the most appropriate and 
accurate utility function to estimate individuals‟ risk preferences in all other cases. Therefore, 
comparisons of the classification of individuals‟ risk preferences results from several 
alternative utility functions cannot be over emphasized.   
Furthermore, the results clearly explained the influence of the farmers‟ socioeconomic 
characteristics on risk preferences. The non-wealth variables such as age, highest education 
level and household size significantly impacted the attitude of Thai farmers towards risk. 
However, the impact of the variable associated with wealth (net farm income) on risk aversion 
is ambiguous. This supported Binswanger (1980) who found a weak relationship between 
wealth and risk aversion among Indian farmers. Moscardi and Janvry (1977) and Binici et al. 
(2003) argued that understanding about farmers‟ risk attitudes and the factors that impacted 
their risk preferences was an effective tool to determine the technological packages and 
managerial strategies which were appropriate for the risk behaviour of the farmers. Therefore, 
the farmers‟ risk attitudes found in this research could be useful in the future research on 
whole farm decision making analysis that accounts for risk in Thailand.  
The stochastic net farm income simulation model and the SERF framework were successfully 
implemented to investigate net returns and risk efficiency of alternative farming systems for 
the central and north-east farmers. According to the SERF results, field crop-based agriculture 
with alternative maize and sorghum (CRFP4) appeared to be the most risk efficient farming 
system suitable for the extremely risk averse central region rain-fed farmers. In contrast, 
intensive agriculture of wet rice and dry rice cultivation (CIFP1) was appropriate to reduce 
risk for the extremely risk averse central region irrigated farmers. The results also indicated 
that integrated crop-livestock farming systems were preferred by both the extremely risk 
averse north-east rain-fed and irrigated farmers. Wet rice followed by cassava with raising 
cattle (NRFP5) was preferred by the north-east rain-fed farmers, but two rice crops with 
raising cattle (NIFP3) was the most risk efficient farming system suitable for the north-east 
irrigated farmers.  
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Although the SERF results yielded useful information, some caution should be taken in 
interpreting them. First, the crop rotation data obtained from the observed central and north-
east region farmers were grouped and treated as the optional farming systems in this research. 
It is undeniable that these risky options may not cover all patterns of farm production among 
all farmers in both regions. Thus, some potential cash crops such as soybean, cotton, jute, 
pineapple and pararubber as well as live-stock such as milking cows and swine were not used 
for comparison using risk efficiency criterion. Second, due to the lack of national and regional 
panel data regarding production costs at the farm-level from the OAE database, the average 
production costs of each farming system were estimated using information from the sampled 
farmers and then incorporated as the deterministic variable in the stochastic net farm income 
simulation model. Hence, an over- or underestimation of production costs given by the 
sampled farmers may have distorted the results. The cost of production estimation problems 
were also highlighted in Eggerman (2006) who claimed that the use of accurate production 
costs, especially from government databases, may improve the evaluation capacity of the 
stochastic net farm income simulation model. Finally, the impact of inflation on commodity 
prices was a major concern when investigating net farm income volatility (see Archer & 
Reicosky, 2009; Prato et al., 2010). Therefore, a sensitivity analysis was carried out; all prices 
for each individual crop were adjusted to 2008 baht using the consumer price index of 
Thailand. The results indicated that the net farm income volatilities for all the different 
farming systems declined when simulated using the inflation-adjusted commodity prices. This 
provided a clear evidence of the effects of commodity price inflation on the volatility of net 
returns. 
For the farmers, the findings in this research can help farmers in deciding what appropriate 
risk efficient options they should choose. The most economically viable combinations of 
activities for farmers in each area were shown in the SERF analysis. The SERF results 
suggested that integrated crop-livestock farming systems were better options to enhance the 
income stability of rural poor farmers who lived in north-east Thailand. Raising small herds 
of cattle allowed for increased diversity of farm income could protect poor farmers against 
variations in income.  
In contrast, the application of excessive chemical fertilizers, high wage costs and the high 
land rents of rice farmers in the central region irrigated area may have caused increases in 
total production costs. This would have a greater probability of generating a negative net farm 
income for intensive rice farming systems. Therefore, rice farmers in the central region should 
pay more attention to strengthening their cost control and management capacities.  
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For policy makers, the findings in this research yielded some suggestions to enhance the risk 
efficiency of farm income and improve the competitiveness of Thai farmers. Thailand‟s 
policy makers should recognize that any new or changed major policies that impacted the 
costs and returns of farmers, either positively or negatively, would also directly influence 
farmers‟ risk efficiency (Hardaker, Huirne, et al., 2004). Moreover, the risk behaviour of 
farmers was an important criterion that policy makers and other stakeholders must consider 
when developing agricultural policies, strategies and programmes. This is because, when 
adopting new policies and agricultural technologies, farmers depend on their particular risk 
perceptions and risk aversion (Anderson, 2003; Hardaker, Huirne, et al., 2004). 
According to the results, farmers in both regions perceived „unexpected variability of input 
prices‟ as the most important sources of risk on farm. It was not only the prices of chemical 
fertilizer but also the increase in wage rates and higher land rental rates that were the main 
factors that pushed the farm production costs upward. Over the past decade, the intervention 
of the Thai government in agricultural input policies had actually declined. The distribution of 
chemical fertilizers at reduced cost was the only scheme that the government organized to 
assist poor rural farmers. However, this scheme has recently been terminated due to limited 
government budget and this had no opportunities for the farmers to reduce production costs 
(see Isvilanonda & Bunyasiri, 2009). 
The results also showed that the average total production costs of the central region farmers 
were nearly four times higher than that of the north-east farmers (see Tables 6.8 and 6.9). This 
resulted from the application of unnecessary chemical fertilizers, especially by the central 
region irrigated rice farmers. This view supported Isvilanonda and Bunyasiri (2009) who 
claimed that Thai farmers in the irrigated areas likely lacked knowledge about the appropriate 
level of fertilizer required to achieve an optimal yield. The authors also argued that the over 
use of chemical fertilizers and intensive use of land for rice cultivation may lead to 
accelerated degradation of soil fertility and continued decreases in productivity. Therefore, the 
development of sustainable soil management practices should be considered a priority to 
introduce to farmers nationwide. The best technical practices to increase soil organic carbon, 
such as minimum tillage, encouraging the use of organic manure and management of crop-
pasture rotations, should be reviewed in order to retain soil fertility (see P. Smith & Powlson, 
2004). Incentives should be provided to the farmers who adopt these soil management 
technologies. This would help farmers reduce the use of chemical fertilizers, reduce 
production costs and improve their risk efficiency.  
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The results indicated that the prices of rice and cassava were highly unstable and affected the 
farmers‟ net farm income volatility in both regions. This is similar to the results of the sources 
of risk perceptions, which showed „unexpected variability of product prices‟ was the second 
most concern source of risk among the central and north-east region farmers. The Thai 
government operated a pledging scheme for the major cash crops such as wet rice, dry rice, 
cassava and maize (Department of Internal Trade, 2010). This scheme aimed to help farmers 
when commodity market prices fluctuated early in the harvesting season. However, the 
pledging scheme has been widely debated among policy experts, especially for rice (see 
Forssell, 2009; Hayami, 2007; Kajisa & Akiyama, 2004). The advantage of the rice pledging 
scheme is that farmers can obtain low-interest loans from the government when they decided 
to pledge their rice to the Bank of Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives (BAAC) at the 
pledging prices and the rice will be transferred to storage at the Public Warehouse 
Organisation (PWO). The government allowed the farmers to redeem and sell their rice in the 
market when market prices increased above the pledging prices. The pledging price was by a 
government announcement and generally the pledging period is approximately five to seven 
months each year (Isvilanonda & Bunyasiri, 2009). Conversely, some economists argued that 
the pledging scheme would have long-term negative impacts on the efficiency of the 
country‟s rice market and it seems that the management of the scheme is shaped by political 
forces (Forssell, 2009). The pledging scheme persuaded farmers to increase their production, 
but the quality of the products was frequently ignored (Chantanusornsiri, 2009). Some 
economists also suggested that the government should discontinue this highly-interventional 
price policy and should encourage farmers to sell their products using futures contracts to 
reduce the risk of price and income volatilities (Arunmas, 2008; Pratruangkrai, 2009). This 
challenged policy makers to create mechanisms to stabilize agricultural prices at levels that 
are economically reasonable for both farmers and consumers. In addition, the effects of price 
policies such as the pledging scheme should be assessed cautiously to improve the 
effectiveness of the scheme. Direct access to futures trading markets may perhaps be too 
complicated for smallholder farmers in Thailand. Hence, government agencies such as 
Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives, Ministry of Commerce and The Agricultural 
Futures Exchange of Thailand should try to find solutions that would increase small farmers‟ 
access to the futures market.  
The research results showed that farmers in both regions perceived „diseases and pests that 
affect plants and animals‟ and „unexpected variability of yields‟ as important sources of on-
farm risk. The government should continuously invest in agricultural research to improve new 
technologies that would enhance productivity and prevent epidemics of pests and diseases in 
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crops and livestock. Genetic improvement for drought tolerance in rice and cassava should be 
created specifically for rain-fed agriculture in the north-east region. In addition, the 
development of high yielding rice and rice varieties resistant to diseases and pests is most 
appropriate for the irrigated environment in the central and north-east regions. However, it is 
important that the new technologies introduced to the farmers for productivity enhancement 
should not increase their farm production costs. 
The development of a national agricultural crop insurance scheme should be one of the Thai 
government‟s priorities. Crop insurance is, theoretically, an efficient instrument in managing 
risks and can facilitate efforts to protect farmers from either the loss of their crops or farm 
income caused by natural disasters or the drops in commodities‟ prices. To date, a new crop 
insurance scheme for Thai farmers that has been operated by BAAC since 2008 is still in the 
pilot project stage (see Yimlamai, 2010). The government expects this crop insurance scheme 
will continue to develop to cover all farmers and crops countrywide in the near future 
(Commodity Online, 2010). The farmers‟ risk attitudes results in this research generate useful 
information for policy makers to develop the crop insurance scheme more quickly. Binici et 
al. (2003) and Wu (2007) argued that risk preference was one of the important factors that 
affected a farmer‟s decision to purchase or not purchase crop insurance. A risk averse farmer 
is more likely to purchase insurance to reduce his or her perceived risks. In addition, there are 
some obstacles that policy makers should consider for the successful implementation of the 
crop insurance schemes (see Abada, 2001; Hardaker, Huirne, et al., 2004; Yimlamai, 2010). 
First, the crop insurance model itself should not be too complicated because it could lead to 
high administrative costs for the scheme. Second, the appropriate insurance premiums and 
coverage accessibility under the scheme for each crop must be carefully considered. Low 
premiums may not always cover all the losses from the large-scale disasters, but the high 
insurance premiums will lead to increased farm production costs. Lastly, the government 
should promote the benefits of crop insurance schemes that could increase farmers‟ 
understanding and participation. 
Alternatively, the government could encourage the adoption of the New Theory concept. This 
concept aimed to diversify farm activities to help improve self-sufficiency and stabilize farm 
income for small scale farmers (see Section 2.3 for details). The results suggested that the 
New Theory would be beneficial and appropriate for farmers in the rain-fed environment, 
especially in the north-east. The results also showed that rain-fed farmers in both regions 
advocated production diversification strategies that would reduce risk on their farms 
significantly more than irrigated farmers. In addition, limited farm size, shortage of financial 
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investment and lack of agricultural labour are important potential barriers for central and 
north-east region farmers in undertaking on-farm diversification. Therefore, the government 
should pay more attention to solving these barriers. More public investment in agricultural 
water resources development in the north-east should be carried out. This would increase 
overall agricultural production capacity, increase productivity and enhance farm revenue. In 
addition, this would help to reduce net farm income volatility for the rural poor north-east 
farmers. 
 Strengthening the role of farmer groups or cooperatives should be considered as part of 
agricultural risk reduction policies in Thailand. This is because farmers‟ groups or 
cooperatives can help farmers to improve their negotiating power. Higher product prices and 
lower input prices can then be achieved more easily, due to economies of scale, than for 
individual farmers (Hardaker, Huirne, et al., 2004). As of January 2010, there were over 3,761 
primary agricultural cooperatives nationwide but only some are successfully operating their 
businesses (Cooperative Promotion Department, 2010). Therefore, appropriate measures 
should be designed to enhance the efficiency of the primary agricultural cooperatives, while 
strictly maintaining the cooperative principles. In the future, primary agricultural cooperatives 
may act as the representative of smallholder farmers in accessing futures trading.    
7.3 Research limitations 
There are a number of limitations in this research related to sample selection, data and 
estimation techniques. These include: 
 The quality and accuracy of the collected data need attention. This is because data 
collection was conducted during January and April 2009 and by then some farmers 
had already started a new growing season. However, the farmers were asked to 
provide information of their farm rotations, farm income and production costs on the 
previous crop (crop year 2008). For this reason the farmers might have given some 
incorrect information, which may have distorted the SERF results in this research.  
 The ELCE interview in this research was performed by the researcher and trained 
research assistants. However, during the interview process, the questions and/or the 
interviewers might sometimes have put pressure on the farmers to choose particular 
alternatives. This may have led to biased answers from the farmers that would have a 
direct effect on the farmers‟ risk attitude estimations.  
 The sources of risk and risk management strategies perceptions were examined using 
structured questionnaires. The lists of sources of risk and risk management strategies 
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provided may not have covered all of the sources of risk that Thailand farmers 
confronted or the risk strategies they used on farm.  
 The historical data on market prices for each individual crop at the provincial level, 
from the 1998 to 2008, employed in this research were collected from the OAE 
database. However, there are many forms of government intervention that subsidized 
the price of major agricultural commodities in Thailand, such as rice, cassava and 
sugarcane. The impacts from these pricing schemes have a substantial affect on market 
prices and market conditions for agricultural products. This may also have affected the 
risk efficiency of the Thai farmers. Unfortunately, this research cannot provide 
evidence to prove this claim. 
 It is necessary to be cautious when interpreting the results of the association between 
the farmers‟ characteristics and the sources of risk and risk strategy components.  This 
is due to the low coefficients of determination ( 2R ) of most regression models. This 
research also encountered similar problems of low 2R  when the relationship of the 
farmers‟ risk aversion and the wealth and non-wealth characteristics were examined. 
However, the low 2R  may be due to the variation in the perceptions of sources of risk 
and risk strategies which differed from farmer to farmer between rain-fed and irrigated 
areas of the central and north-east regions. In addition, the data provided for the 
regression analysis in this study were cross-sectional data which exhibited lower 2R  
compare to time series data (Reisinger, 1997). 
7.4 Recommendations for future research 
The results in this research indicated that the SERF is a useful theoretical framework to 
investigate and compare net farm income associated with risk for the alternative farming 
systems over the differences in risk behaviour of farmers. Further research of economic risk 
analysis of farms in Thailand can focus on evaluating the economic risk efficiency of the 
alternative on-farm production strategies using SERF such as the organic versus conventional 
farming (see Lien, Hardaker, et al., 2007; Tzouramani, Karanikolas, & Alexopoulos, 2008), 
the use of different tillage systems versus no-tillage (see Archer & Reicosky, 2009; Ascough 
II, Fathelrahman, Vandenberg, Green, & Hoag, 2009; Pendell et al., 2007; Watkins, Hill, & 
Anders, 2008), the appropriate tree replanting systems which would help pararubber and 
eucalyptus farmers in replanting or replacement decision making (see Lien, Stordal, et al., 
2007), the use of weed and pest management options on farm (see Upadhyay, Smith, Clayton, 
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Harker, & Blackshaw, 2006) and the optimal farming practices that contribute to less global 
warming and climate change (see Prato et al., 2010). 
The SERF framework can also be employed to quantify the appropriate marketing strategies, 
such as forward contracts and other marketing alternatives, which could help Thai farmers to 
cope with market risks (see Donnelly & Noel, 2006; Elrod et al., 2008). The risk efficient 
farm investment strategies might be usefully investigated for large and small scale Thai 
farmers (see Nartea & Webster, 2008). It is also interesting to incorporate agricultural policy 
variables into the stochastic simulation model to examine the impacts of those policies in 
minimizing farmers‟ income volatility (see Archer & Kludze, 2006; Grove & Oosthuizen, 
2010). Future researchers should carefully consider how to obtain access to data sources in 
Thailand and the quality of the data given by those providers.      
In future, research can be repeated or extended to estimate the most risk efficient farming 
systems for the northern and southern region farmers. This is because the types of crop grown, 
weather and geographical conditions and cost of production are much different among the 
farmers in the four main regions. This would improve the comprehensive understanding 
pertaining to economic risk efficiency between different farming systems in Thailand. 
Moreover, this may provide useful information for the Thai government to develop an 
agricultural production zoning policy that can help minimize production and marketing risks 
for farmers. 
In terms of the farmers‟ risk preference measurement, future research can employ other 
methods, such as the experimental method (EM) and observed  economic behaviour (OEB), to 
elicit individual utility functions and estimate his or her attitude toward risk (see Section 3.3 
for details). Hardaker and Lien (2005) argue that assessing the validity and reliability of the 
individual risk preferences is a critical task because the errors and bias in the analyses could 
mislead the results. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  177 
 
References 
Abada, J. (2001). Micro and area-based schemes: project and program issues. In I. D. Ortiz 
(Ed.), Social protection in Asia and the Pacific (pp. 408-427): Asian Development 
Bank. Retrieved from 
http://www.adb.org/documents/books/social_protection/chapter_10.pdf 
 
  
Adesina, A. A., & Ouattara, A. D. (2000). Risk and agricultural systems in northern Côte 
d'Ivoire. Agricultural Systems, 66(1), 17-32. 
 
  
Ahmad, A., & Isvilanonda, S. (2003). Rural poverty and agricultural diversification in 
Thailand. Unpublished Working Papers. Department of Economics, Lund University. 
 
  
Akasinha, B., Ngamsomsuk, K., Thongngam, K., Sinchaikul, S., & Ngamsomsuk, V. (2006). 
Risk perceptions among rice farmers (in Thai). Paper presented at the Multiple 
Cropping Center annual seminar, Chiangmai, Thailand. Retrieved from 
http://www.mcc.cmu.ac.th/research/MCCannualSeminar2006/link/pdf/11_MCC2006.
pdf 
 
  
Akcaoz, H., & Ozkan, B. (2005). Determining risk sources and strategies among farmers of 
contrasting risk awareness: a case study for Cukurova region of Turkey. Journal of 
Arid Environments, 62(4), 661-675. 
 
  
Ananda, J., & Herath, G. (2005). Evaluating public risk preferences in forest land-use choices 
using multi-attribute utility theory. Ecological Economics, 55(3), 408-419. 
 
  
Anderson, J. R. (2003). Risk in rural development: challenges for managers and policy 
makers. Agricultural Systems, 75(2-3), 161-197. 
 
  
Anderson, J. R., & Dillon, J. L. (1992). Risk analysis in dryland farming systems: FAO. 
 
  
Anderson, J. R., Dillon, J. L., & Hardaker, J. B. (1977). Agricultural decision analysis (1st 
ed.). Ames: Iowa State University Press. 
 
  
Archer, D. W., & Kludze, H. (2006). Transition to organic cropping systems under risk. 
Paper presented at the American Agricultural Economics Association annual meeting, 
23-26 July 2006, Long Beach, California. Retrieved from 
http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/handle/21278 
 
  
  178 
Archer, D. W., & Reicosky, D. C. (2009). Economic performance of alternative tillage 
systems in the Northern Corn Belt. Agronomy Journal, 101(2), 296-304. 
 
  
Arunmas, P. (2008, November 21). Ammar slams 'corrupt' rice scheme. Bangkok Post. 
Retrieved from 
http://www.bangkokpost.com/211108_Business/21Nov2008_biz36.php 
 
  
Ascough II, J. C., Fathelrahman, E. M., Vandenberg, B. C., Green, T. R., & Hoag, D. L. 
(2009). Economic risk analysis of agricultural tillage systems using the SMART 
stochastic efficiency software package. Paper presented at the 18th World 
IMACS/MODSIM Congress, 13-17 July 2009, Cairns, Australia. Retrieved from 
http://www.mssanz.org.au/modsim09/B1/ascough.pdf 
 
  
Asia Insurance Review. (2011). Govt urges farmers and insurers to take part in rice 
insurance programme. Retrieved 2 October, 2011, from 
http://www.asiainsurancereview.com/pages/print2.asp?article_ID=13799 
 
  
Attanandana, T., Kyuma, K., & Kunaporn, S. (1996). Paddy soils: a resource base for rice 
production in Thailand. Paper presented at the International symposium on 
maximizing sustainable rice yield through improved soil and environmental 
management, 11-17 November 1996, Khon Kaen, Thailand. Retrieved from 
http://kukr.lib.ku.ac.th/Fulltext_kukr/KU0199108c.pdf 
 
  
Bank of Thailand [BOT]. (2008). Thailand key economic indicators. Retrieved 25 March, 
2008, from http://www.bot.or.th/English/Statistics/Indicators/Pages/index.aspx 
 
  
Barrett, C. (2003). Integrating qualitative and quantitative approaches: lessons from the 
pastoral risk management project. In S. M. R. Kanbur (Ed.), Q-squared, combining 
qualitative and quantitative methods in poverty appraisal (pp. 90-96). New Delhi: 
Pauls Press. 
 
  
Bassett, G. W. (1987). The St. Petersburg paradox and bounded utility. History of Political 
Economy 19(4), 517-523. 
 
  
Bicini, T., Koc, A., & Bayaner, A. (2001). The risk attitudes of farmers and the 
socioeconomic factors affecting them: a case study for Lower Seyhan Plain farmers in 
Adana province, Turkey. Unpublished working paper. Agricultural Economics 
Research Institute. 
 
  
Binici, T., Koc, A., Zulauf, C., & Bayaner, A. (2003). Risk attitudes of farmers in terms of 
risk aversion: a case study of Lower Seyhan Plain farmers in Adana Province, Turkey. 
Turkish Journal of Agriculture and Forestry, 27, 305-312. 
 
  179 
  
Binswanger, H. P. (1980). Attitudes toward risk: experimental measurement in rural India. 
American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 62(3), 395-407. 
 
  
Boggess, W. G., Anaman, K. A., & Hanson, G. D. (1985). Importance, causes, and 
management responses to farm risks: evidence from Florida and Alabama. Southern 
Journal of Agricultural Economics, 17(2), 105-116. 
 
  
Buccola, S. T. (1982). Specification of Bernoullian utility function in decision analysis: 
Comment Agricultural Economics Research, 34(1), 19-21. 
 
  
Buccola, S. T., & French, B. C. (1978). Estimating exponential utility functions. Agricultural 
Economics Research, 30(1), 37-43. 
 
  
Bureau of Trade and Economic Indices. (2010). Consumer price index statistics. Retrieved 29 
June, 2010, from http://www.price.moc.go.th/price_e/ 
 
  
Chainuvati, C., & Athipanan, W. (2001). Crop diversification in Thailand. In M. K. 
Papademetriou & F. J. Dent (Eds.), Crop diversification in the Asia-Pacific region. 
Bangkok: FAO. Retrieved from 
http://www.fao.org/docrep/003/x6906e/x6906e00.htm#Contents. 
 
  
Chantanusornsiri, W. (2009, September 18). Crop insurance programe not expected to hit rice 
exports. Bangkok Post. Retrieved from 
http://www.readbangkokpost.com/business/agriculture/thailands_new_crop_insurance
_s.php 
 
  
Chavas, J.-P., & Holt, M. T. (1990). Acreage decisions under risk: the case of corn and 
soybeans. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 72(3), 529-538. 
 
  
Chavas, J.-P., & Holt, M. T. (1996). Economic behavior under uncertainty: a joint analysis of 
risk preferences and technology. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 78(2), 329-
335. 
 
  
Chudam, Y., & Toros, W. (2008). The study on the change in production structure of dairy 
and dairy products: market access regarding to the WTO Agreements (in Thai). 
Retrieved 17 September, 2008, from 
http://dld.go.th/transfer/th/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=4125&Ite
mid=102 
 
  
  180 
Commodity Online. (2010). Thailand to extend crop insurance plan. Retrieved 20 December, 
2010, from http://www.commodityonline.com/crops-weather/Thailand-to-extend-
crop-insurance-plan-2010-03-09-26289-3-1.html 
 
  
Cooperative Promotion Department. (2010). Cooperatives statistics. Retrieved 17 December, 
2010, from http://web2.cpd.go.th/web_mis/coop_type.htm 
 
  
Dallas, M. (2006). Value and risk management a guide to best practice. Malden, MA: 
Blackwell Pub. Retrieved from http://site.ebrary.com/lib/lincoln/Doc?id=10232796 
 
  
Delgado, C. L., Narrod, C., & Tiongco, M. (2008). Determinants and implications of the 
growing scale of livestock farms in four fast-growing developing countries. 
Washington: International Food Policy Research Institute. 
 
  
Department of Agricultural Extension [DOAE]. (2007). Drought situation reports for 
Thailand. Retrieved 11 May, 2007, from http://www.doae.go.th/IndexHome.asp 
 
  
Department of Internal Trade. (2010). Pledging schemes. Retrieved 10 October, 2010, from 
http://www.dit.go.th/contentmain.asp?typeid=8&catid=133 
 
  
Department of Livestock Development [DLD]. (2008). Livestock statistics (in Thai). 
Retrieved 27 November, 2008, from http://www.dld.go.th/ 
 
  
Devakula, P. (2006). Thailand's futures. Retrieved 17 September, 2008, from 
http://www10.emergingmarkets.org/article.asp?ArticleID=1016111&CategoryID=198
&PageMove=61 
 
  
Devendra, C., & Thomas, D. (2002). Smallholder farming systems in Asia. Agricultural 
Systems, 71(1-2), 17-25. 
 
  
Devkota, S., Holcomb, R., Taylor, M., & Epplin, F. M. (2006). Economically feasible crop 
production alternatives to peanuts in Southwestern Oklahoma. Paper presented at the 
Southern Agricultural Economics Association annual meeting, 5-8 February 2006, 
Orlando, Florida. Retrieved from http://econpapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:saeaso:35377 
 
  
Dillon, J. L., & Anderson, J. R. (1990). The analysis of response in crop and livestock 
production (3rd ed.). Oxford: Pergamon Press. 
 
  
Dillon, J. L., & Scandizzo, P. L. (1978). Risk attitudes of subsistence farmers in Northeast 
Brazil: a sampling approach. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 60(3), 
425-435. 
  181 
 
  
Donnelly, K., & Noel, J. E. (2006). Optimal market contracting in the California lettuce 
industry. Paper presented at the American Agricultural Economics Association annual 
meeting, 23-26 July 2006, Long Beach, California. 
 
  
Dunn, J. W. (2002). Farm level risk analysis for Kansas farmers. Unpublished doctoral thesis, 
Kansas State University, Manhattan, Kansas. 
 
  
Eggerman, C. R. (2006). Projecting net incomes for Texas crop producers: an application of 
probabilistic forecasting. Unpublished master thesis, Texas A&M University, Texas. 
 
  
Elrod, C. P., Robinson, J. R. C., & Richardson, J. W. (2008). Simulation of alternative 
marketing strategies for U.S. cotton. Paper presented at the Southern Agricultural 
Economics Association annual meeting, 2-6 February 2008, Dallas, Texas. Retrieved 
from http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/6885/2/sp08el01.pdf 
 
  
Falvey, J. L. (2000). Thai agriculture: golden cradle of millennia. Bangkok: Kasetsart 
University Press. 
 
  
Feinerman, E., & Finkelshtain, I. (1996). Introducing socioeconomic characteristics into 
production analysis under risk. Agricultural Economics, 13(3), 149-161. 
 
  
Fishburn, P. C. (1988). Nonlinear preference and utility theory. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press. 
 
  
Flaten, O., Lien, G., Koesling, M., Valle, P. S., & Ebbesvik, M. (2005). Comparing risk 
perceptions and risk management in organic and conventional dairy farming: 
empirical results from Norway. Livestock Production Science, 95(1-2), 11-25. 
 
  
Floch, P., Molle, F., & Loiskandl, W. (2007). Marshalling water resources: a chronology of 
irrigation development in the Chi-Mun river basin, Northeast Thailand. Unpublished 
working paper. Institut de recherche pour le développement. 
 
  
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations [FAO]. (2008a). Agricultural 
production statistics. Retrieved 15 October, 2008, from http://faostat.fao.org/ 
 
  
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations [FAO]. (2008b). Food and 
agriculture annual trade statistics. Retrieved 15 October, 2008, from 
http://faostat.fao.org/ 
 
  
  182 
Forssell, S. (2009). Rice policy in Thailand: policy making and recent developments. 
Unpublished working paper. Department of Economics, University of Lund. 
 
  
Francisco, E. M., & Anderson, J. R. (1972). Chance and choice west of the darling. Australian 
Journal of Agricultural Economics, 16(2), 82-93. 
 
  
Fuglie, K. O. (2001). Agricultural development in Thailand. In C. E. Pray & K. O. Fuglie 
(Eds.), Private investment in agricultural research and international technology 
transfer in Asia (pp. 76-98): USDA Economic Research Service. Retrieved from 
http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/aer805/aer805d.pdf 
 
  
Fukai, S., Pantuwan, G., Jongdee, B., & Cooper, M. (1999). Screening for drought resistance 
in rainfed lowland rice. Field Crops Research, 64(1-2), 61-74. 
 
  
Gingrich, C. D. (1994). GATT and the Thai agricultural economy. Iowa: Center for 
Agricultural and Rural Development, Iowa State University. 
 
  
Gómez-Limón, J. A., Arriaza, M., & Riesgo, L. (2003). An MCDM analysis of agricultural 
risk aversion. European Journal of Operational Research, 151(3), 569-585. 
 
  
Grandstaff, T. B., Grandstaff, S., Limpinuntana, V., & Suphanchaimat, N. (2008). Rainfed 
revolution in northeast Thailand. Southeast Asian Studies, 46(3), 289-376. 
 
  
Grisley, W., & Kellog, E. (1987). Risk-taking preferences of farmers in northern Thailand: 
measurements and implications. Agricultural Economics, 1(2), 127-142. 
 
  
Grove, B., & Oosthuizen, L. K. (2010). Stochastic efficiency analysis of deficit irrigation with 
standard risk aversion. Agricultural Water Management, 97(6), 792-800. 
 
  
Hair, J. F. (2006). Multivariate data analysis (6th ed.). New Jersey: Pearson Prentice Hall. 
 
  
Hall, D. C., Knight, T. O., Coble, K. H., Baquet, A. E., & Patrick, G. F. (2003). Analysis of 
beef producers' risk management perceptions and desire for further risk management 
education. Review of Agricultural Economics, 25(2), 430-448. 
 
  
Hamal, K. B., & Anderson, J. R. (1982). A note on decreasing absolute risk aversion among 
farmers in Nepal. Australian Journal of Agricultural Economics, 26(3), 220-225. 
 
  
  183 
Hardaker, J. B. (2000). Some issues in dealing with risk in agriculture. Unpublished working 
paper. Graduate School of Agricultural and Resource Economics, University of New 
England. 
 
  
Hardaker, J. B., Huirne, R. B. M., Anderson, J. R., & Lien, G. (2004). Coping with risk in 
agriculture. Cambridge, MA: CABI Pub. 
 
  
Hardaker, J. B., & Lien, G. (2005). Towards some principles of good practice for decision 
analysis in agriculture. Unpublished working paper. Norwegian Agricultural 
Economics Research Institute. 
 
  
Hardaker, J. B., & Lien, G. (2010). Stochastic efficiency analysis with risk aversion bounds: a 
comment. Australian Journal of Agricultural & Resource Economics, 54(3), 379-383. 
 
  
Hardaker, J. B., Richardson, J. W., Lien, G., & Schumann, K. D. (2004). Stochastic efficiency 
analysis with risk aversion bounds: a simplified approach. The Australian Journal of 
Agricultural and Resource Economics, 48(2), 253-270. 
 
  
Harris, H. M., Benson, G. A., & Rosson, C. P. (1999). Managing risk in a dynamic world 
economy. Unpublished working paper. AgriLife Communications & Marketing, The 
Texas A&M System. 
 
  
Harwood, J., Heifner, R., Coble, K., Perry, J., & Somwaru, A. (1999). Managing risk in 
farming: concepts, research, and analysis. Unpublished report. United States 
Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service. 
 
  
Hayami, Y. (2007). An emerging agricultural problem in high-performing Asian economies. 
Unpublished working paper. Development Research Group, The World Bank. 
 
  
Hazell, P. B. R., & Norton, R. D. (1986). Mathematical programming for economic analysis 
in agriculture. New York: Macmillan. 
 
  
Hossain, S., Mustapha, N. H. N., & Chen, L. T. (2002). A quadratic application in farm 
planning under uncertainty. International Journal of Social Economics, 29(4), 282-
298. 
 
  
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis [IIASA]. (2002). Climate change puts 
agriculture at great risk. Retrieved 27 March, 2007, from 
http://www.iiasa.ac.at/Admin/INF/PR/pdf-files/joburg_luc.pdf 
 
  
  184 
IRINNews. (2008). Thailand: Flash floods continue to batter farmlands. Retrieved 24 
November, 2009, from http://www.irinnews.org/PrintReport.aspx?ReportId=80360 
 
  
Isvilanonda, S., & Bunyasiri, I. (2009). Food security in Thailand: status, rural poor 
vulnerability and some policy options. Paper presented at the agricultural and food 
policy reforms: food security from the perspective of Asian small-scale farmers, 24-28 
August 2009, Seoul, South Korea. Retrieved from 
http://agri.eco.ku.ac.th/RePEc/kau/wpaper/are200901.pdf 
 
  
Jongdee, B., Pantuwan, G., Fukai, S., & Fischer, K. (2006). Improving drought tolerance in 
rainfed lowland rice: an example from Thailand. Agricultural Water Management, 
80(1-3), 225-240. 
 
  
Kajisa, K., & Akiyama, T. (2004). The evolution of rice price policies over four decades: 
Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines. Unpublished working paper. Foundation for 
Advanced Studies on International Development. 
 
  
Kaplan, S. (1997). The words of risk analysis. Risk analysis, 17(4), 407-417. 
 
  
Kaplan, S., & Garrick, B. J. (1981). On the quantitative definition of risk. Risk analysis, 1(1), 
11-27. 
 
  
Katikarn, K. (1981). Risk and uncertainty of farmers in the central plain of Thailand. 
Unpublished doctoral thesis, University of Kentucky, Lexington, Kentucky. 
 
  
Kermel-Torrès, D. (2004). Atlas of Thailand: spatial structures and development. Paris: IRD 
Editions. 
 
  
Knight, F. H. (1921). Risk, uncertainty and profit. New York: Houghton Mifflin. 
 
  
Krasachat, W. (2003, 18-21 June 2003). Technical efficiencies of rice farms in Thailand: A 
non-parametric approach. Paper presented at the Hawaii international conference on 
business, 18-21 June 2003, Honolulu. Retrieved from 
http://www.hicbusiness.org/biz2003proceedings/Wirat%20Krasachat.pdf 
 
  
Krongkaew, M. (1985). Agricultural development, rural poverty, and income distribution in 
Thailand. The Developing Economies, 23(4), 325-346. 
 
  
Kukeawkasem, Y. (2008). Risk attitudes and risk management strategies among swine 
producers in Northern Thailand. Paper presented at the competition for resources in a 
changing world: new drive for rural development, 7-9 October 2008, Hohenheim, 
  185 
Germany. Retrieved from 
http://www.tropentag.de/2008/abstracts/links/Kukeawkasem_8doBZFi3.pdf 
 
  
Ladányi, M. (2008). Risk methods and their applications in agriculture. Applied Ecology and 
Environmental Research, 6(1), 147-164. 
 
  
Ladányi, M., & Erdélyi, É. (2007). A review of risk methods in climate change impact 
research. Paper presented at the 9th International Symposium Interdisciplinary 
Regional Reseach, 21-22 June 2007, Novi Sad, Serbia. Retrieved from 
http://eproceedings.worldscinet.com/9789812834409/9789812834409_0026.html 
 
  
Land Development Department. (2009). Soil series in Thailand (in Thai). Retrieved 
November, 22, 2009, from 
http://www.ldd.go.th/Lddwebsite/web_osl/survey_1/class_02.htm 
 
  
Land Development Department [LDD]. (2009). Soil classification (in Thai). Retrieved 20 
January, 2009, from http://osl101.ldd.go.th/thaisoils_museum/INDEX0.html 
 
  
Lau, M. H. (2004). Location of an agribusiness enterprise with respect to economic viability: 
a risk analysis. Unpublished doctoral thesis, Texas A&M University, Texas. 
 
  
Lauridsen, L. S. (1998). The financial crisis in Thailand: causes, conduct and consequences? 
World Development, 26(8), 1575-1591. 
 
  
Lence, S. H. (2000). Using consumption and asset return data to estimate farmers' time 
preferences and risk attitudes. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 82(4), 
934-947. 
 
  
Levy, H. (2006). Stochastic dominance: investment decision making under uncertainty (2nd 
ed.). New York: Springer. 
 
  
Lien, G., Flaten, O., Korsaeth, A., Schumann, K. D., Richardson, J. W., Eltun, R., et al. 
(2006). Comparison of risk in organic, integrated and conventional cropping systems 
in Eastern Norway. Journal of Farm Management, 12(7), 385-401. 
 
  
Lien, G., Hardaker, J. B., & Flaten, O. (2007). Risk and economic sustainability of crop 
farming systems. Agricultural Systems, 94, 541-552. 
 
  
Lien, G., Stordal, S., Hardaker, J. B., & Asheim, L. J. (2007). Risk aversion and optimal 
forest replanting: a stochastic efficiency study. European Journal of Operational 
Research, 181, 1584-1592. 
  186 
 
  
Limsombunchai, V. (2006). Rural financing in Thailand. Unpublished doctoral thesis, 
Lincoln University, Lincoln, New Zealand. 
 
  
Lin, W. W., & Chang, H. S. (1978). Specification of Bernoullian utility function in decision 
analysis. Agricultural Economics Research, 30(1), 30-36. 
 
  
Lins, D. A., Gabriel, S. C., & Sonka, S. T. (1981). An analysis of the risk aversion of farm 
operators: an asset portfolio approach. Western Journal of Agricultural Economics, 
6(1), 15-30. 
 
  
Lovelace, G. W., Subhadhira, S., & Simaraks, S. (1988). Rapid rural appraisal in northeast 
Thailand: case studies. Unpublished working paper. KKU-Ford Rural Systems 
Research Project, Khon Kaen Unitversity. 
 
  
Martin, S. (1993). Risk perceptions and management responses to risk in New Zealand 
farming and horticulture. Unpublished technical paper. Ministry of Agriculture and 
Fisheries. 
 
  
Martin, S. (1996). Risk management strategies in New Zealand agriculture and horticulture. 
Review of Marketing and Agricultural Economics, 64(1), 31-44. 
 
  
Martin, S., & McLeay, F. (1998). The diversity of farmers' risk management strategies in a 
deregulated New Zealand environment. Journal of Agricultural Economics, 49(2), 
218-233. 
 
  
McCarl, B. A., & Spreen, T. H. (1996). Applied mathematical programming using algebraic 
systems. Texas: Texas A&M University. 
 
  
McConnell, D. J., & Dillon, J. L. (1997). Farm management for Asia: a systems approach. 
Rome: FAO. 
 
  
McKenna, C. J. (1986). The economics of uncertainty. Brighton: Wheatsheaf. 
 
  
McLellan, A., & Carlberg, J. G. (2010). The economics of annual legume and double legume 
cover cropping in Southern Manitoba. Paper presented at the Sothern Agricultural 
Economics Association annual meeting, 6-9 February 2010, Orlando, Florida. 
Retrieved from http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/handle/56561 
 
  
  187 
Meuwissen, M. P. M., Huirne, R. B. M., & Hardaker, J. B. (2001). Risk and risk management: 
an empirical analysis of Dutch livestock farmers. Livestock Production Science, 69(1), 
43-53. 
 
  
Meyer, J., Richardson, J. W., & Schumann, K. D. (2009). Stochastic efficiency analysis with 
risk aversion bounds: a correction. Australian Journal of Agricultural & Resource 
Economics, 53(4), 521-525. 
 
  
Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives [MOAC]. (2008). Agriculture in Thailand. 
Retrieved 2 October, 2008, from 
http://www.moac.go.th/builder/aid/images/Agriculture%20in%20Thailand1-13.pdf 
 
  
Ministry of Finance [MOF]. (2008). Value of exports. Retrieved 25 March, 2008, from 
http://dwfoc.mof.go.th/ 
 
  
Mongin, P. (1997). Expected utility theory. In J.Davis, W.Hands & U.Maki (Eds.), Handbook 
of Economics Methodology (pp. 342-350). Surrey: Edward Elgar Publishing. 
 
  
Mongkolsawat, C., Thirangoon, P., Suwanweramtorn, R., Karladee, K., Paiboonsank, S., & 
Champathet, P. (2001). An evaluation of drought risk area in Northeast Thailand using 
remotely sensed data and GIS. Asian Journal of Geoinformatics, 1(4), 33-44. 
 
  
Moscardi, E., & Janvry, A. d. (1977). Attitudes toward risk among peasants: an econometric 
approach. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 59(4), 710-716. 
 
  
Moschini, G., & Hennessy, D. A. (2001). Uncertainty, risk aversion, and risk management for 
agricultural producers. In L. G. Bruce & C. R. Gordon (Eds.), Handbook of 
Agricultural Economics (Volume 1, Part 1 ed., pp. 88-153): Elsevier B.V. 
 
  
Musser, W. N., Wetzstein, M. E., Reece, S. Y., Musser, L. M., Varca, P. E., & Chou, C. C. J. 
(1984). Classification of risk preferences with elicited utility data: does functional 
form matter? Western Journal of Agricultural Economics, 9(2), 322-328. 
 
  
Mustafa, R. H. (2006). Risk management in the rain-fed sector of Sudan: case study, Gedaref 
area Eastern Sudan. Unpublished doctoral thesis, Justus Liebig University, Giessen, 
Germany. 
 
  
Nagayets, O. (2005). Small farms: current status and key trends. Paper presented at the future 
of small farms research workshop, 26-29 June 2005, Imperial College, Wye Campus, 
London. Retrieved from 
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.144.1658 
 
  188 
  
Narayan, P. (1990). Farm planning under risk: an application of the capital asset pricing 
model to New Zealand agriculture. Unpublished master thesis, Lincoln University, 
Lincoln, New Zealand. 
 
  
Nartea, G., & Webster, P. (2008). Should farmers invest in financial assets as a risk 
management strategy? Some evidence from New Zealand. Australian Journal of 
Agricultural and Resource Economics, 52(2), 183-202. 
 
  
National Statistical Office of Thailand [NSO]. (2006). The 2003 agriculture census. Retrieved 
26 October, 2006, from http://web.nso.go.th/en/census/agricult/cen_agri03-1.htm 
 
  
National Statistical Office of Thailand [NSO]. (2007). Thailand population statistics. 
Retrieved 26 October, 2007, from http://www.nso.go.th 
 
  
Ng, R. C. Y. (1970). Some land-use problems of northeast Thailand. Modern Asian Studies, 
4(01), 23-42. 
 
  
Nicol, R. M., Ortmann, G. F., & Ferrer, S. R. (2007). Perceptions of key business and 
financial risks by large-scale sugarcane farmers in KwaZulu-Natal in a dynamic socio-
political environment. Agrekon, 46(3), 351-370. 
 
  
Nidhiprabha, B. (2004). Dynamism of the Thai agriculture. Unpublished working paper. The 
International Centre for the Study of East Asian Development. 
 
  
Norstad, J. (1999). An introduction to utility theory. Unpublished working paper. 
Northwestern University. 
 
  
Nyikal, R. A., & Kosura, W. O. (2005). Risk preference and optimal enterprise combinations 
in Kahuro division of Murang'a district, Kenya. Agricultural Economics, 32(2), 131-
140. 
 
  
Office of Agricultural Economics [OAE]. (2008). Agricultural imports and exports statistics. 
Retrieved from http://www.oae.go.th 
 
  
Office of Agricultural Economics [OAE]. (2009). Agricultural statistics of Thailand. 
Retrieved from http://www.oae.go.th 
 
  
Oglethorpe, D. R. (1995). Sensitivity of farm plans under risk-averse behaviour: a note on the 
environmental implications. Journal of Agricultural Economics, 46(2), 227-232. 
 
  189 
  
Padilla-Fernandez, M. D. A. (2000). Farmers goals and efficiency in the production of sugar 
cane: the case of the Philippines. Unpublished doctoral thesis, Lincoln University, 
Lincoln, New Zealand. 
 
  
Pallant, J. (2007). SPSS survival manual: a step by step guide to data analysis using SPSS for 
Windows (3rd ed.). New York: McGraw Hill/Open University Press. 
 
  
Pannell, D. J., Malcolm, B., & Kingwell, R. S. (2000). Are we risking too much? Perspectives 
on risk in farm modeling. Agricultural Economics, 23(1), 69-78. 
 
  
Panusittikorn, P., & Prato, T. (2001). Conservation of protected areas in Thailand: the case of 
Khao Yai National Park. The George Wright Forum, 18(2), 66-76. 
 
  
Patamakitsakul, S. (2006). Thailand agriculture in the 10
th
 National Economic and Social 
Development Plan (2007-2011) (in Thai). Retrieved from 
http://www.oae.go.th/AgroMag/Public/NewsReleaseShow.php?newsID=20070322013
935 
 
  
Patrick, G. R., Wilson, P. N., Barry, P. J., Boggess, W. G., & Young, D. L. (1985). Risk 
perceptions and management responses: producer-generated hypotheses for risk 
modeling. Southern Journal of Agricultural Economics, 17(2), 231-238. 
 
  
Pellegrino, J. M. (1999). Risk management in agriculture: Argentine evidence of perceived 
sources of risk, risk management strategies and risk efficiency in rice farming. 
Unpublished master thesis, Lincoln University, Lincoln, New Zealand. 
 
  
Pendell, D. L., Williams, J. R., Boyles, S. B., Rice, C. W., & Nelson, R. G. (2007). Soil 
carbon sequestration strategies with alternative tillage and nitrogen sources under risk. 
Review of Agricultural Economics, 29(2), 247-268. 
 
  
Pennings, J. M. E., & Garcia, P. (2004). Strategic risk management behavior: What can utility 
functions tell us? Paper presented at the American Agricultural Economics annual 
meeting, 1-4 August 2004, Denver, Colorado. Retrieved from 
http://ideas.repec.org/p/ags/aaea04/20388.html 
 
  
Phuphak, S. (1993). Diversification into fruit production on low-land rice farmer in Thailand. 
Paper presented at the 37
th
 Annual Conference of the Australian Agricultural 
Economics Society, 9-11 February 1993, Sydney, Australia. Retrieved from 
http://www.agri.ubu.ac.th/sura/SYDPAP.pdf 
 
  
  190 
Poapongsakorn, N., Anuchitworawong, C., & Mathrsuraruk, S. (2006). The decline and 
recovery of Thai agriculture: causes, responses, prospects and challenges. In Rapid 
growth of selected Asian economies: lessons and implications for agriculture and food 
security, Republic of Korea, Thailand and Viet Nam. Bangkok, Thailand: FAO. 
 
  
Poapongsakorn, N., Ruths, M., & Tangjitwisuth, S. (1998). Problems and outlook of 
agriculture in Thailand. TDRI Quarterly Review, 13(2), 3-14. 
 
  
Poltanee, A. (1996). Rice-based cropping systems in Northeast Thailand. In S. Fukai, M. 
Cooper & J. Salisbuly (Eds.), Breeding strategies for rainfed lowland rice in drought-
prone environments (Vol. 77, pp. 13-22). Canberra: Australian Centre for International 
Agricultural Research. 
 
  
Pope, R. D., & Just, R. E. (1991). On testing the structure of risk preferences in agricultural 
supply analysis. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 73(3), 743-748. 
 
  
Prato, T., Zeyuan, Q., Pederson, G., Fagre, D., Bengtson, L., & Williams, J. (2010). Potential 
economic benefits of adapting agricultural production systems to future climate 
change. Environmental Management, 45(3), 577-589. 
 
  
Pratruangkrai, P. (2009, February 23). Rice pledging scheme putting exports at risk. The 
Nation. Retrieved from 
http://www.nationmultimedia.com/2009/02/23/business/business_30096391.php 
 
  
Quiggin, J. (1981). Risk perception and the analysis of risk attitudes. Australian Journal of 
Agricultural Economics, 25(2), 160-169. 
 
  
Quiggin, J. (1993). Generalized expected utility theory : the rank-dependent model. Boston 
[Mass.]: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
 
  
Quiggin, J. (2002). Expected utility. Retrieved 17 September, 2007, from 
http://johnquiggin.com/index.php/archives/2002/12/27/expected-utility/ 
 
  
Quinn, C. H., Huby, M., Kiwasila, H., & Lovett, J. C. (2003). Local perceptions of risk to 
livelihood in semi-arid Tanzania. Journal of Environmental Management, 68(2), 111-
119. 
 
  
Ramaratnam, S. S., Rister, M. E., Bessler, D. A., & Novak, J. (1986). Risk attitudes and 
farm/producer attributes: a case study of Texas Coastal Bend grain sorghum 
producers. Southern Journal of Agricultural Economics, 18, 85-96. 
 
  
  191 
Reisinger, H. (1997). The impact of research designs on R2 in linear regression model: an 
exploratory meta-analysis. Journal of Empirical Generalisations in Marketing 
Science, 2(1), 1-12. 
 
  
Richardson, J. W., Herbst, B. K., Duncan, A., den Besten, M., & van Hoven, P. (2007). 
Location preference for risk-averse Dutch dairy farmers immigrating to the United 
States. Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, 39(3), 735-748. 
 
  
Roonnaphai, N. (2005). Enhancing sustainable development of diverse agriculture in 
Thailand (Vol. 90). Bangkok: United Nations Economic and Social Commission for 
Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP). 
 
  
Rose, M. (2001). Risk versus Uncertainty, or Mr. Slate versus Great-Aunt Matilda. Retrieved 
26 March, 2007, from 
http://www.econlib.org/library/Columns/Teachers/riskuncertainty.html 
 
  
Roumasset, J. A. (1976). Rice and risk: decision-making among low-income farmers. New 
York: Elsevier. 
 
  
Rovere, R. L. (1997). Risk, income and land use in the Atlantic zone of Costa Rica: an 
assessment with a linear programming model. Unpublished report. Research Program 
on Sustainability in Agriculture (REPOSA). 
 
  
Royal Irrigation Department [RID]. (2008). Annual report 2007. Retrieved 19 December, 
2008, from http://www.rid.go.th/ 
 
  
Rushtona, J., Viscarraa, R., Bleicha, E. G., & McLeod, A. (2005). Impact of avian influenza 
outbreaks in the poultry sectors of five South East Asian countries (Cambodia, 
Indonesia, Lao PDR, Thailand, Viet Nam) outbreak costs, responses and potential 
long term control. World's Poultry Science Journal, 61(3), 491-514. 
 
  
Saha, A. (1993). Expo-power utility: a 'flexible' form for absolute and relative risk aversion. 
American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 75(4), 905-913. 
 
  
Saha, A., Shumway, C. R., & Talpaz, H. (1994). Joint estimation of risk preference structure 
and technology using expo-power utility. American Journal of Agricultural 
Economics, 76(2), 173-184. 
 
  
Sayaphan, C. (2001). Crop production planing under risk situations in Pitsanulok province 
crop year 1998/99 (in Thai). Unpublished master thesis, Kasetsart University, 
Bangkok, Thailand. 
 
  192 
  
Scheaffer, R. L., Mendenhall, W., & Ott, L. (2006). Elementary survey sampling (6th ed.). 
California: Thomson Brooks/Cole. 
 
  
Schoemaker, P. J. H. (1980). Experiments on decisions under risk: the expected utility 
hypothesis. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Pub. 
 
  
Schumann, K. D. (2005). Resampling confidence regions and test procedures for second 
degree stochastic efficiency with respect to a function. Unpublished doctoral thesis, 
Texas A&M University, Texas. 
 
  
Schumann, K. D., Richardson, J. W., Lien, G., & Hardaker, J. B. (2004). Stochastic efficiency 
analysis using multiple utility functions. Paper presented at the American Agricultural 
Economics Association Annual Meeting. from 
http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/19957/1/sp04sc10.pdf 
 
  
Shadbolt, N. M., & Martin, S. K. (2005). Farm management in New Zealand. Auckland: 
Oxford University Press. 
 
  
Shahabuddin, Q., Mestelman, S., & Feeny, D. (1986). Peasant behaviour towards risk and 
socio-economic and structural characteristics of farm households in Bangladesh. 
Oxford Economic Papers, 38(1), 122-130. 
 
  
Shively, G. E. (1999). Risks and returns from soil conservation: evidence from low-income 
farms in the Philippines. Agricultural Economics, 21(1), 53-67. 
 
  
Simetar Inc. (2007). Our history. Retrieved 29 June, 2007, from 
http://www.simetar.com/aboutus.aspx 
 
  
Sirisup, S., & Kammeier, H. D. (2003). Government policy and farmers' decision making: the 
agricultural diversification programme for the Chao Phraya river basin (1993-1995). 
Unpublished working paper. Asian Institute of Technology. 
 
  
Smith, K., Barrett, C. B., & Box, P. W. (2000). Participatory risk mapping for targeting 
research and assistance: with an example from East African pastoralists. World 
Development, 28(11), 1945-1959. 
 
  
Smith, P., & Powlson, D. S. (2004). Sustainability of soil management practices - a global 
perspective. In L. K. Abbott & D. V. Murphy (Eds.), Soil biological fertility: a key to 
sustainable land use in agriculture. Amsterdam: Khuwer Academic Publishers. 
 
  
  193 
Suetrong, S., & Pairintra, C. (1989). Agroecological and socioeconomic environment of 
northeast Thailand. Unpublished working paper. Khon Kaen University. 
 
  
Tauer, L. W. (1986). Risk preferences of dairy farmers. North Central Journal of Agricultural 
Economics, 8(1), 7-15. 
 
  
Thai Meteorological Department [TMD]. (2008). Thailand weather and climate. Retrieved 4 
November, 2008, from http://www.tmd.go.th/info/info.php?FileID=55 
 
  
Thaiprasert, N. (2006). Rethinking the role of agriculture and agro-Industry in the economic 
development of Thailand: Input-Output and CGE analyses. Unpublished doctoral 
thesis, University Library of Munich, Germany. 
 
  
The Agricultural Futures Exchange of Thailand [AFET]. (2007). Annual report 2007. 
Retrieved 15 May, 2007, from 
http://www.afet.or.th/v081/thai/corporate/annual_report.php 
 
  
The Government Public Relations Department [PRD]. (2004). His Majesty the King's 
philosophy of sufficiency economy. Thailand Illustrated, 21(4). Retrieved from 
http://thailand.prd.go.th/ebook_bak/content.php?idmag=26 
 
  
The Government Public Relations Department [PRD]. (2008). The new theory and the 
sufficiency economy. Retrieved 22 November, 2008, from 
http://thailand.prd.go.th/ebook/king/new_theory.html 
 
  
The Office of the National Economic and Social Development Board [NESDB]. (2008a). 
Gross regional and provincial products statistics. Retrieved 20 December, 2008, from 
http://www.nesdb.go.th/Default.aspx?tabid=96 
 
  
The Office of the National Economic and Social Development Board [NESDB]. (2008b). 
Quarterly gross domestic product: Q2/2008 Retrieved 2 April, 2008, from 
http://www.nesdb.go.th/Default.aspx?tabid=95 
 
  
The Office of the National Economic and Social Development Board [NESDB]. (2008c). 
Report on an analysis of poverty alleviation in 2007 (in Thai). Retrieved from 
http://www.nesdb.go.th/portals/0/tasks/eco_crowd/Poverty%202007.pdf 
 
  
The World Bank. (2007). Participatory risk mapping: procedure and examples. Retrieved 15 
March, 2007, from 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTTOPPSISOU/Resources/1424002-
1185304794278/4026035-1185375653056/4028835-
1185375811087/1_Risk_mapping.pdf 
  194 
 
  
Theparat, C. (2011, 11 March). Rice crop insurance detailed. Bangkok Post. Retrieved from 
http://www.bangkokpost.com/feature/environment/226085/rice-crop-insurance-
detailed 
 
  
Torkamani, J. (2005). Using a whole-farm modelling approach to assess prospective 
technologies under uncertainty. Agricultural Systems, 85(2), 138-154. 
 
  
Torkamani, J., & Haji-Rahimi, M. (2001). Evaluation of farmer's risk attitudes using 
alternative utility functional forms. Journal of Agriculture, Science and Technology, 3, 
243-248. 
 
  
Tzouramani, I., Karanikolas, P., & Alexopoulos, G. (2008). Risk and income risk 
management issues for organic crops in Greece. Paper presented at the 108
th 
European 
Association of Agricultural Econonomists seminar, 8-9 February 2008, Warsaw, 
Poland. Retrieved from http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/handle/48116 
 
  
Tzouramani, I., Karanikolas, P., Alexopoulos, G., Sintori, A., & Liontakis, A. (2008). 
Modeling economic alternatives for tobacco producers: The case of sheep farming. 
Paper presented at the 107th European Association of Agricultural Econonomists 
seminar, 29 January-1 February 2008, Sevilla, Spain. Retrieved from 
http://purl.umn.edu/6695 
 
  
United Nations. (2008). Map of Thailand. Retrieved 17 April, 2008, from 
http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/profile/thailand.pdf 
 
  
Upadhyay, B. M., Smith, E. G., Clayton, G., & Harker, N. (2004). Risk efficiency of alternate 
canola management decisions. Paper presented at the Canadian Agricultural 
Economics Society conference, 20-23 June 2004, Halifax, Nova Scotia. Retrieved 
from https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/34193/1/sp04up01.pdf 
 
  
Upadhyay, B. M., Smith, E. G., Clayton, G. W., Harker, K. N., & Blackshaw, R. E. (2006). 
Economics of integrated weed management in herbicide-resistant canola. Weed 
Science, 54, 138-147. 
 
  
Vanichjakvong, P. (2002). The rice economy of Thailand: supply, demand and price. 
Unpublished doctoral thesis, University of Illinois, Urbana, Illinois. 
 
  
Watkins, K., Hill, J., & Anders, M. (2008). An economic risk analysis of no-till rice 
management from the landlord's perspective Paper presented at the Southern 
Agricultural Economics Association annual meeting, 2-5 February 2008, Dallas, 
Texas. Retrieved from http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/6870/2/sp08wa01.pdf 
  195 
 
  
Wattanutchariya, S., & Jitsanguan, T. (1992). Increasing the scale of small-farm operations in 
Thailand. Unpublished working paper. Department of Agricultural and Resource 
Economics, Kasetsart University. 
 
  
Weisensel, W. P., & Schoney, R. A. (1989). An analysis of the yield-price risk associated 
with specialty crops. Western Journal of Agricultural Economics, 14(2) 
 
  
Wiboonpongse, A., & Chaovanapoonphol, Y. (2001). Rice marketing systems in Thailand. 
Paper presented at the Agribusiness management towards strengthening agricultural 
development and trade, Chiangmai Thailand. Retrieved from 
http://www.mcc.cmu.ac.th/agbus/isam/paper/19Thai_aree.PDF 
 
  
Wu, S. (2007). Some basic lessons in risk management. Retrieved 27 December, 2010, from 
http://ohioline.osu.edu/ae-fact/pdf/Risk_management.pdf 
 
  
Yamane, T. (1973). Statistics: an introductory analysis (3d ed.). New York: Harper & Row. 
 
  
Yimlamai, A. (2010). Agricultural weather index insurance in Thailand. Retrieved 19 
December, 2010, from http://www.foodsecurity-asiapacific.com/wp-
content/uploads/2010/10/pdf/Session5/3%20A%20Yimlamai-
Agricultural%20Weather%20Index%20Insurance%20in%20Thailand.pdf 
 
  
Yiridoe, E. K., Weersink, A., Hooker, D. C., Vyn, T. J., & Swanton, C. (2000). Income risk 
analysis of alternative tillage systems for corn and soybean production on clay soils. 
Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics, 48(2), 161-174. 
 
  
Young, D. L. (1979). Risk preferences of agricultural producers: their use in extension and 
research. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 61(5), 1063-1070. 
 
  
Yu, C. H. (2001). An introduction to computing and interpreting Cronbach coefficient alpha 
in SAS. Paper presented at the SAS User Group International Conference, 22-25 April 
2001, Long Beach, California. Retrieved from 
http://www2.sas.com/proceedings/sugi26/p246-26.pdf 
 
  
Zuhair, S. M. M., Taylor, D. B., & Kramer, R. A. (1992). Choice of utility function form: its 
effect on classification of risk preferences and the prediction of farmer decisions. 
Agricultural Economics, 6(4), 333-344. 
 
  
 
  196 
     Appendix A 
Questionnaire 
 
October 11, 2008 
 
 
Dear Sir/Madam: 
 
You are invited to participate in a survey on risk analysis of smallholder farmers in Central and North-east 
Thailand. This is a part of my requirement in fulfilling the degree of PhD in Agricultural Economics at Lincoln 
University, New Zealand. The aims of this research are to investigate risk factors affecting smallholder farmers‟ 
net revenue and estimate the risk efficient farming systems for smallholder farmer in each region.  
Your name has been randomly selected from a list of farmers from your provincial office of agriculture. Your 
participation in this research involve an interview by a researcher on a series of questions on general farm 
household information, farming system, source of risk on your farm and your risk preferences as a farmer. If you 
are willing to participate, the interviewing time will take approximately 25 to 35 minutes to complete. 
The research has been approved by the Human Ethics Committee of Lincoln University. Complete 
confidentiality is assured in this survey. All responses will be aggregated for research analyses, and hence, no 
individual will be identified. This research is completely voluntary in nature and you are free to decide not to 
participate or to withdraw at anytime. If you participate in the interview, however, it will be understood that you 
are 18 years of age or older and have consented to participate in the research and consent to publication of the 
results of the research with the understanding that anonymity will be preserved. 
If you have any questions or concerns, please feel free to contact me at telephone numbers 0-4336-4638 (in 
Thailand) or +6433253838 ext 8823 (in New Zealand) or by sending an email to adittos2@lincoln.ac.nz. 
Alternatively, you may contact my research supervisors Dr. Christopher Gan and/or Dr. Gerry Nartea at 
telephone numbers +6433253838 (ext 8155 and/or 8368 respectively) or by sending an email to Dr. Gan at 
ganc1@lincoln.ac.nz or Dr. Nartea at narteag@lincoln.ac.nz. 
Thank you for your time and participation in this research. 
 
 
Best regards, 
 
 
Satit Aditto 
PhD Candidate 
Commerce Division 
Lincoln University 
 
Research Supervisors: 
 
 
Dr. Christopher Gan      Dr. Gerry Nartea 
Associate Professor      Senior Lecturer 
Commerce Division      Commerce Division 
 
This project has been reviewed and approved by Lincoln University Human Ethic Committee. 
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Consent Form 
        
 
Name of Project: Risk Analysis of Smallholder Farmers in Central and North-east 
Thailand  
 
 
I have read and understood the description of the project. On this basis I agree to participate 
as an interviewee in the project, and I consent to publication of the results of the interview 
with the understanding that anonymity will be preserved. I understand also that I may at any 
time to stop and withdraw from the interview. 
 
 
 
Name:   
 
 
 
 
 
Signed:                                                                                   Date:   
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INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
Risk Analysis of Smallholder Farmers in Central and North-east Thailand 
 
 
Introduction: You are invited to participate in a survey that is a part of my Doctoral research project 
at Lincoln University, New Zealand. This research aims to identify the factors affecting risk of 
smallholder farmers in Central and North-east Thailand. 
For each question with brackets provided, please check your answer(s); otherwise, please follow the 
instructions given to answer the questions. 
 
 
 
Date of interview _____/_____/ 2008                          Questionnaire Number:   
 
Farm Location :  1) Central-Irrigated area           
     2) Central-Rain fed area     
                             3) North-east-Irrigated area         
     4) North-east-Rain fed area 
Village (Name) _______________________________________________________  
District (Name) _______________________________________________________  
Province (Name) ______________________________________________________  
 
 
Section A: General farm information 
 
 
1. How many rais of land do you farm? ________________ rais 
 
2. What is the ownership status of your land? 
           1. Owner-self operated       
           2. Lease-self operated 
           3. Tenant   
           4. Other_____________________ 
 
3. How did you finance your farming business operation over the last 2 years?  
                         1. Yes   2. No, please go to Q8  
  
4. Please identify the sources of your farm credit (check all that apply)  
            1. Borrow from Bank of Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperative (BAAC) 
            2. Borrow from Commercial Bank 
            3. Borrow from Cooperative 
            4. Borrow Village funds 
            5. Borrow from Relatives/friends 
            6. Personal funds 
            7. Other(s) please specify ___________________________________ 
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5. What is the duration of your farm credit? 
             1. Less than 1 year   2. Between 1 – 2 years 
             3. Between 2 – 3 years   4. Greater than 3 years 
             5. Other(s) please specify ____________________________________ 
  
6. What is your outstanding loan the last year (2007/2008 season)? 
          1. Fully paid    2. Under 30,000 baht 
          3. 31,000-50,000 baht      4. 51,000-70,000 baht 
          5. 71,000-90,000 baht      6. Over 91,000 baht 
          7. Other(s) please specify ____________________________________ 
 
7. What percentage of your loan is used for: 
    1. On-farm activities (for example to purchased farm equipment, seed or fertilizer)  
 __________ % 
    2. Household expenses (for example spent for food, clothing or personnel expenses)  
                   __________ %    
      
8. What are the on-farm assets you owned?  
Items Number Year of 
Purchased 
Purchased 
value 
(baht) 
Useful life 
(Year) 
Remarks 
(If some assets are use 
in household and on 
farm such as 
motorcycle, truck etc. 
please state the 
percentage of that asset 
is used for farm)   
A) Land & Farm Buildings 
1. Land  
Land tax ________(baht/Rai) 
Rental _____(baht/Rai/Annum)  
     
2. Storage cottages      
3. Tractor sheds      
4. Cowsheds      
5. Mushroom house      
6. Shade house      
7. Fish cages      
8. Other________________      
B) Farm Machinery 
1. Four-wheel tractors      
2. Hand tractors      
3. Trailers      
4. Rotary tillers      
5. Rotary weeders       
6. Harvesters      
7. Irrigation pumps      
8. Other________________      
C) Farm Tools 
1. Ploughs      
2. Harrows      
3. Diggers      
4. Sprayers      
5. Other________________      
D) Vehicles 
1. Motorcycle      
2. Car or truck      
3. Other________________      
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Section B: Farming System 
The questions below relate to agricultural activities on your farms. For each question with brackets or 
box provided please tick your answer(s). Otherwise please follow the instructions given to answer the 
questions. 
 
 
1. What kinds of agricultural activities have you raised on your farm over the last year? (Check all that 
apply to all kind of the activities on your farm and complete all questions in each choices and then 
go to Section C)   
 
 1. Rice, please go to Q2 
 2. Arable Crops (All types of arable crops e.g. maize, cassava, sugarcane, soybeans)  
                         please go to Q3 
 3. Horticulture (All types of horticultural production including fruit, vegetables and flowers)  
                         please go to Q4 
 4. Forestry (Plantations of trees including rubber, eucalyptus and etc.) please go to Q5 
 5. Livestock (All types of commercial animal production e.g. cattle, pigs, poultry,  
                 milking cows)  please go to Q6 
 6. Fish (All types of freshwater fish production) please go to Q7  
 
 
2.                  (Do not include rice production for household consumption) 
 
    2.1 During the 2007/08 season, how many cropping of rice did you grow on your farm? 
     1. Single crop per year (wet season rice)   
               2. Two crops per year (wet season rice and dry season rice) 
     3. Three crops per year (wet season rice and two crops of dry season rice) 
 
    2.2 Below is a series of statements pertaining to cropping pattern, planted area, total production sold 
and price for rice in the past cropping season; 
           a. How many rais of land did you grow rice for the 2007/08 season?   
           b. What is the total rice production sold (in tonnes) for the 2007/08 season? 
           c. What is the price of rice sold (in baht/tone) for the 2007/08 season?  
(If any area is used for growing rice twice or three times in a year please record them as well)   
 
 
 
 
          Single season (Start from _________(month) to ________ (month)) 
Wet season rice     
          Second season (Start from _________(month) to ________ (month))  If no tick here  
Dry season rice     
         Third season (Start from _________(month) to ________ (month)) 
 
If no tick here  
Dry season rice     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Rice 
Planted Area 
(Rai) 
 
Total Production 
(Tonnes) 
Price for rice 
(Baht/Tonne) 
 
Total Production 
sold (Tonnes) 
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 2.3 What is your total rice production cost (in baht) for the 2007/08 season?  
 (If the farmer grows rice twice or three times in a year please record the production cost in each 
season as well) 
Items Single season Second season Third season 
 
If no tick here  
 
If no tick here  
Total land preparation cost:  
For example cost of hired labour, 
hired equipment, repairs and 
maintenance and fuel. 
   
Total planting cost:  
For example cost of seeds, 
fertilisation, pesticides, herbicides, 
hired labour to do planting or 
replanting, spraying and irrigation. 
   
Total harvesting cost: 
For example cost of hired harvester 
or combine, drying, hired labour, 
fuel, loading and transportation. 
   
Total production cost    
 
 
3.                                   (Do not include crops production for household consumption) 
     
    3.1 During the 2007/08 season, how many times did you grow arable crops? 
     1. Once a year   
               2. Twice a year 
     3. Three times a year 
 
    3.2 Below is a series of statements pertaining to cropping pattern, planted area, total production sold 
and price for each arable crop in the past cropping season; 
           a. How many rais of land did you grow for each arable crop for the 2007/08 season?   
           b. What is the total production of each arable crop sold (in tonnes) for the 2007/08 season? 
           c. What is the price of each arable crop sold (in baht/tone) for the 2007/08 season?  
(If any area is used for growing arable crop twice or three times in a year please record them as well) 
  
 
 
 
           Single season (Start from _________(month) to ________ (month)) 
Cassava     
Maize     
Sugarcane     
Soybeans     
Other arable crops (please specify) 
     
Second season (Start from _________(month) to ________ (month)) 
 
If no tick here  
Cassava     
Maize     
Sugarcane     
Soybeans     
Other arable crops (please specify) 
     
 
 
Arable Crops 
Planted area 
(Rai) 
 
Total production 
sold (Tonnes) 
 
Price for crop 
(Baht/Tonne) 
 
Type of arable 
crop 
 
Total production 
(Tonnes) 
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           Third season (Start from _________(month) to ________ (month)) 
Cassava     
Maize     
Sugarcane     
Soybeans     
Other arable crops (please specify)  
     
 
 
   3.3 What is your total arable crop production cost (in baht) for the 2007/08 season?  
 (If the farmer grows arable crop twice or three times in a year please record the production cost in 
each season as well) 
 
Items Single season Second season Third season 
 
If no tick here  
 
If no tick here  
Total land preparation cost:  
For example cost of hired labour, 
hired equipment, repairs and 
maintenance and fuel. 
   
Total planting cost:  
For example cost of seeds, 
fertilisation, pesticides, herbicides, 
hired labour to do planting, 
spraying and irrigation. 
   
Total harvesting cost: 
For example cost of hired harvester 
or combine, drying, hired labour, 
fuel, loading and transportation. 
   
Total production cost    
 
 
4.                              (Do not include horticulture production for household consumption) 
 
 
    4.1  
 
4.1.1 During the 2007/08 season, how many times did you grow vegetables? 
             1. Once a year   
               2. Twice a year 
         3. Three times a year 
 
4.1.2 Below is a series of statements pertaining to cropping pattern, planted area, total  
production sold and price for each vegetable on your farm in the past cropping season; 
                 a. How many rais of land did you grow each vegetable for the 2007/08 season?   
                   b. What is the total production of each vegetable sold (in kilograms) for the 2007/08 
season? 
                   c. What is the price of each vegetable sold (in baht/kg.) for the 2007/08 season?  
(If any area is used for growing vegetable twice or three times in a year please record them as well) 
  
 
 
 
If no tick here  
Horticulture 
Vegetables 
Planted area 
(Rai) 
 
Total production 
sold (Tonnes) 
Price for crop 
(Baht/Tonne) 
 
Type of arable 
crop 
 
Total production 
(Tonnes) 
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           Single season (Start from _________(month) to ________ (month))  
     
     
     
     
     
     
Second season (Start from _________(month) to ________ (month)) 
 
If nil tick here  
     
     
     
     
     
     
Third season (Start from _________(month) to ________ (month)) 
 
If nil tick here  
     
     
     
     
     
     
 
      
4.1.3 What is your total vegetable production cost (in baht) for the 2007/08 season?  
 (If the farmer grows vegetable twice or three times in a year please record the production cost in 
each season as well) 
 
Items Single season Second season Third season 
 
If no tick here  
 
If no tick here  
Total land preparation cost:  
For example cost of hired labour, 
hired equipment, repairs and 
maintenance and fuel. 
   
Total planting cost:  
For example cost of seeds, 
fertilisation, pesticides, herbicides, 
hired labour to do planting or 
weeding, spraying and irrigation. 
   
Total harvesting cost: 
For example cost of hired labour 
for harvesting, loading and 
transportation. 
   
Total production cost    
 
 
 
 
 
 
Planted area 
(Rai) 
Total production 
sold (Kilograms) 
 
Price for vegetable 
(Baht/Kg) 
 
Type of      
vegetable 
 
Total production 
(Kilograms) 
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    4.2  
 
4.2.1 Below is a series of statements pertaining to planted area, total production sold and  
price for each fruit on your farm in the past cropping season; 
                 a. How many rais of land did you grow each fruit for the 2007/08 season?   
                   b. What is the total production of each fruit sold (in kilograms) for the 2007/08 season? 
                   c. What is the price of each fruit sold (in baht/kg.) for the 2007/08 season? 
 
 
 
 
 
         
4.2.2 What is your total fruit production cost (in baht) for the 2007/08 season? 
 
Items Cost (baht) 
Total land preparation cost:  
For example cost of hired labour, hired equipment, 
repairs and maintenance and fuel. 
 
Total planting cost:  
For example cost of seeds, fertilisation, pesticides, 
herbicides, hired labour to do planting or weeding, 
spraying and irrigation. 
 
Total harvesting cost: 
For example cost of hired labour for harvesting, 
loading and transportation. 
 
Total production cost  
 
 
    4.3  
 
4.3.1 What kind of the cut flower production system on your farm? 
      1. Open field (outdoor)  
                2. Shade house 
 Shade house size _____________ square meters  
  3. Insect-prevent house (Net house) 
 Net house size _____________ square meters  
 
4.3.2 Below is a series of statements pertaining to planted area, total production sold and  
price of each cut flower on your farm in the past cropping season; 
                 a. How many rais of land did you grow each cut flower for the 2007/08 season?   
                   b. What is the total production of each cut flower sold (in kilograms) for the 2007/08 
season? 
                   c. What is the price of each cut flower sold (in baht/kg.) for the 2007/08 season? 
If no tick here  
Bananas     
Mangoes     
Papaya     
Other fruits (please specify) 
     
     
     
     
If nil tick here  
Fruits 
Cut flower 
Price for fruit 
(Baht/Kg) 
 
Planted area 
(Rai) 
 
 Total production 
sold (Kilograms) 
 
 
Type of fruit 
 
Total production 
(Kilograms) 
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Remarks: Cut orchids approx 40 stems/kg and other cut flowers approx 35 stems or flowers/kg (Department of Agricultural 
Extension, 2008)  
 
4.3.3 What is your total cut flower production cost (in baht) for the 2007/08 season? 
 
Items Cost (baht) 
Total land preparation cost:  
For example cost of hired labour, hired equipment, 
repairs and maintenance and fuel. 
 
Total planting cost:  
For example cost of seeds, fertilisation, pesticides, 
herbicides, hired labour to do planting or weeding, 
spraying and irrigation. 
 
Total harvesting cost: 
For example cost of hired labour for harvesting, 
loading and transportation. 
 
Total production cost  
 
 
5.                              
                                     
    
    5.1  
 
5.1.1 How many rais of rubber did you planted on your farm?  ___________ Rai 
 
5.1.2 What is the total rubber production and sales during the 12 months? 
 
Quantity of rubber produced per month (kg./month)  
How many months of rubber sold in last year?  
Price per unit of rubber sold (baht/kg.) (Please estimate the 
average prices) 
 
Total income from rubber (baht)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Orchids    
Roses    
Lotus    
Marigold     
Champaca    
Jasmine    
Other cut flowers (please specify) 
    
    
If no tick here  
Price for flower 
(Baht/Kg) 
 
Planted area 
(Rai) 
  
Total production sold 
(Kilograms) 
 
Forestry 
Rubber 
Type of cut flower 
 
  206 
5.1.3 What is your total rubber production cost (in baht) during the 12 months? 
 
Items Cost (Baht) 
Total land preparation cost:  
For example cost of hired labour, hired equipment, 
repairs and maintenance and fuel. 
 
Total planting cost:  
For example cost of fertilizer, pesticides, herbicides, 
hired labour to do weeding and cutting and irrigation. 
 
Total harvesting and processing cost: 
For example cost of hired labour for harvesting and 
processing rubber, electricity, chemicals for 
processing rubber, loading and transportation. 
 
Total production cost  
 
 
    5.2  
 
5.2.1 Below is a series of statements pertaining to planted area, total production sold and  
price of each forest production on your farm during the last 12 months: 
                 a. How many rais of land did you plant each type of forest during the 12 months?   
                   b. What is the total production of each type of forest sold (in tones) during the 12 
months? 
                   c. What is the price of each forest production sold (in baht/tone) during the 12 months? 
 
 
 
          
5.2.2 What is your total forest production cost (in baht) during the 12 months? 
 
Items Cost (Baht) 
Total land preparation cost:  
For example cost of hired labour, hired equipment, 
repairs and maintenance and fuel. 
 
Total planting cost:  
For example cost of fertilizer, pesticides, herbicides, 
hired labour to do weeding and cutting and irrigation. 
 
Total harvesting cost: 
For example cost of hired labour for harvesting, 
loading and transportation. 
 
Total production cost  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
If no tick here  
Eucalyptus    
Conifer    
Other tree (please specify) 
    
All other forest production 
Price for tree 
(Baht/Tonne) 
 
Planted area 
(Rai) 
  
Total production sold 
(Tonnes) 
 
Type of tree 
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6.                          (Do not include animal production for household consumption) 
 
    6.1 Below is a series of statements pertaining to animal stocks, production sold and income from 
each animal on your farm during the last 12 months: 
          a. What is the total number of each livestock raised on your farm as at 31 August 2008?  
          b. What is the number of each animal sold during the 12 months? 
          c. How much is the income from each animal sold (in baht) from your farm during the 12 
months? 
 
 
      I) 
 
     
No. of heads 
(as at 31 August 2008) 
No. of beef cattle sold 
(during the 12 months) 
Income from beef cattle 
(baht) 
(please estimate) 
   
 
 
     II) 
 
No. of heads 
(as at 31 August 2008) 
No. of buffaloes sold 
(during the 12 months) 
Income from buffaloes 
(baht) 
(please estimate) 
   
 
 
    III) 
 
No. of heads 
(as at 31 August 2008) 
No. of hogs sold 
(during the 12 months) 
Income from hogs 
(baht) 
(please estimate) 
   
 
  
    IV) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
If no tick here  
If no tick here  
If no tick here  
If no tick here  
 
No. of heads 
(as at 31 August 2008) 
No. of animals sold 
(during the 12 months) 
Income from animals 
(baht) 
(please estimate) 
Dairy cows    
Dry cows    
Heifers    
Male calves    
Female calves    
Livestock 
Beef cattle 
Buffaloes 
Hogs 
Dairy cow 
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What is the milk production and sales during the 12 months? (Do not include milk for household 
consumption) 
 
Quantity of milk produced (kg./month)  
Quantity of milk sold (kg./month)   
How many months of milk sold in last year?   
Price per unit of milk sold (baht/kg.) (Please estimate the 
average prices) 
 
Total income from milk (baht)  
 
 
     V) 
 
 
What is the production of chicken eggs and sales during the 12 months? (Do NOT include fertilised 
eggs and eggs for farm household consumption)  
 
How many dozen of chicken eggs sold? (dozen)  
Price for dozen of chicken eggs sold (baht/dozen) (Please 
estimate the average prices) 
 
Total income from chicken eggs (baht)  
 
What is the production of duck eggs and sales during the 12 months? (Do NOT include fertilised 
eggs and eggs for farm household consumption)  
 
How many dozen of duck eggs sold? (dozen)  
Price for dozen of duck eggs sold (baht/dozen) (Please 
estimate the average prices) 
 
Total income from duck eggs (baht)  
 
 
    VI) 
 
Other livestock (please specify) 
 
 
No. of heads 
(as at 31 August 2008) 
No. of animals sold 
(during the 12 months) 
Income from animals 
(baht) 
(please estimate) 
   
 
 
 
 
If no tick here  
 
No. of heads 
(as at 31 August 2008) 
No. of animals sold 
(during the 12 months) 
Income from animals 
(baht) 
(please estimate) 
Broilers    
Hens     
Native chickens    
Ducks    
If no tick here  All other Livestock 
Poultry 
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    6.2 What is your total animal production cost (in baht) for the last 12 months? 
 
Items Cost (baht) 
Total feed cost: 
including roughage and concentrate feed 
 
 
Total other costs:  
For example cost of breeding stock, veterinary 
supplies and services, hired labour, electricity, fuel, 
transportation and marketing expenses. 
 
Total production cost  
 
 
7.                              (Do not include fish production for household consumption) 
 
    7.1 What kind of the fish production system did you have on your farm?  
     1. Pond system 
 Pond size _____________ square meters  
 Number of ponds __________ 
               2. Paddy-field system 
     3. Ditch system 
      4. Cage system  
 Cage size _____________ square meters  
 Number of cages __________ 
 
     7.2 Below is a series of statements pertaining to total production and income from each fish on the 
farm during the 12 months: 
           a. What is the total production of each fish sold (in kilograms) from your farm during the 12 
months? 
           b. What is the income from each fish sold (in baht) during the 12 months? 
    
 
 
 
   7.3 What is your total fish production cost (in baht) for the last 12 months? 
 
Items Cost (baht) 
Total feed cost: 
 
 
Total other costs:  
For example cost of fish breeding stock, irrigation 
hired labour, electricity, fuel, transportation and 
marketing expenses. 
 
Total production cost  
 
 
Nile tilapia   
Stripped catfish   
Walking catfish   
Sepat siam   
Other fish species (please specify) 
   
Fish 
Income from fish 
(Baht) 
(please estimate) 
No. of fish sold 
(Kilograms) 
(during the 12 months) 
Type of fish 
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Section C: Sources of Risk 
Below is a series of statements pertaining to sources of farm risks. Please circle the number, which 
most accurately reflects how important the risks are to your farming operation 
 
      
 
How important are the following risks to your farming operation? 
 
E
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o
t 
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p
o
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Risk from deficiency in rainfall causing drought 5 4 3 2 1 
Risk from excess rainfall  5 4 3 2 1 
Risk from natural disasters such as heat, fire, flood, storm   5 4 3 2 1 
Risk from diseases and pests that affect plants and animals  5 4 3 2 1 
Risk from unexpected variability of yields 5 4 3 2 1 
Risk from unexpected variability of product prices 5 4 3 2 1 
Risk from unexpected variability of input prices 5 4 3 2 1 
Risk from changes in interest rates 5 4 3 2 1 
Risk from high level of debt 5 4 3 2 1 
Risk from changes in the world economic and political situation 5 4 3 2 1 
Risk from changes in Thailand‟s economic and political situation 5 4 3 2 1 
Risk from changes in national government laws and policies 5 4 3 2 1 
Risk from changes in land prices 5 4 3 2 1 
Risk from accidents or problems with health 5 4 3 2 1 
Risk from changes in family situation such as marital status, inheritances, etc. 5 4 3 2 1 
Risk from problems with hired labour and contractors 5 4 3 2 1 
Risk from theft 5 4 3 2 1 
Risk from being unable to meet contracting obligations  5 4 3 2 1 
Risk from changes in technology and breeding 5 4 3 2 1 
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Section D: Risk Management 
Below is a series of statements pertaining to risk management option. Please circle the number, which 
most accurately reflects the importance of risk management options in managing your farm 
operational risks. Please also circle YES if you use the risk management option and NO if you do not 
use it. 
 
 
 
 
 
How important are the following risk management option 
in your farm operation? 
 
E
x
tr
em
el
y
 i
m
p
o
rt
an
t 
Im
p
o
rt
an
t 
Q
u
it
e 
im
p
o
rt
an
t 
S
o
m
ew
h
at
 i
m
p
o
rt
an
t 
N
o
t 
im
p
o
rt
an
t 
 
Do you use 
this risk 
management 
method? 
Having diversified crop, animal or other enterprises on your 
small farm 
5 4 3 2 1 1.YES 2.NO 
Storing feed and/or seed reserves  5 4 3 2 1 1.YES 2.NO 
Planting several varieties of crops 5 4 3 2 1 1.YES 2.NO 
Apply pests and diseases program  5 4 3 2 1 1.YES 2.NO 
Have a farm reservoir for water supplies in dry season 5 4 3 2 1 1.YES 2.NO 
Purchase farm machinery to replace of labour 5 4 3 2 1 1.YES 2.NO 
Able to adjust quickly to weather, price and other adverse 
factors  
5 4 3 2 1 1.YES 2.NO 
Selection of crop and/or animal varieties with low price 
variability 
5 4 3 2 1 1.YES 2.NO 
Spreading sale over several time period  5 4 3 2 1 1.YES 2.NO 
Use forward contracts  5 4 3 2 1 1.YES 2.NO 
Obtaining market information on prices forecast and trends 5 4 3 2 1 1.YES 2.NO 
Holding cash and easily converted cash assets 5 4 3 2 1 1.YES 2.NO 
Reduce debt level  5 4 3 2 1 1.YES 2.NO 
Leasing farm machinery rather than owning them 5 4 3 2 1 1.YES 2.NO 
Working off farm to supplement net farm income 5 4 3 2 1 1.YES 2.NO 
Investing in non-farm investment/business 5 4 3 2 1 1.YES 2.NO 
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Section E: Farmer’s Utility Elicitation 
This section attempts to measure respondent‟s risk aversion preferences. A series of hypothetical risky 
farm outcomes will be use to derive the farmer‟s utility function.   
 
 
Below is a series of risky farm outcomes. As a farmer, you face prospectively large number of choices 
in different cropping systems. Each cropping system will generate certain risky outcomes. Please 
specify the sure sum of money that makes you indifferent between two risky farm outcomes with 
equal probability given below.  
 
Situation I 
 
If you are given a choice between  
a) a lottery ticket and 
          b) a sure sum of money;  
The lottery ticket will gives you the chance to win either 100,000 baht or nothing (0 baht). If the sure 
sum of money is 40,000 baht. Would you choose the lottery ticket or the 40,000 baht? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: 
a) If the farmer chooses the cash, we pose the same question but lower the cash amount (e.g. 35,000 
baht) 
b) If the farmer chooses the lottery ticket, we pose the same question but increase the cash amount 
(e.g. 45,000 baht) 
c) We will proceed with this line of questioning until the farmer becomes indifferent between taking 
the lottery ticket or taking the cash amount. 
d) Once we have found the cash amount that will make the farmer indifferent (e.g. 30,000 baht) we 
present to the farmer another lottery and repeat the procedure from Scenario I. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: 
If the farmer is indifferent between this new lottery and for example 15,500 baht then we present to 
the farmer another lottery and repeat the procedure.  
 
 
 
               Lottery Ticket              Cash 
 
Probability  
      50%    100,000 baht 
          40,000 baht 
 
      50%          0     baht  
 
               Lottery Ticket              Cash 
 
Probability  
      50%     30,000 baht 
          17,000 baht 
 
      50%          0     baht  
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Note: 
If the farmer is indifferent between this new lottery and for example 9,500 baht then we present to the 
farmer another lottery and repeat the procedure.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: 
Once we have found the cash amount that will make the farmer indifferent between the new lottery 
and the cash we proceed to Scenario II. 
 
 
Situation II   
 
If you are given a choice between  
a) a lottery ticket and 
          b) a sure sum of money  
 
The lottery ticket will give you the chance to win either 100,000 baht or 30,000 baht. If the sure sum 
of money is 55,000 baht. Would you choose the lottery ticket or the 55,000 baht? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: 
a) If the farmer chooses the cash, we pose the same question but lower the cash amount (e.g. 52,000 
baht) 
b) If the farmer chooses the lottery ticket, we pose the same question but increase the cash amount 
(e.g. 57,000 baht) 
               Lottery Ticket              Cash 
 
Probability  
      50%     15,500 baht 
          11,000 baht 
 
      50%          0     baht  
 
               Lottery Ticket              Cash 
 
Probability  
      50%    100,000 baht 
          55,000 baht 
 
      50%       30,000 baht  
 
               Lottery Ticket              Cash 
 
Probability  
      50%      9,500 baht 
          5,000 baht  
 
      50%          0     baht  
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c) We will proceed with this line of questioning until the farmer becomes indifferent between taking 
the lottery ticket or taking the cash amount. 
d) Once we have found the cash amount that will make the farmer indifferent (e.g. 60,000 baht) we 
present to the farmer another lottery and repeat the procedure from Scenario II. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: 
If the farmer is indifferent between this new lottery and for example 75,000 baht then we present to 
the farmer another lottery and repeat the procedure.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: 
Once we have found the cash amount that will make the farmer indifferent between the new lottery 
and the cash then we finish the process in this section.  
 
 
 
For staff use only: 
Situation Number Amount (baht) 
Situation I 
1  
2  
3  
4  
Situation II 
5  
6  
7  
 
 
 
 
 
               Lottery Ticket              Cash 
 
Probability  
      50%    100,000 baht 
          70,000 baht 
 
      50%       60,000 baht  
 
               Lottery Ticket              Cash 
 
Probability  
      50%   100,000 baht 
          85,000 baht 
 
      50%      75,000 baht 
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Section F: Socio-Economic Profile of Farmers 
 
 
1. What is your gender? 
          1. Male    2. Female  
  
2. Which is your age group? 
          1. Less than 30 years old  2. 31-40 years old  3. 41-50 years old 
          4. 51-60  years old  5. Over 60 years old  
 
3. What is your marital status? 
          1. Single/Never married    2. Married  
          3. De factor relationship    4. Divorce/Separated   
 
4. What is your highest educational qualification? 
          1. No education              2. Primary school (grade 1-6)  
          3. Secondary school (grade 7-12)  4. Vocational training 
          5. Bachelor degree    6. Postgraduate degree 
          7. Other (s) please specify _______________________________________  
 
5. How many years have you been farming? 
          1. 10 years or less   2. 11-20 years   3. 21-30 years 
          4. 31-40  years   5. Over 40 years   
 
6. How many children do you have? 
          1. None    2. 1    3. 2 
          4. 3    5. More than 4 
          6. Other (s) please specify _______________________________________   
 
7. The number of people living in your household is (please state): 
     ________________persons 
 
8. Do members of your family work on your farm? 
           1. Yes              2. No, please go to Q10 
          
9. If yes in Q8, who are they? (you may tick more than one) 
           1. Spouse     2. Children   3. Relatives 
           4. Brothers and sisters   5. Parents 
   
10. Did you work off-farm during the last 12 months? 
          1. Yes     2. No, go to Q13 
   
11. What type of off-farm job did you engage in? (check all that apply) 
          1. Privately owned business (e.g. rice mill, dairy shop)    
          2. Wage labour 
          3. Agricultural labour 
          4. Special craftsman      
          5. Other (s) please specify __________________________________________ 
 
12. What is your net off-farm income during the last 12 months?  
          1. Less than 5,000 baht      2. Between 5,001 to 10,000 baht 
          3. Between 10,001 to 15,000 baht    4. Between 15,001 to 20,000 baht 
          5. More than 20,000 baht   
          6. Other (s) please specify _______________________________________ 
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13. What is your annual household income?  
          1. Less than 10,000 baht      2. Between 10,001 to 30,000 baht  
          3. Between 30,001 to 50,000 baht   4. Between 50,001 to 70,000 baht 
          5. Between 70,001 to 90,000 baht   6. More than 90,000 baht 
          7. Other (s) please specify _______________________________________   
 
 
Your participation in this survey is greatly appreciated. Thank you for your time and if you have 
further comments about risk analysis of smallholder farmers, please feel free to comment in the space 
provided below. Once again we assure you that your identity will remain STRICTLY 
CONFIDENTIAL. 
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     Appendix B 
Correlations of sources of risk and risk management strategy components and 
socioeconomic variables 
B.1 Pearson correlation coefficients of source of risk components 1 to 6 (AS1-6) and socioeconomic 
characteristics of all farmer group 
 AGE GEN EDU EXP OFFW FSIZ INCM LOC FINC AHIN HSIZ 
AS1 -0.054 -0.007 0.061
**
 -0.068
**
 0.077
**
 -0.023 -0.017 -0.028 0.001 0.073
**
 0.095
***
 
AS2 -0.102
***
 -0.111
***
 0.182
***
 -0.118
***
 0.231
***
 0.036 0.031 0.201
***
 -0.048 0.070
**
 0.097
***
 
AS3 -0.080
**
 -0.068
**
 0.052 -0.034 0.065
**
 0.019 0.149
***
 0.172
***
 0.108
***
 0.064
**
 0.025 
AS4 -0.058 -0.033 0.070
**
 -0.101
***
 0.077
**
 -0.006 0.012 0.099
***
 0.176
***
 0.050 0.030 
AS5 -0.068
**
 -0.025 0.094
***
 -0.050 0.085
***
 0.016 0.024 0.071
**
 0.002 0.066
**
 0.001 
AS6 -0.035 0.012 0.002 0.021 0.049 -0.064
**
 -0.023 0.033 0.035 0.001 -0.015 
AGE 1 0.001 -0.205
***
 0.313
***
 -0.209
***
 0.057 0.019 -0.067
**
 0.023 0.010 -0.054 
GEN  1 0.023 -0.005 0.042 0.100
***
 0.076
**
 -0.029 0.012 0.072
**
 -0.063
**
 
EDU   1 -0.270
***
 0.238
***
 -0.005 0.026 0.133
***
 -0.120
***
 0.131
***
 -0.070
**
 
EXP    1 -0.264
***
 -0.041 -0.100
***
 -0.320
***
 -0.004 -0.012 0.028 
OFFW     1 -0.103
***
 0.050 0.233
***
 -0.045 0.001 -0.006 
FSIZ      1 0.556
***
 0.337
***
 0.103
***
 0.416
***
 0.079
**
 
INCM       1 0.563
***
 0.082
**
 0.472
***
 0.084
**
 
LOC        1 0.013 0.305
***
 0.023 
FINC         1 0.001 0.005 
AHIN          1 0.040 
HSIZ           1 
Correlation is significant at 
* 1.0P , ** 05.0P  and *** 01.0P  
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B.2 Pearson correlation coefficients of sources of risk components 1 to 6 (CS1-6) and socioeconomic 
characteristics of central region farmer group 
 AGE GEN EDU EXP OFFW FSIZ INCM LOC FINC AHIN HSIZ 
CS1 -0.109
**
 -0.155
***
 0.176
***
 -0.097
**
 0.217
***
 -0.134
***
 -0.216
***
 0.143
***
 -0.017 -0.095
**
 0.085
**
 
CS2 -0.063 -0.106
**
 0.115
**
 0.031 0.095
**
 -0.085
**
 -0.021 -0.206
***
 -0.083
**
 0.157
***
 0.170
***
 
CS3 -0.120
***
 -0.086
**
 0.129
***
 -0.003 0.102
**
 -0.001 -0.007 -0.190
***
 -0.110
**
 0.129
***
 0.081 
CS4 -0.073 -0.040 0.105
**
 0.031 0.139
***
 -0.158
***
 -0.105
**
 -0.230
***
 0.009 0.146
***
 0.146
***
 
CS5 -0.113
**
 -0.064 0.061 -0.071 0.161
***
 -0.153
***
 -0.118
***
 0.008 0.043 -0.060 -0.019 
CS6 -0.104
**
 -0.154
***
 0.103
**
 -0.072 0.193
***
 -0.117
***
 0.045 -0.233
***
 0.060 -0.048 0.065 
AGE 1 0.078 -0.247
***
 0.254
***
 -0.165
***
 0.088
**
 0.072 0.096
**
 0.043 -0.005 -0.066 
GEN  1 -0.061 -0.012 0.008 0.108
**
 0.111
**
 0.056 0.038 0.035 -0.083
**
 
EDU   1 -0.255
***
 0.257
***
 -0.122
***
 -0.064 -0.100
**
 -0.176
***
 0.085
**
 -0.054 
EXP    1 -.182
***
 0.111
**
 0.128
***
 -0.007 0.008 0.094
**
 0.072 
OFFW     1 -0.247
***
 -0.074 -0.048 -0.025 -0.052 0.015 
FSIZ      1 0.543
***
 0.181
***
 0.207
***
 0.259
***
 0.047 
INCM       1 -0.386
***
 0.112
**
 0.434
***
 0.083
**
 
LOC        1 0.069 -0.353
***
 -0.095
**
 
FINC         1 -0.045 0.003 
AHIN          1 0.037 
HSIZ           1 
Correlation is significant at 
* 1.0P , ** 05.0P  and *** 01.0P  
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B.3 Pearson correlation coefficients of sources of risk components 1 to 6 (NS1-6) and socioeconomic 
characteristics of north-east region farmer group 
 AGE GEN EDU EXP OFFW FSIZ INCM LOC FINC AHIN HSIZ 
NS1 -0.051 0.079 0.015 -0.181
***
 0.078 0.040 0.046 0.009 0.073 0.029 0.032 
NS2 -0.029 -0.036 0.067 -0.054 0.100
**
 0.062 0.012 0.169
***
 0.027 -0.059 0.036 
NS3 -0.047 -0.002 -0.029 0.090
**
 -0.087
**
 0.004 0.138
***
 -0.321
***
 0.143
***
 0.051 -0.009 
NS4 -0.060 -0.048 0.058 -0.163
***
 0.033 0.020 -0.031 0.137
***
 0.283
***
 -0.075 -0.053 
NS5 0.009 0.046 0.028 -0.058 0.038 -0.014 -0.063 -0.010 0.119
***
 -0.034 -0.087
**
 
NS6 0.120
***
 0.021 -0.009 0.133
***
 -0.078 0.063 0.060 -0.003 0.011 0.108
**
 0.011 
AGE 1 -0.099
**
 -0.126
***
 0.378
***
 -0.240
***
 0.083
**
 0.078 -0.057 0.002 0.073 -0.037 
GEN  1 0.139
***
 -0.019 0.093
**
 0.125
***
 0.151
***
 -0.068 -0.013 0.133
***
 -0.042 
EDU   1 -0.230
***
 0.166
***
 0.019 -0.062 0.073 -0.061 0.110
**
 -0.097
**
 
EXP    1 -0.229
***
 0.042 0.069 -0.158
***
 -0.007 0.097
**
 0.004 
OFFW     1 -0.156
***
 -0.209
***
 0.105
**
 -0.074 -0.097
**
 -0.038 
FSIZ      1 0.512
***
 0.178
***
 0.015 0.422
***
 0.100
**
 
INCM       1 -0.308
***
 0.064 0.416
***
 0.127
***
 
LOC        1 -0.128
***
 -0.208
***
 -0.029 
FINC         1 0.034 0.005 
AHIN          1 0.031 
HSIZ           1 
Correlation is significant at 
* 1.0P , ** 05.0P  and *** 01.0P  
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B.4 Pearson correlation coefficients of risk management components 1 to 4 (AR1-4) and socioeconomic 
characteristics of all farmer group 
 AGE GEN EDU EXP OFFW FSIZ INCM LOC FINC AHIN HSIZ 
AR1 -0.056 -0.008 0.155
***
 -0.059
**
 0.140
***
 -0.165
***
 -0.254
***
 -0.235
***
 -0.108
***
 -0.106
***
 0.032 
AR2 -0.035 -0.057 0.099
***
 -0.130
***
 0.124
***
 -0.077
**
 -0.256
***
 0.130
***
 -0.039 -0.218
***
 -0.021 
AR3 -0.137
***
 -0.038 0.266
***
 -0.200
***
 0.475
***
 -0.049 -0.007 0.147
***
 -0.124
***
 0.027 0.023 
AR4 -0.054 -0.024 -0.101
***
 -0.075
**
 0.107
***
 -0.113
***
 -0.132
***
 -0.092
***
 -0.042 0.006 -0.018 
AGE 1 0.001 -0.205
***
 0.313
***
 -0.209
***
 0.057 0.019 -0.067
**
 0.023 0.010 -0.054 
GEN  1 0.023 -0.005 0.042 0.100
***
 0.076
**
 -0.029 0.012 0.072
**
 -0.063
**
 
EDU   1 -0.270
***
 0.238
***
 -0.005 0.026 0.133
***
 -0.120
***
 0.131
***
 -0.070
**
 
EXP    1 -0.264
***
 -0.041 -0.100
***
 -0.320
***
 -0.004 -0.012 0.028 
OFFW     1 -0.103
***
 0.050 0.233
***
 -0.045 0.001 -0.006 
FSIZ      1 0.556
***
 0.337
***
 0.103
***
 0.416
***
 0.079
**
 
INCM       1 0.563
***
 0.082
**
 0.472
***
 0.084
***
 
LOC        1 0.013 0.305
***
 0.023 
FINC         1 0.001 0.005 
AHIN          1 0.040 
HSIZ           1 
Correlation is significant at 
* 1.0P , ** 05.0P  and *** 01.0P  
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B.5 Pearson correlation coefficients of risk management components 1 to 4 (CR1-4) and socioeconomic 
characteristics of central region farmer group 
 AGE GEN EDU EXP OFFW FSIZ INCM LOC FINC AHIN HSIZ 
CR1 -0.141
***
 -0.092
**
 0.183
***
 -0.082 0.242
***
 -0.166
***
 -0.197
***
 0.003 -0.085
**
 -0.111
**
 0.136
***
 
CR2 -0.079 -0.104
**
 0.136
***
 -0.147
***
 0.201
***
 -0.185
***
 -0.334
***
 0.33
***
9 -0.067 -0.326
***
 -0.012 
CR3 -0.139
***
 -0.123
***
 0.310
***
 -0.092
**
 0.531
***
 -0.216
***
 -0.141
***
 -0.017 -0.123
***
 -0.089
**
 0.076 
CR4 -0.128
***
 -0.075 0.134
***
 -0.099
**
 0.159
***
 -0.151
***
 -0.124
***
 0.067 -0.099
**
 0.018 0.012 
AGE 1 0.078 0.247
***
 0.254
***
 -0.165
***
 0.088
**
 0.072 0.096
**
 0.043 -0.005 -0.066 
GEN  1 -0.061 -0.012 0.008 0.108
**
 0.111
**
 0.056 0.038 0.035 -0.083
**
 
EDU   1 -0.255
***
 0.257
***
 -0.122
***
 -0.064 -0.100
**
 -0.176
***
 0.085
**
 -0.054 
EXP    1 -0.182
***
 0.111
**
 0.128
***
 -0.007 0.008 0.094
**
 0.072 
OFFW     1 -0.247
***
 -0.074 -0.048 -0.025 -0.052 0.015 
FSIZ      1 0.543
***
 0.181
***
 0.207
***
 0.259
***
 0.047 
INCM       1 -0.386
***
 0.112
**
 0.434
***
 0.083
**
 
LOC        1 0.069 -0.353
***
 -0.095
**
 
FINC         1 -0.045 0.003 
AHIN          1 0.037 
HSIZ           1 
Correlation is significant at 
* 1.0P , ** 05.0P  and *** 01.0P  
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B.6 Pearson correlation coefficients of risk management components 1 to 3 (NR1-3) and socioeconomic 
characteristics of north-east region farmer group 
 AGE GEN EDU EXP OFFW FSIZ INCM LOC FINC AHIN HSIZ 
NR1 -0.013 0.098
**
 0.146
***
 -0.205
***
 0.087
**
 0.061 0.090
**
 0.041 -0.035 0.100
**
 -0.045 
NR2 -0.111
**
 0.036 0.193
***
 -0.281
***
 0.323
***
 0.035 -0.041 0.183
***
 -0.126
***
 0.036 -0.011 
NR3 0.016 0.005 0.025 -0.216
***
 0.099
**
 0.076 0.031 0.209
***
 0.005 -0.018 0.023 
AGE 1 -0.099
**
 -0.126
***
 0.378
***
 -0.240
***
 0.083
**
 0.078 -0.057 0.002 0.073 -0.037 
GEN  1 0.139
***
 -0.019 0.093
**
 0.125
***
 0.151
***
 -0.068 -0.013 0.133
***
 -0.042 
EDU   1 -0.230
***
 0.166
***
 0.019 -0.062 0.073 -0.061 0.110
**
 -0.097
**
 
EXP    1 -0.229
***
 0.042 0.069 -0.158
***
 -0.007 0.097
**
 0.004 
OFFW     1 -0.156
***
 -0.209
***
 0.105
**
 -0.074 -0.097
**
 -0.038 
FSIZ      1 0.512
***
 0.178
***
 0.015 0.422
***
 0.100
**
 
INCM       1 -0.308
***
 0.064 0.416
***
 0.127
***
 
LOC        1 -0.128
***
 -0.208
***
 -0.029 
FINC         1 0.034 0.005 
AHIN          1 0.031 
HSIZ           1 
Correlation is significant at 
* 1.0P , ** 05.0P  and *** 01.0P  
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     Appendix C 
Absolute risk aversion coefficients 
C.1 Summary of parameter coefficients estimated by four different 
utility functions using the non-linear least square method for 
central region farmers 
Parameter(s) and 
2R  of 
each functional form 
Mean  
estimated
 a 
High  
estimated
 a
 
Low  
estimated
 a
 
Percentage by which 
parameters and 
2R  
are significant
 c
 
     Cubic function     
     a  0.0012218 0.1050300 -0.0833220 1 
     b      0.0000174 0.0000569 -0.0000197 64 
     c  -1.65E-11 1.16E-09 -1.07E-09 56 
     d  -5.81E-16 6.04E-15 -9.56E-15 55 
     
2R  b 0.985 0.999 0.928 100 
     Negative exponential function    
     c  0.0000300 0.0001330 0.0000144 100 
     
2R  b 0.926 0.995 0.657 100 
     Power function
 d
     
       -0.051454 0.0214550 -0.100735 0 
       0.0028355 0.0263880 3.85E-08 2 
       0.6908190 1.4892590 0.3254880 100 
     
2R  b 0.942 0.999 0.750 100 
     Expo-power function
 e
     
       1.0062349 1.0589530 0.9598710 100 
       0.0000573 0.0029390 1.84E-09 1 
       1.4556039 1.9012240 0.6176960 100 
     
2R  b 0.979 0.999 0.844 100 
a
 The 207 regression equations were estimated for each utility functional form.  
b
 
2R  is the coefficient to assess the goodness of curve fit when each utility functional form was employed to fit 
with the individual sequence of data points from the ELCE elicitation method. 
c
 The statistically significance at the 10 per cent level was employed on the t-statistic for the parameters and F-
statistic for 
2R . 
d
 25 equations had violated parameter restrictions for the power utility function. 
e
 85 equations had violated parameters restrictions for the expo-power utility function. 
Source: Field survey, 2009 
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C.2 Summary of parameter coefficients estimated by four different 
utility functions using the non-linear least square method for 
north-east region farmers 
Parameter(s) and 
2R  of 
each functional form 
Mean  
estimated
 a
 
 
High  
estimated
 a
 
Low  
Estimated
 a
 
Percentage by which 
parameters and 
2R  
are significant
 c
 
     Cubic function     
     a  0.01541351 0.1279060 -0.1124360 10 
     b      0.00001992 0.0009330 -0.0000184 63 
     c  -1.13E-09 9.33E-10 -2.45E-07 46 
     d  1.02E-14 2.35E-12 -8.08E-15 46 
     
2R  b 0.986 0.999 0.929 100 
     Negative exponential function    
     c  0.0000345 0.0012450 0.0000109 100 
     
2R  b 0.930 0.996 0.544 100 
     Power function
 d
     
       -0.0345938 0.0570960 -0.2307760 0 
       0.0056593 0.2942850 2.07E-08 3 
       0.7431495 1.5479450 0.1298320 99 
     
2R  b 0.965 0.999 0.705 100 
     Expo-power function
 e
     
       1.0204643 1.0933600 0.9484040 100 
       0.0001332 0.0101570 7.93E-10 4 
       1.4180671 1.9258560 0.4877080 99 
     
2R  b 0.978 0.999 0.733 100 
a
 The 228 regression equations were estimated for each utility functional form.  
b
 
2R  is the coefficient to assess the goodness of curve fit when each utility functional form was employed to fit 
with the individual sequence of data points from the ELCE elicitation method. 
c
 The statistically significance at the 10 per cent level was employed on the t-statistic for the parameters and F-
statistic for 
2R . 
d
 40 equations had violated parameter restrictions for the power utility function. 
e
 54 equations had violated parameters restrictions for the expo-power utility function. 
Source: Field survey, 2009 
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C.3 The absolute risk aversion coefficients estimated by four 
different utility functions for central region farmers (n=207) 
Respondent 
Number 
Absolute risk aversion coefficients  
Cubic function Negative 
exponential function 
Power function Expo-power 
function 
401 0.0000051 0.0000187 0.0000012 0.0000214 
402 0.0001804 0.0000239 0.0000061 0.0000232 
403 0.0000046 0.0000185 0.0000013 0.0000229 
404 0.0010622 0.0000221 0.0000055 0.0000228 
405 0.0000248 0.0000243 0.0000062 0.0000299 
406 -0.0000153 0.0000220 0.0000050 0.0000172 
407 -0.0000245 0.0000220 0.0000046 0.0000171 
412 -0.0000305 0.0000249 0.0000069 0.0000229 
413 -0.0000172 0.0000237 0.0000065 0.0000204 
415 -0.0000298 0.0000227 0.0000057 0.0000193 
416 -0.0000435 0.0000228 0.0000055 0.0000209 
417 -0.0000424 0.0000231 0.0000063 0.0000214 
418 0.0002422 0.0000220 0.0000046 0.0000187 
421 0.0000411 0.0000242 0.0000059 0.0000241 
422 -0.0000985 0.0000245 0.0000063 0.0000246 
425 -0.0000301 0.0000236 0.0000063 0.0000209 
427 0.0002378 0.0000227 0.0000054 0.0000219 
429 -0.0000374 0.0000212 0.0000044 0.0000180 
435 -0.0000296 0.0000230 0.0000059 0.0000220 
436 -0.0000748 0.0000220 0.0000053 0.0000211 
438 -0.0000545 0.0000227 0.0000055 0.0000209 
442 -0.0002629 0.0000223 0.0000050 0.0000193 
444 -0.0000210 0.0000236 0.0000061 0.0000214 
447 -0.0000526 0.0000226 0.0000059 0.0000199 
449 0.0000242 0.0000231 0.0000054 0.0000210 
452 0.0000704 0.0000354 0.0000098 0.0000987 
454 0.0000727 0.0000237 0.0000057 0.0000254 
455 -0.0000097 0.0000610 0.0000128 0.0000958 
456 -0.0000166 0.0000320 0.0000090 0.0000398 
459 -0.0000141 0.0000374 0.0000106 0.0000346 
460 0.0000513 0.0000282 0.0000080 0.0000515 
462 0.0000077 0.0000228 0.0000053 0.0000429 
463 0.0000068 0.0000239 0.0000055 0.0000267 
466 -0.0000732 0.0000369 0.0000102 0.0000471 
467 -0.0000578 0.0000332 0.0000099 0.0000365 
468 -0.0001118 0.0000362 0.0000100 0.0000744 
471 -0.0000312 0.0000319 0.0000092 0.0000984 
472 -0.0002044 0.0000323 0.0000090 0.0000691 
473 -0.0000170 0.0000358 0.0000104 0.0000511 
474 -0.0000163 0.0000357 0.0000105 0.0000513 
475 -0.0000115 0.0000529 0.0000122 0.0000428 
490 -0.0000115 0.0000529 0.0000122 0.0000430 
495 -0.0004612 0.0000234 0.0000057 0.0000223 
496 -0.0000257 0.0000292 0.0000088 0.0000846 
497 -0.0000355 0.0000305 0.0000087 0.0000340 
498 -0.0000407 0.0000378 0.0000101 0.0000720 
499 -0.0000120 0.0000415 0.0000109 0.0000399 
500 -0.0000072 0.0000498 0.0000116 0.0000382 
501 -0.0000117 0.0000477 0.0000119 0.0000364 
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C.3 The absolute risk aversion coefficients estimated by four 
different utility functions for central region farmers (n=207) 
(cont.) 
Respondent 
Number 
Absolute risk aversion coefficients 
Cubic function Negative 
exponential function 
Power function Expo-power 
function 
502 -0.0000072 0.0000535 0.0000122 0.0000412 
503 -0.0000182 0.0000306 0.0000091 0.0000310 
505 -0.0000107 0.0000481 0.0000121 0.0000370 
507 -0.0000115 0.0000416 0.0000110 0.0000423 
510 -0.0000270 0.0000323 0.0000094 0.0000309 
512 0.0000080 0.0000214 0.0000040 0.0000362 
513 -0.0000082 0.0000471 0.0000120 0.0000307 
514 -0.0000110 0.0000479 0.0000119 0.0000417 
515 0.0001002 0.0000351 0.0000097 0.0000621 
517 -0.0000095 0.0000423 0.0000112 0.0000376 
519 -0.0000069 0.0001330 0.0000135 0.0000367 
520 0.0000168 0.0000261 0.0000069 0.0000344 
521 -0.0000157 0.0000477 0.0000115 0.0000712 
525 -0.0000074 0.0000503 0.0000119 0.0000457 
526 -0.0000440 0.0000331 0.0000092 0.0000486 
527 -0.0000086 0.0000446 0.0000113 0.0000355 
528 -0.0000109 0.0000438 0.0000112 0.0000392 
529 -0.0000109 0.0000356 0.0000101 0.0000360 
530 -0.0000096 0.0000542 0.0000120 0.0000563 
532 -0.0000101 0.0000498 0.0000118 0.0000446 
533 -0.0000139 0.0000390 0.0000104 0.0000430 
535 -0.0000170 0.0000489 0.0000115 0.0000843 
536 -0.0000138 0.0000400 0.0000105 0.0000447 
537 -0.0000125 0.0000477 0.0000114 0.0000666 
538 -0.0000212 0.0000375 0.0000102 0.0000475 
540 -0.0000285 0.0000408 0.0000109 0.0000493 
541 -0.0000106 0.0000482 0.0000117 0.0000418 
542 -0.0000129 0.0000473 0.0000115 0.0001571 
543 -0.0000115 0.0000454 0.0000112 0.0000438 
545 -0.0000111 0.0000426 0.0000110 0.0000402 
546 -0.0000164 0.0000312 0.0000088 0.0000382 
547 -0.0000110 0.0000405 0.0000108 0.0000357 
548 -0.0000121 0.0000466 0.0000114 0.0000511 
550 0.0000089 0.0000314 0.0000099 0.0000479 
555 -0.0000234 0.0000379 0.0000104 0.0000540 
556 -0.0000771 0.0000348 0.0000099 0.0000434 
557 -0.0000152 0.0000391 0.0000107 0.0000590 
558 -0.0000292 0.0000364 0.0000102 0.0000468 
564 0.0000108 0.0000289 0.0000086 0.0000408 
565 -0.0000083 0.0000541 0.0000122 0.0000329 
566 0.0000051 0.0000185 0.0000009 0.0000225 
568 -0.0000386 0.0000273 0.0000074 0.0000395 
572 -0.0000087 0.0001030 0.0000125 0.0000361 
575 -0.0000112 0.0000411 0.0000110 0.0000363 
577 -0.0000006 0.0000179 -0.0000010 0.0000135 
578 -0.0000084 0.0000529 0.0000120 0.0000326 
579 -0.0000127 0.0000443 0.0000116 0.0000355 
580 0.0000146 0.0000273 0.0000073 0.0000286 
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C.3 The absolute risk aversion coefficients estimated by four 
different utility functions for central region farmers (n=207) 
(cont.) 
Respondent 
Number 
Absolute risk aversion coefficients 
Cubic function Negative 
exponential function 
Power function Expo-power 
function 
581 0.0000074 0.0000228 0.0000047 0.0000258 
583 0.0000128 0.0000253 0.0000066 0.0000536 
584 0.0000191 0.0000243 0.0000059 0.0000399 
585 0.0000235 0.0000247 0.0000062 0.0000317 
586 0.0000109 0.0000222 0.0000045 0.0000320 
587 0.0000097 0.0000207 0.0000036 0.0000343 
588 0.0000032 0.0000195 0.0000018 0.0000200 
589 0.0000082 0.0000207 0.0000036 0.0000337 
593 0.0000087 0.0000228 0.0000052 0.0000399 
595 0.0000112 0.0000254 0.0000068 0.0000607 
601 -0.0000029 0.0000175 -0.0000018 0.0000112 
602 -0.0000035 0.0000183 -0.0000018 0.0000111 
603 0.0000012 0.0000196 0.0000004 0.0000147 
604 -0.0000736 0.0000314 0.0000095 0.0000295 
605 0.0000019 0.0000199 0.0000010 0.0000156 
606 -0.0000005 0.0000187 -0.0000010 0.0000120 
610 0.0000011 0.0000192 -0.0000002 0.0000142 
611 0.0000019 0.0000199 0.0000010 0.0000156 
612 -0.0000005 0.0000187 -0.0000010 0.0000120 
614 -0.0000004 0.0000188 -0.0000012 0.0000129 
615 0.0000077 0.0000216 0.0000039 0.0000189 
616 -0.0003118 0.0000171 -0.0000055 0.0000086 
617 0.0000020 0.0000201 0.0000012 0.0000159 
618 0.0000190 0.0000228 0.0000053 0.0000260 
619 0.0000023 0.0000195 0.0000006 0.0000150 
620 -0.0000149 0.0000331 0.0000106 0.0000289 
621 0.0000704 0.0000354 0.0000098 0.0000987 
622 0.0000018 0.0000204 0.0000014 0.0000154 
623 0.0000056 0.0000210 0.0000035 0.0000266 
624 0.0000544 0.0000264 0.0000073 0.0000425 
625 0.0000099 0.0000313 0.0000090 0.0000629 
635 0.0000099 0.0000313 0.0000090 0.0000629 
636 0.0000209 0.0000326 0.0000093 0.0000820 
637 0.0000169 0.0000230 0.0000054 0.0000329 
638 0.0000232 0.0000476 0.0000118 0.0001199 
639 -0.0000033 0.0000144 -0.0000073 0.0000085 
640 0.0000160 0.0000299 0.0000085 0.0000540 
641 0.0000100 0.0000311 0.0000089 0.0000635 
642 0.0000011 0.0000177 0.0000001 0.0000191 
643 0.0000133 0.0000274 0.0000076 0.0000412 
654 0.0000243 0.0000472 0.0000116 0.0001216 
656 0.0000168 0.0000298 0.0000085 0.0000907 
659 0.0000076 0.0000269 0.0000077 0.0000641 
660 0.0000096 0.0000318 0.0000092 0.0000640 
664 0.0000099 0.0000313 0.0000090 0.0000629 
665 0.0000704 0.0000354 0.0000098 0.0000987 
668 0.0000051 0.0000228 0.0000053 0.0000358 
669 0.0000100 0.0000306 0.0000088 0.0000670 
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C.3 The absolute risk aversion coefficients estimated by four 
different utility functions for central region farmers (n=207) 
(cont.) 
Respondent 
Number 
Absolute risk aversion coefficients 
Cubic function Negative 
exponential function 
Power function Expo-power 
function 
671 0.0000147 0.0000406 0.0000108 0.0001457 
672 0.0000216 0.0000241 0.0000056 0.0000233 
675 0.0000006 0.0000180 -0.0000010 0.0000151 
677 0.0000333 0.0000436 0.0000113 0.0000879 
678 0.0000099 0.0000313 0.0000090 0.0000629 
679 0.0000127 0.0000308 0.0000088 0.0000634 
681 0.0000056 0.0000225 0.0000050 0.0000335 
682 0.0000173 0.0000281 0.0000078 0.0000461 
684 0.0005091 0.0000413 0.0000109 0.0000715 
685 0.0000027 0.0000217 0.0000035 0.0000192 
687 0.0000243 0.0000472 0.0000116 0.0001216 
690 -0.0000377 0.0000146 -0.0000098 0.0000046 
692 0.0000041 0.0000231 0.0000041 0.0000169 
694 0.0000127 0.0000308 0.0000088 0.0000634 
698 0.0000021 0.0000193 0.0000004 0.0000151 
701 -0.0000183 0.0000256 0.0000077 0.0000243 
702 0.0000022 0.0000180 0.0000002 0.0000127 
703 0.0000090 0.0000225 0.0000044 0.0000218 
704 -0.0000038 0.0000159 -0.0000048 0.0000086 
707 0.0000165 0.0000239 0.0000055 0.0000218 
710 -0.0000540 0.0000314 0.0000094 0.0000519 
712 0.0000891 0.0000257 0.0000078 0.0000268 
713 0.0000025 0.0000189 -0.0000002 0.0000154 
714 -0.0001556 0.0000225 0.0000050 0.0000207 
719 -0.0000945 0.0000255 0.0000070 0.0000245 
720 -0.0000125 0.0000180 -0.0000039 0.0000097 
721 -0.0001133 0.0000279 0.0000082 0.0000288 
722 0.0000136 0.0000226 0.0000047 0.0000209 
724 -0.0004151 0.0000281 0.0000082 0.0000339 
725 0.0000052 0.0000203 0.0000023 0.0000147 
728 0.0000018 0.0000184 0.0000001 0.0000128 
729 -0.0000019 0.0000169 -0.0000025 0.0000098 
730 0.0000120 0.0000229 0.0000052 0.0000279 
731 0.0000018 0.0000184 -0.0000001 0.0000142 
732 0.0000004 0.0000184 0.0000001 0.0000135 
734 0.0000191 0.0000270 0.0000075 0.0000293 
735 0.0000091 0.0000202 0.0000026 0.0000167 
737 -0.0000015 0.0000188 0.0000001 0.0000103 
739 0.0000123 0.0000218 0.0000038 0.0000161 
746 -0.0000377 0.0000146 -0.0000098 0.0000046 
750 0.0000041 0.0000231 0.0000042 0.0000169 
758 0.0000056 0.0000210 0.0000035 0.0000266 
761 0.0000019 0.0000199 0.0000010 0.0000156 
762 -0.0000005 0.0000187 -0.0000010 0.0000120 
765 0.0000007 0.0000189 -0.0000005 0.0000136 
767 0.0000008 0.0000176 -0.0000012 0.0000157 
770 0.0000023 0.0000195 0.0000006 0.0000150 
771 0.0000151 0.0000370 0.0000105 0.0000552 
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C.3 The absolute risk aversion coefficients estimated by four 
different utility functions for central region farmers (n=207) 
(cont.) 
Respondent 
Number 
Absolute risk aversion coefficients 
Cubic function Negative 
exponential function 
Power function Expo-power 
function 
772 0.0000173 0.0000281 0.0000078 0.0000461 
773 0.0000333 0.0000436 0.0000113 0.0000879 
774 -0.0000144 0.0000152 -0.0000096 0.0000067 
777 -0.0000377 0.0000146 -0.0000098 0.0000046 
779 0.0000368 0.0000331 0.0000099 0.0000350 
781 0.0000022 0.0000186 0.0000004 0.0000173 
782 0.0000100 0.0000221 0.0000042 0.0000232 
784 0.0000135 0.0000263 0.0000070 0.0000238 
785 0.0000050 0.0000196 0.0000018 0.0000205 
789 -0.0000044 0.0000168 -0.0000053 0.0000121 
794 0.0000099 0.0000233 0.0000049 0.0000221 
795 0.0000024 0.0000197 0.0000011 0.0000158 
797 0.0000012 0.0000192 0.0000008 0.0000172 
799 -0.0000200 0.0000418 0.0000116 0.0000368 
Source: Field survey, 2009 
 
C.4 The absolute risk aversion coefficients estimated by four 
different utility functions for northeast region farmers (n=228) 
Respondent 
Number 
Absolute risk aversion coefficients 
Cubic function Negative 
exponential function 
Power function Expo-power 
function 
1 -0.0001548 0.0000348 0.0000102 0.0000320 
2 -0.0000074 0.0001700 0.0000142 0.0000296 
4 0.0000088 0.0000238 0.0000055 0.0000275 
6 0.0000094 0.0000220 0.0000044 0.0000277 
7 0.0000177 0.0000201 0.0000035 0.0000279 
10 0.0000081 0.0000197 0.0000030 0.0000187 
12 -0.0000021 0.0000185 -0.0000011 0.0000117 
14 0.0000127 0.0000226 0.0000049 0.0000278 
15 0.0000152 0.0000223 0.0000046 0.0000220 
16 0.0000854 0.0000301 0.0000088 0.0000305 
19 0.0000256 0.0000240 0.0000062 0.0000289 
20 0.0000018 0.0000186 -0.0000010 0.0000144 
23 -0.0000009 0.0000193 -0.0000006 0.0000122 
29 -0.0000110 0.0000157 -0.0000071 0.0000072 
31 -0.0000146 0.0000239 0.0000068 0.0000210 
36 0.0000033 0.0000193 0.0000010 0.0000172 
38 -0.0001251 0.0000296 0.0000155 0.0000357 
45 0.0005569 0.0000109 -0.0000110 -0.0000005 
46 0.0000125 0.0000391 0.0000116 0.0000526 
49 0.0000187 0.0000218 0.0000040 0.0000142 
50 -0.0000272 0.0000307 0.0000097 0.0000273 
51 -0.0000800 0.0000236 0.0000066 0.0000157 
53 -0.0000009 0.0000209 0.0000032 0.0000081 
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C.4 The absolute risk aversion coefficients estimated by four 
different utility functions for north-east region farmers (n=228) 
(cont.) 
Respondent 
Number 
Absolute risk aversion coefficients 
Cubic function Negative 
exponential function 
Power function Expo-power 
function 
54 -0.0000119 0.0000441 0.0000112 0.0000409 
55 -0.0000092 0.0000214 0.0000051 0.0000193 
56 0.0000910 0.0000228 0.0000052 0.0000168 
57 0.0000205 0.0000250 0.0000064 0.0000272 
62 -0.0000071 0.0000210 0.0000027 0.0000105 
68 -0.0001343 0.0000289 0.0000088 0.0000282 
69 0.0001213 0.0000267 0.0000076 0.0000259 
70 -0.0000207 0.0000274 0.0000081 0.0000275 
71 0.0000009 0.0000181 -0.0000001 0.0000135 
72 0.0000723 0.0000276 0.0000076 0.0000399 
75 0.0000042 0.0000188 0.0000012 0.0000160 
76 -0.0000102 0.0000295 0.0000098 0.0000260 
78 -0.0000043 0.0000162 -0.0000048 0.0000074 
79 0.0000010 0.0000181 -0.0000005 0.0000163 
80 0.0000087 0.0000198 0.0000020 0.0000183 
82 -0.0000124 0.0000233 0.0000063 0.0000240 
83 0.0000126 0.0000217 0.0000044 0.0000304 
84 -0.0000507 0.0000295 0.0000081 0.0000429 
85 -0.0000035 0.0000965 0.0000141 0.0000470 
87 -0.0000556 0.0000337 0.0000107 0.0000278 
90 -0.0000005 0.0000177 -0.0000024 0.0000119 
92 0.0000133 0.0000206 0.0000044 0.0000244 
94 0.0001711 0.0000412 -0.0000096 0.0000039 
95 -0.0000151 0.0000412 0.0000110 0.0000408 
96 -0.0000018 0.0000150 -0.0000059 0.0000098 
102 -0.0000097 0.0000231 0.0000069 0.0000166 
103 -0.0000156 0.0000320 0.0000099 0.0000324 
105 -0.0005440 0.0000292 0.0000086 0.0000285 
106 0.0000001 0.0000190 -0.0000006 0.0000124 
108 -0.0000156 0.0000337 0.0000107 0.0000281 
109 -0.0000063 0.0000193 0.0000016 0.0000119 
110 0.0000179 0.0000172 -0.0000020 0.0000112 
111 -0.0000070 0.0000269 0.0000099 0.0000227 
112 0.0000171 0.0000208 0.0000034 0.0000139 
114 0.0000100 0.0000203 0.0000025 0.0000157 
115 0.0000284 0.0000237 0.0000054 0.0000214 
116 0.0000009 0.0000188 -0.0000004 0.0000137 
117 -0.0000301 0.0000306 0.0000095 0.0000263 
119 0.0000032 0.0000183 0.0000002 0.0000133 
120 0.0000630 0.0000270 0.0000078 0.0000219 
121 0.0000124 0.0000200 0.0000033 0.0000251 
122 0.0000756 0.0000269 0.0000079 0.0000217 
123 -0.0000105 0.0000326 0.0000097 0.0000339 
124 0.0000498 0.0000989 0.0000153 0.0002562 
125 -0.0000072 0.0000220 0.0000065 0.0000236 
126 -0.0000270 0.0000275 0.0000091 0.0000230 
128 -0.0000068 0.0000988 0.0000141 0.0000506 
129 -0.0000001 0.0000172 -0.0000016 0.0000122 
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C.4 The absolute risk aversion coefficients estimated by four 
different utility functions for north-east region farmers (n=228) 
(cont.) 
Respondent 
Number 
Absolute risk aversion coefficients 
Cubic function Negative 
exponential function 
Power function Expo-power 
function 
130 -0.0000078 0.0000265 0.0000093 0.0000231 
132 0.0000039 0.0000177 0.0000011 0.0000163 
133 0.0000741 0.0000250 0.0000066 0.0000261 
134 -0.0000169 0.0000235 0.0000062 0.0000201 
135 -0.0000115 0.0000140 -0.0000093 0.0000052 
136 0.0000041 0.0000191 0.0000021 0.0000141 
138 0.0000095 0.0000267 0.0000071 0.0000274 
141 0.0002170 0.0000263 0.0000074 0.0000210 
142 -0.0000392 0.0000294 0.0000092 0.0000263 
144 0.0000448 0.0000237 0.0000057 0.0000214 
145 0.0000448 0.0000238 0.0000058 0.0000232 
146 -0.0000079 0.0000211 0.0000045 0.0000185 
150 -0.0000097 0.0000617 0.0000136 0.0000316 
152 -0.0000142 0.0000228 0.0000059 0.0000241 
153 0.0000117 0.0000195 0.0000032 0.0000183 
154 -0.0000466 0.0000282 0.0000087 0.0000343 
155 0.0012670 0.0000260 0.0000071 0.0000256 
156 0.0000041 0.0000196 0.0000015 0.0000146 
158 0.0000132 0.0000370 0.0000108 0.0000512 
160 0.0000131 0.0000196 0.0000016 0.0000137 
161 -0.0000014 0.0000192 -0.0000014 0.0000107 
165 -0.0000071 0.0000247 0.0000081 0.0000217 
166 0.0000173 0.0000256 0.0000066 0.0000402 
169 -0.0000410 0.0000129 -0.0000098 0.0000029 
170 -0.0000133 0.0000205 0.0000043 0.0000199 
171 -0.0000027 0.0000922 0.0000144 0.0000755 
172 0.0000252 0.0000231 0.0000053 0.0000243 
175 0.0000039 0.0000189 0.0000013 0.0000174 
176 0.0000055 0.0000197 0.0000016 0.0000148 
179 -0.0000091 0.0000300 0.0000101 0.0000258 
180 -0.0000094 0.0000251 0.0000081 0.0000215 
182 0.0000017 0.0000184 -0.0000003 0.0000141 
183 -0.0000052 0.0000160 -0.0000042 0.0000108 
184 -0.0000041 0.0000150 -0.0000067 0.0000093 
186 0.0000016 0.0000197 0.0000003 0.0000135 
189 0.0000026 0.0000181 -0.0000001 0.0000150 
190 -0.0000012 0.0000167 -0.0000030 0.0000140 
193 -0.0000461 0.0000297 0.0000090 0.0000305 
196 -0.0000179 0.0000233 0.0000061 0.0000227 
201 0.0000583 0.0000170 -0.0000062 0.0000091 
202 0.0000011 0.0000188 0.0000002 0.0000142 
203 -0.0000282 0.0000137 -0.0000101 0.0000041 
204 -0.0000238 0.0000142 -0.0000096 0.0000047 
205 -0.0000076 0.0000449 0.0000112 0.0000404 
206 -0.0000101 0.0000148 -0.0000074 0.0000073 
207 0.0000026 0.0000170 -0.0000007 0.0000140 
210 -0.0003442 0.0000239 0.0000071 0.0000276 
211 0.0000090 0.0000207 0.0000037 0.0000325 
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C.4 The absolute risk aversion coefficients estimated by four 
different utility functions for north-east region farmers (n=228) 
(cont.) 
Respondent 
Number 
Absolute risk aversion coefficients 
Cubic function Negative 
exponential function 
Power function Expo-power 
function 
212 -0.0000437 0.0000247 0.0000075 0.0000326 
213 -0.0000028 0.0000193 -0.0000031 0.0000101 
214 0.0000064 0.0000182 0.0000012 0.0000210 
215 0.0000027 0.0000178 0.0000006 0.0000214 
216 0.0000154 0.0000233 0.0000053 0.0000298 
217 -0.0000190 0.0000182 -0.0000034 0.0000101 
218 0.0000062 0.0000194 0.0000021 0.0000268 
219 0.0000548 0.0000259 0.0000072 0.0000315 
222 -0.0000121 0.0000491 0.0000134 0.0000283 
223 -0.0000091 0.0000686 0.0000141 0.0000369 
224 0.0000044 0.0000193 0.0000013 0.0000185 
225 -0.0000125 0.0000508 0.0000125 0.0000339 
227 0.0000764 0.0000226 0.0000050 0.0000224 
228 0.0000012 0.0000164 -0.0000023 0.0000157 
230 0.0000000 0.0000177 -0.0000012 0.0000137 
231 0.0000077 0.0000179 0.0000015 0.0000191 
232 0.0000202 0.0000251 0.0000066 0.0000501 
237 0.0000218 0.0000260 0.0000068 0.0000315 
238 -0.0000745 0.0000298 0.0000085 0.0001052 
240 0.0000136 0.0000241 0.0000058 0.0000305 
241 0.0000115 0.0000222 0.0000042 0.0000209 
243 0.0000133 0.0000202 0.0000042 0.0000254 
244 0.0000159 0.0000227 0.0000052 0.0000233 
245 0.0000046 0.0000202 0.0000018 0.0000170 
246 0.0000122 0.0012450 0.0000174 0.0030196 
247 -0.0000130 0.0000451 0.0000113 0.0000454 
248 0.0000010 0.0000186 -0.0000005 0.0000138 
249 0.0000023 0.0000192 0.0000009 0.0000163 
250 0.0000137 0.0000233 0.0000055 0.0000375 
251 -0.0000224 0.0000418 0.0000113 0.0000420 
252 -0.0000090 0.0000455 0.0000119 0.0000313 
254 0.0000382 0.0000335 0.0000101 0.0000337 
255 0.0000121 0.0000235 0.0000058 0.0000416 
256 0.0000077 0.0000209 0.0000025 0.0000141 
257 0.0000547 0.0000253 0.0000072 0.0000258 
259 -0.0000056 0.0000147 -0.0000072 0.0000065 
260 0.0004478 0.0000253 0.0000070 0.0000208 
262 0.0000044 0.0000205 0.0000014 0.0000185 
263 0.0000018 0.0000186 -0.0000001 0.0000144 
264 -0.0000001 0.0001420 0.0000149 0.0000701 
267 -0.0000075 0.0000908 0.0000146 0.0000902 
268 0.0000818 0.0000431 0.0000118 0.0000481 
269 -0.0033131 0.0000233 0.0000055 0.0000185 
270 -0.0000083 0.0000189 0.0000006 0.0000105 
274 0.0000231 0.0000247 0.0000063 0.0000302 
275 0.0000253 0.0000247 0.0000065 0.0000257 
276 0.0000024 0.0000201 0.0000009 0.0000115 
277 0.0000592 0.0000250 0.0000070 0.0000162 
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C.4 The absolute risk aversion coefficients estimated by four 
different utility functions for north-east region farmers (n=228) 
(cont.) 
Respondent 
Number 
Absolute risk aversion coefficients 
Cubic function Negative 
exponential function 
Power function Expo-power 
function 
278 0.0000087 0.0000219 0.0000042 0.0000213 
279 0.0000748 0.0000311 0.0000097 0.0000261 
280 -0.0000334 0.0000328 0.0000106 0.0000270 
281 0.0000143 0.0000225 0.0000049 0.0000187 
282 -0.0000316 0.0000163 -0.0000069 0.0000090 
283 0.0000103 0.0000220 0.0000037 0.0000175 
286 0.0000224 0.0000247 0.0000064 0.0000253 
287 -0.0000097 0.0000298 0.0000099 0.0000262 
288 0.0000110 0.0000211 0.0000033 0.0000186 
289 -0.0000456 0.0000223 0.0000042 0.0000145 
290 0.0000010 0.0000195 -0.0000004 0.0000080 
294 -0.0000006 0.0001420 0.0000148 0.0000623 
297 -0.0000150 0.0000460 0.0000123 0.0000330 
299 0.0000082 0.0000248 0.0000057 0.0000225 
300 -0.0000012 0.0000197 -0.0000014 0.0000112 
301 0.0000888 0.0000187 -0.0000019 0.0000101 
302 0.0000034 0.0000201 0.0000017 0.0000167 
303 0.0000006 0.0000204 -0.0000004 0.0000114 
304 0.0000116 0.0000223 0.0000043 0.0000227 
305 -0.0000066 0.0000244 0.0000077 0.0000223 
306 0.0000250 0.0000229 0.0000058 0.0000273 
307 -0.0000159 0.0000240 0.0000065 0.0000201 
308 0.0000100 0.0000222 0.0000030 0.0000154 
314 0.0000322 0.0000237 0.0000058 0.0000208 
316 0.0002257 0.0000241 0.0000059 0.0000208 
317 0.0000304 0.0000272 0.0000074 0.0000369 
318 -0.0000570 0.0000404 0.0000116 0.0000369 
319 -0.0000180 0.0000331 0.0000106 0.0000266 
323 0.0000304 0.0000275 0.0000075 0.0000363 
327 0.0000427 0.0000245 0.0000064 0.0000230 
331 -0.0000024 0.0000844 0.0000138 0.0001329 
332 0.0000306 0.0000260 0.0000077 0.0000186 
333 0.0001381 0.0000205 0.0000017 0.0000115 
334 0.0000260 0.0000290 0.0000090 0.0000241 
338 -0.0000428 0.0000311 0.0000093 0.0000325 
343 0.0000757 0.0000277 0.0000078 0.0000318 
344 -0.0000109 0.0000456 0.0000116 0.0000375 
347 -0.0000213 0.0000261 0.0000075 0.0000224 
348 0.0000047 0.0000213 0.0000021 0.0000155 
351 0.0000441 0.0000224 0.0000050 0.0000278 
352 0.0000133 0.0000226 0.0000049 0.0000272 
353 -0.0001571 0.0000284 0.0000087 0.0000235 
355 -0.0000029 0.0000871 0.0000141 0.0002294 
362 0.0000198 0.0000256 0.0000069 0.0000396 
365 -0.0000991 0.0000354 0.0000101 0.0000443 
367 0.0000034 0.0000194 0.0000016 0.0000173 
369 0.0000200 0.0000253 0.0000068 0.0000345 
374 -0.0000131 0.0000229 0.0000061 0.0000205 
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C.4 The absolute risk aversion coefficients estimated by four 
different utility functions for north-east region farmers (n=228) 
(cont.) 
Respondent 
Number 
Absolute risk aversion coefficients 
Cubic function Negative 
exponential function 
Power function Expo-power 
function 
375 -0.0000114 0.0000552 0.0000131 0.0000318 
376 0.0000171 0.0000234 0.0000052 0.0000233 
377 -0.0000120 0.0000252 0.0000077 0.0000227 
382 0.0000131 0.0000217 0.0000045 0.0000213 
385 -0.0000154 0.0000447 0.0000122 0.0000328 
387 -0.0000309 0.0000260 0.0000079 0.0000261 
390 -0.0000109 0.0000514 0.0000128 0.0000311 
391 -0.0000099 0.0000909 0.0000133 0.0000400 
392 0.0000092 0.0000428 0.0000135 0.0000599 
393 0.0000091 0.0000226 0.0000041 0.0000145 
394 0.0000273 0.0000253 0.0000066 0.0000278 
395 -0.0001139 0.0000253 0.0000076 0.0000191 
396 -0.0000139 0.0000316 0.0000100 0.0000271 
Source: Field survey, 2009 
 
C.5 The average of absolute risk aversion coefficients by farmers in 
the central and north-east regions 
Absolute risk aversion 
coefficients generated from 
Central 
(n=207) 
North-east 
(n=228) 
Test of 
difference
 a 
Mean SD Mean SD 
Cubic function -0.0000016 0.0001062 -0.0000042 0.0002477 0.14 
Negative exponential 
function 0.0000300 0.0000137 0.0000345 0.0000831 -0.80 
Power function 0.0000062 0.0000049 0.0000051 0.0000056 2.07
*
 
Expo-power function 0.0000373 0.0000259 0.0000399 0.0001998 -0.18 
a
 Mean of the absolute risk aversion coefficients of the central and north-east respondents are significantly 
different at 
* 1.0P , ** 05.0P  and *** 01.0P . 
Source: Field survey, 2009 
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     Appendix D 
Correlations of absolute risk aversion coefficients and 
farmer’s socioeconomic characteristics 
D.1 Pearson correlation coefficients of the absolute risk aversion 
coefficients and socioeconomic variables of central region 
farmers 
 )(wra  AGE GEN EDU HSIZ FSIZ INCM 
)(wra  1 0.090 0.001 -0.179*** -0.181*** 0.025 0.001 
AGE  1 0.047 -0.237
***
 -0.162
***
 0.077 0.085 
GEN   1 -0.010 -0.046 0.092 0.031 
EDU    1 -0.006 -0.095 -0.070 
HSIZ     1 -0.016 0.006 
FSIZ      1 0.504
***
 
INCM       1 
Correlation is significant at 
* 1.0P , ** 05.0P  and *** 01.0P  
 
D.2 Pearson correlation coefficients of the absolute risk aversion 
coefficients and socioeconomic variables of north-east region 
farmers 
 )(wra  AGE GEN EDU HSIZ FSIZ INCM 
)(wra  1 -0.198*** 0.032 0.135** 0.006 0.008 0.054 
AGE  1 -0.069 -0.205
***
 -0.045 0.095 0.104 
GEN   1 0.094 -0.059 0.128
**
 0.164
***
 
EDU    1 -0.043 0.025 -0.068 
HSIZ     1 0.130
**
 0.172
***
 
FSIZ      1 0.446
***
 
INCM       1 
Correlation is significant at 
* 1.0P , ** 05.0P  and *** 01.0P  
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     Appendix E 
Descriptive variables of net farm income calculations 
E.1 Descriptive average product prices, yields, plantation areas 
and production costs for each alternative farming system in the 
central region rain-fed area at 2008 price levels 
Variable Unit 
Alternative farming system 
CRFP1 CRFP2 CRFP3 CRFP4 
Cassava Sugarcane Maize Maize Sorghum 
Crop price baht/kg 1.34 0.72 5.63 6.19 4.53 
Yield kgs/rai 3,261 17,285 755 723 399 
Effective area used for 
each individual crop
 a
 rai 21.44 24.93 26.22 21.24 21.67 
Variable cost:      
    Land preparation cost baht 11,577.78 22,761.63 12,100.00 12,965.22 
    Planting cost baht 15,413.89 100,483.72 19,518.33 22,186.30 
    Harvesting cost baht 13,202.78 32,670.93 13,561.11 14,688.26 
    Total variable costs
 a
  baht 40,194.44 155,916.28 45,179.44 49,839.78 
Fixed cost:      
    Land tax baht 99.44 91.26 99.89 67.59 
    Rent baht - 5,381.39 1,952.78 2,521.74 
    Depreciation
 b
:      
        Four wheel tractor baht - 5,881.91 2,277.78 479.35 
        Hand tractor baht 2,063.15 1,989.59 1,087.68 2,048.13 
        Irrigation pumps baht 365.74 229.46 484.26 182.75 
        Car or truck baht 401.11 2,706.67 425.93 755.94 
        Other farm assets baht 1,675.19 1,402.49 1,793.59 2,168.33 
        Sub Total      baht 4,505.19 12,210.12 6,069.24 5,634.51 
    Total fixed costs
 a
 baht 4,604.64 17,677.19 8,121.91 8,223.83 
Total production costs
 c
 baht 44,799.08 173,593.47 53,301.35 58,063.61 
a
 Deterministic variables will be incorporated into the stochastic simulation model to evaluate an empirical 
probability distribution of annual net farm income for each alternative farming system in SERF analysis.  
b
 Estimated using the straight line depreciation method. 
c
 Total production costs = Total variable cost + Total fixed cost 
Source: Field survey, 2009 
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E.2 Descriptive average product prices, yields, plantation areas 
and production costs for each alternative farming system in the 
central region irrigated area at 2008 price levels 
Variable Unit 
Alternative farming system 
CIFP1 CIFP2 
WSR DSR I WSR DSR I DSR II 
Crop price baht/kg 9.86 9.80 10.02 9.74 9.68 
Yield kgs/rai 799 804 800 784 780 
Effective area used for 
each individual crop
 a
 rai 20.45 20.48 21.82 21.82 21.58 
Variable cost:    
    Land preparation cost baht 33,394.25 56,144.00 
    Planting cost baht 61,940.70 93,778.00 
    Harvesting cost baht 31,200.12 56,552.00 
    Total variable costs
 a
 baht 126,535.07 206,474.00 
Fixed cost:    
    Land tax baht 75.14 84.60 
    Rent baht 7,402.79 5,338.00 
    Depreciation
 b
:    
        Four wheel tractor baht 882.95 494.43 
        Hand tractor baht 1,480.20 2,470.92 
        Irrigation pumps baht 396.13 353.44 
        Car or truck baht 1,582.46 3,285.21 
        Other farm assets baht 2,474.10 3,954.55 
        Sub Total      baht 7,283.04 10,560.54 
    Total fixed costs
 a
 baht 14,527.37 15,983.14 
Total production costs
 c
 baht 141,062.44 222,457.14 
a
 Deterministic variables will be incorporated into the stochastic simulation model to evaluate an empirical 
probability distribution of annual net farm income for each alternative farming system in SERF analysis.  
b
 Estimated using the straight line depreciation method. 
c
 Total production costs = Total variable cost + Total fixed cost 
Source: Field survey, 2009 
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E.3 Descriptive average product prices, yields, plantation areas and production costs for each alternative 
farming system in the north-east region rain-fed area at 2008 price levels 
Variable Unit 
Alternative farming system 
NRFP1 NRFP2 NRFP3 NRFP4 NRFP5 NRFP6 
WSR WSR Cassava WSR Sugar 
cane 
WSR Cattle WSR Cassava Cattle WSR Sugar 
cane 
Cattle 
Crop price baht/kg 8.90 9.60 1.42 8.66 0.83 9.94  7.73 1.29  8.23 0.79  
Animal price baht/head       5,732   7,060   8,500 
Yield kgs/rai 366 392 2,249 441 8,441 357  377 2,204  345 7,163  
Effective area used for 
each individual crop
 a
 rai 9.09 8.97 9.31 8.52 11.21 15.97  10.20 10.80  9.00 9.57  
Animal sold
 a
 head       1.90   1.20   1.42 
Variable cost:        
    Land preparation cost baht 2,652.78 6,881.67 11,197.93 4,481.48 5,530.00 7,894.28 
    Planting cost baht 6,560.36 13,411.11 31,948.27 11,558.24 14,279.00 21,982.86 
    Harvesting cost baht 2,742.07 8,290.33 15,844.14 5,713.67 8,396.00 12,910.00 
    Feed cost baht - - - 942.41 608.00 242.86 
    Total variable costs
 a
 baht 11,955.21 28,583.11 58,990.34 22,695.80 28,813.00 43,030.00 
Fixed cost:        
    Land tax baht 44.85 68.66 82.15 79.99 108.30 94.00 
    Rent baht 17.14 14.81 - - - - 
    Depreciation
 b
:        
        Four wheel tractor baht - 500.00 - 296.30 - - 
        Hand tractor baht 834.65 1,843.36 2,540.86 1,182.07 2,218.33 1,304.45 
        Irrigation pumps baht 81.83 227.78 280.15 121.96 225.00 166.67 
       Car or truck baht 134.76 216.97 658.73 385.67 60.00 - 
       Other farm assets baht 1,275.53 2,461.11 2,507.29 2,521.50 2,426.44 2,554.36 
       Sub Total      baht 2,326.78 5,249.23 5,987.04 4,507.49 4,959.78 4,025.48 
    Total fixed costs
 a
 baht 2,388.77 5,332.71 6,069.19 4,587.49 5,068.08 4,119.48 
Total production costs
 c
 baht 14,343.98 33,915.82 65,059.53 27,283.29 33,881.08 47,149.48 
a Deterministic variables will be incorporated into the stochastic simulation model to evaluate an empirical probability distribution of annual net farm income for each alternative farming system in 
SERF analysis.  
b Estimated using the straight line depreciation method. 
c Total production costs = Total variable cost + Total fixed cost 
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E.4 Descriptive average product prices, yields, plantation areas and production costs for each alternative 
farming system in the north-east region irrigated area at 2008 price levels 
Variable Unit 
Alternative farming system 
NIFP1 NIFP2 NIFP3 
WSR DSR I WSR DSR I Tomatoes WSR DSR I Cattle 
Crop price baht/kg 9.35 8.89 9.58 10.05 12.17 8.09 7.66  
Animal price baht/head        6,634.29 
Yield kgs/rai 404.07 622.28 423.76 607.78 2,544.44 472.74 613.41  
Effective area used for 
each individual crop
 a
 rai 12.55 12.77 10.33 10.11 0.58 8.88 8.84  
Animal sold
 a
 head        1.00 
Variable cost:     
    Land preparation cost baht 9,550.52 7,577.78 5,954.29 
    Planting cost baht 24,747.93 29,644.44 20,306.29 
    Harvesting cost baht 13,786.77 12,311.11 10,635.00 
    Feed cost baht - - 1,072.00 
    Total variable costs
 a
 baht 48,085.22 49,533.33 38,010.43 
Fixed cost:     
    Land tax baht 47.62 36.44 42.97 
    Rent baht 67.50 - 114.29 
    Depreciation
 b
:     
        Four wheel tractor baht 1,619.79 - 333.33 
        Hand tractor baht 1,277.82 1,726.78 1,226.38 
        Irrigation pumps baht 182.30 231.30 179.71 
        Car or truck baht 632.06 333.33 469.76 
        Other farm assets baht 2,703.66 1,850.52 2,188.40 
        Sub Total      baht 6,415.63 4,141.93 4,397.59 
    Total fixed costs
 a
 baht 6,530.75 4,178.37 4,554.84 
Total production costs
 c
 baht 54,615.97 53,711.7 42,565.27 
a Deterministic variables will be incorporated into the stochastic simulation model to evaluate an empirical probability distribution of annual net farm income for each alternative farming system in 
SERF analysis.  
b Estimated using the straight line depreciation method. 
c Total production costs = Total variable cost + Total fixed cost 
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     Appendix F 
Price and yield statistics of the individual crops 
F.1 Descriptive price statistics of the individual crops for the 
alternative farming systems in the central region in baht per 
kilogram, 1998-2008 
Year WSR
 a
 DSR
 a
 Cassava
 a
 Sugarcane
 a
 Maize
 a
 Sorghum
 a
 
Rain-fed area 
1998 - - 1.340 0.600 3.850 3.850 
1999 - - 0.770 0.487 4.060 2.640 
2000 - - 0.600 0.477 4.010 3.860 
2001 - - 0.700 0.567 3.930 3.180 
2002 - - 1.010 0.441 3.910 3.200 
2003 - - 0.930 0.508 4.330 3.340 
2004 - - 0.930 0.315 4.400 4.290 
2005 - - 1.540 0.509 4.810 4.040 
2006 - - 1.220 0.712 5.200 5.360 
2007 - - 1.290 0.646 6.560 6.020 
2008 - - 1.790 0.516 6.380 5.770 
Mean   1.102 0.525 4.676 4.141 
CV
 b
   33.48 20.19 20.94 27.07 
Irrigated area 
1998 6.543 7.020 - - - - 
1999 5.570 5.203 - - - - 
2000 4.724 4.237 - - - - 
2001 4.360 3.969 - - - - 
2002 4.640 4.462 - - - - 
2003 4.702 4.687 - - - - 
2004 6.240 5.501 - - - - 
2005 6.704 6.741 - - - - 
2006 6.909 6.823 - - - - 
2007 6.673 6.485 - - - - 
2008 9.496 12.133 - - - - 
Mean 6.051 6.114     
CV
 b
 24.71 37.36     
a
 Averaged from the province-level price data in the study areas. 
b
 100
SD
CV
X
 
  
 
 where SD  = Standard deviation and X  = Arithmetic mean. 
Source: Office of Agricultural Economics (2009) 
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F.2 Descriptive price statistics of the individual crops and cattle for 
the alternative farming systems in the north-east region in baht 
per kilogram and baht per head, 1998-2008 
Year WSR
 a
 DSR
 a
 Cassava
 a
 Sugarcane
 a
 Tomatoes
 a
 Cattle
 b
 
Rain-fed area 
1998 6.516 - 1.447 0.507 - 7,745 
1999 6.761 - 0.840 0.466 - 8,785 
2000 6.980 - 0.637 0.436 - 10,793 
2001 5.732 - 0.860 0.546 - 11,850 
2002 5.341 - 1.100 0.463 - 12,776 
2003 7.002 - 0.960 0.453 - 14,275 
2004 8.557 - 0.947 0.457 - 14,976 
2005 7.781 - 1.450 0.518 - 14,418 
2006 7.976 - 1.247 0.756 - 14,937 
2007 8.652 - 1.410 0.659 - 14,294 
2008 12.773 - 1.923 0.686 - 13,206 
Mean 7.643  1.165 0.540  12,550 
CV
 c
 26.22  31.84 20.37  19.90 
Irrigated area 
1998 6.521 6.288 - - 6.610 7,745 
1999 6.919 5.119 - - 6.580 8,785 
2000 7.037 3.978 - - 7.330 10,793 
2001 5.682 3.835 - - 7.960 11,850 
2002 5.349 4.645 - - 8.090 12,776 
2003 7.068 4.244 - - 7.930 14,275 
2004 8.556 5.246 - - 10.700 14,976 
2005 7.773 5.713 - - 11.450 14,418 
2006 8.037 5.834 - - 10.590 14,937 
2007 8.723 6.427 - - 12.010 14,294 
2008 12.423 9.622 - - 10.520 13,206 
Mean 7.644 5.541   9.070 12,550 
CV
 c
 25.10 29.22   20.66 19.90 
a
 Averaged from the province-level price data in the study areas. 
b
 Cattle price is the average prices of the medium size live cattle (250-350 kilograms) in the north-east region. 
c
 100
SD
CV
X
 
  
 
 where SD  = Standard deviation and X  = Arithmetic mean. 
Source: Office of Agricultural Economics (2009) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  242 
F.3 Descriptive yield statistics of the individual crops for the 
alternative farming systems in the central region in kilograms 
per rai, 1998-2008 
Year WSR
 a
 DSR
 a
 Cassava
 a
 Sugarcane
 a
 Maize
 a
 Sorghum
 a
 
Rain-fed area 
1998 - - 2,670 7,515 596 245 
1999 - - 2,829 8,576 598 273 
2000 - - 2,964 8,968 630 285 
2001 - - 2,874 8,905 654 295 
2002 - - 2,674 9,296 659 302 
2003 - - 2,837 10,485 645 306 
2004 - - 3,602 9,324 609 220 
2005 - - 2,921 7,115 589 313 
2006 - - 3,800 7,266 622 223 
2007 - - 3,906 9,583 626 277 
2008 - - 3,557 10,444 628 261 
Mean   3,148.54 8,861.54 623.27 272.73 
CV
 b
   14.85 13.14 3.77 11.83 
Irrigated area 
1998 543 691 - - - - 
1999 569 727 - - - - 
2000 554 730 - - - - 
2001 602 722 - - - - 
2002 722 673 - - - - 
2003 651 724 - - - - 
2004 665 703 - - - - 
2005 680 701 - - - - 
2006 663 718 - - - - 
2007 664 717 - - - - 
2008 666 727 - - - - 
Mean 634.36 712.02     
CV
 b
 9.17 2.52     
a
 Averaged from the province-level yield data in the study areas. 
b
 100
SD
CV
X
 
  
 
 where SD  = Standard deviation and X  = Arithmetic mean. 
Source: Office of Agricultural Economics (2009) 
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F.4 Descriptive yield statistics of the individual crops for the 
alternative farming systems in the north-east region in 
kilograms per rai, 1998-2008 
Year WSR
 a
 DSR
 a
 Cassava
 a
 Sugarcane
 a
 Tomatoes
 a
 
Rain-fed area 
1998 240 - 2,285 7,325 - 
1999 300 - 2,416 8,669 - 
2000 348 - 2,595 9,885 - 
2001 321 - 2,688 9,094 - 
2002 335 - 2,630 9,633 - 
2003 347 - 2,899 10,608 - 
2004 343 - 3,198 9,168 - 
2005 354 - 2,691 7,730 - 
2006 346 - 3,379 7,800 - 
2007 347 - 3,640 10,356 - 
2008 337 - 3,252 11,543 - 
Mean 328.84  2,879.39 9,255.14  
CV
 b
 10.11  14.95 14.24  
Irrigated area 
1998 224 442 - - 3,170 
1999 316 455 - - 4,403 
2000 355 502 - - 3,833 
2001 331 523 - - 3,675 
2002 387 466 - - 2,477 
2003 380 514 - - 3,985 
2004 376 504 - - 4,741 
2005 393 508 - - 4,686 
2006 371 487 - - 3,322 
2007 382 535 - - 3,381 
2008 361 543 - - 4,180 
Mean 352.09 498.09   3,804.82 
CV
 b
 13.87 6.52   18.17 
a
 Averaged from the province-level yield data in the study areas. 
b
 100
SD
CV
X
 
  
 
 where SD  = Standard deviation and X  = Arithmetic mean. 
Source: Office of Agricultural Economics (2009) 
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     Appendix G 
Inflation-adjusted prices of the individual crops 
G.1 Consumer price index (CPI) of Thailand, 1998-2008 
Year Consumer price index Annual change (per cent) 
1998 82.0 8.1 
1999 82.2 0.3 
2000 83.5 1.6 
2001 84.9 1.6 
2002 85.4 0.7 
2003 87.0 1.8 
2004 89.4 2.7 
2005 93.4 4.5 
2006 97.8 4.7 
2007 100.0 2.3 
2008 105.4 5.5 
Source: Bureau of Trade and Economic Indices (2010) 
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G.2 Inflation-adjusted prices of the individual crops for the 
alternative farming systems in the central region in baht per 
kilogram, in 2008 baht values 
Year WSR DSR Cassava Sugarcane Maize Sorghum 
Rain-fed area 
1998 - - 1.722 0.771 4.949 4.949 
1999 - - 0.987 0.624 5.206 3.385 
2000 - - 0.757 0.602 5.062 4.872 
2001 - - 0.869 0.704 4.879 3.948 
2002 - - 1.247 0.544 4.826 3.949 
2003 - - 1.127 0.615 5.246 4.046 
2004 - - 1.096 0.371 5.187 5.058 
2005 - - 1.738 0.574 5.428 4.559 
2006 - - 1.315 0.767 5.604 5.777 
2007 - - 1.360 0.681 6.914 6.345 
2008 - - 1.790 0.516 6.380 5.770 
Mean   1.273 0.616 5.425 4.787 
CV
 a
   27.86 18.94 12.11 19.20 
Irrigated area 
1998 8.410 9.023 - - - - 
1999 7.142 6.672 - - - - 
2000 5.963 5.348 - - - - 
2001 5.412 4.927 - - - - 
2002 5.726 5.507 - - - - 
2003 5.696 5.678 - - - - 
2004 7.356 6.486 - - - - 
2005 7.566 7.607 - - - - 
2006 7.446 7.353 - - - - 
2007 7.033 6.835 - - - - 
2008 9.496 12.133 - - - - 
Mean 7.022 7.052     
CV
 a
 17.90 29.17     
a
 100
SD
CV
X
 
  
 
 where SD  = Standard deviation and X  = Arithmetic mean. 
Source: Own calculations 
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G.3 Inflation-adjusted prices of the individual crops and cattle for 
the alternative farming systems in the north-east region in baht 
per kilogram and baht per head, in 2008 baht values 
Year WSR DSR Cassava Sugarcane Tomatoes Cattle 
Rain-fed area 
1998 8.375 - 1.859 0.652 - 9,955 
1999 8.669 - 1.077 0.598 - 11,264 
2000 8.811 - 0.804 0.550 - 13,624 
2001 7.116 - 1.068 0.677 - 14,711 
2002 6.592 - 1.358 0.571 - 15,768 
2003 8.483 - 1.163 0.549 - 17,294 
2004 10.088 - 1.116 0.538 - 17,656 
2005 8.780 - 1.636 0.585 - 16,270 
2006 8.596 - 1.344 0.814 - 16,098 
2007 9.119 - 1.486 0.695 - 15,066 
2008 12.773 - 1.923 0.686 - 13,206 
Mean 8.855  1.349 0.628  14,628 
CV
 a
 18.06  26.02 13.50  16.58 
Irrigated area 
1998 8.381 8.082 - - 8.496 9,955 
1999 8.872 6.564 - - 8.437 11,264 
2000 8.883 5.021 - - 9.252 13,624 
2001 7.054 4.761 - - 9.882 14,711 
2002 6.601 5.733 - - 9.985 15,768 
2003 8.562 5.142 - - 9.607 17,294 
2004 10.087 6.185 - - 12.615 17,656 
2005 8.772 6.447 - - 12.921 16,270 
2006 8.661 6.287 - - 11.413 16,098 
2007 9.194 6.774 - - 12.659 15,066 
2008 12.423 9.622 - - 10.520 13,206 
Mean 8.863 6.420   10.526 14,628 
CV
 a
 17.13 22.06   15.64 16.58 
a
 100
SD
CV
X
 
  
 
 where SD  = Standard deviation and X  = Arithmetic mean. 
Source: Own calculations 
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     Appendix H 
Sensitivity analysis SERF results 
H.1 Simulated CDFs of annual net farm income for the CRFP1-4 in 
the central region rain-fed area using inflation-adjusted 
commodity prices 
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H.2 CEs of the CRFP1-4 in the central region rain-fed area with 
different magnitudes of the absolute risk aversion coefficient 
under the negative exponential utility function 
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H.3 Simulated CDFs of annual net farm income for the CIFP1 and 2 
in the central region irrigated area using inflation-adjusted 
commodity prices 
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H.4 CEs of the CRFP1 and 2 in the central region irrigated area with 
different magnitudes of absolute the risk aversion coefficient 
under the negative exponential utility function 
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H.5 Simulated CDFs of annual net farm income for the NRFP1-6 in 
the north-east region rain-fed area using inflation-adjusted 
commodity prices 
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H.6 CEs of the NRFP1-6 in the north-east region rain-fed area with 
different magnitudes of the absolute risk aversion coefficient 
under the negative exponential utility function 
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H.7 Simulated CDFs of annual net farm income for the NIFP1-3 in 
the north-east region irrigated area using inflation-adjusted 
commodity prices 
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H.8 CEs of the NIFP1-3 in the north-east region irrigated area with 
different magnitudes of the absolute risk aversion coefficient 
under the negative exponential utility function 
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